Russia's Anxieties About The Arab Revolutions

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RUSSIA'S ANXIETIES ABOUT THE ARAB REVOLUTION

by Stephen Blank



July 11, 2011



Stephen Blank is a Professor at the Strategic Studies

Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA. The

views expressed here do not necessarily represent those of

the US Army, Defense Department, or the U.S. Government.



Available on the web and in pdf format at:

http://www.fpri.org/enotes/2011/201107.blankrussiaarabspring.html



RUSSIA'S ANXIETIES ABOUT THE ARAB REVOLUTION



by Stephen Blank



By June 2011, the Arab revolutions had evolved into a series

of disconnected but increasingly violent civil

wars-particularly in Libya and Syria. The international

community has certainly not been spared the effects of these

wars. As a long-time patron-if not an ally-of these states,

Russia views these trends with mounting anxiety. These

revolutions and civil wars pose three serious challenges or

even threats to Russia.



FEAR OF DOMESTIC UNREST

Domestically, the revolutions could inspire citizens to take

autonomous political action against the regime.

Alternatively, they could further inflame the insurgency in

the North Caucasus among a largely Muslim population to

which Russia is already dedicating approximately 250,000

regular army and Ministry of Interior forces. Meanwhile,

Moscow clearly has no effective strategy for quelling this

violence or for resolving this insurgency by political

means.



Russian domestic and external braggadocio is intended in

part to hide the regime's fears of domestic unrest. Russian

officials believe and publicly profess that since 2003 the

United States has been trying to foment democracy campaigns

in Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

to undermine existing regimes there. Accordingly, they

continue to promote the image of Russia as a besieged

fortress surrounded by linked enemies, foreign governments

and democratic reformers. Thus, President Dmitry Medvedev

said, in March 2011:



Look at the current situation in the Middle East and the

Arab world. It is extremely difficult and great problems

still lie ahead. In some cases it may even come to the

disintegration of large, heavily populated states, their

break-up into smaller fragments. The character of these

states is far from straightforward. It may come to very

complex events, including the arrival of fanatics into

power. This will mean decades of fires and further

spread of extremism. We must face the truth. In the past

such a scenario was harbored for us, and now attempts to

implement it are even more likely. In any case, this

plot will not work. But everything that happens there

will have a direct impact on our domestic situation in

the long term, as long as decades.



While Moscow does not attribute the Arab revolutions to

outside forces, it believes that those forces could exploit

their example to incite an increasingly dissatisfied

populace. In response to the color revolutions of 2003-2005,

Moscow has terminated elections of governors, passed

increasingly draconian laws suppressing freedom of the

press, assembly, speech, and the dissemination of

information, and has created thousands of Paramilitary units

whose primary mission is to suppress any manifestation of

public unrest and autonomous political action. Dissidents

and journalists have been jailed, beaten, and sometimes

killed. Vladimir Putin has even revived Leonid Brezhnev's

notorious practice of putting dissidents into psychiatric

institutions. According to journalist Andrei Soldatov,

Russia is also working to prevent a "Facebook Revolution" by

proposing that the owners of online social media be

responsible for all content posted on their websites.

Despite the regime's habitual public swagger, these policies

betray a government deeply afraid of its own people. An

April 2009 report outlined the threat perceived by the

authorities quite clearly. Specifically it stated:



The Russian intelligence community is seriously worried

about latent social processes capable of leading to the

beginning of civil wars and conflicts on RF [Russian

Federation] territory that can end up in a disruption of

territorial integrity and the appearance of a large

number of new sovereign powers. Data of an information

"leak," the statistics and massive number of

antigovernment actions, and official statements and

appeals of the opposition attest to this.



This report proceeded to say that these agencies expected

massive protests in the Moscow area, industrial areas of the

South Urals and Western Siberia and in the Far East, while

ethnic tension among the Muslims of the North Caucasus and

Volga-Ural areas was also not excluded. The proliferation of

the Arab "virus" would be the Kremlin's worst nightmare.



FEAR OF REVOLUTION SPREADING TO CENTRAL ASIA

Russia's second source of anxiety lies in the possibility

that Arab revolutions might spread to Central Asia. Russian

elites regard this area as particularly vulnerable to

upheaval from both within and without, especially if the

Taliban were to prevail in Afghanistan. On June 14,

President Medvedev, speaking in Tashkent, made clear that

these revolutions concern Russia and its Central Asian

partners. Indeed, by April it was clear to Moscow that

dangerous pressure was building up in these states. When

the Duma held public hearings about the possibility of these

revolutions spreading to Central Asia, Deputy Foreign

Minister Grigory Karasin, on April 13, publicly urged these

states to make timely reforms lest they be swept away like

Tunisia and Egypt. Russia is seeking stability because it

will prevent these other states from drawing closer. To

achieve this, Karasin has recommended the formation of a

civil society with the intention of establishing

international and inter-religious peace, leaders' heightened

responsibility for raising the population's standard of

living, and the development of education and work with

youth. However, this limited program cannot overcome the

results of profound misrule, corruption, and stunted

economic development. Additionally, there has been no

mention of economic development, freedom, or genuine

political reform. Clearly, Russia is only willing to

tolerate cosmetic reforms, and it is doubtful that Central

Asian leaders will even reach those limits.



Indeed, these leaders are quite unwilling to countenance

genuine reforms and their responses to the Arab revolutions

have been dismissive. Kazakhstan's President, Nursultan

Nazarbayev, initiated an instant election rather than a

palpably stage-managed referendum to give him life tenure

because the latter would have been too egregious in today's

climate. Meanwhile in Uzbekistan, already a draconian state

in many ways, we see a further crackdown on mobile Internet

media. News blackouts are becoming frequent occurrences in

Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan; all across Central Asia,

government agencies continue to deny the possibility of

revolution. Subsequently, Uzbek President Islam Karimov

stated that these revolutions were externally instigated by

states who covet Central Asian resources, though he would

not specifically identify them. Tajikistan's President,

Emomali Rahmon, told his Parliament on April 20, 2011:



Much has been said and written about the possibility of

the repetition of such events in Central Asia, [---] "I

want to reiterate that the wise people of Tajikistan,

who were once the victims of such events, know the

meaning of peace and stability. They are aware of the

importance of peace and stability. [---] They have gone

through civil wars; therefore, they reject military

solutions to any problem.



Similarly, Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov

recently said that the abundance of goods at domestic

markets, especially food, and cheap prices are key

indicators of progress and stability. While governments in

the region are doing their best to leave nothing to chance,

they are not reforming themselves. These regimes are

whistling in the wind and have good reason for anxiety.

Large demonstrations are now occurring in Azerbaijan, where

unrest in response to the regime's crackdown on dissent and

Islamic agitation has been growing since late 2010.



RUSSIA'S CONCERN ABOUT LIBYA

Russia's third source of anxiety pertains to NATO's

operation to support Libya's insurgents and to the

possibility of deepening involvement there-and even more so

in Syria. NATO's actions and the ongoing civil strife place

several Russian interests in these countries at risk. Russia

already stands to lose, by its own account, $4.5 billion in

arms deals with Libya and that figure excludes Syria. Those

arms sales not only benefit defense industry, but also

Russian leaders who habitually pocket the proceeds from arms

sales for their private "slush funds." Beyond that, Libya

has also reportedly offered Russia a naval base in Benghazi

while Syria has offered Moscow a naval base at Tartus. These

events suggest that in return for arms sales host states are

being pressured to give Moscow access to foreign bases. We

have also seen this in Latin America. Moreover, Russia might

still be supplying weapons covertly to Libya through

Belarus, a habitual conduit of weapons to places where

Russia wishes to retain deniability, since Libya has

recently asked Belarus for more weapons. Syria's importance

as a buyer of Russian arms, often paid for by Saudi or

Iranian subsidies to Syria, is of a comparable economic and

strategic magnitude.



Second, Libya is important to Russia's energy strategy. Just

before the Libyan revolution, Russia signed an asset-

swapping deal with ENI, Italy's state energy company, to

obtain half of ENI's stake of 66 percent of Libya's Elephant

oilfield with 700 million recoverable barrels of oil. In

exchange, ENI will be allowed to take part in projects to

develop northwest Siberian assets owned by the Arctic Gas

company. Specifically ENI and Gazprom agreed to finalize a

contract for the sale of gas from these fields in Siberia

that will be produced by a joint Russo-Italian company

called SeverEnergia (Northern Energy). This deal comports

with Russia's twin objectives of: 1) ensconcing itself in

North African gas supply networks to surround and put more

pressure on Europe to deal with Russian gas suppliers and 2)

obtaining foreign equity ownership investment without overly

intrusive conditions like majority equity ownership in

Russia's Siberian and Far Eastern energy projects.

Presumably, in this case, there is a trade so if the Libyan

project were to fall through due to the success of the

revolutionaries, ENI might have to pull out of the Siberian

project.



Therefore, the implications of maintaining a Russian gas

stake in Libya and the broader North African scene possess

considerable economic and geopolitical importance. In sum,

Russia clearly cannot gain decisive leverage upon European

gas supplies unless it gains major equity in North African,

i.e. Libyan and Algerian fields. Lukoil already holds stakes

in Egypt, Tatneft is in Libya, and Gazprom is in Algeria

while Gazprom, as shown below, is primed to move as well

into Libya. Moscow also clearly wants BP's assets in Algeria

and in the Caspian Basin. TNK-BP announced in October 2010

its interests in BP's Algerian holdings worth $3 billion.

President Medvedev also proposed buying these holdings

during his 2010 state visit to Algeria. TNK-BP even offered

assets to Sonatrach, Algeria's national gas company, in

exchange for these BP assets. BP may also have asked

Algeria and Sonatrach to cooperate with Russia. Beyond

those BP assets in Algeria, Gazprom plans to participate in

new tenders to develop gas fields there. Despite an initial

interest in cooperating with Russian firms, Algeria and

Sonatrach reversed course and decided to resist Russia.

Russia's interest in acquiring Algerian energy assets is

quite straightforward. Whatever leverage it gains in

Algerian oil and gas can be used to encircle Europe since

Moscow expects Western demand for gas will return to 2007-8

levels.



But Moscow also needs foreign assets like these fields in

North Africa for critical domestic economic purposes to

shore up Gazprom's bottom line. Moscow must now reckon with

stagnant, if not declining, demand in Western Europe and the

arrival of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and shale gas where

it cannot compete. These challenges cause Moscow to doggedly

pursue its earlier strategy. Furthermore, the prospect of

higher domestic energy taxes also drives Gazprom to seek

more foreign assets rather than reform its domestic

operations. On the other hand, the unrest in Libya has had

a major silver lining for Moscow. The general sense of

turbulence throughout the Persian Gulf has caused oil prices

to spike to over $100 per barrel unit (bbl).



This windfall simultaneously plays a key role in Russian

domestic politics. As Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin has

stated, Russia's budget is in deficit if oil prices fall

below $120/bbl. Consequently this windfall relieves pressure

on the budget. But more importantly, for all those who,

like Putin, cling to the idea of an energy powerhouse, but

an essentially unreformed economy (and political system),

this windfall obviates any demand to undertake the reforms

needed to modernize the political and economic system.

Medvedev has talked but failed to deliver here. Since it

provides an illusion of prosperity and stability, popular

and elite pressures for reform are tranquilized as long as

panic and speculation dominate global energy markets.

Third, in foreign policy, instability in the Gulf and North

Africa seemingly allows Russian leaders like Prime Minister

Putin, to tell Europe that it should make deals with Russia

because Russia supposedly is a stable predictable supplier

without whom Europe cannot manage. Needless to say, this is

ultimately a geopolitical argument, although it includes

economics, for strengthening Russia's clout over Europe.

Thus, Russia's energy strategy aims not only to reduce

pressure for domestic reform, it also is the critical

instrument by which Russia seeks to dominate the CIS and

gain enduring leverage in Europe. Failures in either

foreign policy theater immediately reverberate in Russian

domestic politics and economics.



Another reason for Russian opposition to intervention lies

in the fact that Russia has consistently tried to restrict

the U.S. use of force so that Washington must get approval

from the UN Security Council where Russia has a veto.

Invoking the UN as the supreme and exclusive arbiter of the

use of force for the United States has been a systematic

plank in Russian foreign policy for over a decade. If the

United States and Europe showed that they did not need a UN

approval (which, in any case, Moscow and Beijing would

veto), this would demonstrate Washington's effective -and

even successful- disregard for Russia to the world, with a

corresponding blow to Russian status, prestige, and real

influence in the Middle East and beyond. Therefore,

continuation or worse, extension and prolongation, of this

operation would only confirm Russian fears that Washington

and NATO are unpredictable actors who are not bound by

consideration of Russian interests, international law, or

anything other than their own sense of their values. These

values, which remain quite inexplicable to Russian leaders,

are often indistinguishable and unnecessarily complex in the

conduct of relations with the West. Moreover, Western

leaders could one day claim the lack of democracy in Russia

or the CIS as a pretext for intervention. Russia, like

China, wants to conduct a "values-free" foreign policy with

the United States and Europe in the manner of eighteenth or

nineteenth century cabinet diplomacy where states could do

as they please domestically. Thus, for example, Russia

simultaneously published atrocity stories about NATO's

conduct while seeking to persuade NATO and Muammar Qaddafi

that it can be a reliable mediator in this operation. Such

maneuvers represent the acme of tactical flexibility that

Moscow prides itself on possessing.



Finally, NATO's Libyan operation presents Russia with

multiple geopolitical risks. Once again Moscow believes that

NATO, backed by Washington, has usurped the clear meaning of

a UN resolution to intervene unilaterally in a civil war on

behalf of forces opposing Russia's client or partner and to

impose democracy by force. Russia also worries that this

could lead (as may well happen) to a prolonged stalemate

that could further inflame its and its neighbors' restive

Muslim populations and the entire Middle East. Second, the

potential victory of these revolutionary forces and NATO

could lead them to ratchet up similar pressure on Syria and

use Libya as a precedent for intervening there. Third, if

the Libyan and Syrian revolutionaries were to win, such a

victory could lead them to look to NATO, not Moscow, in the

future. This would result in strengthening the Western

presence in the Middle East and allowing NATO to consolidate

the area unilaterally. That would constitute a clear defeat

of Moscow's long-standing geopolitical objective of not

letting the United States and/or NATO unilaterally organize

the Middle East. Then Moscow would face regional

marginalization, as well as another successful NATO

unilateral precedent in coercive diplomacy.



All these considerations came together when Foreign Minister

Sergei Lavrov met Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi in

Moscow on May 6, 2011. They announced their grave concern

over Middle Eastern events. Furthermore, they would now

coordinate actions to bring about a "speedy stabilization"

of the situation and prevent negative unpredictable

consequences. Specifically, they adhere to the principle

that peoples should be free to arrange their affairs as they

see fit without outside interference. They both see the UN

Contact Group as having grossly overstepped its authority

and as now being in favor of a NATO ground operation, thus

usurping the Security Council's formal role. They called for

a peaceful settlement and no foreign intervention, which

means Qaddafi stays in power. This coordination will

undoubtedly spread to questions concerning reform in Central

Asia even though Moscow, as noted earlier, would like to see

cautious reforms.



Yet within weeks, Moscow offered to mediate between Qaddafi

and the rebels. It did so because much as it fears prolonged

strife in Libya, it fears marginalization and NATO's victory

even more. Therefore, despite the agreement with China, it

quickly reversed course lest it be isolated vis-…-vis NATO

and regionally. Moscow's maneuvers betray weakness despite

its public posturing. Its advice to Libya, Yemen, Syria,

and Central Asia to institute moderate reforms was utterly

disregarded yet it upholds these regimes even though they

depend, as Syria's Foreign Minister Walid Muallem, said, on

Russia. Their propensity to murder their citizens has

apparently not suggested to Moscow that it has again backed

the wrong horses. Meanwhile, Russia's domestic policies of

repression and anticipation of what amounts to counter-

revolution also betray fear, weakness, and an inability to

transcend the status quo notwithstanding Medvedev's call for

modernization. Should Russia or its neighbors experience

their own version of the Arab spring, this elite

determination to retain power and befriend tyrants as allies

might lead Moscow to its own violent emulation of what is

now a truly revolutionary and violent process in the Middle

East.



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