From FPRI:
ISRAEL AND IRAN:
EVERYONE IS ASKING THE WRONG QUESTION
by Garrett Jones
Garrett Jones is a retired operations officer with the Central
Intelligence Agency. He spent extensive time in the Middle
East and Africa and is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College.
On the 19th of February 2012, the New York Times had an
interesting article pointing out the logistical and tactical
problems the Israeli Air Force would encounter if it were to
try to interdict the development of Iran’s nuclear weapons
program. [1] The conclusion reached by the author was that the
problems involved precluded Israel from making an attempt at
derailing the Iranian nuclear program through conventional
military means. While I largely concur with the logic in the
article, I do not believe the Israelis ever have seriously
considered a conventional military strike as an effective way
of stopping Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. The more
pertinent question is: Will nuclear weapons be used by Israel
against Iran?
Since the beginning of Israel’s own nuclear weapons program,
the Israeli doctrine on nuclear weapons has been to reserve the
employment of nuclear weapons for attacks or potential dangers
that threaten the existence of the Israeli state. This is best
demonstrated by Israel’s reaction to Pakistan’s announcement
that it had acquired nuclear weapons in 1998. While there was
no celebration of the development of an “Islamic Bomb” in
Israeli circles, nor was there any public talk of retaliation
or military strikes. While Pakistan was not an ally or supporter
of Israel, it also did not develop nuclear weapons with much
regard to Israel at all.
The development of nuclear weapons was focused on the threat
from India, not Israel. While key players in the Pakistani
nuclear program may have taken steps to promote the spread of
the “Islamic bomb” to other Middle East players, it has been
the unwavering stand of the Government of Pakistan, and, more
importantly, the Pakistani Army that nuclear weapons were for
self-defense — “from India” being the unsaid but clearly
understood source of any threat requiring the use of Pakistani
nuclear weapons. This was the weapon system to prevent the
neighboring Indian Army from simply overwhelming Pakistan with
its superior size.
While both distance and the support of the U.S. for both
Israel and Pakistan by the U.S. also mitigated the threat of
Pakistani possession of nuclear in regard to Israel, it is clear
that the Pakistani’s nuclear program simply did not rise to the
level of an existential threat to the Israeli state. I do
believe, however, that as an unintended consequence, the
Pakistani nuclear program is the current greatest existential
threat to Pakistan.
The possibility of Pakistani nuclear weapons falling into
terrorist hands is of major interest to the United States,
but such a development is a survival threat to India. While
the Pakistani Army may publicly express concern about the U.S.
staging a special operation mission to deprive them of their
nuclear weapons should the command and control of Pakistani
weapons be threatened, it is far more likely the Indian Army
will be there long before the U.S. feels compelled to move.
In view of the history of conflict between India and Pakistan,
the addition of nuclear weapons to the mix means that the next
conflict which is more than a border skirmish, is almost by
definition an extinction event for Pakistan. It would hardly
be rational for the Indians to leave a defeated enemy on its
very border in possession of nuclear weapons in the wake of
a serious bilateral military engagement. Pakistan cannot hope
to be a victor in any prolonged military engagement against
India. Pakistani’s nuclear weapons were meant to create a
military stalemate with India. Stalemates are great as long as
they work. Loose nukes in Pakistan are an Indian survival
threat long before any U.S. targets are held at risk in such
an eventuality. I fully expect to see India move to destroy the
Pakistani nuclear program should any serious question of
uncertainty over the control of Pakistani weapons arise.
Much the same view should be taken in regard to the Iranian
quest for nuclear weapons. The question is not whether Iran
should be permitted by the West to develop nuclear weapons.
The true question is whether Israel determines the Iranian
possession of nuclear weapons poses an existential threat
to the Israeli state. If it does, Israel will employ its
nuclear arsenal to end the threat. If it does not, there will
be no overt military action. The logistical and tactical
problems outlined in the New York Times article dictate the
use of nuclear weapons. What would have required hundreds of
aircraft to neutralize with conventional weapons can be done
by a handful of aircraft employing nuclear weapons. A
nuclear mission against Iran is well within the capability of
the Israeli Air Force.
Unfortunately, such a mission seems to be outside the
limits of imagination of the West’s current national
leaders. There has been little discussion of such an
occurrence in public circles and I believe that
reflects a lack of thoughtful consideration of the
possibility. I believe most observers expect a violent
and prolonged reaction against Israeli interests, and
by extension the interests of Israel’s allies such as
the U.S., should Israel carry out a conventional
military strike against Iran. I believe it would be
fair to say that such a reaction to a conventional strike
will pale in comparison to the uproar caused by a
nuclear strike. I also believe such a development would
completely reset the relationship and positions of all
the players in the Middle East peace process in an
unpredictable manner. The current stalemate and
fossilization of positions would be swept aside, for
better or worse.
The Israeli government will receive condemnation and
hostility from the other players in the Middle East no
matter what sort of military action it takes against Iran.
By the same token, Israel’s supporters in the U.S. are
likely to back any action Israel takes, if it is cast in
the form of the preservation of the Jewish state. “Never
again,” reflecting the unique history of the founding of
the state of Israel in the wake of the Jewish holocaust
after World War II, is probably the most powerful phrase
in Israeli politics. It is a slogan which will unite all
parts of the political spectrum in Israel and the
supporters of the Jewish state internationally.
No private citizen is truly in a position to judge the
rationality and the intentions of a government such as
is now in control of Iran. The opacity of lines of
responsibility and decision making processes in Iran make
such a judgment properly within the purview of national
intelligence organizations of the various sovereign
governments. With that said, the public statements of the
Iranian leadership lead me to believe that they will not
be diverted from their goal of achieving nuclear weapons.
The same public statements also do not engender much
confidence in the rationality or judgment of Iran’s
leadership.
The history of the Israeli state and its location in a sea
of enemies has in an almost unique way trained the leaders
of Israel to think the unthinkable. If Israel determines
the Iranian nuclear program is in fact a threat to its very
existence, then it will strike, and strike in such a manner
as to be successful. This will require nuclear weapons.
If Israel determines it can live with Iran as a nuclear
state, then expect there to be no overt military action
but a continuing series of low-level sabotage and covert
intelligence actions.
I believe the West and the current U.S. administration are
again engaged in a failure of imagination. I do not think
the current crop of Western leaders fully understand that
Israel may well believe itself to be facing an extinction
threat. This may simply be because since the end of the
Cold War those currently exercising power in the West have
not been faced with such a dilemma. In a very real way,
they may not have sufficient practice in both “thinking the
unthinkable” and preparing for the consequences of the
“unthinkable.”
----------------------------------------------------------
Notes
[1] http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/20/world/middleeast/
iran-raid-seen-as-complex-task-for-israeli-military.html?_r=2
----------------------------------------------------------
Copyright Foreign Policy Research Institute
(http://www.fpri.org/).
ISRAEL AND IRAN:
EVERYONE IS ASKING THE WRONG QUESTION
by Garrett Jones
Garrett Jones is a retired operations officer with the Central
Intelligence Agency. He spent extensive time in the Middle
East and Africa and is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College.
On the 19th of February 2012, the New York Times had an
interesting article pointing out the logistical and tactical
problems the Israeli Air Force would encounter if it were to
try to interdict the development of Iran’s nuclear weapons
program. [1] The conclusion reached by the author was that the
problems involved precluded Israel from making an attempt at
derailing the Iranian nuclear program through conventional
military means. While I largely concur with the logic in the
article, I do not believe the Israelis ever have seriously
considered a conventional military strike as an effective way
of stopping Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. The more
pertinent question is: Will nuclear weapons be used by Israel
against Iran?
Since the beginning of Israel’s own nuclear weapons program,
the Israeli doctrine on nuclear weapons has been to reserve the
employment of nuclear weapons for attacks or potential dangers
that threaten the existence of the Israeli state. This is best
demonstrated by Israel’s reaction to Pakistan’s announcement
that it had acquired nuclear weapons in 1998. While there was
no celebration of the development of an “Islamic Bomb” in
Israeli circles, nor was there any public talk of retaliation
or military strikes. While Pakistan was not an ally or supporter
of Israel, it also did not develop nuclear weapons with much
regard to Israel at all.
The development of nuclear weapons was focused on the threat
from India, not Israel. While key players in the Pakistani
nuclear program may have taken steps to promote the spread of
the “Islamic bomb” to other Middle East players, it has been
the unwavering stand of the Government of Pakistan, and, more
importantly, the Pakistani Army that nuclear weapons were for
self-defense — “from India” being the unsaid but clearly
understood source of any threat requiring the use of Pakistani
nuclear weapons. This was the weapon system to prevent the
neighboring Indian Army from simply overwhelming Pakistan with
its superior size.
While both distance and the support of the U.S. for both
Israel and Pakistan by the U.S. also mitigated the threat of
Pakistani possession of nuclear in regard to Israel, it is clear
that the Pakistani’s nuclear program simply did not rise to the
level of an existential threat to the Israeli state. I do
believe, however, that as an unintended consequence, the
Pakistani nuclear program is the current greatest existential
threat to Pakistan.
The possibility of Pakistani nuclear weapons falling into
terrorist hands is of major interest to the United States,
but such a development is a survival threat to India. While
the Pakistani Army may publicly express concern about the U.S.
staging a special operation mission to deprive them of their
nuclear weapons should the command and control of Pakistani
weapons be threatened, it is far more likely the Indian Army
will be there long before the U.S. feels compelled to move.
In view of the history of conflict between India and Pakistan,
the addition of nuclear weapons to the mix means that the next
conflict which is more than a border skirmish, is almost by
definition an extinction event for Pakistan. It would hardly
be rational for the Indians to leave a defeated enemy on its
very border in possession of nuclear weapons in the wake of
a serious bilateral military engagement. Pakistan cannot hope
to be a victor in any prolonged military engagement against
India. Pakistani’s nuclear weapons were meant to create a
military stalemate with India. Stalemates are great as long as
they work. Loose nukes in Pakistan are an Indian survival
threat long before any U.S. targets are held at risk in such
an eventuality. I fully expect to see India move to destroy the
Pakistani nuclear program should any serious question of
uncertainty over the control of Pakistani weapons arise.
Much the same view should be taken in regard to the Iranian
quest for nuclear weapons. The question is not whether Iran
should be permitted by the West to develop nuclear weapons.
The true question is whether Israel determines the Iranian
possession of nuclear weapons poses an existential threat
to the Israeli state. If it does, Israel will employ its
nuclear arsenal to end the threat. If it does not, there will
be no overt military action. The logistical and tactical
problems outlined in the New York Times article dictate the
use of nuclear weapons. What would have required hundreds of
aircraft to neutralize with conventional weapons can be done
by a handful of aircraft employing nuclear weapons. A
nuclear mission against Iran is well within the capability of
the Israeli Air Force.
Unfortunately, such a mission seems to be outside the
limits of imagination of the West’s current national
leaders. There has been little discussion of such an
occurrence in public circles and I believe that
reflects a lack of thoughtful consideration of the
possibility. I believe most observers expect a violent
and prolonged reaction against Israeli interests, and
by extension the interests of Israel’s allies such as
the U.S., should Israel carry out a conventional
military strike against Iran. I believe it would be
fair to say that such a reaction to a conventional strike
will pale in comparison to the uproar caused by a
nuclear strike. I also believe such a development would
completely reset the relationship and positions of all
the players in the Middle East peace process in an
unpredictable manner. The current stalemate and
fossilization of positions would be swept aside, for
better or worse.
The Israeli government will receive condemnation and
hostility from the other players in the Middle East no
matter what sort of military action it takes against Iran.
By the same token, Israel’s supporters in the U.S. are
likely to back any action Israel takes, if it is cast in
the form of the preservation of the Jewish state. “Never
again,” reflecting the unique history of the founding of
the state of Israel in the wake of the Jewish holocaust
after World War II, is probably the most powerful phrase
in Israeli politics. It is a slogan which will unite all
parts of the political spectrum in Israel and the
supporters of the Jewish state internationally.
No private citizen is truly in a position to judge the
rationality and the intentions of a government such as
is now in control of Iran. The opacity of lines of
responsibility and decision making processes in Iran make
such a judgment properly within the purview of national
intelligence organizations of the various sovereign
governments. With that said, the public statements of the
Iranian leadership lead me to believe that they will not
be diverted from their goal of achieving nuclear weapons.
The same public statements also do not engender much
confidence in the rationality or judgment of Iran’s
leadership.
The history of the Israeli state and its location in a sea
of enemies has in an almost unique way trained the leaders
of Israel to think the unthinkable. If Israel determines
the Iranian nuclear program is in fact a threat to its very
existence, then it will strike, and strike in such a manner
as to be successful. This will require nuclear weapons.
If Israel determines it can live with Iran as a nuclear
state, then expect there to be no overt military action
but a continuing series of low-level sabotage and covert
intelligence actions.
I believe the West and the current U.S. administration are
again engaged in a failure of imagination. I do not think
the current crop of Western leaders fully understand that
Israel may well believe itself to be facing an extinction
threat. This may simply be because since the end of the
Cold War those currently exercising power in the West have
not been faced with such a dilemma. In a very real way,
they may not have sufficient practice in both “thinking the
unthinkable” and preparing for the consequences of the
“unthinkable.”
----------------------------------------------------------
Notes
[1] http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/20/world/middleeast/
iran-raid-seen-as-complex-task-for-israeli-military.html?_r=2
----------------------------------------------------------
Copyright Foreign Policy Research Institute
(http://www.fpri.org/).
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