From NOW Lebanon:
To read more: http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArchiveDetails.aspx?ID=356704#ixzz1nT8ld6Mr
Only 25% of a given NOW Lebanon article can be republished. For information on republishing rights from NOW Lebanon: http://www.nowlebanon.com/Sub.aspx?ID=125478
The Brotherhood’s media blitz
Essam El-Erian (2nd row L), vice chairman of the Freedom and Justice Party, and Muslim Brotherhood member Mohamed El-Beltagy chat during a parliament session. Since winning big in the wake of the revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood and FJP have launched a media blitz. (AFP photo)
Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood has been displaying great skill in handling the media over the past year. Since the revolution last January and the party’s electoral success in the recent round of polls in the country, the Brotherhood’s media outlets have tirelessly tried to project an image of moderation. But many secularists and leftists remain suspicious.
The Muslim Brotherhood and its political arm, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), have invested considerable human and financial capital in their marketing campaign over the past twelve months.
“The Brotherhood is very savvy and clever when it comes to the media, and they know their audience very well. They certainly have very good media advisors,” says Khaled Fahmy, professor of History at the American University in Cairo.
In the past year, the Brotherhood has set up a TV channel and a newspaper, and both it and the FJP have been keeping daily-updated websites in English and Arabic.
Their Twitter page, Ikhwanweb, has almost 8,500 followers. The managers of the account regularly engage their followers in lively discussions, and the FJP is the only party in Egypt that has its own smartphone App.
“They show a high degree of sophistication,” says Said Sadek, a political analyst in Cairo. “The money for their media efforts is coming from Saudi Arabia.”
Sadek, along with other liberal and leftist commentators in Egypt, believe that the Brotherhood’s efforts aim at concealing their real intentions. “The Brotherhood and the FJP are trying to appease the growing fears of an Islamist takeover. They want to appear liberal. But what they are saying is just lip service,” he says.
Since the Brotherhood did not take part in the recent round of Tahrir protests in November and December, many liberal and leftist commentators talk of an alleged deal between the body and the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which critics say is attempting to monopolize power in the wake of the revolution.
“The Brotherhood and SCAF are the most important stakeholders in the country now,” says Mara Revkin, analyst at the US think-tank the Atlantic Council. “They have a lot to gain and a lot to lose.”
Critics claim SCAF wants to hand over internal powers to the Brotherhood while it remains in charge of defense and security and gets to keep control of its enormous budget. SCAF’s assets are estimated to be worth between 10 and 30 percent of the country’s formal economy.
“The Brotherhood has always publicly insisted that there is no deal. But especially since they offered immunity from legal action to the SCAF for its actions since the revolution, the allegations grew louder,” says Revkin.
The Brotherhood reacted to the allegations in a statement published in Egyptian newspaper Al-Masry Al-Youm. “After the glorious revolution, Egypt will not accept any deals or make any agreements that detract from the people’s sovereignty, or impose a trusteeship over… absolute freedom.”
Less immediate but just as profound are the growing fears in liberal and international circles that the Brotherhood will use its electoral success to Islamize Egyptian society and foreign policy. The Brotherhood has tried to counter those fears in its media campaigns.
“The Brotherhood has two tongues for two kinds of people: To the international community they talk like the Gulf States. But to their own members they send a different message,” says Sadek.
Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel is of particular concern to policy makers in Western capitals.
Senior leader of the Brotherhood Essam El-Erian recently said in an interview with the New York Times that the Camp David Accords are a “commitment of the state, not a group or a party, and this we respect.”
But other members of the Brotherhood said that there are parts of the treaty that will be revised, while still others have called for a national referendum on the pact. The peace treaty is widely unpopular in Egypt and would probably fail in a public referendum.
“The Brotherhood and the FJP often say different things. So sometimes you don’t know. Is this statement a shift in policy or just the opinion of one spokesman?” says Revkin.
A recent example was a statement by the chairman of the Brotherhood, Mohammed Badi, who said that after the elections his group got closer to establishing a “rightly guided caliphate.”
After newspaper commentaries used Badi’s statement to say that the Brotherhood wants to create a fundamentalist state, FJP spokesmen rushed forward to counter. Instead, they claimed that Badi was talking about something more in line with an economic union, like in Europe.
“Since the FJP is a political party and stood in elections it has softened its rhetoric,” says Sadek.
Historian Fahmy sees the Brotherhood as a victim of its own making. “Because the Brotherhood has these very good spokesmen and media campaigns, the people start to distrust them. But if we keep on saying that they are insincere, they will become insincere,” he says.
“I don’t know what they think,” concludes Fahmy. “The test will be if the things they say in public and the things they do thereafter match. It will depend on what they deliver.”
The Muslim Brotherhood and its political arm, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), have invested considerable human and financial capital in their marketing campaign over the past twelve months.
“The Brotherhood is very savvy and clever when it comes to the media, and they know their audience very well. They certainly have very good media advisors,” says Khaled Fahmy, professor of History at the American University in Cairo.
In the past year, the Brotherhood has set up a TV channel and a newspaper, and both it and the FJP have been keeping daily-updated websites in English and Arabic.
Their Twitter page, Ikhwanweb, has almost 8,500 followers. The managers of the account regularly engage their followers in lively discussions, and the FJP is the only party in Egypt that has its own smartphone App.
“They show a high degree of sophistication,” says Said Sadek, a political analyst in Cairo. “The money for their media efforts is coming from Saudi Arabia.”
Sadek, along with other liberal and leftist commentators in Egypt, believe that the Brotherhood’s efforts aim at concealing their real intentions. “The Brotherhood and the FJP are trying to appease the growing fears of an Islamist takeover. They want to appear liberal. But what they are saying is just lip service,” he says.
Since the Brotherhood did not take part in the recent round of Tahrir protests in November and December, many liberal and leftist commentators talk of an alleged deal between the body and the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which critics say is attempting to monopolize power in the wake of the revolution.
“The Brotherhood and SCAF are the most important stakeholders in the country now,” says Mara Revkin, analyst at the US think-tank the Atlantic Council. “They have a lot to gain and a lot to lose.”
Critics claim SCAF wants to hand over internal powers to the Brotherhood while it remains in charge of defense and security and gets to keep control of its enormous budget. SCAF’s assets are estimated to be worth between 10 and 30 percent of the country’s formal economy.
“The Brotherhood has always publicly insisted that there is no deal. But especially since they offered immunity from legal action to the SCAF for its actions since the revolution, the allegations grew louder,” says Revkin.
The Brotherhood reacted to the allegations in a statement published in Egyptian newspaper Al-Masry Al-Youm. “After the glorious revolution, Egypt will not accept any deals or make any agreements that detract from the people’s sovereignty, or impose a trusteeship over… absolute freedom.”
Less immediate but just as profound are the growing fears in liberal and international circles that the Brotherhood will use its electoral success to Islamize Egyptian society and foreign policy. The Brotherhood has tried to counter those fears in its media campaigns.
“The Brotherhood has two tongues for two kinds of people: To the international community they talk like the Gulf States. But to their own members they send a different message,” says Sadek.
Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel is of particular concern to policy makers in Western capitals.
Senior leader of the Brotherhood Essam El-Erian recently said in an interview with the New York Times that the Camp David Accords are a “commitment of the state, not a group or a party, and this we respect.”
But other members of the Brotherhood said that there are parts of the treaty that will be revised, while still others have called for a national referendum on the pact. The peace treaty is widely unpopular in Egypt and would probably fail in a public referendum.
“The Brotherhood and the FJP often say different things. So sometimes you don’t know. Is this statement a shift in policy or just the opinion of one spokesman?” says Revkin.
A recent example was a statement by the chairman of the Brotherhood, Mohammed Badi, who said that after the elections his group got closer to establishing a “rightly guided caliphate.”
After newspaper commentaries used Badi’s statement to say that the Brotherhood wants to create a fundamentalist state, FJP spokesmen rushed forward to counter. Instead, they claimed that Badi was talking about something more in line with an economic union, like in Europe.
“Since the FJP is a political party and stood in elections it has softened its rhetoric,” says Sadek.
Historian Fahmy sees the Brotherhood as a victim of its own making. “Because the Brotherhood has these very good spokesmen and media campaigns, the people start to distrust them. But if we keep on saying that they are insincere, they will become insincere,” he says.
“I don’t know what they think,” concludes Fahmy. “The test will be if the things they say in public and the things they do thereafter match. It will depend on what they deliver.”
To read more: http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArchiveDetails.aspx?ID=356704#ixzz1nT8ld6Mr
Only 25% of a given NOW Lebanon article can be republished. For information on republishing rights from NOW Lebanon: http://www.nowlebanon.com/Sub.aspx?ID=125478
No comments:
Post a Comment