From FPRI:
IS THE KIM FAMILY REGIME RATIONAL
AND WHY DON'T THE NORTH KOREAN PEOPLE REBEL?
by David S. Maxwell
January 30, 2012
David S. Maxwell is the Associate Director of the Center for
Peace and Security Studies and the Security Studies Program
in the School of Foreign Service of Georgetown University.
He is a retired US Army Special Forces Colonel with command
and staff assignments in Korea, Japan, Germany, the
Philippines, and the continental United States. Before
retirement from military service he served as a member of
the military faculty teaching national security at the
National War College.
Available on the web and in pdf format at:
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/2012/201201.maxwell.nkorea.html
IS THE KIM FAMILY REGIME RATIONAL
AND WHY DON'T THE NORTH KOREAN PEOPLE REBEL?
by David S. Maxwell
With the death of Kim Jong-il and the ensuing temporary
focus on North Korea, I was recently asked some questions
that I think are worth considering. In light of the negative
reaction of the South Korean stock markets to the rumor that
the North had conducted a nuclear test, I was asked whether
the North would ever carry out the irrational act of using
its very limited nuclear weapons against the South when such
an action would cause the end of the regime? In addition,
given the horrendous suffering of the North, many rightly
question why North Koreans do not rebel against the
tyrannical and criminal dictatorship -- arguably one of the
worst violators of human rights in modern history -- of the
Kim Family Regime (KFR)? This paper will provide some
thoughts on the answers to these separate but inter-related
questions.
IS NORTH KOREA RATIONAL?
The political entity North Korea, or more specifically the
Kim Family Regime, is very rational in the sense that it
knows what it wants and works tirelessly to achieve it. The
regime's operating strategy can be broken down as follows:
Vital national interest: survival of the Kim Family
Regime (not the nation-state but the regime).
Strategic aim: reunification of the Peninsula under the
control of the DPRK (the only way to ensure the long-
term survival of the KFR -- because anything else means
that it will not survive)
Key condition to achieve its strategic aim: get US
forces off the Peninsula (or in Sun Tzu terms "split the
alliance").
International political aim: to be recognized as a
nuclear power.
Why does the North want (or need in its calculus) nuclear
weapons? First and foremost it believes that it needs its
nuclear program as a necessary deterrent. We should
understand that the lessons that the regime has learned from
Iraq and Libya are that their downfalls were a result of
their not yet having developed nuclear weapons. Of course
if anything happens to limit Iran's development of such
weapons (like what happened to Syria's covert reactor
several years ago) that lesson will only be reinforced.
Second, the nuclear program has proved to be an extremely
useful strategic instrument in its diplomatic toolkit that
has resulted in a range of political and economic
concessions over the years and it will exploit that tool for
as long as the regime is in existence.
Third, in my opinion, the regime is not suicidal at all and
everything that it does and will do is focused on protecting
its vital national interest. However, as irrational as it
may seem to us that could include launching a war
(particularly if the regime believes it is threatened and
has no other alternative). And what is really dangerous to
the region is that by the nature of the system no one is
going to tell Kim Jong-un that his military is not capable
of winning and the information that he receives from people
around him (who have to act like sycophants in order to
survive) can make a very irrational decision to us seem very
rational to him.
Fourth, deterrence has been effective against the North.
Hwang Jong Yop's debriefings suggest that the North has
never initiated an attack on the ROK because it knows that
it cannot win a nuclear war with the US and it believes that
the US would use nuclear weapons against it.[1] This
calculation drove its need for its own nuclear deterrent,
which the regime had been trying to develop since the
1950's. Ironically, the very effectiveness of our deterrent
drove the North to possess its own.
Lastly, I think an examination of the regime's actions over
the past 60 years shows that it has been very rationally
following its own "play book" to protect its vital national
interests based on its understanding of the international
and peninsula security situation. It has been singularly
focused on its vital national interest and achieving its
strategic aim as well as using provocations to gain
political and economic concessions.
Of course on the flip side there are myriad reasons to judge
the North as irrational: Is it rational to think it can win
a war with the ROK, let alone with the ROK-US alliance? Is
it rational to use provocations up to and including either
the use or sale of nuclear weapons or capabilities? Is it
rational to starve some 23 million people to allow the
regime to survive? Was it rational to attack and hijack the
Pueblo? Is it rational to attempt multiple assassinations
to kill the South Korean leadership (at least twice in Seoul
and once in Rangoon) and to use terrorist action against the
South and international community? Is it rational to trade
in myriad illicit activities to include being one of the
world's largest and most proficient counterfeiters (to
include that of US currency but also cigarettes and drugs
such as Viagra and methamphetamines)? Is it rational to turn
down Chinese help for economic reform (because such reform
would likely end the regime)? Of course from our perspective
the answer to my rhetorical questions is no but we cannot
just view the problem from our perspective or even through
the eyes of South Koreans, who are now vastly different than
the North Korean regime. From the Kim Family Regime's
perspective, it has acted in a very rational way and, if we
look at things carefully, we should see it has acted in a
very predictable way over the past 60 years.
But to the irrationality question and the reaction of the
ROK financial markets response to the rumor, I think the
question has to be focused on the market rationality.
Surely the "market" must think the North is irrational
which is why the rumor of a nuclear test might affect
decisions to buy and sell. It is difficult to explain the
North's rationality to the market -- though if we could make
the "market" understand the regime and its decision making
we would be on our way to being able to attack a key part of
the North's strategy, which is to be able to stir up fear of
it.
WHY DON'T THE PEOPLE REBEL?
The answer is actually three fold. First, there is a belief
system in place that is far worse than that of the Japanese
prior to and during the Second World War and it is called
Juche. Some have even called it "Kim Il Sungism" or as the
father of Juche himself called it "Dear Leader Absolutism."
Juche is all about the cult of the Kim Family, taking on a
religious dimension. Kim Il Sung took on a deity-like status
when he died; his body remains on display and he remains the
leader of North Korea for eternity (which is why the regime
is working so hard to connect Kim Jong-un to Kim Il-sung
notably in his looks, dress, and mannerisms). Since 1993 the
Juche ideology has taught that to die for your country means
you will achieve immortality.
Juche, although popularly called "Self Reliance," can be
summarized this way: "Man rules all things; man decides
all things," the man being Kim Il-sung or the regime
leadership. "The Kim Il-sung Juche ideology is based on
these precepts: In ideology Juche (autonomy); in politics,
self-reliance; in economics, independence; and in National
Security: self-defense."[2]
As Hwang Jong Yop, who has spoken out about the Juche
ideology after he defected in 1997, puts it:
The fundamental reason for human rights being trampled
in North Korea lies in the 'Dear Leader Absolutism'
dictatorship. There can be no human rights for the
people in North Korea where the greatest morality and
absolute law is giving one's mind and body to the Dear
Leader; and living as a slave who obeys completely and
unconditionally the Dear Leader - it is the only life
permitted the North Korean People.[3]
Second is that Kim Il-sung established a security and
control system that would have made Joseph Stalin blush.
From the "rule of threes" (anyone found to be disloyal in
word or deed will have three generations "expunged" -- at
best all three generations go to the gulag and at worst all
three are totally expunged, as in execution) to the
establishment of a personal loyalty system -- i.e., you get
promoted or get ahead or are simply allowed to exist by
demonstrating personal loyalty to the regime and not by
merit -- means that there is a system of control that is
totally focused on protecting the regime from rebellion.
This personal loyalty system has the added benefit of
preventing coups because anyone who says a word against the
regime must be reported both by regulation but also because
by reporting it one further demonstrates one's loyalty to
the regime and allows that person to "get ahead."
At the same time the personal loyalty system explains why
the bureaucratic systems within the regime are so broken and
inefficient -- loyalty does not mean competence of course.
It further sows the seeds of distrust as people even report
others for such simple things as forgetting to wear the pin
of the Great Leader on their jackets and shirts -- as it
must be displayed at all times (as an aside most people will
wear the pin of the Great Leader [Kim Il-sung] vice the Dear
Leader [Kim Jong-il]). Even family members report on other
family members (the dirty little secret is that while the
rule of threes still applies the family member who reports
on his or her family will be initially rewarded, but usually
suffers from some quiet but catastrophic accident some
months later such as a swimming accident in the winter or a
traffic accident or perhaps poisoning by a piece of lead the
size of 7.62 millimeters). This system is probably the best
at preventing coups and conspiracies from within, both among
the elite and at the grassroots level.
Many of our defector friends have informed us about the
"paralysis" of the people in the North because they cannot
reconcile their sixty years of indoctrination with the
increasing knowledge that they are gaining of the outside
world. A simple explanation can actually be seen in works
like Ted Gurr's Why Men Rebel, such as this from the summary
of his book:
People can become inured to a bad state of affairs, even
one that offers so little access to life-sustaining
resources that members of the group are starving or
dying of remediable diseases or exposure.
CONCLUSION
I still hold out some hope for the North Korean people.
Principally, I strongly recommend an aggressive influence
campaign to get information into the people to conduct the
psychological preparation necessary to mitigate the
challenges in a post-regime collapse or post-conflict North.
In addition, we need to target the second-tier leadership
to be able to coerce and co-opt them when the time comes.
But I am under no illusion that an influence campaign will
cause a popular uprising for reasons more than the people
just having access to social media and cell phones in large
numbers. While I know that there are some who say that if
there is no chance of a popular uprising then why bother
with an influence campaign? Still, we really need to invest
in one for the long-term reasons I mention above. And we
should remember that regime collapse will only occur when it
loses its central governing effectiveness and the coherency
of its military and security forces. As long as those two
conditions exist the regime will remain in power with the
people sufficiently oppressed (and their horrendous
suffering continuing).
----------------------------------------------------------
Notes
[1] Based on the author's personal knowledge from serving in
South Korea at the time.
[2] Kukpang Ilbo, March 1999.
[3] "North Korean Human Rights/HwangJong-yop," Chosun Ilbo,
2 DEC
99, www.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/199912/19991202034.ht,
----------------------------------------------------------
Copyright Foreign Policy Research Institute
(http://www.fpri.org/).
IS THE KIM FAMILY REGIME RATIONAL
AND WHY DON'T THE NORTH KOREAN PEOPLE REBEL?
by David S. Maxwell
January 30, 2012
David S. Maxwell is the Associate Director of the Center for
Peace and Security Studies and the Security Studies Program
in the School of Foreign Service of Georgetown University.
He is a retired US Army Special Forces Colonel with command
and staff assignments in Korea, Japan, Germany, the
Philippines, and the continental United States. Before
retirement from military service he served as a member of
the military faculty teaching national security at the
National War College.
Available on the web and in pdf format at:
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/2012/201201.maxwell.nkorea.html
IS THE KIM FAMILY REGIME RATIONAL
AND WHY DON'T THE NORTH KOREAN PEOPLE REBEL?
by David S. Maxwell
With the death of Kim Jong-il and the ensuing temporary
focus on North Korea, I was recently asked some questions
that I think are worth considering. In light of the negative
reaction of the South Korean stock markets to the rumor that
the North had conducted a nuclear test, I was asked whether
the North would ever carry out the irrational act of using
its very limited nuclear weapons against the South when such
an action would cause the end of the regime? In addition,
given the horrendous suffering of the North, many rightly
question why North Koreans do not rebel against the
tyrannical and criminal dictatorship -- arguably one of the
worst violators of human rights in modern history -- of the
Kim Family Regime (KFR)? This paper will provide some
thoughts on the answers to these separate but inter-related
questions.
IS NORTH KOREA RATIONAL?
The political entity North Korea, or more specifically the
Kim Family Regime, is very rational in the sense that it
knows what it wants and works tirelessly to achieve it. The
regime's operating strategy can be broken down as follows:
Vital national interest: survival of the Kim Family
Regime (not the nation-state but the regime).
Strategic aim: reunification of the Peninsula under the
control of the DPRK (the only way to ensure the long-
term survival of the KFR -- because anything else means
that it will not survive)
Key condition to achieve its strategic aim: get US
forces off the Peninsula (or in Sun Tzu terms "split the
alliance").
International political aim: to be recognized as a
nuclear power.
Why does the North want (or need in its calculus) nuclear
weapons? First and foremost it believes that it needs its
nuclear program as a necessary deterrent. We should
understand that the lessons that the regime has learned from
Iraq and Libya are that their downfalls were a result of
their not yet having developed nuclear weapons. Of course
if anything happens to limit Iran's development of such
weapons (like what happened to Syria's covert reactor
several years ago) that lesson will only be reinforced.
Second, the nuclear program has proved to be an extremely
useful strategic instrument in its diplomatic toolkit that
has resulted in a range of political and economic
concessions over the years and it will exploit that tool for
as long as the regime is in existence.
Third, in my opinion, the regime is not suicidal at all and
everything that it does and will do is focused on protecting
its vital national interest. However, as irrational as it
may seem to us that could include launching a war
(particularly if the regime believes it is threatened and
has no other alternative). And what is really dangerous to
the region is that by the nature of the system no one is
going to tell Kim Jong-un that his military is not capable
of winning and the information that he receives from people
around him (who have to act like sycophants in order to
survive) can make a very irrational decision to us seem very
rational to him.
Fourth, deterrence has been effective against the North.
Hwang Jong Yop's debriefings suggest that the North has
never initiated an attack on the ROK because it knows that
it cannot win a nuclear war with the US and it believes that
the US would use nuclear weapons against it.[1] This
calculation drove its need for its own nuclear deterrent,
which the regime had been trying to develop since the
1950's. Ironically, the very effectiveness of our deterrent
drove the North to possess its own.
Lastly, I think an examination of the regime's actions over
the past 60 years shows that it has been very rationally
following its own "play book" to protect its vital national
interests based on its understanding of the international
and peninsula security situation. It has been singularly
focused on its vital national interest and achieving its
strategic aim as well as using provocations to gain
political and economic concessions.
Of course on the flip side there are myriad reasons to judge
the North as irrational: Is it rational to think it can win
a war with the ROK, let alone with the ROK-US alliance? Is
it rational to use provocations up to and including either
the use or sale of nuclear weapons or capabilities? Is it
rational to starve some 23 million people to allow the
regime to survive? Was it rational to attack and hijack the
Pueblo? Is it rational to attempt multiple assassinations
to kill the South Korean leadership (at least twice in Seoul
and once in Rangoon) and to use terrorist action against the
South and international community? Is it rational to trade
in myriad illicit activities to include being one of the
world's largest and most proficient counterfeiters (to
include that of US currency but also cigarettes and drugs
such as Viagra and methamphetamines)? Is it rational to turn
down Chinese help for economic reform (because such reform
would likely end the regime)? Of course from our perspective
the answer to my rhetorical questions is no but we cannot
just view the problem from our perspective or even through
the eyes of South Koreans, who are now vastly different than
the North Korean regime. From the Kim Family Regime's
perspective, it has acted in a very rational way and, if we
look at things carefully, we should see it has acted in a
very predictable way over the past 60 years.
But to the irrationality question and the reaction of the
ROK financial markets response to the rumor, I think the
question has to be focused on the market rationality.
Surely the "market" must think the North is irrational
which is why the rumor of a nuclear test might affect
decisions to buy and sell. It is difficult to explain the
North's rationality to the market -- though if we could make
the "market" understand the regime and its decision making
we would be on our way to being able to attack a key part of
the North's strategy, which is to be able to stir up fear of
it.
WHY DON'T THE PEOPLE REBEL?
The answer is actually three fold. First, there is a belief
system in place that is far worse than that of the Japanese
prior to and during the Second World War and it is called
Juche. Some have even called it "Kim Il Sungism" or as the
father of Juche himself called it "Dear Leader Absolutism."
Juche is all about the cult of the Kim Family, taking on a
religious dimension. Kim Il Sung took on a deity-like status
when he died; his body remains on display and he remains the
leader of North Korea for eternity (which is why the regime
is working so hard to connect Kim Jong-un to Kim Il-sung
notably in his looks, dress, and mannerisms). Since 1993 the
Juche ideology has taught that to die for your country means
you will achieve immortality.
Juche, although popularly called "Self Reliance," can be
summarized this way: "Man rules all things; man decides
all things," the man being Kim Il-sung or the regime
leadership. "The Kim Il-sung Juche ideology is based on
these precepts: In ideology Juche (autonomy); in politics,
self-reliance; in economics, independence; and in National
Security: self-defense."[2]
As Hwang Jong Yop, who has spoken out about the Juche
ideology after he defected in 1997, puts it:
The fundamental reason for human rights being trampled
in North Korea lies in the 'Dear Leader Absolutism'
dictatorship. There can be no human rights for the
people in North Korea where the greatest morality and
absolute law is giving one's mind and body to the Dear
Leader; and living as a slave who obeys completely and
unconditionally the Dear Leader - it is the only life
permitted the North Korean People.[3]
Second is that Kim Il-sung established a security and
control system that would have made Joseph Stalin blush.
From the "rule of threes" (anyone found to be disloyal in
word or deed will have three generations "expunged" -- at
best all three generations go to the gulag and at worst all
three are totally expunged, as in execution) to the
establishment of a personal loyalty system -- i.e., you get
promoted or get ahead or are simply allowed to exist by
demonstrating personal loyalty to the regime and not by
merit -- means that there is a system of control that is
totally focused on protecting the regime from rebellion.
This personal loyalty system has the added benefit of
preventing coups because anyone who says a word against the
regime must be reported both by regulation but also because
by reporting it one further demonstrates one's loyalty to
the regime and allows that person to "get ahead."
At the same time the personal loyalty system explains why
the bureaucratic systems within the regime are so broken and
inefficient -- loyalty does not mean competence of course.
It further sows the seeds of distrust as people even report
others for such simple things as forgetting to wear the pin
of the Great Leader on their jackets and shirts -- as it
must be displayed at all times (as an aside most people will
wear the pin of the Great Leader [Kim Il-sung] vice the Dear
Leader [Kim Jong-il]). Even family members report on other
family members (the dirty little secret is that while the
rule of threes still applies the family member who reports
on his or her family will be initially rewarded, but usually
suffers from some quiet but catastrophic accident some
months later such as a swimming accident in the winter or a
traffic accident or perhaps poisoning by a piece of lead the
size of 7.62 millimeters). This system is probably the best
at preventing coups and conspiracies from within, both among
the elite and at the grassroots level.
Many of our defector friends have informed us about the
"paralysis" of the people in the North because they cannot
reconcile their sixty years of indoctrination with the
increasing knowledge that they are gaining of the outside
world. A simple explanation can actually be seen in works
like Ted Gurr's Why Men Rebel, such as this from the summary
of his book:
People can become inured to a bad state of affairs, even
one that offers so little access to life-sustaining
resources that members of the group are starving or
dying of remediable diseases or exposure.
CONCLUSION
I still hold out some hope for the North Korean people.
Principally, I strongly recommend an aggressive influence
campaign to get information into the people to conduct the
psychological preparation necessary to mitigate the
challenges in a post-regime collapse or post-conflict North.
In addition, we need to target the second-tier leadership
to be able to coerce and co-opt them when the time comes.
But I am under no illusion that an influence campaign will
cause a popular uprising for reasons more than the people
just having access to social media and cell phones in large
numbers. While I know that there are some who say that if
there is no chance of a popular uprising then why bother
with an influence campaign? Still, we really need to invest
in one for the long-term reasons I mention above. And we
should remember that regime collapse will only occur when it
loses its central governing effectiveness and the coherency
of its military and security forces. As long as those two
conditions exist the regime will remain in power with the
people sufficiently oppressed (and their horrendous
suffering continuing).
----------------------------------------------------------
Notes
[1] Based on the author's personal knowledge from serving in
South Korea at the time.
[2] Kukpang Ilbo, March 1999.
[3] "North Korean Human Rights/HwangJong-yop," Chosun Ilbo,
2 DEC
99, www.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/199912/19991202034.ht,
----------------------------------------------------------
Copyright Foreign Policy Research Institute
(http://www.fpri.org/).
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