from Fikra Forum:
In recent months, as uncertainty over Assad’s future continues, Turkey’s position with regard to its potential military or humanitarian intervention has been heavily debated. While Turkish leaders have condemned the Syrian government’s brutal suppression of dissent since February 2011 and warned several times that Turkey may intervene militarily, questions remain over how clearly that discourse will translate into concrete action. In addition to issues regarding the regional balance of power, a key concern limiting options in Turkey’s toolbox is the intertwined nature of the Kurdish issues in Turkey and Syria and the perception of political Islam as being a rival to Kurdish nationalist movements.
Ankara fears ramifications of the conflict inside Turkey; therefore, the Syria refugee problem is of critical importance. Turkey has not officially recognized displaced Syrians who fled from government forces as “refugees”; instead, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu chose to define them as Turkey’s “guests.” To that end, a refugee camp (officially called a “temporary compound”) and smaller “tent cities” were established in Hatay province on the Syrian border. Still, these camps host about 20,000 refugees, including the headquarters of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), which operates under Turkish military and intelligence cover. Furthermore, Turkey conducted a military exercise on the Syrian border in October 2011 and retains increased military presence there.
The most direct official declaration on the matter came recently, when Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan hinted at the possibility of establishing a humanitarian safe haven and an aid corridor into Syrian territory, building on his prior statement, which referred to the issue as “Turkey’s domestic problem.” Indeed, with a 560-mile shared border, the prospects of an escalating Syrian refugee crisis, coupled with the significant Alawite population at Turkey’s Syrian border and in the refugee camps, render Syria a domestic concern for Turkey and create many incentives for a Turkish intervention.
Yet, as time passes, Turkey discovers the limits of its involvement in Syria. From a foreign policy standpoint, a dual Russo-Iranian support for Assad makes a unilateral Turkish intervention in Syria costly. Such an action cannot occur without openly confronting the strategic goals of both powers. The other limit, though less explicit, is the equally critical domestic policy concern of how Turkey’s own Kurdish opposition will respond to Turkish support for the Syrian opposition and those Kurdish groups that aligned with the opposition forces.
With the recent October 2011 killing of Kurdish leader Mashaal Tammo by Syrian government operatives and the subsequent incident in which government forces opened fire on funeral attendees, more Syrian Kurds have taken part in the anti-government demonstrations. While the fragmented nature of the Syrian Kurdish opposition makes it difficult for Syria’s Kurds to mount a unified front against Assad’s forces, prospects of a Turkish military intervention in Syria fracture them even further.
The Kurdish National Council, a coalition of ten Kurdish political parties, officially supports the removal of the Assad government, the establishment of a federal system in Syria, and limited foreign involvement, though the coalition has remained independent from pan-Syrian opposition forums, such as the Syrian National Council (SNC). However, other influential Kurdish groups—the most important being the left-wing Syrian Democratic Union Party (PYD), which has close links to the main militant Kurdish group in Turkey, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)—remain outside this coalition and strongly oppose foreign intervention, including any Turkish involvement. The core of this opposition perceives Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) to be pushing the agenda of the Muslim Brotherhood, thus opposing Kurdish nationalism, in an eventual post-Assad political settlement via its support for and influence over the FSA.
The Muslim Brotherhood’s influence on the Syrian opposition not only distances the PYD from the Kurdish National Council, but also renders the FSA, which receives arms from the Brotherhood, a natural opponent to secular Kurdish nationalism. Salih Muhammad, the leader of the PYD, claimed: “Foreign intervention in Syria will open the door for Turkey and that is only in the best interest of Muslim Brotherhood […] We won’t work with anyone who supports Turkish intervention in Syria.”
The rise of political Islam as a rival to Kurdish nationalism is seen as an existential threat by secular Kurdish activists in both Syria and Turkey. In Turkey, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and its political extensions—the Union of Communities in Kurdistan (KCK) and the Freedom and Democracy Party (BDP)—all see the Muslim conservative ideology put forward by Turkey’s AKP government as a challenge to secular Kurdish nationalism. This perception was reinforced by the AKP’s appeal to the Kurdish electorate; while the Kurdish party emerged victorious in 13 Kurdish majority cities in the 2002 general elections, the AKP managed to win in 7 of those cities in 2007. Renewed Kurdish activism managed to take back 2 of those cities in the 2011 elections, but the electoral battle between the AKP and the Kurdish nationalist parties remain heated in southeast Turkey. In other words, while Turkish military and intelligence battles militant Kurdish nationalism, the AKP battles its political extensions.
Recently, Turkey’s judicial branch opened up a third front against Kurdish nationalism by initiating a court case against the Union of Communities in Kurdistan (KCK), a quasi-state structure that was created in 2005 by the imprisoned leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, which operates like an executive branch with its own legislative, judicial, and security organs. The so-called “KCK-case” was initiated in 2009 and more than 1,800 people have been detained on charges of being members of the KCK structure.
As Turkey’s struggle with Kurdish nationalism continues, the extent to which it can shape the Kurdish opposition in Syria is dubious. It is obvious that Turkey has decided to focus most of its support on the activities of the Free Syrian Army and considers the group integral to its plans for a post-Assad settlement. While numerous Kurdish groups within the Kurdish National Council are either supportive or neutral to the idea of a Turkish intervention or Muslim Brotherhood influence, both prospects are fiercely rejected by the PYD. Though Turkey may rally the Kurdish National Council to act with the FSA, under Turkish influence, parts of the Kurdish nationalist opposition will inevitably be marginalized and excluded from the process.
The PYD’s rejection of Turkish involvement is related to the group’s links to the PKK. A high-ranking PYD member, Aldar Xelil, recently admitted to the PKK’s activity in Syria through its influence over the PYD. He did not deny the allegations that PKK members man checkpoints and conduct random ID checks. According to Xelil, the PKK also supports the Assad government and is actively exerting pressure on groups that take arms against the regime, including the FSA. Other Kurdish parties that are unaffiliated with the PKK have issued strong condemnations of the joint PKK-PYD support for the Assad government. The Kurdistan Future Party, founded by the assassinated Kurdish leader Mashaal Tammo, recently issued a statement condemning the PYD for its authoritarian attitude towards the Kurds. Though the PYD maintains that the majority of the Syrian Kurds sympathize with the PKK, the Kurdistan Future Party argues that anti-Assad sentiments unite all Syrian Kurds.
Therefore, the PYD’s marginalization has the potential to produce two main scenarios: First, with the cooperation of the PKK, the PYD can militarily challenge the FSA by acting as Assad’s militia on the Turkish-Syrian border. This could include a wide range of asymmetrical acts such as infiltration of the Hatay refugee camps, assassinations, kidnappings, ambush and espionage with the goal of disrupting the activities of the FSA. Recently, Turkish intelligence prevented a Syrian Mukhabaratkidnapping operation directed against an FSA leader in the Hatay camp.
In an alternative scenario, the PKK may dissolve its offshoot, the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK)—which has operated against Iran since 2003—as a gesture of goodwill to Iran and subsequently offer the services of its other regional arbiter, the PYD, to Iranian interests in Syria. This could result in the ‘Hizballah-ization’ of the PKK in Syria and render the PYD a militant proxy of Iran: first as a Basij-like structure that performs police duties in the Kurdish parts of Syria, and second as a secular Kurdish nationalist version of Hizballah in Lebanon, engaging in militant warfare. If this second scenario proves to be accurate, in the case of Assad’s removal, the PYD will then assume a third character in Syria, engaging in grassroots political activities in order to increase their influence in the post-conflict legislature, while simultaneously focusing on social services to build grassroots support.
Both prospects explain the daunting nature of Turkey’s political calculations and sum up one of the most important factors as to why Turkey still hasn’t intervened decisively in Syria.
H. Akin Unver is the Ertegun Lecturer of Turkish and Middle Eastern Studies at the Princeton University Near Eastern Studies department.
Ankara fears ramifications of the conflict inside Turkey; therefore, the Syria refugee problem is of critical importance. Turkey has not officially recognized displaced Syrians who fled from government forces as “refugees”; instead, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu chose to define them as Turkey’s “guests.” To that end, a refugee camp (officially called a “temporary compound”) and smaller “tent cities” were established in Hatay province on the Syrian border. Still, these camps host about 20,000 refugees, including the headquarters of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), which operates under Turkish military and intelligence cover. Furthermore, Turkey conducted a military exercise on the Syrian border in October 2011 and retains increased military presence there.
The most direct official declaration on the matter came recently, when Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan hinted at the possibility of establishing a humanitarian safe haven and an aid corridor into Syrian territory, building on his prior statement, which referred to the issue as “Turkey’s domestic problem.” Indeed, with a 560-mile shared border, the prospects of an escalating Syrian refugee crisis, coupled with the significant Alawite population at Turkey’s Syrian border and in the refugee camps, render Syria a domestic concern for Turkey and create many incentives for a Turkish intervention.
Yet, as time passes, Turkey discovers the limits of its involvement in Syria. From a foreign policy standpoint, a dual Russo-Iranian support for Assad makes a unilateral Turkish intervention in Syria costly. Such an action cannot occur without openly confronting the strategic goals of both powers. The other limit, though less explicit, is the equally critical domestic policy concern of how Turkey’s own Kurdish opposition will respond to Turkish support for the Syrian opposition and those Kurdish groups that aligned with the opposition forces.
With the recent October 2011 killing of Kurdish leader Mashaal Tammo by Syrian government operatives and the subsequent incident in which government forces opened fire on funeral attendees, more Syrian Kurds have taken part in the anti-government demonstrations. While the fragmented nature of the Syrian Kurdish opposition makes it difficult for Syria’s Kurds to mount a unified front against Assad’s forces, prospects of a Turkish military intervention in Syria fracture them even further.
The Kurdish National Council, a coalition of ten Kurdish political parties, officially supports the removal of the Assad government, the establishment of a federal system in Syria, and limited foreign involvement, though the coalition has remained independent from pan-Syrian opposition forums, such as the Syrian National Council (SNC). However, other influential Kurdish groups—the most important being the left-wing Syrian Democratic Union Party (PYD), which has close links to the main militant Kurdish group in Turkey, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)—remain outside this coalition and strongly oppose foreign intervention, including any Turkish involvement. The core of this opposition perceives Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) to be pushing the agenda of the Muslim Brotherhood, thus opposing Kurdish nationalism, in an eventual post-Assad political settlement via its support for and influence over the FSA.
The Muslim Brotherhood’s influence on the Syrian opposition not only distances the PYD from the Kurdish National Council, but also renders the FSA, which receives arms from the Brotherhood, a natural opponent to secular Kurdish nationalism. Salih Muhammad, the leader of the PYD, claimed: “Foreign intervention in Syria will open the door for Turkey and that is only in the best interest of Muslim Brotherhood […] We won’t work with anyone who supports Turkish intervention in Syria.”
The rise of political Islam as a rival to Kurdish nationalism is seen as an existential threat by secular Kurdish activists in both Syria and Turkey. In Turkey, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and its political extensions—the Union of Communities in Kurdistan (KCK) and the Freedom and Democracy Party (BDP)—all see the Muslim conservative ideology put forward by Turkey’s AKP government as a challenge to secular Kurdish nationalism. This perception was reinforced by the AKP’s appeal to the Kurdish electorate; while the Kurdish party emerged victorious in 13 Kurdish majority cities in the 2002 general elections, the AKP managed to win in 7 of those cities in 2007. Renewed Kurdish activism managed to take back 2 of those cities in the 2011 elections, but the electoral battle between the AKP and the Kurdish nationalist parties remain heated in southeast Turkey. In other words, while Turkish military and intelligence battles militant Kurdish nationalism, the AKP battles its political extensions.
Recently, Turkey’s judicial branch opened up a third front against Kurdish nationalism by initiating a court case against the Union of Communities in Kurdistan (KCK), a quasi-state structure that was created in 2005 by the imprisoned leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, which operates like an executive branch with its own legislative, judicial, and security organs. The so-called “KCK-case” was initiated in 2009 and more than 1,800 people have been detained on charges of being members of the KCK structure.
As Turkey’s struggle with Kurdish nationalism continues, the extent to which it can shape the Kurdish opposition in Syria is dubious. It is obvious that Turkey has decided to focus most of its support on the activities of the Free Syrian Army and considers the group integral to its plans for a post-Assad settlement. While numerous Kurdish groups within the Kurdish National Council are either supportive or neutral to the idea of a Turkish intervention or Muslim Brotherhood influence, both prospects are fiercely rejected by the PYD. Though Turkey may rally the Kurdish National Council to act with the FSA, under Turkish influence, parts of the Kurdish nationalist opposition will inevitably be marginalized and excluded from the process.
The PYD’s rejection of Turkish involvement is related to the group’s links to the PKK. A high-ranking PYD member, Aldar Xelil, recently admitted to the PKK’s activity in Syria through its influence over the PYD. He did not deny the allegations that PKK members man checkpoints and conduct random ID checks. According to Xelil, the PKK also supports the Assad government and is actively exerting pressure on groups that take arms against the regime, including the FSA. Other Kurdish parties that are unaffiliated with the PKK have issued strong condemnations of the joint PKK-PYD support for the Assad government. The Kurdistan Future Party, founded by the assassinated Kurdish leader Mashaal Tammo, recently issued a statement condemning the PYD for its authoritarian attitude towards the Kurds. Though the PYD maintains that the majority of the Syrian Kurds sympathize with the PKK, the Kurdistan Future Party argues that anti-Assad sentiments unite all Syrian Kurds.
Therefore, the PYD’s marginalization has the potential to produce two main scenarios: First, with the cooperation of the PKK, the PYD can militarily challenge the FSA by acting as Assad’s militia on the Turkish-Syrian border. This could include a wide range of asymmetrical acts such as infiltration of the Hatay refugee camps, assassinations, kidnappings, ambush and espionage with the goal of disrupting the activities of the FSA. Recently, Turkish intelligence prevented a Syrian Mukhabaratkidnapping operation directed against an FSA leader in the Hatay camp.
In an alternative scenario, the PKK may dissolve its offshoot, the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK)—which has operated against Iran since 2003—as a gesture of goodwill to Iran and subsequently offer the services of its other regional arbiter, the PYD, to Iranian interests in Syria. This could result in the ‘Hizballah-ization’ of the PKK in Syria and render the PYD a militant proxy of Iran: first as a Basij-like structure that performs police duties in the Kurdish parts of Syria, and second as a secular Kurdish nationalist version of Hizballah in Lebanon, engaging in militant warfare. If this second scenario proves to be accurate, in the case of Assad’s removal, the PYD will then assume a third character in Syria, engaging in grassroots political activities in order to increase their influence in the post-conflict legislature, while simultaneously focusing on social services to build grassroots support.
Both prospects explain the daunting nature of Turkey’s political calculations and sum up one of the most important factors as to why Turkey still hasn’t intervened decisively in Syria.
H. Akin Unver is the Ertegun Lecturer of Turkish and Middle Eastern Studies at the Princeton University Near Eastern Studies department.
في الأشهر الأخيرة حيث تستمر الضبابية حول مستقبل الأسد دارت مناقشات مكثفة حول موقف تركيا من تدخلها العسكري أو الإنساني المحتمل. ورغم أن القادة الأتراك قد أدانوا القمع الوحشي من جانب الحكومة السورية للمنشقين منذ شباط/فبراير 2011 وحذروا عدة مرات من أن تركيا ربما تتدخل عسكريا إلا أن الأسئلة تظل مطروحة حول كيفية ترجمة هذا الخطاب بوضوح إلى عمل ملموس. وبالإضافة إلى قضايا تتعلق بالتوازن الإقليمي للقوى فإن ثمة قلقا رئيسيا يحدُّ من الخيارات في جعبة تركيا ألا وهو الطبيعة المتداخلة للقضايا الكردية في تركيا وسوريا وتصور الإسلام السياسي كمنافس للحركات القومية الكردية.
وتخشى أنقرة من عواقب الصراع داخل تركيا ولذا فإن مشكلة لاجئي سوريا تمثل أهمية كبيرة. ولم تستقبل تركيا رسميا المرحلين السوريين الذين فروا من قوات الحكومة بوصفهم "لاجئين" بل اختار وزير الخارجية أحمد داود أوغلو أن يطلق عليهم اسم "ضيوف" تركيا. ولهذا الغرض أقيم معسكر اللاجئين (الذي يسمى رسميا "معسكر مؤقت") و"مدن الخيم" الصغيرة في محافظة هتاي على الحدود السورية. لكن هذه المعسكرات تستضيف 20000 لاجئا من بينهم قيادة الجيش السوري الحر التي تعمل تحت غطاء عسكري واستخباراتي تركي. وعلاوة على ذلك نفذت تركيا تدريبات عسكرية على الحدود السورية في تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2011 واحتفظت بوجود عسكري متزايد هناك.
وأكثر تصريح رسمي مباشر عن المسألة أتى مؤخرا عندما ألمح رئيس الوزراء رجب طيب أردوجان إلى إمكانية إقامة مأوى آمن وممر مساعدات في الأراضي السورية وذلك إكمالا لتصريح سابق له أشار فيه إلى القضية باعتبارها "مشكلة تركية داخلية." وفي الحقيقة فإنه في ظل حدود مشتركة تبلغ 560 ميلا فإن فرص تصاعد أزمة اللاجئين السوريين مضافا إليها النسبة السكانية العلوية الكبيرة على حدود تركيا مع سوريا وفي معسكرات اللاجئين تجعل سوريا بمثابة قلق محلي لتركيا وتخلق الكثير من الحوافز لتدخل تركي.
غير أنه بمرور الوقت تكتشف تركيا حدود تدخلها في سوريا. ومن وجهة نظر السياسة الخارجية فإن الدعم الروسي الإيراني المزدوج للأسد يجعل التدخل التركي الأحادي في سوريا مكلفا. بل إنه لا يمكن أن يحدث بدون المواجهة الصريحة للأهداف الاستراتيجية لكلتا القوتين. وأما القيد الآخر فيمثل رغم عدم صراحته قلقا داخليا سياسيا على نفس الدرجة من الخطورة، وهو كيف سيكون رد فعل المعارضة الكردية في تركيا على الدعم التركي للمعارضة السورية وتلك الجماعات الكردية التي اصطفت إلى جانب القوى المعارضة.
وبسبب مقتل الزعيم الكردي مشعل التامو مؤخرا في تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2011 على يد عناصر من الحكومة السورية والحادثة اللاحقة التي فتحت فيها قوات الحكومة النار على الحاضرين في الجنازة شارك المزيد من الكرد السوريين في المظاهرات ضد الحكومة. ورغم أن الطبيعة المتشرذمة للمعارضة الكردية السورية تجعل من الصعب على كرد سوريا تكوين جبهة موحدة ضد قوات الأسد إلا أن فرص التدخل العسكري التركي في سوريا تشرذمهم أكثر وأكثر.
فالمجلس الوطني الكردي وهو تحالف من عشرة أحزاب سياسية كردية يدعم رسميا الإطاحة بحكومة الأسد وإقامة نظام فيدرالي في سوريا مع تدخل أجنبي محدود رغم أن التحالف قد ظل مستقلا عن جموع منتديات المعارضة السورية مثل المجلس الوطني السوري. ومع ذلك فإن الجماعات الكردية المؤثرة الأخرى –الأهم هو حزب الوحدة الديمقراطي السوري اليساري الذي له روابط وثيقة مع الجماعة المسلحة الكردية الرئيسية في تركيا وهي حزب العمال الكردستاني- ما تزال خارج هذا التحالف وتعارض بقوة التدخل الأجنبي بما في ذلك أي تدخل تركي. وجوهر هذه المعارضة يتصور أن حزب تركيا الحاكم وهو العدالة والتنمية يدفع بأجندة الإخوان المسلمين وبالتالي هو يعارض القومية الكردية في التسوية السياسية النهائية لفترة ما بعد الأسد من خلال دعمه للجيش السوري الحر ونفوذه عنده.
ونفوذ الإخوان المسلمين على المعارضة السورية لا يُبعد فقط حزب الوحدة الديمقراطي السوري عن المجلس الوطني الكردي بل أيضا يجعل الجيش السوري الحر -الذي يتلقى أسلحة من الإخوان- خصما طبيعيا للقومية الكردية العلمانية. وقد ادعى صالح محمد زعيم حزب الوحدة الديمقراطي أن "التدخل الأجنبي في سوريا سوف يفتح الباب أمام تركيا مما يصب فقط في صالح الإخوان المسلمين […] ونحن لن نعمل مع أي شخص يدعم التدخل التركي في سوريا."
وصعود الإسلام السياسي كمنافس للقومية الكردية يُرى من قبل النشطاء الأكراد العلمانيين باعتباره التهديد الوجودي في كل من سوريا وتركيا. ففي تركيا نجد أن حزب العمال الكردستاني وامتداداته السياسية –منظومة المجتمع الكردستاني (KCK) وحزب الحرية والديمقراطية (BDP)- كلهم يرون الأيديولوجية الإسلامية المحافظة التي وضعتها حكومة حزب العدالة والتنمية الكردية كتحدٍ للقومية الكردية العلمانية. وقد تعزز هذا التصور بتقرب حزب العدالة من جمهور الناخبين الكردي حيث ظهر الحزب الكردي منتصرا في 13 مدينة ذات أغلبية كردية في الانتخابات العامة بينما تمكن حزب العدالة في 2002 من الفوز في 7 من تلك المدن في 2007. وقد تمكن النشاط الكردي المتجدد من استعادة اثنتين من تلك المدن في انتخابات 2011 لكن المعركة الانتخابية بين حزب العدالة والأحزاب القومية الكردية ما تزال حامية في جنوب شرق تركيا. وبعبارة أخرى فإنه رغم مقاومة الجيش والاستخبارات التركية للقومية الكردية العسكرية إلا أن حزب العدالة يقاوم امتداداتها السياسية.
ومؤخرا فتح فرع قضائي في تركيا جبهة ثالثة ضد القومية الكردية ببدء قضية ضد منظومة المجتمع الكردستاني وهو هيكل يشبه الدولة تم إنشاؤه في 2005 بواسطة القائد المسجون لحزب العمال الكردستاني عبد الله أوجلان الذي يعمل كفرع تنفيذي مع عناصره التشريعية والقضائية والأمنية. وقد بدأ ما يسمى "قضية منظومة المجتمع الكردستاني " في 2009 وتم اعتقال أكثر من 1800 شخصا بتهم كونهم أعضاء في هيكل منظومة المجتمع الكردستاني .
وحيث يستمر الصراع في تركيا مع القومية الكردية فإن المدى الذي يمكن إليه تشكيل المعارضة الكردية في سوريا مشكوك فيه. وواضح أن تركيا قد قررت التركيز أكثر على دعمها لأنشطة الجيش السوري الحر وأنها تعتبر الجماعة مكملة لخططها في تسوية ما بعد الأسد. ورغم أن العديد من الجماعات الكردية داخل المجلس الوطني الكردي إما مناصرة أو محايدة لفكرة التدخل الكردي أو النفوذ الإخواني إلا أن كلا الفرصتين مرفوضتان بقوة من جانب حزب الوحدة الديمقراطي. ورغم أن تركيا ربما تجتذب المجلس الوطني الكردي للعمل مع الجيش السوري الحر تحت نفوذ تركي إلا أن أجزاء من المعارضة القومية الكردية سوف يتم تهميشها في نهاية المطاف واستثنائها من العملية.
ويرتبط رفض حزب الوحدة للتدخل التركي بروابط الجماعة بحزب العمال الكردستاني. وقد اعترف عضو بارز في حزب الوحدة وهو ألدار إكسيليل مؤخرا بنشاط حزب العمال في سوريا من خلال نفوذه على حزب الوحدة. بل إنه لم ينكر المزاعم التي تقول إن أعضاء حزب العمال يشغلون النقاط المرورية ويقومون بتفتيش عشوائي عن الهوية. وطبقا لإكسيليل فإن حزب العمال يدعم أيضا حكومة الأسد يقوم بالضغط الشديد على الجماعات التي ترفع السلاح ضد النظام ومن بينها الجيش السوري الحر. وقد أصدرت الأحزاب الكردية الأخرى غير التابعة لحزب العمال إدانات قوية للدعم المشترك من حزب الوحدة وحزب العمال لصالح حكومة الأسد. كما أصدر مؤخرا حزب مستقبل كردستان الذي أسسه الزعيم الكردي المغتال مشعل التامو بيانا يدين فيه موقف حزب الوحدة الاستبدادي تجاه الكرد. ورغم أن حزب الوحدة يتمسك بقوله أن أغلبية الكرد السوريين يتعاطفون مع حزب العمال إلا أن حزب مستقبل كردستان يؤكد أن المشاعر المعادية للأسد توحد كل السوريين الكرد.
ولذا فإن تهميش حزب الوحدة يحمل بداخله إمكانية إنتاج سيناريوهين رئيسيين: الأول أن حزب الوحدة يستطيع بالتعاون مع حزب العمال أن يتحدى الجيش السوري الحر عسكريا بالعمل كميليشيا تابعة للأسد على الحدود التركية السورية. وربما يشمل هذا مدى عريضا من الأعمال غير المتناظرة مثل تسلل معسكرات اللاجئين في هتاي والاغتيالات والاختطافات والكمائن والتجسس بهدف تعطيل أنشطة الجيش السوري الحر. ومؤخرا منعت الاستخبارات التركية عملية اختطاف للمخابرات السورية كانت موجهة ضد زعيم الجيش السوري الحر في معسكر هتاي.
وفي سيناريو بديل ربما يقوم حزب العمال بحل فرعه وهو حزب الحياة الحرة في كردستان (PJAK)- الذي عمل ضد إيران منذ 2003- كإشارة إلى حسن نواياه تجاه إيران ثم لاحقا يعرض خدمات وسيطه الإقليمي الآخر وهو حزب الوحدة للمصالح الإيرانية في سوريا. ويمكن أن يضفي هذا نمطا من نوع حزب الله على حزب العمال في سوريا ويجعل حزب الوحدة وكيلا مسلحا لإيران أولاً كهيكل يشبه الباسيج التي تؤدي واجبات الشرطة في المناطق الكردية في سوريا والثاني كنسخة قومية كردية علمانية من حزب الله في لبنان وذلك للانخراط في حرب. ولو بدا السيناريو الثاني دقيقا فإن حزب الوحدة حال الإطاحة بالأسد سيكون بمثابة الطرف الثالث في سوريا وسينخرط في أنشطة سياسية شعبية لكي يزيد نفوذه في الكيان التشريعي لفترة ما بعد الأسد ويركز في ذات الوقت على الخدمات الاجتماعية لبناء دعم شعبي.
وكلا الاحتمالين يشرح الطبيعة المروعة للحسابات السياسية التركية ويلخص أحد أهم العوامل وراء السبب في أن تركيا لم تتدخل بعد بشكل قاطع في سوريا.
إتش أكين أونفر هو محاضر تركي في دراسات الشرق الأوسط وتركيا بجامعة برنستون
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