From FPRI:
THE THREAT OF ISLAMISM IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:
The Case of Tanzania
by Harvey Glickman
April 2, 2011
Harvey Glickman is Professor Emeritus of Political Science
at Haverford College and Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy
Research Institute. He is currently researching Islamism
throughout Sub-Saharan Africa.
Thanks are expressed to Sean Stambaugh, research assistant,
Haverford class of 2009 and Caila Heyison, research
assistant, Haverford class of 2011; also appreciation to
Haverford College for financial support of this research,
and to scholar Richard Mshomba for helpful critiques.
Available on the web and in pdf format at:
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201104.glickman.islamismsubsaharanafrica.html
THE THREAT OF ISLAMISM IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:
The Case of Tanzania
by Harvey Glickman
The states of Africa south of the Sahara, with their large
Muslim populations, certainly are vulnerable to the popular
unrest sweeping across North Africa and the Gulf region
since January 2011. These states present a "backdoor"
opening for radical jihadist Islam, which is already a
strong presence in Algeria, Morocco, Egypt and, (if Qaddafi
lasts) in Libya. With about 25 percent of the world's Muslim
population living in Africa, the overall restrictive
economic and political conditions, and an expanding youth
population, extrude Islamist ideology as a plausible
alternative for self-styled repressed out-groups.
Consequently, Sub-Saharan Africa merits more attention for
signs of more radical, jihadist Islamism.
Islamism is a political ideology, not an offshoot religious
cult. Its strategy ranges from violence as a prime tactic
to political militancy, to competitive political parties
that seek local or national representation in parliaments or
local governments. Islamism may spawn violent jihadi groups
that dream of recreating a global Islamic community (umma)
or groups attempting to restore ultra-traditionalist,
Salafist tenets of Islam, similar to what prevails in
Wahabbist Saudi Arabia.
This essay examines both the extent and dynamics of Islamism
and radical, violent Islamist groups in Tanzania, the
location of the 1998 al Qaeda bombing. Additionally, the
piece considers the appeal and spread of Islamist ideology,
and the "state of play" today. Tanzania is examined here for
the number of Muslims in the population-about a third of the
total; for its proximity to the eastern African cockpit of
Islamism-Somalia; and for the character of its internal
politics, a one party-dominant political system-with the
position of its Muslim population emerging as a divisive
political issue.
Thus far, Tanzania harbors a low level of Islamist activity
compared to, for example, Sudan, Somalia, and Egypt. It is
representative of countries in Africa south of the Sahara
with significant Muslim populations, whose cooperation is
necessary if global jihadist terrorism is to be controlled
and overcome. Not least is the problem of spillover of
sporadic, small scale wars (Congo, Rwanda and Burundi are
western neighbors). Secular nationalism, a lame
parliamentary democracy, slow and uneven economic growth,
and perceived unequal opportunity permit Muslim Africans, in
Tanzania, as elsewhere, to subscribe to an alternative
ideology of Islamism.
POLITICS AND RELIGION IN TANZANIA
Of a population of about 42 million today in Tanzania, it is
estimated that about one-third are Muslim, about one-third
are Christian and perhaps one-third are "animist." Muslims
in Tanzania live largely along the pre-colonial and colonial
trade routes: coastal north-south, and east-west, in the
past involving slaves, ivory, sisal, coffee and tea. Ninety-
nine percent of the population of the Zanzibar islands, the
hub of pre-colonial trade-about a million people-are Muslim.
In the traditional centers of Swahili culture along the
coast, Muslims adhere to Sunni Islam. From the ninth
century, Arab traders married local women; the new culture
that developed combined Persian and indigenous elements. As
Islam expanded into the interior, so did syncretic practices
combining Islam and traditional beliefs, some of which
strayed far from the conventional. The Christian population
lives primarily in the southwest and north-central areas of
the country.
The Tanzanian state is officially secular and its
constitution guarantees freedom of religion. The state also
prohibits religious political parties. The ruling party,
Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), the direct descendant of the
Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), has held power, by
a large margin, since independence in 1962, changing its
name in 1977.
TANU merged with Zanzibar's Afro-Shirazi Party, the
victorious party in 1963 after the Zanzibar revolution,
which saw the overthrow of the Sultan and an Arabized elite.
The CCM has dominated government on the mainland, but the
Civic United Front (CUF) has gained a substantial following
in Pemba Island, near Zanzibar. The CUF was founded in 1992,
with the advent of a multi-party system. Two movements
merged: Kamahuru, a group advocating the democratization of
Zanzibar, with the Civic Movement, a human rights
organization based on the coastal mainland. The CCM gains
much support in Unguja, the main Zanzibar Island, from its
resident Africans, while the CUF is strong on Pemba, the
small nearby island, part of the Zanzibar administrative
entity. It is also strong among non-Africans, i.e., those
who identify as "Arab." In 1995 the CUF refused to accept
the results of the national elections, claiming that the
vote had been rigged by the CCM. (The CUF repeated these
allegations after the October-November 2000 elections and
boycotted Zanzibar's regional parliament, as well as
Tanzania's national legislature.)
In January 2001 violence broke out when police fired into a
crowd of CUF protesters, who were flouting a ban on
protesting, killing thirty-three. During the 2005
presidential and parliamentary elections the opposition
claimed that the CCM used illegal and unethical means in
their campaign. Opposition politicians and supporters also
reported being beaten and tortured. In addition, the CUF
claimed that the electoral commission was influenced by the
ruling party.
Although bloody demonstrations occurred in 1995 and in 2000,
the CUF has maintained that it does not use or condone
violence as a means of gaining power, preferring to operate
through legitimate, democratic means. Yet, it has not
totally dismissed the use of violence as a means for
establishing itself in Zanzibar, especially if political
corruption and marginalization continue to occur there.
The CUF organized a cadre of young men, called the Blue
Guards, to protect CUF party leaders, despite the law
against alternative police forces. Members of the Blue
Guards said their goal was to "release Tanzanian society
from the dictatorship of Christianity"; the goal of CUF is
to make Zanzibar an Islamic state.[1] The political struggle
between the CUF and CCM in the past two decades has created
new distinctions between Muslims and Christians. During the
early years of one party socialist rule, President Julius
Nyerere was adamant about creating a nation free of racial
and religious divisions. The demise of ujamaa ("community")
socialism that had tried to create national unity, as well
as the rise of the multi-party system, permitted region and
religion to divide the population. In particular, "the
contested nature of the Zanzibar state makes it very
appealing to politicians to resort to the politicization of
racial identity in order to claim legitimacy to rule."[2]
Ethnic differences and overlapping religion have become
rallying points in the search for the "true" identity of
Zanzibar, which have faint echoes on the mainland. Religion
has become a salient issue, especially in Zanzibar, as has
the future of the union of the mainland and the offshore
islands. "[...] people at the grassroots level advance
religious identities in pursuit of their interests in regard
to spiritual, material, and political interests" all across
Tanzania.[3]
MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN RELATIONS
Religious tensions have risen in Tanzania. Since the end of
socialist rule in the 1990s, people claiming Zanzibari Arab
identity have alleged that the government of Zanzibar,
directed by the ruling CCM party, discriminates against
them, denying access to government jobs, housing, and
business licenses. Similar dissatisfaction has spread to the
mainland among the coastal Swahili and "Arab" population.
Frustration with the state has manifested itself in attacks
upon Christians. Muslims have always been able to hold key
governmental positions, but many people perceive the
governing elite as Christian. The presidency has
unofficially rotated between a Christian and a Muslim. The
rise in tension also parallels the rise in political
visibility and assertiveness of the Muslim community in the
past decade. This has also raised an issue historically
undebated in Tanzania: the nature of the state-partly Arab
or African, Muslim or Christian, Zanzibar vs. Tanzania. At
risk is the unity of the manufactured state that stitched
together the two independent former colonies, Tanganyika and
Zanzibar.
There have been several instances in the past two decades
that have fueled Muslim fears of marginalization. In 1992,
the government announced that in order to reduce public
spending, it would transfer the country's health and
education system to the country's powerful Catholic Church.
In December 2002, the Tanzanian government signed The
Prevention of Terrorism Act into law, largely under pressure
from the United States. Criticism of this act, especially
from Muslims, asserted that the law specifically targeted
them. Critics noted that this law borrowed heavily from the
U.S. Patriot Act, the British Prevention of Terrorism Act
and the Suppression of Terrorism Act of apartheid South
Africa.[4] Additional dissatisfaction is leveled against the
police. In Muslim areas the police are often Christians and
they disregard local customs, alienating residents. The
government-sponsored Islamic association, the Supreme
Council of Muslims in Tanzania, attracts limited legitimacy.
Marginalized Muslims seek alternative associations, some of
them extremist, as Islam can act as an ideology of protest.
THE ISLAMIC REVIVAL AND ISLAMISM IN TANZANIA
Zanzibar Archipelago is the name that combines two Indian
Ocean Islands (Unguja or Zanzibar and Pemba), as well as
several smaller islands. Zanzibar became a British
protectorate in 1890 after centuries of rule by Omani Arabs.
As Zanzibar moved toward independence in the 1950s, two
groups found themselves at odds; the "Arab" settler class,
supporting the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP) and the
"African" laboring class, supporting the Afro-Shirazi party
(ASP). (Both classes crossed lines and inter-married, but
neither could overcome a certain mutual hostility as a
result of the Arab slave-holding past.) The indigenous
peasantry was split between the two parties, with the pro-
ZNP dominating Pemba. In the election immediately after
independence in 1963, the ZNP coalition narrowly defeated
the ASP. The Zanzibari revolution in 1964 represented an
uprising of African laborers and ex-soldiers that mushroomed
into an anti-Arab revolution, overthrowing the ZNP
government and the Sultan, as well as the whole enterprise
of constitutional monarchy. Abeid Karume, the ASP coalition
leader, ruled by decree, warding off any group challenges to
the new regime. Three months later, Karume and Tanganyikan
President Nyerere united Zanzibar and Tanganyika. (The
designation Tanzania came later as a result of a contest to
name the new country.) The rapid pace and questionable
constitutionality of these beginnings remains a background
factor to the increasing demands for autonomy. In 1994, the
CUF raised the issue of separation from the mainland, but
the CCM condemned this claim and refused to act upon it.
On the Zanzibar islands, Muslim religious scholars are
becoming more influential in setting rules for social
behavior-such as enforcing a dress code and attempting to
shut down establishments that serve alcohol. A Western-
focused tourist industry is small and vulnerable. Since the
1980s, wealthy individuals from the Gulf States have funded
mosques, madrasahs, health clinics, and secondary schools on
Zanzibar. Saudi Arabia alone spends about $1 million a year
building mosques, madrasahs, and Islamic centers.[5] In
addition, young Zanzibari men receive scholarships to study
in Medina and Khartoum. Two of Zanzibar's universities are
Islamic, funded by Saudi Arabians and Kuwaitis. Teachers
come from Pakistan, Sudan and other East African countries.
Zanzibar University is funded by Darul Iman Charitable
Association, registered as a charity in Canada. Chukwani
College of Education offers classes in Islamic studies and
Islamic education.
High levels of poverty on the islands continue to contribute
to political discontent. Zanzibar has fallen behind the
mainland in economic growth; economic liberalization in the
1990s seems to have hit Zanzibar particularly hard.
Three factors have helped an Islamic revival in Tanzania.
First, the demise of the one party state allowed for
alternative forms of association. Groups formerly prohibited
have emerged to proselytize for a more purified Islam.
Second, new Islamic organizations are opposing formerly
state-sanctioned groups. This Muslim revival is part of
"reconnecting" with the Muslim world after years of
isolation. It parallels the availability of new Islamic
satellite television channels in Tanzania. Third, the
country still remains relatively poor. Muslim traditions are
now presented as threatened by a secularist state, requiring
a return to basics. The revival includes all age groups and
socioeconomic classes. On the Zanzibar islands, the revival
is directed toward Muslims who are munafik, "Muslims in name
only," and the Sufi brotherhoods, which grew strong in the
nineteenth century. On the mainland it is directed toward
Christians. Islamist ideas do not rest on their instant
identical reproduction in different contexts, but instead on
their ability to adapt to different contexts. While
concerned with the "onslaught and failure" of Western
values, the revival in Tanzania also concerns the lack of
good government in the country, as well as a widespread
dissatisfaction with government in the Muslim population.
The revival groups offer an alternative to the older, state-
sanctioned Muslim identity.
The translation of the Qur'an into Swahili has ensured that
the established Arabic-speaking scholars no longer have a
monopoly on its interpretation. In addition, there is
currently an abundance of Islamic literature, tapes, CDs,
DVDs, in Arabic, English, and Swahili. These products are
widely available in bookstores, streets, and outside
Mosques, after Friday prayers, further aiding the
individualization of Islam, allowing more freedom of
interpretation of the religion through expanded access.
Thus, the revival is not just directed at the state, but
also toward those Muslims perceived as being a part of the
state apparatus, mainly an older group of Muslims who worked
within the state's conception of a rather passive Muslim
identity.
Whereas, in a country like Senegal, politics reflects a type
of Muslim hegemony, and in a country, such as Nigeria, there
is continuous strife invoking Muslim-Christian differences,
in Tanzania religion has taken a subservient position to the
unifying nationalist agenda of the dominant political party.
As a response to transferring control of the nation's
education and health administration to the Catholic Church
in 1992, a group called the Council for the Propagation of
the Qur'an (commonly known as Balukta) accused the Tanzanian
government's National Muslim Organization (Bakwata) of
corruption, temporarily seizing its headquarters. This was
Tanzania's first militant Islamist group, but its actions
were short-lived. President Ali Hassan Mwinyi expelled them
from the Bakwata headquarters, and the group was banned in
1993.[6]
Tanzania's major simmering conflict is the political
struggle between the Tanzanian mainland and Zanzibar, which
reflects the "shotgun marriage" between two separate, former
dependencies of Britain. Despite efforts to tie Zanzibar to
the mainland, largely by granting considerable autonomy to
the administration of Zanzibar, separatist sentiments never
died in the offshore islands. Because many Zanzibaris
identify culturally with their supposed Arab ancestry from
across the Indian Ocean, rather than the African mainland,
the question of Zanzibari sovereignty remains a political
issue.
ISLAMISM'S FUTURE IN TANZANIA
A history of cooperation in the name of nationalism has
mitigated religious conflict in the country. Indeed, "while
there are some ethnic identities and geographic areas that
coincide with a certain religious tradition, often other
identities, such as class divisions or support for political
parties, are cross-cutting and do not reinforce these
religious divisions." The legacy of the unifying mission of
TANU in the drive toward independence, inter-religious
cooperation, has, for the most part, endured. Yet, in the
past decade circumstances have changed.
As mentioned earlier, Tanzania remains plagued by poverty.
Despite mineral discoveries, its economy relies on
agriculture, but only a small portion of its land is subject
to sustainable cultivation. Comparatively paltry resources,
combined with failed economic programs since independence,
have translated into an $800 per capita GDP, with 36 percent
of the population below the poverty line.[7]
In recent years, expatriate Wahhabis from Saudi Arabia have
been active in Muslim charitable organizations and in
schools. Diplomats in East Africa say the Saudis' influence
in the region is still minimal but growing. Fundamentalists
have, on occasion, taken over 30 of the 487 mosques in Dar
es Salaam and have begun bombing bars, as well as beating
women who go out without being fully covered. According to a
Western intelligence report, the Saudis are spending about
$1 million a year in Tanzania to build new mosques and buy
influence with the ruling CCM. "We get our funds from Yemen
and Saudi Arabia," says Mohammed Madi, an activist.
"Officially the money is used to buy medicine, but in
reality the money is given to us to support our work and buy
guns."[8] Zanzibar also is home to an Islamist preacher,
Sheikh Ponda Issa Ponda, leader of the Islamist organization
Simba wa Mungu (God's Lion), which has forcibly taken over
mosques in Dar es Salaam and violently targeted tourists.
Ponda preaches jihadi Islamism and is reputed to have ties
to al Qaeda officials.[9] Several Islamic groups, associated
with a loosely organized movement, Ansar al-Sunnah, seek a
purified Islam. Other revivalists are critical of Ansar,
saying it is too closely linked to Salafism, Wahabism, and
Hanbalism, conservative Muslim religious movements. Ansar
has recently grown more visible, in small towns, as well as
in larger cities in Tanzania. A second potentially Islamist
movement is Tablighi Jamaat. Its main aim is to improve the
morality of Muslim society by improving behavior as Muslims.
Instead of pointing a finger at the West or Christians for
the current ills that have befallen society, adherents
believe that they should start with themselves, calling for
living by the rules of Shar'ia.
So far these trends, Ansar and Tablighi, are largely ripples
on the surface of theology and social life across the whole
country. Sufi Islam and Islamic traditions remain mixed
with local tribal customs, creating a formidable barrier to
reformists, whose ideas of purification of Islam would
undercut Sufi influences.
RADICAL ISLAMISM IN TANZANIA
The bombing of the U.S. embassy in Dar es Salaam in 1998,
which killed eleven people and injured eighty-five, revealed
the existence of a cell of jihadi terrorists. The bombing
was not a plot planned by Tanzanian Muslims, although two
Zanzibari were implicated. The attack was orchestrated by a
few Somalis: al Qaeda operatives and sleepers, with
regional links to cells in Tanzania and Kenya, and planned
outside. These extremists, based in Nairobi, began in 1993
to use the trade in diamonds, tanzanite, and rubies to
render the al Qaeda cells in Tanzania self-sufficient. The
Saudi charity, al-Haramain Islamic Foundation in Tanzania,
now shut down, supplied funds.[10]
Uamsho, an NGO, began by offering public lectures on Islam
in the 1990s. It later became interested in Muslim rights.
It employs the language of human rights and good governance
in its critique of the government, which is unique for an
Islamic group. Supporters accuse the government of
intervening in religious affairs, which would go against
Article 19 of the Constitution. They also claim that
government corruption has led to the moral decline of the
country. Finally, they claim that there are laws in
Tanzania regulating dress codes and alcohol, but the corrupt
government does not enforce them. The government of Zanzibar
has claimed that this group has fundamentalist views. In
addition, various Western groups and think tanks have
accused this group of contemplating terrorist attacks
against the tourist industry in Zanzibar. Yet an inquiry by
the British, American, and Danish embassies found it to be
non-violent.[11]
Overall, Tanzania remains vulnerable to radical Islamists.
Tanzania has a low capacity government, in a large
territorial expanse (the size of France and Germany
combined). Thirty six percent of the population is below the
poverty line. With rudimentary border controls, a wide open
coastline and troubled neighbors, such as Somalia,
Tanzania's large coastal trade and much smuggling provide
excellent logistical cover for extremists. (The neighboring
countries of Kenya and Uganda have each suffered violent
jihadi attacks.) Small arms and other weapons are readily
available on the black market in East Africa. The police are
unable, and sometimes unwilling, to provide even the most
basic public safety services, as major crimes often go
unsolved. The Tanzanian National Security Service is more
capable than the police force, but it is better suited to
spying on political opponents, since that has been their
training. These security weaknesses make Tanzania a
relatively soft target. Currently, the Muslim population,
taken as a whole, has not succumbed to extremist rhetoric.
The small and weak Islamists, and radical elements within
them, concentrate on bringing their co-religionists in
Tanzania more in line with fundamentalist Islamic practices.
Tanzania faces the dilemma of post-authoritarian states in
Africa: a tropism toward official blandishments or outright
control of associations once prohibited under one party
rule. Ironically, the more moderate groups, who offer no
structural challenge to the system, are more likely to be
candidates for co-optation. Radicals, even at the level of
ideas, are forced to work outside the system. Thus, the
government risks pushing Islamist believers in more radical
directions by sheer clumsiness-such as election rigging in
Zanzibar.
The Islamic revival thus far has not instigated a wave of
Islamist radicalism. Most revivalists have been critical of
anti-government fundamentalists. But the Islamic revival has
opened new sources of information on Islam, beyond the
leading clerics inside the country. The way is open for
simplistic and politicized interpretations to capitalize on
local grievances, such as the integrity of the federation of
the mainland and Zanzibar, and interpret that as a Muslim-
Christian matter or a matter of the relative weight of
Zanzibari opinion within the overall politics of the union.
LOOKING AHEAD
Tanzania's so-far successful pattern of political co-
optation was reflected in the conduct of its fourth multi-
party general elections on October 31, 2010. The ruling CCM
party faced its most serious competition in the multi-party
era, but President Kikwete was re-elected with 61 percent of
the vote, reduced from 80 percent in 2005. The Chadema
party-the perennial territorial opposition since the end of
one party rule-for the first time received the most
opposition votes. Chadema's presidential candidate,
Willibrod Slaa, took 27 percent, while CUF's Ibrahim Lipumba
received 8 percent. This marked a decline in CUF's salience
in national politics, for the first time in decades. Voter
turnout, at 42 percent, was, however the lowest in Tanzanian
history; previously, at least 70 percent of registered
voters had cast ballots. Although the elections were
conducted without major disturbances or irregularities,
Chadema officials complained about voting and tabulation
procedures, as well as the constitutional prohibition on
challenging presidential election results after their formal
announcement.
As expected, CCM retained its absolute majority in
Parliament, with nearly 80 percent of the seats. With a
total of 47 seats-24 elected and 23 "special seats" for
women-Chadema displaced CUF as the official territorial
opposition and selected its Chairman, Freeman Mbowe, as
opposition leader. The new Parliament selected Anne Makinda
as Tanzania's first woman Speaker of Parliament.
Self-governing Zanzibar (3 percent of Tanzania's population)
displayed relative calm. Serious irregularities and sporadic
violence had marred every election in Zanzibar since 1964.
However, after years of abortive negotiations, the CUF and
the ruling party reached a power-sharing agreement. The
outcome of the July 31, 2010 referendum set the stage for
peaceful general elections on October 31 in Zanzibar. The
deal eliminated the winner-take-all system for Zanzibar,
giving the losing side one of two vice president slots and
ministerial positions in proportion to the seats it holds in
the Zanzibar House of Representatives. On October 31,
Zanzibar CCM presidential candidate Ali Mohamed Shein won
with 50.1 percent of the vote, while runner-up Civic United
Front (CUF) presidential candidate Seif Sharif Hamad
received 49.1 percent. Shein selected Hamad as his First
Vice President and Seif Ali, the former Union Deputy Foreign
Minister, as his Second Vice President.[12]
Despite major opposition in confederated Zanzibar, Tanzania
provides a degree of comparative calm in East Africa, a
region facing increasing spillover possibilities from Somali
pirates, Islamist propaganda, and systemic instability
sweeping over North Africa and the Middle East. The United
States is well-advised to cultivate official Tanzanian
friendship and "bank" good relations in the face of a
regional future of uncertainty.
----------------------------------------------------------
Notes
[1] Barbara G. and Deo S. Mshigeni Brents, "Terrorism in
Context: Race, Religion, Party, and Violent Conflict in
Zanzibar," The American Sociologist, Summer 2004, p. 62.
www.unlv.edu/faculty/brents/research/terrorZanzibar.pdf
accessed July 25, 2010.
[2] Bernadetta Killian, "The State and Identity Politics in
Zanzibar: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation in
Tanzania," African Identities, 6, 2, May 2008, p. 115.
[3] Roman Loimeier, "Perceptions of Marginalization: Muslims
in Contemporary Tanzania," in Rene Otayek and Benjamin F.
Soares, eds., Islam and Muslim Politics in Africa, NY:
Palgrave, 2007, p. 138.
[4] Andre LeSage, "Terrorism Threats and Vulnerabilities in
Africa," in Andre LeSage, ed., African Counterterrorism Co-
operation: Assessing Regional and Subregional Initiatives.
Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2007. p.
87.
[5] Simon Turner, "'These Young Men Show No Respect for
Local Customs' -Globalization and Islamic Revival in
Zanzibar," Journal of Religion in Africa, 39, 2009, p. 259.
[6] Jeffrey Haynes, "Islamic Militancy in East Africa,"
Third World Quarterly, 26, 8, 2005, p. 1330.
[7] Central Intelligence Agency, "Tanzania," World Fact
Book, online, accessed July 24, p. 2010.
[8] Lisa Beyer "Inside the Kingdom," Time Magazine,
September 15, 2003,
www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1005663-8.00.html,
accessed July 26, 2010.
[9] Peter Kagwanja, "Counter-terrorism in the Horn of
Africa: New Security Frontiers, Old Strategies," African
Security Review, 15, 3, 2006, p. 77.
[10] David H. Shinn, "Al-Qaeda in East Africa and the Horn,"
Journal of Conflict Studies, Summer 2007, p. 37.
[11] Turner, Op. Cit., 242.
[12] B. James and B. Lugongo, "Tanzania: Is Democracy,
Political Competition Under Threat?"
allafrica.com/stories/201008310556.html; also U.S.
Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, Background
Note: Tanzania. www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2843.htm, Dec. 13,
2010;> accessed March 22, 2011.
----------------------------------------------------------
Copyright Foreign Policy Research Institute
(http://www.fpri.org/).
THE THREAT OF ISLAMISM IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:
The Case of Tanzania
by Harvey Glickman
April 2, 2011
Harvey Glickman is Professor Emeritus of Political Science
at Haverford College and Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy
Research Institute. He is currently researching Islamism
throughout Sub-Saharan Africa.
Thanks are expressed to Sean Stambaugh, research assistant,
Haverford class of 2009 and Caila Heyison, research
assistant, Haverford class of 2011; also appreciation to
Haverford College for financial support of this research,
and to scholar Richard Mshomba for helpful critiques.
Available on the web and in pdf format at:
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201104.glickman.islamismsubsaharanafrica.html
THE THREAT OF ISLAMISM IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:
The Case of Tanzania
by Harvey Glickman
The states of Africa south of the Sahara, with their large
Muslim populations, certainly are vulnerable to the popular
unrest sweeping across North Africa and the Gulf region
since January 2011. These states present a "backdoor"
opening for radical jihadist Islam, which is already a
strong presence in Algeria, Morocco, Egypt and, (if Qaddafi
lasts) in Libya. With about 25 percent of the world's Muslim
population living in Africa, the overall restrictive
economic and political conditions, and an expanding youth
population, extrude Islamist ideology as a plausible
alternative for self-styled repressed out-groups.
Consequently, Sub-Saharan Africa merits more attention for
signs of more radical, jihadist Islamism.
Islamism is a political ideology, not an offshoot religious
cult. Its strategy ranges from violence as a prime tactic
to political militancy, to competitive political parties
that seek local or national representation in parliaments or
local governments. Islamism may spawn violent jihadi groups
that dream of recreating a global Islamic community (umma)
or groups attempting to restore ultra-traditionalist,
Salafist tenets of Islam, similar to what prevails in
Wahabbist Saudi Arabia.
This essay examines both the extent and dynamics of Islamism
and radical, violent Islamist groups in Tanzania, the
location of the 1998 al Qaeda bombing. Additionally, the
piece considers the appeal and spread of Islamist ideology,
and the "state of play" today. Tanzania is examined here for
the number of Muslims in the population-about a third of the
total; for its proximity to the eastern African cockpit of
Islamism-Somalia; and for the character of its internal
politics, a one party-dominant political system-with the
position of its Muslim population emerging as a divisive
political issue.
Thus far, Tanzania harbors a low level of Islamist activity
compared to, for example, Sudan, Somalia, and Egypt. It is
representative of countries in Africa south of the Sahara
with significant Muslim populations, whose cooperation is
necessary if global jihadist terrorism is to be controlled
and overcome. Not least is the problem of spillover of
sporadic, small scale wars (Congo, Rwanda and Burundi are
western neighbors). Secular nationalism, a lame
parliamentary democracy, slow and uneven economic growth,
and perceived unequal opportunity permit Muslim Africans, in
Tanzania, as elsewhere, to subscribe to an alternative
ideology of Islamism.
POLITICS AND RELIGION IN TANZANIA
Of a population of about 42 million today in Tanzania, it is
estimated that about one-third are Muslim, about one-third
are Christian and perhaps one-third are "animist." Muslims
in Tanzania live largely along the pre-colonial and colonial
trade routes: coastal north-south, and east-west, in the
past involving slaves, ivory, sisal, coffee and tea. Ninety-
nine percent of the population of the Zanzibar islands, the
hub of pre-colonial trade-about a million people-are Muslim.
In the traditional centers of Swahili culture along the
coast, Muslims adhere to Sunni Islam. From the ninth
century, Arab traders married local women; the new culture
that developed combined Persian and indigenous elements. As
Islam expanded into the interior, so did syncretic practices
combining Islam and traditional beliefs, some of which
strayed far from the conventional. The Christian population
lives primarily in the southwest and north-central areas of
the country.
The Tanzanian state is officially secular and its
constitution guarantees freedom of religion. The state also
prohibits religious political parties. The ruling party,
Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), the direct descendant of the
Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), has held power, by
a large margin, since independence in 1962, changing its
name in 1977.
TANU merged with Zanzibar's Afro-Shirazi Party, the
victorious party in 1963 after the Zanzibar revolution,
which saw the overthrow of the Sultan and an Arabized elite.
The CCM has dominated government on the mainland, but the
Civic United Front (CUF) has gained a substantial following
in Pemba Island, near Zanzibar. The CUF was founded in 1992,
with the advent of a multi-party system. Two movements
merged: Kamahuru, a group advocating the democratization of
Zanzibar, with the Civic Movement, a human rights
organization based on the coastal mainland. The CCM gains
much support in Unguja, the main Zanzibar Island, from its
resident Africans, while the CUF is strong on Pemba, the
small nearby island, part of the Zanzibar administrative
entity. It is also strong among non-Africans, i.e., those
who identify as "Arab." In 1995 the CUF refused to accept
the results of the national elections, claiming that the
vote had been rigged by the CCM. (The CUF repeated these
allegations after the October-November 2000 elections and
boycotted Zanzibar's regional parliament, as well as
Tanzania's national legislature.)
In January 2001 violence broke out when police fired into a
crowd of CUF protesters, who were flouting a ban on
protesting, killing thirty-three. During the 2005
presidential and parliamentary elections the opposition
claimed that the CCM used illegal and unethical means in
their campaign. Opposition politicians and supporters also
reported being beaten and tortured. In addition, the CUF
claimed that the electoral commission was influenced by the
ruling party.
Although bloody demonstrations occurred in 1995 and in 2000,
the CUF has maintained that it does not use or condone
violence as a means of gaining power, preferring to operate
through legitimate, democratic means. Yet, it has not
totally dismissed the use of violence as a means for
establishing itself in Zanzibar, especially if political
corruption and marginalization continue to occur there.
The CUF organized a cadre of young men, called the Blue
Guards, to protect CUF party leaders, despite the law
against alternative police forces. Members of the Blue
Guards said their goal was to "release Tanzanian society
from the dictatorship of Christianity"; the goal of CUF is
to make Zanzibar an Islamic state.[1] The political struggle
between the CUF and CCM in the past two decades has created
new distinctions between Muslims and Christians. During the
early years of one party socialist rule, President Julius
Nyerere was adamant about creating a nation free of racial
and religious divisions. The demise of ujamaa ("community")
socialism that had tried to create national unity, as well
as the rise of the multi-party system, permitted region and
religion to divide the population. In particular, "the
contested nature of the Zanzibar state makes it very
appealing to politicians to resort to the politicization of
racial identity in order to claim legitimacy to rule."[2]
Ethnic differences and overlapping religion have become
rallying points in the search for the "true" identity of
Zanzibar, which have faint echoes on the mainland. Religion
has become a salient issue, especially in Zanzibar, as has
the future of the union of the mainland and the offshore
islands. "[...] people at the grassroots level advance
religious identities in pursuit of their interests in regard
to spiritual, material, and political interests" all across
Tanzania.[3]
MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN RELATIONS
Religious tensions have risen in Tanzania. Since the end of
socialist rule in the 1990s, people claiming Zanzibari Arab
identity have alleged that the government of Zanzibar,
directed by the ruling CCM party, discriminates against
them, denying access to government jobs, housing, and
business licenses. Similar dissatisfaction has spread to the
mainland among the coastal Swahili and "Arab" population.
Frustration with the state has manifested itself in attacks
upon Christians. Muslims have always been able to hold key
governmental positions, but many people perceive the
governing elite as Christian. The presidency has
unofficially rotated between a Christian and a Muslim. The
rise in tension also parallels the rise in political
visibility and assertiveness of the Muslim community in the
past decade. This has also raised an issue historically
undebated in Tanzania: the nature of the state-partly Arab
or African, Muslim or Christian, Zanzibar vs. Tanzania. At
risk is the unity of the manufactured state that stitched
together the two independent former colonies, Tanganyika and
Zanzibar.
There have been several instances in the past two decades
that have fueled Muslim fears of marginalization. In 1992,
the government announced that in order to reduce public
spending, it would transfer the country's health and
education system to the country's powerful Catholic Church.
In December 2002, the Tanzanian government signed The
Prevention of Terrorism Act into law, largely under pressure
from the United States. Criticism of this act, especially
from Muslims, asserted that the law specifically targeted
them. Critics noted that this law borrowed heavily from the
U.S. Patriot Act, the British Prevention of Terrorism Act
and the Suppression of Terrorism Act of apartheid South
Africa.[4] Additional dissatisfaction is leveled against the
police. In Muslim areas the police are often Christians and
they disregard local customs, alienating residents. The
government-sponsored Islamic association, the Supreme
Council of Muslims in Tanzania, attracts limited legitimacy.
Marginalized Muslims seek alternative associations, some of
them extremist, as Islam can act as an ideology of protest.
THE ISLAMIC REVIVAL AND ISLAMISM IN TANZANIA
Zanzibar Archipelago is the name that combines two Indian
Ocean Islands (Unguja or Zanzibar and Pemba), as well as
several smaller islands. Zanzibar became a British
protectorate in 1890 after centuries of rule by Omani Arabs.
As Zanzibar moved toward independence in the 1950s, two
groups found themselves at odds; the "Arab" settler class,
supporting the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP) and the
"African" laboring class, supporting the Afro-Shirazi party
(ASP). (Both classes crossed lines and inter-married, but
neither could overcome a certain mutual hostility as a
result of the Arab slave-holding past.) The indigenous
peasantry was split between the two parties, with the pro-
ZNP dominating Pemba. In the election immediately after
independence in 1963, the ZNP coalition narrowly defeated
the ASP. The Zanzibari revolution in 1964 represented an
uprising of African laborers and ex-soldiers that mushroomed
into an anti-Arab revolution, overthrowing the ZNP
government and the Sultan, as well as the whole enterprise
of constitutional monarchy. Abeid Karume, the ASP coalition
leader, ruled by decree, warding off any group challenges to
the new regime. Three months later, Karume and Tanganyikan
President Nyerere united Zanzibar and Tanganyika. (The
designation Tanzania came later as a result of a contest to
name the new country.) The rapid pace and questionable
constitutionality of these beginnings remains a background
factor to the increasing demands for autonomy. In 1994, the
CUF raised the issue of separation from the mainland, but
the CCM condemned this claim and refused to act upon it.
On the Zanzibar islands, Muslim religious scholars are
becoming more influential in setting rules for social
behavior-such as enforcing a dress code and attempting to
shut down establishments that serve alcohol. A Western-
focused tourist industry is small and vulnerable. Since the
1980s, wealthy individuals from the Gulf States have funded
mosques, madrasahs, health clinics, and secondary schools on
Zanzibar. Saudi Arabia alone spends about $1 million a year
building mosques, madrasahs, and Islamic centers.[5] In
addition, young Zanzibari men receive scholarships to study
in Medina and Khartoum. Two of Zanzibar's universities are
Islamic, funded by Saudi Arabians and Kuwaitis. Teachers
come from Pakistan, Sudan and other East African countries.
Zanzibar University is funded by Darul Iman Charitable
Association, registered as a charity in Canada. Chukwani
College of Education offers classes in Islamic studies and
Islamic education.
High levels of poverty on the islands continue to contribute
to political discontent. Zanzibar has fallen behind the
mainland in economic growth; economic liberalization in the
1990s seems to have hit Zanzibar particularly hard.
Three factors have helped an Islamic revival in Tanzania.
First, the demise of the one party state allowed for
alternative forms of association. Groups formerly prohibited
have emerged to proselytize for a more purified Islam.
Second, new Islamic organizations are opposing formerly
state-sanctioned groups. This Muslim revival is part of
"reconnecting" with the Muslim world after years of
isolation. It parallels the availability of new Islamic
satellite television channels in Tanzania. Third, the
country still remains relatively poor. Muslim traditions are
now presented as threatened by a secularist state, requiring
a return to basics. The revival includes all age groups and
socioeconomic classes. On the Zanzibar islands, the revival
is directed toward Muslims who are munafik, "Muslims in name
only," and the Sufi brotherhoods, which grew strong in the
nineteenth century. On the mainland it is directed toward
Christians. Islamist ideas do not rest on their instant
identical reproduction in different contexts, but instead on
their ability to adapt to different contexts. While
concerned with the "onslaught and failure" of Western
values, the revival in Tanzania also concerns the lack of
good government in the country, as well as a widespread
dissatisfaction with government in the Muslim population.
The revival groups offer an alternative to the older, state-
sanctioned Muslim identity.
The translation of the Qur'an into Swahili has ensured that
the established Arabic-speaking scholars no longer have a
monopoly on its interpretation. In addition, there is
currently an abundance of Islamic literature, tapes, CDs,
DVDs, in Arabic, English, and Swahili. These products are
widely available in bookstores, streets, and outside
Mosques, after Friday prayers, further aiding the
individualization of Islam, allowing more freedom of
interpretation of the religion through expanded access.
Thus, the revival is not just directed at the state, but
also toward those Muslims perceived as being a part of the
state apparatus, mainly an older group of Muslims who worked
within the state's conception of a rather passive Muslim
identity.
Whereas, in a country like Senegal, politics reflects a type
of Muslim hegemony, and in a country, such as Nigeria, there
is continuous strife invoking Muslim-Christian differences,
in Tanzania religion has taken a subservient position to the
unifying nationalist agenda of the dominant political party.
As a response to transferring control of the nation's
education and health administration to the Catholic Church
in 1992, a group called the Council for the Propagation of
the Qur'an (commonly known as Balukta) accused the Tanzanian
government's National Muslim Organization (Bakwata) of
corruption, temporarily seizing its headquarters. This was
Tanzania's first militant Islamist group, but its actions
were short-lived. President Ali Hassan Mwinyi expelled them
from the Bakwata headquarters, and the group was banned in
1993.[6]
Tanzania's major simmering conflict is the political
struggle between the Tanzanian mainland and Zanzibar, which
reflects the "shotgun marriage" between two separate, former
dependencies of Britain. Despite efforts to tie Zanzibar to
the mainland, largely by granting considerable autonomy to
the administration of Zanzibar, separatist sentiments never
died in the offshore islands. Because many Zanzibaris
identify culturally with their supposed Arab ancestry from
across the Indian Ocean, rather than the African mainland,
the question of Zanzibari sovereignty remains a political
issue.
ISLAMISM'S FUTURE IN TANZANIA
A history of cooperation in the name of nationalism has
mitigated religious conflict in the country. Indeed, "while
there are some ethnic identities and geographic areas that
coincide with a certain religious tradition, often other
identities, such as class divisions or support for political
parties, are cross-cutting and do not reinforce these
religious divisions." The legacy of the unifying mission of
TANU in the drive toward independence, inter-religious
cooperation, has, for the most part, endured. Yet, in the
past decade circumstances have changed.
As mentioned earlier, Tanzania remains plagued by poverty.
Despite mineral discoveries, its economy relies on
agriculture, but only a small portion of its land is subject
to sustainable cultivation. Comparatively paltry resources,
combined with failed economic programs since independence,
have translated into an $800 per capita GDP, with 36 percent
of the population below the poverty line.[7]
In recent years, expatriate Wahhabis from Saudi Arabia have
been active in Muslim charitable organizations and in
schools. Diplomats in East Africa say the Saudis' influence
in the region is still minimal but growing. Fundamentalists
have, on occasion, taken over 30 of the 487 mosques in Dar
es Salaam and have begun bombing bars, as well as beating
women who go out without being fully covered. According to a
Western intelligence report, the Saudis are spending about
$1 million a year in Tanzania to build new mosques and buy
influence with the ruling CCM. "We get our funds from Yemen
and Saudi Arabia," says Mohammed Madi, an activist.
"Officially the money is used to buy medicine, but in
reality the money is given to us to support our work and buy
guns."[8] Zanzibar also is home to an Islamist preacher,
Sheikh Ponda Issa Ponda, leader of the Islamist organization
Simba wa Mungu (God's Lion), which has forcibly taken over
mosques in Dar es Salaam and violently targeted tourists.
Ponda preaches jihadi Islamism and is reputed to have ties
to al Qaeda officials.[9] Several Islamic groups, associated
with a loosely organized movement, Ansar al-Sunnah, seek a
purified Islam. Other revivalists are critical of Ansar,
saying it is too closely linked to Salafism, Wahabism, and
Hanbalism, conservative Muslim religious movements. Ansar
has recently grown more visible, in small towns, as well as
in larger cities in Tanzania. A second potentially Islamist
movement is Tablighi Jamaat. Its main aim is to improve the
morality of Muslim society by improving behavior as Muslims.
Instead of pointing a finger at the West or Christians for
the current ills that have befallen society, adherents
believe that they should start with themselves, calling for
living by the rules of Shar'ia.
So far these trends, Ansar and Tablighi, are largely ripples
on the surface of theology and social life across the whole
country. Sufi Islam and Islamic traditions remain mixed
with local tribal customs, creating a formidable barrier to
reformists, whose ideas of purification of Islam would
undercut Sufi influences.
RADICAL ISLAMISM IN TANZANIA
The bombing of the U.S. embassy in Dar es Salaam in 1998,
which killed eleven people and injured eighty-five, revealed
the existence of a cell of jihadi terrorists. The bombing
was not a plot planned by Tanzanian Muslims, although two
Zanzibari were implicated. The attack was orchestrated by a
few Somalis: al Qaeda operatives and sleepers, with
regional links to cells in Tanzania and Kenya, and planned
outside. These extremists, based in Nairobi, began in 1993
to use the trade in diamonds, tanzanite, and rubies to
render the al Qaeda cells in Tanzania self-sufficient. The
Saudi charity, al-Haramain Islamic Foundation in Tanzania,
now shut down, supplied funds.[10]
Uamsho, an NGO, began by offering public lectures on Islam
in the 1990s. It later became interested in Muslim rights.
It employs the language of human rights and good governance
in its critique of the government, which is unique for an
Islamic group. Supporters accuse the government of
intervening in religious affairs, which would go against
Article 19 of the Constitution. They also claim that
government corruption has led to the moral decline of the
country. Finally, they claim that there are laws in
Tanzania regulating dress codes and alcohol, but the corrupt
government does not enforce them. The government of Zanzibar
has claimed that this group has fundamentalist views. In
addition, various Western groups and think tanks have
accused this group of contemplating terrorist attacks
against the tourist industry in Zanzibar. Yet an inquiry by
the British, American, and Danish embassies found it to be
non-violent.[11]
Overall, Tanzania remains vulnerable to radical Islamists.
Tanzania has a low capacity government, in a large
territorial expanse (the size of France and Germany
combined). Thirty six percent of the population is below the
poverty line. With rudimentary border controls, a wide open
coastline and troubled neighbors, such as Somalia,
Tanzania's large coastal trade and much smuggling provide
excellent logistical cover for extremists. (The neighboring
countries of Kenya and Uganda have each suffered violent
jihadi attacks.) Small arms and other weapons are readily
available on the black market in East Africa. The police are
unable, and sometimes unwilling, to provide even the most
basic public safety services, as major crimes often go
unsolved. The Tanzanian National Security Service is more
capable than the police force, but it is better suited to
spying on political opponents, since that has been their
training. These security weaknesses make Tanzania a
relatively soft target. Currently, the Muslim population,
taken as a whole, has not succumbed to extremist rhetoric.
The small and weak Islamists, and radical elements within
them, concentrate on bringing their co-religionists in
Tanzania more in line with fundamentalist Islamic practices.
Tanzania faces the dilemma of post-authoritarian states in
Africa: a tropism toward official blandishments or outright
control of associations once prohibited under one party
rule. Ironically, the more moderate groups, who offer no
structural challenge to the system, are more likely to be
candidates for co-optation. Radicals, even at the level of
ideas, are forced to work outside the system. Thus, the
government risks pushing Islamist believers in more radical
directions by sheer clumsiness-such as election rigging in
Zanzibar.
The Islamic revival thus far has not instigated a wave of
Islamist radicalism. Most revivalists have been critical of
anti-government fundamentalists. But the Islamic revival has
opened new sources of information on Islam, beyond the
leading clerics inside the country. The way is open for
simplistic and politicized interpretations to capitalize on
local grievances, such as the integrity of the federation of
the mainland and Zanzibar, and interpret that as a Muslim-
Christian matter or a matter of the relative weight of
Zanzibari opinion within the overall politics of the union.
LOOKING AHEAD
Tanzania's so-far successful pattern of political co-
optation was reflected in the conduct of its fourth multi-
party general elections on October 31, 2010. The ruling CCM
party faced its most serious competition in the multi-party
era, but President Kikwete was re-elected with 61 percent of
the vote, reduced from 80 percent in 2005. The Chadema
party-the perennial territorial opposition since the end of
one party rule-for the first time received the most
opposition votes. Chadema's presidential candidate,
Willibrod Slaa, took 27 percent, while CUF's Ibrahim Lipumba
received 8 percent. This marked a decline in CUF's salience
in national politics, for the first time in decades. Voter
turnout, at 42 percent, was, however the lowest in Tanzanian
history; previously, at least 70 percent of registered
voters had cast ballots. Although the elections were
conducted without major disturbances or irregularities,
Chadema officials complained about voting and tabulation
procedures, as well as the constitutional prohibition on
challenging presidential election results after their formal
announcement.
As expected, CCM retained its absolute majority in
Parliament, with nearly 80 percent of the seats. With a
total of 47 seats-24 elected and 23 "special seats" for
women-Chadema displaced CUF as the official territorial
opposition and selected its Chairman, Freeman Mbowe, as
opposition leader. The new Parliament selected Anne Makinda
as Tanzania's first woman Speaker of Parliament.
Self-governing Zanzibar (3 percent of Tanzania's population)
displayed relative calm. Serious irregularities and sporadic
violence had marred every election in Zanzibar since 1964.
However, after years of abortive negotiations, the CUF and
the ruling party reached a power-sharing agreement. The
outcome of the July 31, 2010 referendum set the stage for
peaceful general elections on October 31 in Zanzibar. The
deal eliminated the winner-take-all system for Zanzibar,
giving the losing side one of two vice president slots and
ministerial positions in proportion to the seats it holds in
the Zanzibar House of Representatives. On October 31,
Zanzibar CCM presidential candidate Ali Mohamed Shein won
with 50.1 percent of the vote, while runner-up Civic United
Front (CUF) presidential candidate Seif Sharif Hamad
received 49.1 percent. Shein selected Hamad as his First
Vice President and Seif Ali, the former Union Deputy Foreign
Minister, as his Second Vice President.[12]
Despite major opposition in confederated Zanzibar, Tanzania
provides a degree of comparative calm in East Africa, a
region facing increasing spillover possibilities from Somali
pirates, Islamist propaganda, and systemic instability
sweeping over North Africa and the Middle East. The United
States is well-advised to cultivate official Tanzanian
friendship and "bank" good relations in the face of a
regional future of uncertainty.
----------------------------------------------------------
Notes
[1] Barbara G. and Deo S. Mshigeni Brents, "Terrorism in
Context: Race, Religion, Party, and Violent Conflict in
Zanzibar," The American Sociologist, Summer 2004, p. 62.
www.unlv.edu/faculty/brents/research/terrorZanzibar.pdf
accessed July 25, 2010.
[2] Bernadetta Killian, "The State and Identity Politics in
Zanzibar: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation in
Tanzania," African Identities, 6, 2, May 2008, p. 115.
[3] Roman Loimeier, "Perceptions of Marginalization: Muslims
in Contemporary Tanzania," in Rene Otayek and Benjamin F.
Soares, eds., Islam and Muslim Politics in Africa, NY:
Palgrave, 2007, p. 138.
[4] Andre LeSage, "Terrorism Threats and Vulnerabilities in
Africa," in Andre LeSage, ed., African Counterterrorism Co-
operation: Assessing Regional and Subregional Initiatives.
Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2007. p.
87.
[5] Simon Turner, "'These Young Men Show No Respect for
Local Customs' -Globalization and Islamic Revival in
Zanzibar," Journal of Religion in Africa, 39, 2009, p. 259.
[6] Jeffrey Haynes, "Islamic Militancy in East Africa,"
Third World Quarterly, 26, 8, 2005, p. 1330.
[7] Central Intelligence Agency, "Tanzania," World Fact
Book, online, accessed July 24, p. 2010.
[8] Lisa Beyer "Inside the Kingdom," Time Magazine,
September 15, 2003,
www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1005663-8.00.html,
accessed July 26, 2010.
[9] Peter Kagwanja, "Counter-terrorism in the Horn of
Africa: New Security Frontiers, Old Strategies," African
Security Review, 15, 3, 2006, p. 77.
[10] David H. Shinn, "Al-Qaeda in East Africa and the Horn,"
Journal of Conflict Studies, Summer 2007, p. 37.
[11] Turner, Op. Cit., 242.
[12] B. James and B. Lugongo, "Tanzania: Is Democracy,
Political Competition Under Threat?"
allafrica.com/stories/201008310556.html; also U.S.
Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, Background
Note: Tanzania. www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2843.htm, Dec. 13,
2010;> accessed March 22, 2011.
----------------------------------------------------------
Copyright Foreign Policy Research Institute
(http://www.fpri.org/).
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