Ecuador: President Rafael Correa Attacked By Police In Possibel Coup Attempt

From The Christian Science Monitor and The Heritage Foundation:

Ecuador coup attempt? President Rafael Correa attacked in police revolt.


Ecuador coup attempt? On Thursday, President Rafael Correa was attacked, a state of emergency was declared, and police across the country revolted.



Riot police repel supporters of Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa from reaching the hospital where he took refuge for protection from police protesters, in Quito, on Sept. 30. Police protesters attacked Correa in an eruption of political unrest over austerity measures, leaving the leader holed up in an hospital with demonstrators outside.



Guillermo Granja/Reuters

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By Sara Miller Llana, Staff writer / September 30, 2010



Mexico City

Ecuador President Rafael Correa was holed up in Quito on Thursday afternoon after being attacked by police angered over changes to their job benefits.



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.In the aftermath of that attack, police across the country revolted, a state of emergency was declared, and flights into the country were canceled. While what exactly is going on in the Ecuadorian capital is still being sorted out, some fear the South American nation could be witnessing its second coup in a decade.



“What started as a rebellion over salaries could end in something tragic,” says Ramiro Crespo, president of Analytica Securities in Ecuador.



Mr. Correa, who was only lightly injured, later charged opposition figures, the police, and the military of attempting a coup détat. His leftist ally in Venezuela, President Hugo Chávez, wrote over Twitter: “They are trying to oust President Correa."



The crisis erupted when Correa attempted to enter a police barracks in Quito to mollify officers angry at Wednesday's passage of a law that cut bonus pay and extended the time period for receiving promotions, from five years to seven. The law has not yet been published so is not in effect.



The president was roughed up and sprayed with tear gas, and eventually fled to a hospital. Police officers across the country soon took over their barracks. Highways were blocked by burning tires, schools were shut down, and many businesses closed. Residents of Quito were urged to stay in their homes.



A state of siege has been declared, which means the military is in charge and soldiers can search without warrant.



Correa, who is reportedly unable to leave the hospital, which is surrounded by protesters, said angrily after the attack: "If you want to kill the president, here he is! Kill me!"



No political party appears to be leading or supporting a government takeover, causing Mr. Crespo to doubt this will spiral into a coup. But he says it is a cautionary tale, especially for countries in Latin America where institutions tend to be weak. He blames the president for a polarized atmosphere, where people feel there are no checks and balances on presidential power.



“When a country does not have strong institutions, these things can happen at any moment,” he says.



Leaders throughout Latin America, reeling from the ouster of Manuel Zelaya in Honduras last summer, have put their support behind Correa. The Organization of American States (OAS) held a crisis meeting in Washington, and Secretary General José Miguel Insulza pledged the organization's "full support" in a telephone conversation with Correa, according to a statement

Venezuela's Legislative Elections: Democratic Opposition Makes Major Gains

From The Heritage Foundation:

Venezuela’s Legislative Elections: Democratic Opposition Makes Major GainsPublished on September 27, 2010 by Ray Walser, Ph.D. WebMemo #3028 Print PDF



On September 26, Venezuelan voters selected 165 members for its single-chamber National Assembly. Approximately 66.45 percent of an estimated 17 million eligible voters cast ballots. As with every election since 1998 in Venezuela, these elections became a referendum about the rule of authoritarian populist President Hugo Chávez. Despite alarmist predictions of violence by Chávez, the elections took place without violence and with only scattered reports of problems or irregularities.



Supermajority Lost



The results translated into at least 96 seats for Chávez’s United Venezuelan Socialist Party (PSUV) and roughly 61 seats for a slate of opposition candidates. Indigenous representatives, members of the Country for All Party, and some undecided races rounded out the 165.



In practical terms, PSUV preserved a clear majority but lost its previous two-thirds majority that allowed it to pass major legislation submitted by Chávez without serious debate or dissent. It also appears that in the cumulative popular vote, the opposition is able to claim majority status over PSUV. The opposition said it received 52 percent of all votes cast, although Venezuela’s national electoral council has yet to release official numbers, a delay that has raised suspicions among the opposition.



The results of the September 26 elections are clear. The majority of Venezuelans have not abandoned their historical dedication to defending the fundamentals of representative democracy and protecting individual rights and liberties from the encroachment of Chávez’s socialist revolutionary program.


Venezuela Grows Restless After a Decade of Chávez Missteps




Even before the September 26 elections, Hugo Chávez’s poll numbers and approval rating were slumping. Chávez’s 21st-century brand of socialism had begun to suffer from the same defects as socialism of the 20th century: confiscatory nationalizations, mismanagement, inefficiency, corruption, a lack of productivity, and an overall loss of economic freedom.



Chávez’s oil-based economy has become increasingly dependent on the international price of oil, an underperforming national oil company, and shadowy global energy deals. In Venezuela, infrastructure, especially the electrical sector, showed significant deterioration that in turn led to major shortages and blackouts. Venezuelans have also begun to worry deeply about numbers such as the annual inflation rate (30 percent) and the murder rate in Caracas, both among the highest in the Americas.



Venezuelan voters were mindful of Chávez’s great affection for the Cuban communist model and his embrace of oppressive, anti-American regimes from the Iran of the ayatollahs and Mahmoud Admadinejad to the genocidal Omar al-Bashir of Sudan and Libya’s dictator-for-life Muammar Qadhafi. Nor did voters forget Chávez’s affinity for terrorist organizations like Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia.



Democratic Opposition Fights an Uphill Battle



In the 2005 legislative elections, the anti- Chávez opposition chose not to run candidates in protest to what it considered Chávez’s manipulation of the electoral system. In retrospect, this was a controversial decision that many in the opposition came to regret.



Learning from its mistakes, the opposition has made substantial progress. In November 2007, a majority defeated a major referendum that would have granted sweeping powers to Chávez. In the November 2008 municipal elections, the opposition showed renewed strength, especially in Caracas and states like Zulia and Táchira. Under the general direction of the Unity Table, the opposition came together and fielded a single slate of candidates throughout Venezuela, paving the way for 60 new opposition legislative members.



The opposition had to stand up to Chávez’s polarizing politics on a tilted playing field. Factors favoring a massive PSUV victory included the following facts

Venezuela has become a vast patronage machine where employees are under orders to vote for Chávez;


Nationalizations have gobbled up the independent private sector;

Government voters are recipients of Chávez’s largess;

The national electoral council remains under the control of Chávez-appointed officials, and many able candidates have been denied an opportunity to run; and

Chávez has increasingly restricted media freedoms and used automatic media access to sell himself and his candidates.

The 2009 electoral law created electoral districts heavily favorable to Chávez’s party and weighted representation to rural, Chávez-dominated states. This helps explain why PSUV was able to win more than 90 seats with less than a majority of the vote.



The new National Assembly does not take office until 2011. This electoral setback for Chávez will likely trigger a series of retaliations and fresh efforts to use the lame duck assembly to pass legislation that could undercut the authority of a new, more pluralist body. Chávez also claims to possess the authority to construct an alternative legislative process based on citizens’ councils. The opposition has not forgotten how Chávez unconstitutionally undercut the powers and the resources of elected opposition governors and mayors following elections in 2008.



A Democratic Venezuela Is in the U.S. National Interest



Given its proximity, resources, and long tradition of friendship with the U.S., Venezuela is a nation of strategic importance to U.S. policy in the Americas. The U.S.’s national interests are linked to a restoration of a stable, friendly, and responsible Caribbean neighbor.



Speaking to the U.N. General Assembly on September 23, President Obama stressed the importance of worldwide democracy, noting that “the common thread of progress is the principle that government is accountable to its citizens. And the diversity in this room makes clear—no one country has all the answers, but all of us must answer to our own people.” He might well have added that no one president, including Hugo Chávez, has all the answers. Therefore, in response to last yesterday’s election, the Obama Administration should do the following:



Warmly welcome the September 26 vote as an outcome that encourages greater pluralism in Venezuela and indicates a deep-rooted determination to preserve democratic freedoms and executive accountability;

Together with Congress, work with the National Endowment for Democracy and others to redouble efforts to improve legislative expertise and management skills that bolster accountability and legislative oversight in Venezuela’s new National Assembly;


Work with pro-democracy elements in Latin America and Europe to encourage sustained support for civil society in Venezuela; and

Keep its focus on the Inter-American Democratic Charter as the central tool within the Organization of American States system for opening political space in Venezuela and as a yardstick for measuring governance in Venezuela in the months ahead.

Looking Ahead



The Venezuelan opposition emerges from the September 26 elections with a credible and stronger base—as well as a fresh sense of legitimacy and greater unity—as it looks ahead to decisive presidential elections in 2012.



Ray Walser, Ph.D., is Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation

East China Sea Flare-Up: Learning The Wrong Lessons In Beijing

From The Heritage Foundation:

East China Sea Flare-Up: Learning the Wrong Lessons in BeijingPublished on September 27, 2010 by Dean Cheng WebMemo #3027 Print PDF


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Japanese prosecutors have reportedly decided to release the captain of the Chinese fishing boat whom they arrested after he apparently rammed two Japanese coast guard vessels in the waters around the Senkakus. The decision, a Japanese deputy public prosecutor said, was made “taking into account the impact on our citizens and Japan–China relations, [so] our judgment was that it would have been excessive to prolong the investigation and his detention.”[1]



The Japanese government’s comments make it even clearer that this decision was made due to the impact of the case on Sino–Japanese relations. Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshito Sengoku stated explicitly, “It is a fact that there was the possibility that Japan–China relations might worsen or that there were signs of that happening.”[2]



While this decision may resolve the immediate issue of Captain Zhan Qixiong, it is likely to generate far more problems in the future.



Sending the Wrong Message



The situation first erupted on September 7, when Japanese coast guard vessels intercepted Zhan’s fishing boat in the waters around the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyutai islets. The captain tried to flee and apparently collided with two of the coast guard vessels (with little damage and no loss of life), for which he was arrested.



In the immediate aftermath of the incident, Beijing demanded that the Japanese government “immediately and unconditionally” release the captain. Such an aggressive response was unusual, given that the situation was far from critical. Of even greater concern, however, was the fact that Beijing escalated both the rhetoric and its responses over the following two weeks, to the point of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao publicly snubbing Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan last week at the United Nations and China suspending the sale of rare earth minerals (essential for the production of electronics) to Japanese customers. For Tokyo to decide to release the Chinese captain in the face of such overreaction only teaches Beijing that its policies worked.



This is an extremely dangerous precedent not only for Japan but for the larger East Asia region and, ultimately, even for the United States.




It was Beijing, not Tokyo, that decided that this relatively minor incident should escalate. Some recent reports even suggest that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was responsible for the harder line pursued by the Chinese in this crisis.[3] Regardless of whether it was ultimately the military that pushed this position or simply hardliners writ large, they have now been handed a victory by Tokyo. Chinese demands for immediate and unconditional release have been met.



Weishe Works



More to the point, from Beijing’s perspective, the combination of diplomatic paroxysm and economic blackmail have led to a desired outcome. This would suggest the successful application of weishe.



While commonly translated as “deterrence,” the Chinese phrase weishe embodies not only dissuasion (commonly associated with the term deterrence) but also coercion. That is, whereas Western concepts of deterrence tend to focus on persuading a rival not to do something they would otherwise do, the Chinese concept of deterrence also includes persuading a rival to do something they would otherwise not do.



It would therefore be logical for the PRC to pursue a similar approach over future territorial disputes—use weishe to coerce neighbors into make concessions. And there are many such disputes looming if not already underway, including with Japan and most of Southeast Asia, as well as India. Consequently, the Japanese decision makes it more likely that there will be increasing confrontations all along China’s disputed periphery.



What will Japan do the next time a Chinese fishing boat is found around the Senkaku/Diaoyutai? Or if Chinese vessels challenge Japanese survey operations in disputed waters?



Worse, this incident is also likely to persuade Chinese officials that their current approach to crises is a successful one. A review of recent crises—such as the 2001 EP-3 incident and the 2007 shooting down of a Chinese satellite, as well as the case of Captain Zhan—reveals that Chinese responses are consistently delayed and fragmented—and initially nearly incoherent. Yet there are few downsides for the Chinese aside from a demarche or two.

A Dangerous Situation: The U.S.’s Two-Pronged Response




For the U.S., which is often allied or friends with parties that have territorial disputes with the PRC, this situation will become ever more dangerous. Chinese miscalculations (which are essentially being encouraged) will inevitably draw in the U.S. if the situation starts to spiral out of control. Washington needs to engage in a two-pronged approach.



First, the U.S. needs to make clear to its allies that their policy of preemptive concession and non-response to Chinese irascibility is ultimately self-defeating. Not only does it encourage the Chinese to be more belligerent and less conciliatory, but it is also more likely to escalate future crises. And Washington has no intention to help those who will not help themselves.



Simultaneously, the U.S., in its own policies, needs to be more coherent and coordinated. China resorting so promptly to the economic threat of curtailing rare earth exports, for example, should be a clear signal to American decision-makers that it is time to reexamine its decisions influencing domestic exploration and exploitation of said materials. Similarly, Chinese efforts to exclude the U.S. Navy from operating in the Yellow Sea and East China Sea should be met with a recommitment of the U.S. to uphold its treaty and legal obligations to allies and friends in the Pacific.



America: “Returning” to Asia



If the U.S. is going to argue that it is “returning” to Asia, it needs to make clear that, this time, it is here to stay. Such a commitment requires not only maintaining a strong military presence but deepening its diplomatic and trade ties to the region. The American presence has always been multifaceted, and its “return” should reflect all those aspects.



Dean Cheng is Research Fellow in Chinese Political and Security Affairs in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.



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[1]Sachiko Sakamaki, “Japan Cites China Relations in Releasing Boat Captain,” Bloomberg, September 24, 2010, at http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-09-24/japan-cites-china-relations-in-releasing-boat-captain.html (September 24, 2010).



[2]Yoko Nishikawa and Chisa Fujioka, “Japan to Free China Boat Captain at Centre of Row,” Reuters, September 24, 2010, at http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKTRE68N09H20100924 (September 24, 2010).



[3]John Pomfret, “In China, Officials in Tug of War to Shape Foreign Policy,” The Washington Post, September 24, 2010, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/23/AR2010092306843_pf.html (September 24, 2010).

China-Japan Confrontation At Sea: Senkaku Islands Issue Won't Go Away

From The Heritage Foundation:

China–Japan Confrontation at Sea: Senkaku Islands Issue Won’t Go AwayPublished on September 24, 2010 by Dean Cheng WebMemo #3025 Print PDF



In recent weeks, a group of uninhabited rocky outcroppings in the East China Sea between Okinawa and Taiwan have become a serious source of tension between Beijing and Tokyo. On September 8, the Japan Coast Guard arrested the crew of a Chinese fishing vessel operating in the waters off the Senkakus, which is administered by Japan. Reports indicate that the fishing boat, in an attempt to evade inspection, collided with two coast guard vessels.



This should be a routine matter—even in a region where sovereignty is in dispute. Yet the incident has approached crisis levels because it happened in the context of growing concern over aggressive Chinese diplomacy in many of Beijing’s territorial disputes with its neighbors, as well as a military modernization program with unsettling security implications. For the same reasons, this matter will not end with the release of the crew and captain of the Chinese boat.



Larger Issues at Stake



These islets, called the “Diaoyutai” by the Chinese and the “Senkakus” by the Japanese, are claimed by both sides but are currently under the administration of Japan.



Part of the ongoing disagreement is a fundamental territorial dispute. In an Asia marked by many disputed borders (e.g., Tok-do/Takeshima between South Korea and Japan, the Northern Territories between Japan and Russia, the South China Sea, the precise borders between India and China), the Senkaku/Diaoyutai are hardly atypical.



For both sides, however, larger issues are at stake. This dispute, for example is as much about the resources in the waters and under the seabed around the islands as it is about sovereignty over the islands themselves. The islands are in the midst of rich fishing grounds. But even more importantly, they may sit atop significant oil deposits. For both China and Japan, control over the islands is a reflection, in part, of their competition over natural resources.



Formal sovereignty over the islets may also have implications for the establishment of baselines for Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and attendant exploitation of resources in those waters. The Chinese and Japanese have been disputing the precise demarcation of their respective EEZs in the larger East China Sea area for the past several years, affecting efforts at oil exploration.



For the Chinese, the Diaoyutai are also partly about history—and specifically the bloody record of Sino–Japanese relations. From the Chinese perspective, Japanese claims are about historical revisionism; Beijing believes that Japan’s claim denies China’s claim to have first discovered, and established ownership of, the islands. Sino–Japanese interactions often spark a nationalist reaction. This nationalist sentiment may also explain why Beijing has thus far shown no interest in conciliation or concession. The Chinese insistence on “unconditional release” of the captain of the fishing boat (the rest of the crew has already been repatriated) may be a nod to domestic sentiment.



Further complicating affairs in this regard is the potential role of Taiwan. On September 15, a Taiwan fishing boat with several activists aboard was turned back by the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency as it tried to approach the islets. Both Beijing and Taipei are in agreement that these islands are not Japanese, even if they are not in agreement on much else. Indeed, the apparent intent of a group of Hong Kong activists to also protest the Japanese claim highlights that, for Chinese of many political stripes, the islands are a point of national pride. Fortunately, cooler heads seem to have prevailed in both Taipei and Hong Kong, and the protest flotillas remain anchored.



America’s Role



The United States’ position has, thus far, been carefully staked out.[1] On the one hand, Washington has refused to take a formal position on ultimate sovereignty over the islets. Washington would clearly prefer to see the entire situation peaceably resolved. At the same time, however, the U.S. has noted that the islands are under the purview of the 1960 U.S.–Japan Security Treaty, since that treaty covers all territories under the administration of Japan—which would include the Senkakus.



Where U.S. and Chinese interests potentially collide is in the security implications of this incident. While the islets themselves have little strategic value, recent Chinese assertiveness about control of the Yellow Sea, South China Sea, and the larger East China Sea have set Washington and Beijing at odds. Chinese demands that the U.S. not engage in joint exercises with its ally South Korea in the wake of the North Korean sinking of the South Korean frigate Cheonan, as well as Chinese harassment of U.S. oceanographic survey vessels, hint at a broader Chinese campaign aimed at establishing dominance over the waters within the “first island chain,” which encompasses the East China Sea.



The blurring of the lines between Chinese government and civilian roles is exacerbated by past Chinese use of civilian fishing boats to press territorial claims. Indeed, several of the vessels that harassed the USNS Impeccable as well as the USS John S. McCain III were civilian fishing boats. This precedent raises the fundamental question of whether the current Senkakus crisis was precipitated deliberately by the PRC government through the use of a civilian vessel as a stalking horse.



Proceed with Caution



It is difficult to imagine that this group of islets should precipitate a full-blown crisis involving the world’s three largest economies and Asia’s largest navies. Yet history is replete with crises that spun out of control, many of which also started from small issues and incidents. It is therefore incumbent upon Beijing, Tokyo, and Washington to proceed with caution.



For the PRC, these incidents once again demonstrate that Beijing is extremely poor at crisis management. From a foreign ministry that appears unable to move beyond repetition of its talking points to the lack of any kind of policy initiatives even after several days of escalating tensions, China’s behavior is consistent with its prior non-responses to similar crises.



Beijing would do well to ratchet down its rhetoric so that it does not paint itself into a corner through ill-considered statements and actions. Moreover, in light of this and other recent experiences, Beijing will hopefully begin earnest participation in transparency and confidence-building measures rather than relying on unilateral demands imposed upon China’s neighbors.



For Japan, investigating a fishing vessel trespassing in areas under its administration (which was what precipitated the crisis) would seem appropriate, as does its reaction when its orders are resisted. Yet the reported decision to release the captain without trial seems to undermine this position. More to the point, Japan’s response is likely to teach Beijing that if it blusters and shouts sufficiently, it will get its way. By failing to hold to their principles, Japanese officials should brace themselves for further such incursions and ever more assertive Chinese stances.



America’s Focus



For the U.S., the focus has been on the implications for the alliance and on regional stability. This should remain the case in the future. Specially, the U.S. should:



Stand by America’s allies. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen were right to reaffirm the U.S.–Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. That their explicit support did not apparently strengthen the resolve of America’s Japanese allies should give all concerned—here, in Japan, and in the broader East Asian region—pause.

Express support, but do not dictate. In light of ongoing Sino–American tensions, a greater U.S. role in this specific crisis might well have exacerbated tensions. Washington should therefore be applauded in making it clear that it is Japan rather than the U.S. that is the main party to this dispute, even as Washington made clear to Tokyo that it was standing by its security commitments and coordinating its responses.

Do not be coerced by Chinese irascibility. In the future, the U.S. should also draw attention to what is an apparent trend of Chinese provocations in disputed seas and call for their cessation. Chinese escalation of what should be a routine fisheries matter is a perfect case in point. It is uncalled for and raises concerns throughout the region about China’s long-term intentions toward its neighbors—and not just in Japan. The U.S. should make clear that it will continue to preserve and protect freedom of navigation—a principle it has long supported.

Not Going Away



The recent tensions between China and Japan over rocky islets in the East China Sea are likely to recur as China pushes its territorial claims out to the first island chain.



Dean Cheng is Research Fellow in Chinese Political and Security Affairs in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.



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[1]See Bruce Klingner, “So Much for Japanese Resolve,” The Foundry, September 24, 2010, at http://blog.heritage.org/2010/09/24/so-much-for-japanese-resolve/.

Egypt: A Muslim And Coptic Christian Tug Of War Versus Civil Liberties

From Afrik News and The Christian Reader:

Egypt: A Muslim and Coptic Christian tug of war versus civil liberties


Thursday 30 September 2010 / by YOUSSRA







Religious events in Egypt have lately taken a new direction. It is an open secret that the minority Copt Christians in the northern African country feel persecuted. Recently, a Copt bishop’s wife, Kamilia Shehata, it appears, decided to convert to Islam. Shortly afterwards, she changed her mind and left Islam for Christianity. A decision that stirred the ire of the Muslim majority with some calling for her death. But, Kamilia’s story is far from being the first of its kind. In 2004, another woman, Wafaa Costantine, who converted to Islam is said to have been forced to reconvert to Christianity. These cases might be overlooked as banal everyday occurrences in a country that has the Islamic Sharia law taking precedence in parts of its constitution. But whilst death threats may seem justifiable by religious precepts, the question is whether the Egyptian constitution protects all citizens.

The conversion cases involving Kamilia Shehata and Wafaa Constantine follow the heels of another affair involving a man, El Gohary, who converted from Islam some 30 years ago. While the conversions have triggered protests in both the Copt and Muslim communities with some Muslims calling for the deaths of the so-called apostates, the legal protection of Egyptians irrespective of their religion, race or sex remains questionable. Indeed, all three cases, albeit separate, bring a hidden fear of the other to the fore. But above all, they reflect the inability of a lopsided legal system to alley the fears of citizens, and insure that whatever decision they make concerning their personal faiths does not see them falling prey to deadly faith-based anger.



With sentiments running amok, the bishop’s wife publicly announced that she had never changed her religion and that what was said about her becoming Muslim was pure invention by the media. And to protect her from Muslims who took to the streets to express their anger because she converted to Christianity, even if she is originally a Christian, the Copt community whisked Kamilia Shehata to a church where she is being kept under close surveillance. El-Gohary, on the other hand, is ensuring his own safety as he moves from one place to another to cover his tracks. Last year, El-Gohary’s case hit Egyptian headlines when he decided to change his religious affiliation on his documents three decades after converting to Christianity. Unsurprisingly, he has been met with fatwas that clearly indicate contempt of Islam, as some continue to call for his head for a constitutional sin. And after refusing to agree to change his religious affiliation on his legal documents, the court that was charged with the case thus confirms a lopsided judiciary. But at closer look, the Egyptian constitution that is expected to protect all citizens irrespective of religion, race or sex "guarantees freedom of religion unless it contradicts set practices in sharia, or Islamic law" indicates Compass Direct news.



A long fight



But despite these incidents, it does not go without saying that Coptic Christians and Muslims in Egypt have been known for their historic cohabitation. Historians, however, argue that the cohabitation of the two communities has not always been peaceful. Indeed, since the invasion of Egypt by Arab Muslims, the Coptic church, considered as one of the oldest churches in the world, has seen a slow decline of its numbers. And although Copts have since the mid 20th century seen a strong revival of faith in their community, the fear of being submerged by the Muslim population whose numbers — besides being protected by law, given that a Muslim cannot change his or her religion,— have grown in part due to the legality of polygamy among Muslim males. By the early 90’s, only between 13 and 15% of the total Egyptian population of 59 million belonged to the Coptic Christian faith. Today, Copt’s need permits to put up churches as against Muslims who do not, in a country where the world’s first Christian monasteries are believed to have sprung and where the historical importance of Coptic Christians who have religiously preserved the ancient and extinction-prone Egyptian or Coptic language cannot be over-emphasised.



Kamilia Shehata’s affair brings another problem to the fore. Although she is supposed to be free to convert to Islam, reconverting to Christianity, even an iota of second later, would be interpreted by a part of the Muslim community as a case of apostasy. Some Muslims argue that sentencing her to death is right under the law, which guarantees freedom of religion "unless it contradicts Islamic laws". Her case, they say, contradicts with Islamic laws. As the case gave way to heated arguments, religious people from the church made declarations that were considered by Muslims as an attack against Islam. Anger rose to fever pitch levels in both the Muslim and Christian communities, and writers and religious Muslims asked the government to intervene. But discussions became more agitated and inflammatory. In the heat of the action, the use of Koranic verses by some Copts was considered derogatory by Muslims who organised demonstrations, during which some Muslim writers accused the church of having weapons and of preparing for an insurrection. Meanwhile, some Copts say that their members have recently been killed by Muslims.



Following the ensuing protests after conflicting rumours suggested that Kamilia was being held against her will in a Church on the one hand, and on the other hand that she was being protected, some Egyptians claimed that "Muslims who called for Kamilia’s right to convert to Islam are the same demanding her death for apostasy". Others argue that "Copts intent on keeping Kamilia Shehata within the confines of the church and blocking her decision to convert to Islam are the same who tirelessly advocate for every Egyptian to be given the right to choose his or her religion". But what becomes the fate of Kamilia Shehata whose hurried conversion and reconversion might have been a pure fabrication by the media? Whether or not the bishop’s wife converted and reconverted, is it not up to her to decide what her inner faith should be? And is killing people off as prescribed by sharia a viable legal solution? As the question of why the government has allowed such an explosive situation to reach this fever pitch level burns on people’s minds, successfully dealing with this case would mean tackling the sensitive issue of freedom: freedom of worship, freedom of religion, civil liberties. It should not come as a surprise if the non-separation of religion from state sees religious groups claiming legitimacy to assume the powers of state.











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When The Taliban Calls, Should You Take It?

From Common Dreams.org:

Published on Friday, October 1, 2010 by CommonDreams.org


When the Taliban Calls, Should You Take It?

How can we cover a war when we only cover one side? Do We Live in a “Republic of Fear?”

by Danny Schechter



There is a saying I may be twisting in the retelling to the effect of "what you do unto others will be done onto you." In Karmic terms, it boils down to what goes around comes around. These thoughts come to mind as I wrestle with a dilemma that seems to be worming its way out of the soil of a country at war overseas and with itself.



Earlier this week, I received a friend request on Facebook from one Abdullah Musafir. He identified himself as from the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. His wall was filled with Islamic proverbs and reports on the killing of Western forces and battles with "cowardly terrorists," i.e., NATO, Afghan soldiers and US Troops. There were reference to the destruction of "puppet" police vehicles and the use of IEDs.



Clearly it was Taliban propaganda, a side of the war we rarely get in any unfiltered form, as opposed to our propaganda that routinely comes our way on TV and in the press. Theirs is crude; ours is much slicker. Is any of it credible?



Yes, there are also some excellent and gutsy US correspondents there who try to tell the truth, and that truth seems to be we are not winning, which is a way of saying, without saying, that we are losing.



When reports from the battlefield appear in the print press, there is usually some background like reports that military units worry about hostility from the people they are ostensibly there to defend. (Over 80% of Afghans surveyed BEFORE the ongoing Khandahar surge were against it!)



General Petraeus speaks of facing an "industrial strength insurgency." He is reported to be welcoming reports that Taliban commanders want to talk with our Karzai regime. That is supposedly a good thing, maybe the only way out in Afghanistan. (Of course, we want them to talk only on our terms as in: lay down your arms, pledge loyalty to Karzai's corrupt government, and then, and only then, can we talk. This is, of course, a non-starter, especially when you are on the defensive.)



Now, Karzai has handpicked a 70-person "peace panel" stacked with anti-Taliban personalities. Independent Afghan analyst Maritine van Bijlert believes it will go nowhere, saying, "He is not interested in substantial talks." That is no doubt why Washington is said to be supporting this phony "initiative."



The Taliban has just denied they are talking to a government they claim has no support, so this whole effort may be a deception to try to boost world opinion and divert attention away from the pervasive corruption and a losing war, as in, see, ‘we are trying negotiations too!'



At the same time, our corporate media just regurgitates the one-sided poop we have come to expect. You never hear from the other side or even international observers who are not gung-ho US backers. As Fairness & Accuracy In Reporting (FAIR) points out, "The escalation of the war in Afghanistan is treated as something that cannot be debated (see the Sunday chat shows) or as the only thing that might save the women of that country (see Time magazine's recent propagandistic cover)."



When these same stories air on TV, they become classic "bang-bang" war coverage of US troops shooting at the enemy and fighting bravely, The assessments of their performance often lacks background and context. One Afghan province looks like another. Our atrocities are rarely reported.



The assumption seems to be that if you get information from the "enemy," you become the enemy. Huh? Two Al Jazeera journalists were recently jailed for talking to the other side -- but then released. This shows the information control focus that is part of our "Perception Management" strategy.



It is not working with 60% of the American public now opposing the war.



Even as the Obama Administration expands the use of brutal drone attacks that so often kill civilians, over Pakistani objections, and Petraeus threatens to expand the war into Cambodia, oops, Pakistan, without Congressional approval, it's déjà vu stalemate all over again.



But does that mean that American journalists like myself shouldn't talk with or write to or even "friend" someone on the other side? I recently asked this question on my Facebook "wall" seeking advice from the people who have opted to "follow me." (We all know this more a fiction than a platform for real friends.)



I was amazed when my request for advice triggered 58 comments. Many were genuinely concerned about my safety. Some thought I was going there; others worried that it could lead to an outrageous FBI raid, as is taking place in the Mid-West, or being put on the No Fly List. One suggested I could be in Gitmo by Christmas.



Apparently, guilt by association is alive and well. You can easily become an "enemy" if you have the wrong friends. Big Brother is back, if he ever left.



Many warned that we have no real online privacy especially with the Obama Administration threatening to monitor, and, when think necessary, shut down the Internet. (Wasn't Joe Lieberman the first to recommend the practice already followed in China and other countries?)



This paranoia and blow against freedom is being fed by what political scientist Michael Brenner calls a "phony war," writing,



"Warnings are sounding about the growing menace to the U.S. homeland from "homegrown terrorism." A recent Congressional Research Service purporting to quantify that increased risk has created a stir. All this angst needs to be placed in dispassionate perspective. America stills lives in an acutely anxious post-9/11 state...



"My personal judgment is that the war on terror, on balance, has had two dire effects: one, we are less safe as a consequence due to the great number of persons that our actions have recruited and motivated to support terrorist acts against the United States; and, two, we have seriously weakened our civil liberties.



"Moreover, the number of persons and institutions with vested interests in keeping the terrorism industry thriving ensures that these costs will mount over time."



I keep thinking of a book written about Saddam's Iraq called "Republic of Fear." That title could be applied to a book about the USA today.



So what to do about Abdullah, the holy warrior in Afghanistan and a wannabe "friend?" Is even looking at his post the equivalent of viewing porn yet? If I friend him, does that make me a Taliban supporter?



I decided to write him to tell him that rather than become "friends," he could send me his "news" via email and so he will be in the company of so many others like Newt Gingrich, the Tea Party, The Repugs, The Minutemen, The Birthers, The Birchers, The Israeli hardliners, the Mosque Marauders et al who just love to inundate/litter my in-box with their "urgent communiques" forcing me to waste time hitting delete.



He wrote back inviting me to visit their website, but warned that it is often hacked. I wonder who would have the means and the motive to do that?



We can't ignore what such a powerful force is saying.



Fascinating that this should occur as the new Facebook Movie opens nationwide.



I don't have to see it. I am living it.



News Dissector Danny Schechter wrote When News Lies (2006) about media complicity and the war in Iraq. His film WMD (Weapons of Mass Deception) covered that coverage. Comments to dissector@mediachannel.org

U.S. Continues To Take Hard Line In Peace Talks With Taliban

From Common Dreams.org:

Published on Friday, October 1, 2010 by Inter Press Service


US Still Taking a Hard Line on Peace Talks with Taliban

by Gareth Porter



WASHINGTON - Following serious setbacks to the U.S. military's war plan in Afghanistan, the Barack Obama administration has taken the first tentative step toward a negotiated settlement of the conflict by actively seeking to ascertain the willingness of the Taliban to enter into negotiations, according to a source familiar with the administration's thinking about the issue.



But the administration is still sticking to demands on the Taliban that it knows are not realistic, in a manner that is strikingly similar to the demands stated publicly by the United States in the early stage of the Vietnam War.



Obama has yet to make a crucial political decision to separate a military settlement with the Taliban from the negotiation of a settlement between the Taliban and the Hamid Karzai government, according to the source.



The source confirmed to IPS that the Pakistani military has been in discussions with Taliban leaders and had been sharing its notes of the meetings with U.S. and Saudi officials, as had been reported by Syed Saleem Shahzad in the Asia Times Sep. 11.



But the source suggested that, contrary to the implication of the Shahzad story, the Pakistani conversations with the Taliban are not aimed at preparing the way for a separate U.S.-Taliban deal. The administration is still in the stage of intensive intelligence gathering, according to the source, rather than conducting an indirect political dialogue with the Taliban leadership separate from contacts between Karzai and the Taliban.



The administration position on peace talks was articulated by Gen. Petraeus in an interview with Katie Couric Aug. 20. "We're not the ones calling the shots," said Petraeus. "At the end of the day those who will determine whether reconciliation goes forward or not are those who lead the Afghan government, and that is why it is appropriate that they lead these efforts…."



Petraeus listed Karzai's conditions for the Taliban to meet for a peace settlement: "They must respect the constitution, lay down weapons, cut off ties with al Qaeda and essentially be willing to be productive members of society."



The source indicated that the Obama administration has not suggested any willingness to agree to a U.S. troop withdrawal in return for a Taliban commitment to reject al Qaeda and to ensure that it will not be able to operate from Afghan soil. Such a troop withdrawal-for-al Qaeda deal could satisfy the U.S. national security interest in the war as articulated by the Obama administration itself.



Contrary to the Shahzad article, the Pakistanis have not conveyed anything to the Taliban as concrete as asking whether the Taliban would agree to a deal under which U.S. troops would evacuate from the south but remain in the north.



The U.S. continues to assert that full U.S. troop withdrawal would only come in conjunction with a settlement between Karzai and the Taliban.



The administration is fully aware that the final settlement in Afghanistan will bear no resemblance to the demand for Taliban submission that is the official U.S.-Karzai position at present, according to the source.



That demand is roughly equivalent to the position taken by the Lyndon Johnson administration in 1965 that the insurgents in South Vietnam could participate in elections if they would "lay down their arms" and "accept amnesty".



The source explained the rationale for maintaining that unrealistic maximalist position as being the belief that it will result in a better deal than going to the U.S. "bottom line" immediately.



Underlying that posture is the assumption that the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan gives the United States significant leverage on the Taliban with regard to the internal settlement with Karzai.



Even if the United States were to withdraw two-thirds of its troops, the source indicated, it would still have such diplomatic leverage, partly because it would increase domestic support for the war, in the same way that President Richard Nixon's withdrawal of troops from Vietnam from 1969 through 1972 made it possible for him to lengthen the war.



In the Pakistani-Taliban talks on a settlement, the Taliban leaders have insisted on a complete U.S. troop withdrawal, according to Shahzad.



The Taliban has also confirmed what had been signaled in an article on the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan website last December - that it is prepared to give legal assurances that al Qaeda and other global jihadist organisations would not be allowed to operate in Afghanistan after the war against foreign military forces.



In an interview with IPS last January, Arsalaan Rahmani, a former deputy minister of education in the Taliban regime who participated in a small team that had served as intermediaries between Karzai and the Taliban, said any negotiations between the Taliban and Karzai regime would have to be preceded by agreement with the United States on the key international issues of withdrawal of all foreign troops and the Taliban's renunciation of ties with al Qaeda.



A comment by Gen. David Petraeus on Monday that high-level Taliban figures had "reached out" to Karzai appeared to suggest that the Taliban might be relaxing that position. But Rachmani told IPS he doubted Petraeus's claim of a new Taliban approach to Karzai. He said he would be aware of any such change in the Taliban posture.



Former Taliban foreign ministry official Wahid Muzhda, who follows Taliban policies closely, also told IPS he had not heard of any such move by the Taliban. Muzhda noted that during Eid, the three-day Muslim holiday marking the end of Ramadan Sep. 9, Taliban spiritual leader Mullah Omar had vowed to continue the war and said the Taliban would "never accept" the current government.



The fact that the administration's thinking about a negotiated settlement has not advanced beyond the stage of maximalist demands suggests that its policy will have to through a series of stages before adjusting fully to the reality that it cannot control the post-occupation politics of Afghanistan.



Additional reporting by Ahmad Walid Fazly in Kabul.





© 2010 IPS North America