From FPRI:
TURMOIL IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA
by J.E. Peterson
The Arabian Peninsula-that is, the six Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) states plus Yemen-has been for the most part
touched only superficially by the wave of political
instability and popular unrest that has affected much of the
Arab world. The GCC states are governed by ruling families
that mostly have been in charge for more than two centuries.
They can be more accurately characterized as being sclerotic
than instable. Saudi Arabia, for example, has had only six
kings since 1902. Sultan Qabus in Oman has ruled for more
than 40 years; until just a few years ago, he was one of the
junior leaders. Yemen has an extremely fractious past and
the present regime has an abundance of troubles; still
President Ali Abdullah Saleh has led the country for 33
years.
But it cannot be denied that the contagion of unrest,
dissidence, and popular revolutionary sentiment that so far
has toppled autocrats in Tunisia and Egypt has infected the
Arabian Peninsula. Yemen is on the brink of toppling;
Bahrain keeps control only through the application of
repression once again; Oman withstands persistent protests
for the first time; and Saudi Arabia exhibits a familiar
unyielding attitude mixed with nervousness.
YEMEN
Without doubt, the most serious situation exists in Yemen.
Ali Abdullah Saleh was virtually unknown and unrespected
when he slipped into power in 1978. Since then, he has
maintained and strengthened his hold over the fractious
polity by a combination of shrewdness, the construction of
an inner core of support, a reliance on extensive patronage,
the maintenance and management of a state of chaos, and, in
his own metaphor, dancing on the heads of snakes.
But the wily survivor seems to have been slipping in recent
years. His manipulation of unity between north and south
Yemen in 1990, followed by the victory in the 1994 civil
war, resulted in a northern occupation of the south that
southerners resoundingly resent. Southern opposition
coalesced around 2007 into a largely peaceful movement that
seeks either independence or autonomy and southern activists
in 2011 have found common cause with northern opposition.
While conspicuously failing to manage this serious threat to
his regime, Saleh has allowed a serious rebellion in the
extreme north by the so-called Huthis to continue without
foreseeable resolution. A series of all-out campaigns
against Huthi strongholds failed to defeat the movement
while exposing the military weakness of the regime,
antagonizing most of the population of the north through
indiscriminate shelling and bombing of villages, and even
embarrassing neighboring Saudi Arabia when it was forced to
take large-scale action against the Huthis after fighting
spilled over into Saudi territory.
Furthermore, the regime's game of courting and denying
Islamists, including Islamist extremists, has strengthened
the extremists' position. Once Saleh realized that such a
policy could not continue indefinitely, his pursuit of an
alliance with the United States against the extremists
polarized Yemeni attitudes and provoked groups such as al
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to target government
officials for execution.
At the same time, these three very serious challenges to the
Yemen regime's longevity transcend more fundamental problems
bedeviling the Arab world's poorest state. Yemen has been
surviving financially thanks to fortuitous oil revenues. But
the level of oil production and oil revenues has been
waning. While the inception of liquefied natural gas exports
will help soften the fall, Yemen's principal foreign-
exchange earner by far will not last long. Yemen is an
agricultural country with rapidly growing urbanization and a
mushrooming and very young population. Its water supplies
are on the verge of depletion, standards of living are
extremely low, and the growing legions of youth have few
jobs prospects. Even in the best of times, Yemen's future is
clouded-and these are perhaps the worst of times.
As of now, Ali Abdullah Saleh is hanging on by his
fingernails. Longstanding popular dissatisfaction with him
was, until recently, manageable through his manipulation of
the political system-a system that with an elected
parliament and relatively free press seemed on the surface
to be open. He nurtured an efficient power base relying on
his immediate family, his own and an allied tribe, and his
control of a compliant and tribally dominated military
apparatus.
But the winds of change blowing in from the north of Africa
brought simmering popular discontent out into enormous
street demonstrations. As in Cairo, Saleh's ill-advised
attempt to meet peaceful opposition with force did much to
change the balance of power. Resignations of members of his
party and members of his cabinet multiplied. The most
prominent Islamist, Abd al-Majid al-Zindani, announced his
opposition. The al-Ahmar brothers, sons of the most
prominent tribal leader in the country who died in 2007,
declared for the opposition. Finally, Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar
(a member of Saleh's own tribe and no relation to the al-
Ahmar brothers) and four other generals joined the other
side, leaving large swathes of the countryside outside
central control.
On the surface, this seemingly would have spelled the end
for the president and there were persistent rumors that a
negotiated exit strategy was imminent. But caveats can be
attached to the actions and position of each of the above
personalities. Zindani, one of the founders of the Islamist-
tribal-conservative al-Islah Party, had been in "loyal
opposition" already since Saleh dropped al-Islah from his
government. Abdullah Husayn al-Ahmar, the father, had been
prominent in Yemeni politics since the revolution of 1962.
But even though he last served as Speaker of the Parliament
until his death, he too was a member of the loyal
opposition. His sons do not carry the same authority and,
since his death, they have tended to waver in their
political positions, although the strongest of them, Hamid,
is thought to have ambitions.
Generally, it has been considered that years ago General Ali
Muhsin al-Ahmar had forged a pact with Saleh providing that
Ali Muhsin would succeed Saleh as president. This
understanding was threatened in recent years as Saleh
attempted to maneuver his son Ahmad into position to succeed
him. Ali Muhsin was in charge of combating the Huthis-some
would say that he instigated the fighting in the first
place-but his failure to crush the Huthis weakened his
position and perhaps was engineered by Saleh through the
withholding of the necessary military assets. It can be
considered that all of the above figures have acted as
opportunists, sensing the end of the Saleh regime and
positioning themselves for the future. Furthermore, all can
be described as part of the elite that has dominated Yemeni
politics in the last few decades-i.e., they are opposite
sides of the same coin that the protesters in the street
reject.
The GCC seemed to have brokered a deal that would allow
Saleh to leave without punishment but then the inveterate
politician backtracked on his promise. At the time of
writing, the GCC's intervention remains in play.
Assuming that Ali Abdullah Saleh does depart the scene in
the immediate future, there is no clear picture of what a
post-Saleh Yemen will look like. Who shall succeed him? Will
the military step in to take charge, as it has done in Egypt
and in many other Arab countries in the past? If so, which
elements of the military? Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar is a powerful
figure but essentially part of the establishment (and
perhaps has signaled his departure from the political scene)
while Ahmad Ali Abdullah Saleh remains in charge of the
elite and powerful Republican Guard.
BAHRAIN
Bahrain is a good example of why the GCC states are not all
interchangeable. It is a small country and its oil reserves,
small to begin with, have just about run out. Thus the post-
oil future that hangs over all six members has struck
already in Bahrain. While Bahrain's ruling family has been
in charge for more than two centuries, it has been more
autocratic than its neighbors and consequently the
archipelago has witnessed regular periodic protests and
periods of dissidence for more than a century.
Bahrain's troubles are often ascribed to sectarian tensions
between a Sunni minority (including the al Khalifa ruling
family) and a Shia majority. But the country's political
problems are better seen as a perpetual contest between the
al Khalifa (who trace their background from a tribe of
central Arabia) and their tribal allies who also came to
Bahrain from the mainland on the one hand, and the great
majority of the both Sunni and Shia population on the other.
Among the Sunnis are the hawala families, of Arab origin but
who arrived in Bahrain from the Persian coast of the Gulf;
they dominate in business. The Shia are principally the Arab
Baharna, generally regarded as the original inhabitants, but
there are also many Persians who have immigrated over the
last century. The opposition also charges the regime with
having naturalized thousands of Sunnis, especially
Jordanians, Syrians, Yemenis, and Pakistanis, in an attempt
to redress the sectarian imbalance.
Sunni and Shia dissidents have banded together in their
opposition to the al Khalifa regime in 1938, 1953-1956,
1965, and the early 1970s. But the Shia have taken the lead
in organized and persistent opposition because they are the
disadvantaged in Bahrain. Shia villages are visibly poorer
and lack many of the amenities found in Sunni villages. The
Shia are systematically excluded from the military and the
security forces and are under-represented in government
employment in general and in senior positions in particular.
Thus most of the large numbers of young and unemployed are
Shia who have become increasingly disaffected. The serious
unrest of the late 1990s was a Shia-driven phenomenon
although it had the quiet support of many Sunnis as well.
When long-time ruler Shaykh Isa died in 1999, many Bahrainis
saw the succession of his son Hamad as a positive
development. Isa had never been very interested in the
affairs of government and he reigned while his brother
Khalifa ruled as prime minister. Khalifa not only made
himself one of the wealthiest men in the Gulf, he also
easily became the most hated man in Bahrain for many
Bahrainis. Through his control of internal security, Khalifa
spearheaded the wave of repression that saw Bahrainis jailed
for political offenses, some of them tortured, and others
victims of the peculiarly Bahraini practice of exiling. For
expatriates, Bahrain was a welcoming place to live and work,
but deep-seated tensions underlay the friendly, prosperous
air of the capital al-Manamah.
In his first two years as ruler, Hamad enacted a number of
long overdue reforms. Prisoners were freed, exiles were
welcomed home, real steps were made toward freedom of speech
and press, and the ruler engaged in serious dialogue with
opposition leaders. In 2001, however, he declared himself
king and the process of change stagnated. True, he held
elections for a national assembly but the elected assembly
was matched with an appointed assembly whose speaker could
cast the final vote breaking any tie. Furthermore, electoral
constituencies were gerrymandered so that Shia
representatives won a maximum of 18 of the 40 available
seats, even though they constitute the majority of voters.
Most of the other seats have been won by Sunni Islamist
supporters of the government.
The political situation remained unresolved until the "Arab
spring" of 2011 burst forth in Tunisia and Egypt. In
imitation of Cairo's Tahrir Square, Bahrainis occupied Pearl
Roundabout as the center of their vocal opposition to the
government. The goal of most of the protesters was not the
toppling of the regime as in Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen, but
genuine reform beginning with the dismissal of the prime
minister (and the king's uncle) Khalifa. He was seen by many
as the leader of the hardline faction of the ruling family
while the heir apparent and son of the king, Salman, was
regarded as the liberal leader, urging dialogue and
accommodation. King Hamad was said to be in the middle.
In the end, the hardliners won out and the regime reacted
with repression, eventually clearing the roundabout. More
protesters began to call for the overthrow of the regime and
the government acted with force, arresting many and
instituting martial law. Not all Bahrainis have protested
and there have been mass demonstrations in support of the
government. But the government has been stubborn in its
rejection of opposition demands. It apparently has sought to
stoke a sectarian dimension of conflict, it has declared
that Iran was behind opposition movements, and it has re-
arrested some opposition leaders and closed the principal
opposition newspaper.
Disturbingly, the al Khalifa have received the support of
fellow GCC monarchs and they invited Saudi Arabian and
United Arab Emirates (UAE) troops to enter Bahrain in
support of Bahraini security forces-although it is debatable
how much of an "invitation" Saudi Arabia needed. The
situation has quieted and many of the foreign media have
departed. But underneath, nothing has changed. All the al
Khalifa remain in their usual positions, the old allegations
of unjustified arrest and torture have resurfaced, hundreds
of Bahrainis are being held by security forces, and
thousands of young Bahrainis remain unemployed and
disaffected. The economic damage of the last several months
is enormous while the tenuous "social contract" between
ruler and ruled is fraying badly.
OMAN
Many observers were surprised when calm, quiet Oman produced
its own explosion of demonstrations and protests, most
visibly the takeover of the Globe Roundabout in the town of
Suhar. They should not have been, however. While Oman has
been a reasonably well-run country with an easy-going and
practical people, it faces many of the same economic
problems as Bahrain. Oil production is relatively small and
has been declining over the last decade. The population is
burgeoning but jobs are scarce and standards of living for
the majority of Omanis pale beside the prosperity of the
small elite.
Older Omanis regard their ruler, Sultan Qabus, with
considerable respect, noting that before he took control in
1970, life was hard; after his accession, development began
in earnest and life changed for the better. But some 80-90
percent of all Omanis were not alive in 1970 and they do not
know the travails of the previous period. Their attitude to
the sultan is based more on their poor job prospects and the
ostentatious lifestyles displayed by the sultan and many of
his ministers who have grown rich while in public service.
They do not wish to replace the sultan or the system, they
just want promises to be fulfilled and justice served upon
those they regard as corrupt.
Sultan Qabus has made a number of concessions, dismissing
twelve ministers, promising to create 50,000 jobs and a
range of economic benefits, and initiating steps to broaden
the remit of the elected yet largely ineffectual
consultative body. None of these changes has diminished his
own authority and none of the dismissals involved his own
immediate family. Nevertheless, several key figures found
themselves without jobs, including the minister of national
economy, the minister of the royal office (roughly
equivalent to the White House chief of staff), the head of
the Royal Court, and the head of the important Royal Oman
Police.
Despite this, the youthful protesters have refused to give
up and they continue to demand more changes, including the
prosecution for corruption of leading officials. The
government has been taking an increasingly hard line,
detaining some protesters for criminal behavior but
pointedly refraining from the type of repression prevailing
in Bahrain.
SAUDI ARABIA
A number of petitions calling for social justice and
political reform have been circulated by so-called liberals
and even Islamist reformists for the attention of King
Abdullah, first when he was heir apparent during King Fahd's
long illness and then as king. Much hope was placed on the
king to institute long-overdue political reforms. And
Abdullah responded by such promising steps as establishing a
national dialogue, welcoming back Shia religious leaders
from exile, and removing girls' education from the grasp of
the conservative religious establishment. But reform seems
to have stalled in the past several years. A ballyhooed
national "day of rage," inspired by demonstrations elsewhere
in the Arab world, was a bust - only partly because of a
heavy security presence.
There has been persistent low-level dissidence, however,
among the country's restive and repressed Shia community.
From a practical point of view-that is to say, regime
survival-Saudi Arabia's Shia do not pose a formidable
threat. Their numbers are limited, even though they
constitute a sizeable minority of perhaps a million or more.
With a few exceptions, they are concentrated in one region
of the country. Admittedly, that region is the important
Eastern Province where Saudi Arabia's oil is located, but
they are probably a minority even in that region and their
dominance in their two traditional centers of al-Hasa and
al-Qatif oases has been diluted by the immigration of
Sunnis.
So in large part the "Arab spring" has passed Saudi Arabia
by and the country is girding for a return to another
blazing hot summer. Grievances of one sort or another
undoubtedly are nursed by much, indeed a large majority, of
the citizenry. But it should be remembered that the kingdom
has weathered a violent storm by its own Islamist extremists
and most Saudis seem to have little stomach for activist
stances that could rock an essentially calm boat.
FINAL THOUGHTS
The other three members of the GCC-Qatar, Kuwait, and the
UAE-have been almost untouched by the contagion of protest.
It is not coincidental that these are the "rich" three
members, with small populations and high oil (and in Qatar,
gas) production. The UAE, however, seems to be taking no
chances, and has detained three bloggers in a continuation
of a policy of quietly muzzling potential dissent.
The immediate crisis seems to have passed in the affected
GCC states while Yemen remains in turmoil. Most GCC citizens
seem to wish their governments would be more responsive and
less oriented to the benefit of the elites. They do not,
however, want drastic changes, let alone regime change. The
exception is Bahrain where a compliant attitude is
increasingly under threat by growing numbers who see no
change in the dismissive attitude of the ruling family and
its return to reliance on repression instead of resolution
of political disputes. It is doubtful that any of the rulers
and their families have grasped the fact that change cannot
be avoided and it is best to introduce substantive reforms
now rather than be forced into them later.
Yemen provides an all-too-uncomfortable close reminder of
the chaos that could emerge in the GCC's future. At the time
of writing, Ali Abdullah Saleh still clings to power in
Sana'a despite all odds. But the country remains in the grip
of massive dissatisfaction, incipient rebellion, violent
threats from al Qaeda, desertions among the president's
allies, and severe economic liabilities. There is no easy
answer to most of these problems and limited viable actions
that a more responsive and popular government can take to
solve them. What is certain is that whether Saleh leaves or
hangs on, the country's political and economic problems will
persist.
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Copyright Foreign Policy Research Institute
(http://www.fpri.org/).
