From Fikra Forum:
In recent weeks, Bahrain’s Royal Court and mainstream opposition groups have exchanged communications regarding a way forward for Bahrain. Though a real dialogue has yet to commence, communications consisted of how a dialogue will proceed logistically.
It is widely believed that Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad al-Khalifa stands behind the latest initiative. Unsurprisingly, he opted to include the Royal Court Minister Khalid bin Ahmed al-Khalifa and other adversaries from the onset, a marked difference from the strategy used last year.
Political groups led by Al Wefaq contend that opponents of the Crown Prince within the royal family succeeded in torpedoing his six week mandate for negotiations with opposition leaders in February 2011. These original discussions commenced on February 19, 2011 for a six week period, but they were cut short on March 14th upon the arrival of troops from neighboring Saudi Arabia.
Opposition groups took advantage of the latest opportunity for dialogue by submitting their proposal for a political solution, as detailed in the Manama Document. The main demands center on the formation of a parliamentary government, ensuring popular input and requiring fair electoral districts that meet the universal practice of “one person, one vote.” Other demands call for ensuring equal opportunity to all citizens, showing no tolerance for discriminatory practices, and allowing for free media.
Significantly, the meetings occurred in the lead up to the first anniversary of the uprising on February 14. Some fear that Bahraini officials were trying to assuage the opposition in advance of the anniversary by publicizing the renewed talks. Conversely, others view this act as a testimony to the success of anti-regime youths forcing politicians back to the negotiating table for a variety of reasons.
Still, those familiar with the initiative point out that the Minister of the Royal Court demonstrated an unwillingness to commit himself to specifics, including an agenda and dates for future meetings. Lastly, some maintain that the latest move by the Royal Court was primarily to ease international pressures from the U.S., UK, and EU calling for the Bahraini government to engage with opposition groups. As someone familiar with behind the scenes moves, I can confirm that both sides, namely the authorities and the opposition groups, are under pressure from the West—particularly the U.S., UK, and EU—to find a compromise.
Off the streets
On a positive note, recent communications are indicative of the main opposition groups’ willingness to engage in negotiations. Opposition groups firmly believe that the majority of Bahrainis look for a political solution to address challenges facing the nation.
Nevertheless, the views of the opposition and regime forces are not uniform; there are elements on both sides that adamantly oppose a compromise. Some in the opposition camp continue to press for regime change, while pro-regime hardliners inside and outside the royal court remain suspicious of Shiite opposition groups, who make up a majority of government opponents.
Damage control
Bahrain cannot afford further losses; thus far, damage has been considerable (66 deaths at the time of writing this piece). The longer the problem persists, the more casualties are likely along with other adverse consequences.
Concurrently, Bahrain’s economy has sustained substantial costs in a span of one year alone. For example, real gross domestic product growth dropped by one half to 2 per cent in 2011. An index of Bahrain’s stock market showed a decline by a hefty 20 per cent, the worst amongst fellow Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Also, Bahrain has emerged as the least competitive economy of all GCC countries according to the 2011-2012 Global Competitiveness Report, produced by the World Economic Forum.
An agreement over a framework for facilitating a political solution is essential to help bring about much needed national reconciliation. Animosity between Sunnis and Shiites is at a historically high level to the point of undermining the country’s unity.
Nevertheless, prospects for a lasting political solution do not look as depressing as they were one year since the start of February 14th movement. Happily, many people look forward to a fair and a lasting solution, as the alternative is violence.
Looking forward, people like Crown Prince Salman need to find ways to convince hardliners in the royal family and in the Sunni community of the need for having a dialogue with opponents. Many people close to the regime do not like the idea of officials engaging in talks with political opponents, branding them as unappreciative of the achievements of the royal family. Consequently, the authorities will most likely press for offering minimum political concessions, instead focusing energies, where possible, on addressing outstanding issues such as jobs and housing that affect the day to day life of ordinary Shiites.
For their part, political groups are less constrained in convincing their supporters of the need for engaging in dialogue. Religious leaders wielding considerable influence such as Sheikh Isa Qasem as well as Sheikh Ali Salman (General-Secretary of Al Wefaq) should not have trouble explaining the logic for a negotiated political solution. Their argument should center on the role of authorities finding common ground, rather than on their opponents changing course.
In short, slowly but surely, the light at the end of the tunnel can be seen in Bahrain.
Jasim Husain is a former Member of Parliament in Bahrain. In March 2011, he resigned as part of a group decision by Bahrain’s Al Wefaq Society.
It is widely believed that Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad al-Khalifa stands behind the latest initiative. Unsurprisingly, he opted to include the Royal Court Minister Khalid bin Ahmed al-Khalifa and other adversaries from the onset, a marked difference from the strategy used last year.
Political groups led by Al Wefaq contend that opponents of the Crown Prince within the royal family succeeded in torpedoing his six week mandate for negotiations with opposition leaders in February 2011. These original discussions commenced on February 19, 2011 for a six week period, but they were cut short on March 14th upon the arrival of troops from neighboring Saudi Arabia.
Opposition groups took advantage of the latest opportunity for dialogue by submitting their proposal for a political solution, as detailed in the Manama Document. The main demands center on the formation of a parliamentary government, ensuring popular input and requiring fair electoral districts that meet the universal practice of “one person, one vote.” Other demands call for ensuring equal opportunity to all citizens, showing no tolerance for discriminatory practices, and allowing for free media.
Significantly, the meetings occurred in the lead up to the first anniversary of the uprising on February 14. Some fear that Bahraini officials were trying to assuage the opposition in advance of the anniversary by publicizing the renewed talks. Conversely, others view this act as a testimony to the success of anti-regime youths forcing politicians back to the negotiating table for a variety of reasons.
Still, those familiar with the initiative point out that the Minister of the Royal Court demonstrated an unwillingness to commit himself to specifics, including an agenda and dates for future meetings. Lastly, some maintain that the latest move by the Royal Court was primarily to ease international pressures from the U.S., UK, and EU calling for the Bahraini government to engage with opposition groups. As someone familiar with behind the scenes moves, I can confirm that both sides, namely the authorities and the opposition groups, are under pressure from the West—particularly the U.S., UK, and EU—to find a compromise.
Off the streets
On a positive note, recent communications are indicative of the main opposition groups’ willingness to engage in negotiations. Opposition groups firmly believe that the majority of Bahrainis look for a political solution to address challenges facing the nation.
Nevertheless, the views of the opposition and regime forces are not uniform; there are elements on both sides that adamantly oppose a compromise. Some in the opposition camp continue to press for regime change, while pro-regime hardliners inside and outside the royal court remain suspicious of Shiite opposition groups, who make up a majority of government opponents.
Damage control
Bahrain cannot afford further losses; thus far, damage has been considerable (66 deaths at the time of writing this piece). The longer the problem persists, the more casualties are likely along with other adverse consequences.
Concurrently, Bahrain’s economy has sustained substantial costs in a span of one year alone. For example, real gross domestic product growth dropped by one half to 2 per cent in 2011. An index of Bahrain’s stock market showed a decline by a hefty 20 per cent, the worst amongst fellow Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Also, Bahrain has emerged as the least competitive economy of all GCC countries according to the 2011-2012 Global Competitiveness Report, produced by the World Economic Forum.
An agreement over a framework for facilitating a political solution is essential to help bring about much needed national reconciliation. Animosity between Sunnis and Shiites is at a historically high level to the point of undermining the country’s unity.
Nevertheless, prospects for a lasting political solution do not look as depressing as they were one year since the start of February 14th movement. Happily, many people look forward to a fair and a lasting solution, as the alternative is violence.
Looking forward, people like Crown Prince Salman need to find ways to convince hardliners in the royal family and in the Sunni community of the need for having a dialogue with opponents. Many people close to the regime do not like the idea of officials engaging in talks with political opponents, branding them as unappreciative of the achievements of the royal family. Consequently, the authorities will most likely press for offering minimum political concessions, instead focusing energies, where possible, on addressing outstanding issues such as jobs and housing that affect the day to day life of ordinary Shiites.
For their part, political groups are less constrained in convincing their supporters of the need for engaging in dialogue. Religious leaders wielding considerable influence such as Sheikh Isa Qasem as well as Sheikh Ali Salman (General-Secretary of Al Wefaq) should not have trouble explaining the logic for a negotiated political solution. Their argument should center on the role of authorities finding common ground, rather than on their opponents changing course.
In short, slowly but surely, the light at the end of the tunnel can be seen in Bahrain.
Jasim Husain is a former Member of Parliament in Bahrain. In March 2011, he resigned as part of a group decision by Bahrain’s Al Wefaq Society.
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