Iran's Internal Dynamics

From FPRI:

Footnotes


The Newsletter of FPRI's Wachman Center



Iran's Internal Dynamics

by Amin Tarzi



Vol. 16, No. 10

December 2011



Amin Tarzi is the Director of Middle East Studies at the

Marine Corps University in Quantico, Virginia. This essay is

based on his lecture at FPRI's History Institute for

Teachers, Oct. 15-16, 2011, on "Teaching the Middle East:

Between Authoritarianism and Reform." Videofiles and other

materials from the conference are available at:

http://www.fpri.org/education/1110middleeast/



Available on the web and in pdf format at:

http://www.fpri.org/footnotes/1610.201111.tarzi.iran.html

Audio and Video of Is the Green Movement Dead?: Political

Dissent Iran available at:

http://www.fpri.org/multimedia/20111015.tarzi.iran.html





Iran's Internal Dynamics



by Amin Tarzi



Since its establishment in 1979, the Islamic Republic of

Iran has never been free of political intrigue. However,

since the disputed June 2009 presidential election, the

level of intrigue has increased. And the recent pubic rift

between the two highest office holders-the unelected supreme

leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and the elected president,

Mahmud Ahmadinejad-may very well be pushing Iran and the

Islamic Republic regime close to the brink. While the

denouement of this latest political wrangling has yet to be

written, the "writing on the wall" suggests that the results

will be anything but anti-climactic.



Prior to the 2009 presidential election and the internal

fallout that ensued, the Islamic Republic's leadership

structure, while perplexing and labyrinthine, was

intelligible. The office of the supreme leader was, both on

paper and in fact, the final arbiter, an impartial entity

external to and above the governing administrative

structures. The person of Khamenei and his position served

as the source of ultimate legitimacy within the Islamic

Republic regime and as the regime's guardian. That all

changed with the supreme leader's blatant and unquestioned

support of Ahmadinejad prior to the election and after his

controversial victory. This action removed any lingering

sense that the office of the supreme leader and the person

of Khamenei were impartial and above political machinations

and manipulations.[1]



While most of the world's attention was focused on the

activities of the popular opposition and its Green

Revolution after the controversial electoral outcome, a rift

emerged between the Supreme Leader and his chosen candidate,

the reelected president. The alliance formed for political

expediency prior to the 2005 presidential election to keep

the pragmatist and reformist camps from political position

and strengthened in the run-up to the 2009 election now

seemed to be unraveling. The confident, newly reelected

president began asserting his independence and, in the minds

of the conservatives aligned with Khamenei, deviating from

the correct path of the Islamic Revolution. In boxing terms,

the gloves came off. In July 2009, the president appointed

Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei as the first vice president, but

Khamenei pressured Ahmadinejad to reverse the appointment.

While caving to this demand of the Supreme Leader,

Ahmadinejad challenged Khamenei by appointing Mashaei as his

chief of staff. Furthermore, in December, Ahmadinejad,

reportedly per insistence of Mashaei, fired his foreign

minister, Manouchehr Motaki while the latter was on an

official visit to Africa. Motaki's dismissal was regarded as

a rebuke to Khamenei for preventing Mashaei's appointment to

the post of first vice presidency. The tensions between the

office of the president and that of the supreme leader

continued to escalate, and mostly in public, until the two

offices came to blows over Ahmadinejad's dismissal and his

forced reinstatement of intelligence minister, Haydar

Moslehi, in April 2011. The growing animosity between the

two men and their respective offices is evidence of the

widening crack in the Islamic Republic's governing regime,

something not seen since the very early days of the

revolution.



IRGC FLEXES ITS MUSCLE

Lieutenant General Mohammad Ali Jafari, Commander of Islamic

Republic Guard Corps (IRGC), declared in a July 2011

interview that the IRGC, acting as commissars of Iran's

judicial branch, arrested a number of deviant individuals on

charges of economic and moral violations.[2] These

individuals also happened to have close ties to supporters

of Ahmadinejad and Mashaei, or the true figures of the

"digressive current," as Jafari insinuated. What this

announcement suggests is that the IRGC is seeking to expand

its authority within the Islamic Republic regime. Yes, the

IRGC has in the past warned former president Mohammad

Khatami not to stray too far off the path of the Islamic

Revolution; however, it was done via private correspondence,

not via the press and not without the usual deference to the

office to which the IRGC is subservient. The IRGC's main

mission is to safeguard the Islamic Revolution, including

the office of the supreme leader. Throughout the existence

of the Islamic Republic, the powers of the judiciary have

been kept, at least ostensibly, outside the authority of the

IRGC. Jafari's public declaration that his forces are in

fact acting as enforcers of the law is a potential game

changer and is an affirmation of what was anticipated in the

first issue of the Middle East Studies Insights, in January

2010, that "as the Iranian leadership continues to scramble

to regain order and legitimacy, the door has been opened for

the_ IRGC to step in amid the power struggle with clinched

fists to fill the power vacuum-leaving the hardliners in the

IRGC ranks as the powerbrokers and eventual deciders of the

course of action for the Islamic Republic."[3] The power

balance has shifted. With Khamenei's unprecedented overt

support of Ahmadinejad and the subsequent public sparring

between former allies, Khamenei and his office lost much

credibility, becoming more dependent on the IRGC for

safeguarding the Islamic Republic regime and thus, changing

the relationship between the supreme leader and the IRGC

from one of leader and follower to that of interdependency

for mutual survival.



ELIMINATION OF THE PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM?

Khamenei in a recent speech reinforced the elevated position

of his office, stressing that the role of the office of the

supreme leader was to manage not administer and that he, as

leader, was charged with overseeing the administrative

branches of the government and guarding the general

direction of the Islamic Republic regime. He also hinted

during that speech that if necessary the Islamic Republic

might change the current presidential system into a

parliamentary system of government.[4] This was no veiled

threat. Through this speech, Khamenei issued a warning to

Ahmadinejad and his supporters that they as individuals as

well as the top elected administrative branch of government

could be sacrificed if required to safeguard the Islamic

Republic regime and that he, Khamenei, has the authority to

carry this out. But does he?



END OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC?

The question remains whether Khamenei and the office of the

supreme leader enjoy the level of support that they had

prior to 2005, especially in light of the 2009 election and

ensuing political maneuvering. If not, then that leaves room

for the IRGC to "insert self" as the true guardian of the

administrative systems of the Islamic Republic and to

sideline the office of the supreme leader or to alter its

authorities if the Islamic Republic regime or the IRGC

itself requires it. This would end the Islamic Republic of

Iran as we know it since 1979. In a twist of irony,

Ahmadinejad, the man who has come to personify all that is

negative about the regime in Tehran, may in fact be the

albatross that is now hanging on the neck of the Islamic

Republic.



*This article has been reprinted with the permission of the

author from: Amin Tarzi, "Iran's Internal Dynamics," MES

Insights, Volume 2, Issue 5 (November 2011),

www.mcu.usmc.mil/Middle%20East%20Studies%20Documents/MES%20Insights/MES%20Insights%20Vol%202,%20Issue%205.pdf



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Notes



[1] Amin Tarzi and Adam Seitz, "Iran at a Crossroad," MES

Insights, Volume 1, Issue 1 (January 2010).



[2] "Sepah zabet-e dastgah-e qazayi dar barkhord ba jaryan-e

enherafi ast," Mehr News Agency, July 5, 2011,

www.mehrnews.com/fa/NewsPrint.aspx?NewsID=1351670, accessed

November 3, 2011.



[3] Tarzi and Seitz, "Iran at a Crossroad."



[4] "Bayanat-e rahbar-e muazam-e enqelab dar didar ba

daneshgahyan-e ostan-e Kermanshah" The Office of the Supreme

Leader Sayyid Ali Khamenei, October 16, 2011,

www.leader.ir/langs/fa/print.php?sec=bayanat&id=8729,

accessed October 31, 2011.



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(http://www.fpri.org/).