From The Heritage Foundation and The Hoover Institution:
China’s Assertive Behavior
Part One: On “Core Interests”
Michael D. Swaine
(I am deeply indebted to Rachel Odell and Tan Weilu, Carnegie Junior Fellows, for their
invaluable research assistance in the preparation of this article.)
Among both casual observers and experts alike, the single most dominant
theme in Sino-U.S. relations of the past year or more has been the
emergence of a more “assertive China.” In CLM 32, we examined how
both Chinese and outside observers look at China’s growing assertiveness
on the international stage, that is, the purely perceptual dimensions of the
issue. In this and several subsequent CLMs, we intend to assess whether,
to what extent, and in what manner, the Chinese government is becoming
more assertive in several major areas of relevance to the United States:
First, in defining and promoting the concept of “core interests”; second,
with regard to U.S. political and military behavior along China’s maritime
periphery; third, concerning a variety of economic, trade, and finance
issues, from so-called indigenous innovation to global standards regarding
reserve currencies; and fourth, with regard to several issues related to
international security, from counter-proliferation to climate change.
In each of these four areas, we shall to varying degrees attempt to
answer several basic questions regarding Chinese assertiveness that build
on those addressed in CLM 32: In what ways are Chinese leaders
becoming more assertive, employing what methods, and to what apparent
ends? Is Chinese assertiveness a “new” and highly significant
phenomenon for U.S. interests, and if so, in what manner? What
misconceptions, if any, exist about China’s assertiveness? What internal
and external forces are driving China’s assertive behavior? In particular, is
Chinese assertiveness associated with particular interest groups or factions
within Chinese state and society? How is China’s assertiveness evolving
in response to both inside and outside pressures? And finally, what do the
answers to the foregoing questions tell us about the likely future direction
and strength of China’s assertiveness over the next several years?
What Kind of Assertive Behavior?
As indicated in CLM 32, China’s assertiveness means different things to different people.
As a result, the concept, in describing Chinese behavior, is somewhat vague and
ambiguous, potentially encompassing everything from attempts to play a more active role
in a wide variety of international regimes, to deliberate efforts to alter basic international
norms and challenge the fundamental national interests or policies of the United States. In
addition, there are many forms of assertiveness, from mere verbal statements or
comments, to concerted official actions that appear designed to intimidate or even to
force other nations or foreign entities to change their behavior. As this typology suggests,
some forms of Chinese assertiveness are probably beneficial to the workings of the
international system and U.S. interests while others are not. Indeed, U.S. officials
welcome a more active, engaged China that seeks both to strengthen and to shape
international institutions and norms in ways that advance prosperity, stability, and the
peaceful resolution of problems. They presumably do not welcome a China that desires or
appears to do otherwise.
In addition, not all indications of Chinese assertiveness (whether “good” or “bad” for
the United States and other Western powers) are sanctioned or supported by the Chinese
government. Indeed, as we have seen in CLM 32, many unofficial Chinese observers and
pundits express or advocate various levels and types of assertiveness that are not reflected
in official Chinese statements or documents.
Thus, any assessment of Chinese assertiveness must distinguish between official and
unofficial actions or utterances, productive or creative assertiveness (what one might call
“positive activism”) and confrontational, destabilizing, or threatening (from a Western or
U.S. perspective) assertiveness. This essay, and those that follow, focuses primarily on
identifying, measuring, and assessing official or governmental forms of negative or
potentially threatening Chinese assertiveness, given its clear significance for future Sino-
American relations and the obvious attention that it has received among outside
observers.
Why “Core Interests”?
Since at least November of 2009, when it was inserted in the U.S.-China Joint Statement
between Hu Jintao and Barack Obama during the latter’s state visit to China,1 the notion
of China’s “core interests” has received enormous attention among both media
pundits and experts alike. Many observers interpret the use of this concept by the PRC
government as an indication of strong (and growing) Chinese assertiveness in the
international arena, for three apparent reasons: first, because in recent years the concept
has been more formally defined and included in official PRC (and at least one bilateral
U.S.-PRC) statements and documents to a greater extent than in the past; second, because
some Chinese officials and unofficial observers have apparently asserted that China’s
“core interests” are essentially nonnegotiable in nature, thus conveying a level of rigidity
and perhaps militancy toward whatever issue might be defined as a core interest; and
third, because China is allegedly steadily defining more and more controversial
international issues as affecting its “core interests,” including U.S. arms sales to Taiwan,
meetings between foreign leaders and the Dalai Lama, and disputed territories in the
South China Sea, thus by implication challenging an array of foreign activities relating to
such issues. In the remainder of this essay, we shall examine these observations in turn.
Increasing Usage and an Official Definition
An examination of the historical record indicates that the Chinese government has indeed
in recent years invoked China’s “core interests” far more frequently, and presented
publicly a more explicit definition of the term, than it has done in the past.2 In fact,
official Chinese sources only began referring to China’s “core interests” on a fairly
frequent basis in 2003–2004. The term was initially used in Chinese official media during
the 1980s and ’90s only in reference to the interests of other nations.3
It was first used with reference to China in the mid-’90s and in the first years of the
new century, but primarily in a domestic context. At that time, the term was closely
associated with and seemed to emerge from the term “fundamental interests” ()
as applied to China’s economic- and social-reform policies and the general maintenance
of domestic order and stability.4
The term “core interests” has also been used in official PRC media alongside the
term “major concerns” ().5 The latter term was in fact employed earlier than
“core interests” in official PRC media and at times was used in joint statements between
China and foreign governments, for example, in a report on a meeting between Jiang
Zemin and President Chirac of France in 2000. It has also been used to refer to the
Taiwan issue and the one-China principle.6
The term “core interests” was apparently first applied to China in a foreign context in
PRC media in early 2002, but in an unofficial capacity, in an article written by a Chinese
scholar.7 The first official foreign-oriented reference to the term “core interests” appeared
in the report of a meeting between Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan and Secretary of State
Colin Powell on January 19, 2003, in which Tang identified Taiwan as among China’s
“core interests.” (See below for more on the link between Taiwan and the emergence of
the official PRC use of “core interests”).8
The first apparent official identification of the oft-espoused concepts of “sovereignty
and territorial integrity” () as a Chinese “core interest” occurred in April
2004, again in the context of a discussion of Taiwan.9 During the remainder of 2004, both
official and unofficial Chinese usage of the term “core interests” in reference to
sovereignty and territorial interests (and Taiwan in particular) increased significantly.10
The related issue of “national security” () was apparently first explicitly
identified officially as a core interest in a speech given by then Foreign Minister Li
Zhaoxing in September 2006 and reported in the People’s Daily.11
As one might surmise from the above references, major official and unofficial PRC
media mentions of China’s core interests in a foreign-policy context increased notably
beginning in the early 2000s, from a mention in one People’s Daily article in 2001 to 260
articles in 2009 and 325 articles in 2010.
Moreover, by 2004, Chinese officials had begun routinely mentioning the need for
countries to respect and accommodate one another’s “core interests” in speeches with
foreign officials and dignitaries, thus indicating that the term had not only entered the
official lexicon but also become an important element of PRC diplomacy.12
It is therefore not surprising that the senior Chinese official responsible for PRC
foreign policy (State Councilor Dai Bingguo) publicly defined the general elements of
China’s core interests in July 2009, during a session of the U.S.-China Strategic and
Economic Dialogue (S&ED). Dai stated in his closing remarks at the S&ED that the term
includes three components: 1) preserving China’s basic state system and national security
(); 2) national sovereignty and territorial integrity (
); and 3) the continued stable development of China’s economy and society (
).13 Variations of this multi-part definition have occurred officially since
that time, and have been repeated by unofficial Chinese sources as well.14
In addition, Chinese officials have also at times identified “national unity” or
“reunification” (/ / ) as a Chinese core interest, as well as
“independence” (), in some instances alongside the three elements listed above.
However, the former references were almost invariably intended to buttress the Chinese
position regarding issues associated with territorial integrity, such as Taiwan, and hence
can be taken as largely duplicative of an element contained in Dai Bingguo’s list.15 In the
case of “independence,” references have been very few in number and have always
occurred in a bilateral or multilateral context (with regard to the “core interests” of both
countries or of countries in general); in some cases the word was inserted within the
phrase “sovereignty and territorial integrity,” as in: “The defense of sovereignty,
independence and territorial integrity is the core interest of every country.”16 Thus, the
concept is, as with “national unity” or “reunification,” most closely associated with the
general category of sovereignty and territorial integrity as a core interest.
Chinese officials have also identified “human rights” as a Chinese core interest.
However, this has only occurred nine times in official Foreign Ministry sources. Hu
Jintao used it twice, in November 2006, during state visits to Laos and Pakistan. In both
instances, he was expressing China’s appreciation for the support the two countries have
extended to Beijing’s position on “ . . . Taiwan, Tibet, human rights and other major
questions involving China’s state sovereignty and core interests.”17 The seven other
references include two from Yang Jiechi in 2008 and five from various ambassadors,
including statements by Zhou Wenzhong, ambassador to the United States, in November
2009, and Song Zhe, ambassador to the EU, in December 2008.18 Moreover, overall, this
context seems to suggest that human rights as a core interest refers primarily to Beijing’s
right to determine how the lives of China’s citizenry will be promoted, especially in
contested regions such as Taiwan and Tibet, for example, via the advancement of local
economic and social conditions. In other words, the issue is again associated with
domestic interests or other core interests involving sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Therefore, the most common and authoritative formulation of the general concepts
comprising China’s core interests appears to remain that of Dai Bingguo, presented in
July 2009. That said, since Dai articulated his definition, Chinese officials have continued
to place the most emphasis on “sovereignty and territorial integrity” as the most
important characteristic of China’s core interests. The first and third elements of Dai’s
definition—“basic state system and national security,” and “continued stable social and
economic development”—are still only infrequently mentioned in the context of China’s
“core interests.”
Motivated by the Taiwan Issue?
It is not entirely clear what prompted official Chinese sources to begin employing the
term “core interests” to such a degree and in this manner. Of course, the defense or
protection of China’s national security, the PRC system or regime, and Chinese
sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as the protection and advancement of China’s
economy and society, has been a staple of PRC foreign policy for decades. Indeed, they
are basic to any nation’s definition of its national interests.
That said, it is quite likely that Beijing began to sharpen and promote vigorously the
concept of “core interests” in response to growing concerns over the Taiwan issue. By
2004–2005, Beijing had become extremely worried about what it regarded as the efforts
of former Taiwan president Chen Shuibian to achieve de jure Taiwan independence,
possibly with U.S. backing. In response, during that time, the National People’s Congress
promulgated the so-called Anti-Secession Law (ASL, in March 2005), and PRC officials
began pressing (or warning) the United States and other countries to reject Chen’s efforts
and to recognize China’s vital interests on the issue.19 As indicated above, it is precisely
at this time that Chinese officials began to emphasize China’s core interests, and to
specify Taiwan as a primary example.20 Indeed, for some unofficial Chinese observers,
Beijing’s “core interests” are primarily about sovereignty and territorial integrity.21
Used as a Warning and for Diplomatic Leverage
As suggested above, China’s relatively recent and repeated invocation of the phrase “core
interests” generates concern among both foreigners and some Chinese in large part
because of: 1) Beijing’s efforts to pressure foreign governments (and especially the
United States) to officially acknowledge acceptance of the general concept and the
specific policy issues to which it applies (such as Taiwan—discussed below); and, more
importantly, 2) its apparent association with a rigid, uncompromising diplomatic or
military stance. In other words, the appearance of the term appears to signal a more
vigorous attempt to lay down a marker, or type of warning, regarding the need for the
United States and other countries to respect (indeed, accept with little if any negotiation)
China’s position on certain issues
Regarding the first point, beginning in the early 2000s, Chinese officials increasingly
pressed the United States to issue formal statements indicating a willingness to respect
one another’s core interests (as indicated above), and even, in recent years, to explicitly
and formally recognize the category of “core interests and major concerns” in general, as
a necessary basis for the advancement of the bilateral relationship.22 This pressure
campaign culminated in the inclusion of the term in the November 2009 U.S.-China Joint
Statement. This was the first time that it had been used in an official, high-level Sino-
American statement or communiqué. In fact, even in past meetings where senior Chinese
officials were pressing their U.S. counterparts to respect China’s “core interests,” U.S.
officials never repeated the phrase, but instead merely conveyed support for various longstanding
U.S. policies, such as the “one China” principle and the three joint
communiqués.23
The 1972 and 1982 Sino-U.S. joint communiqués do affirm “respect for the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states” and “respect for each other’s sovereignty
and territorial integrity” (respectively), which Beijing has since identified as one of its
core interests.24 However, by November 2009 Beijing had significantly expanded its
definition of core interests to include several other general categories, as indicated in the
July 2009 statement by Dai Bingguo, discussed above. Therefore, such past U.S.
acknowledgments (of respect for China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity) could not
be viewed as a precedent for the U.S. acceptance of Beijing’s “core interests” in the Hu-
Obama joint statement.
Since the signing of the November 2009 Joint Statement, Beijing has repeatedly and
emphatically cited the mutual commitment to respect one another’s “core interests”
contained in that document as a basis for its demands that Washington alter its behavior
in a variety of areas, from arms sales to Taiwan to presidential meetings with the Dalai
Lama. Indeed, the Chinese have branded the joint statement as an “important consensus”
that is a major step in the development of a “new era” () in U.S.-China relations. It
is often mentioned in official Chinese sources alongside the three Sino-U.S. joint
communiqués.25 However, the reference to “core interests” was not included in the joint
statement issued after Hu Jintao’s state visit to Washington in January 2011.26 The reason
for this omission is not entirely clear, but most likely reflects, at least partly, a U.S. desire
to avoid the controversy that followed the inclusion of the term in the 2009 joint
statement. At that time, some observers argued that the Obama administration had shown
undue weakness in allegedly acceding to a Chinese demand to include a phrase closely
associated with Beijing’s claim to sovereignty over Taiwan, and other supposed territorial
ambitions.27
Regarding the association of “core interests” with an uncompromising official PRC
stance, the historical record suggests that, although Chinese officials have not to our
knowledge used the phrase “non-negotiable” ( ) to
describe China’s stance toward its “core interests,” they have certainly employed similar
terms on many occasions. For example, officials have stated that China will “never
waver, compromise, or yield” ( ), will not haggle or
bargain (), and “must stand firm, be clear-cut, have courage to fight, and never
trade away principles” ( )
when dealing with its core interests, and with issues involving sovereignty and territorial
integrity in particular.28
Moreover, Chinese officials and official media sources have at times separately used
the term “non-negotiable” to refer to issues that Beijing has described as a “core interest,”
notably, sovereignty and territorial integrity, involving, for example, Hong Kong,
Taiwan, and Tibet.29 And in some cases, Chinese officials have explicitly connected the
defense of specific core interests (again, most notably sovereignty and territorial
integrity) with the possible use of force. Such language has been used quite consistently
for years.30 Of course, even official (and unofficial) statements of strong resolve and a
refusal to compromise do not necessarily guarantee that Beijing would in reality in every
instance employ such a rigid approach (including, perhaps the use of force) to defend
what it has defined as its core interests. Yet, at least with regard to sovereignty and
territorial issues, the historical record of China’s behavior suggests that such a possibility
would be extremely high, and certainly cannot be dismissed.31
Hence, what China labels as its “core interest” is certainly significant. And so,
perhaps the most important issue becomes, what specific policy areas does Beijing
include among its core interests?
Territorial Issues (and Especially Taiwan) are at the Core
A large number of unofficial Chinese and foreign observers have identified a range of
issues as being among China’s “core interests.” These include Taiwan, Tibet and
Xinjiang-related issues; territories in the South China Seas; the defense of the Yellow
Sea; the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands; bilateral trade; and the value of China’s currency.
Some of these issues (such as Taiwan and access to international waters near China)
directly concern critical U.S. security interests.32 In truth, much of the unofficial
commentary contains inaccuracies, distortions, and misconceptions. A close examination
of the historical record, along with personal conversations with knowledgeable senior
U.S. officials, confirms that thus far the Chinese government has officially, and
repeatedly, identified only three closely related issues as specific core interests: the
defense of China’s sovereignty claims regarding Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang.
As indicated above, the Taiwan issue probably originally triggered official use of the
term “core interests” in the realm of foreign affairs and has clearly been most often
associated with its official use.33 On the subject of Tibet, Chinese officials have of course
for many years referred to Tibet’s status as part of China as an important or fundamental
sovereignty issue. For example, the 1992 PRC white paper on Tibet stated that “there is
no room for haggling” () on the fundamental principle () that “Tibet is an
inalienable part of China.”34 However, perhaps the first (or at least an early) occurrence
of an official, explicit reference to Tibet as a Chinese “core interest” occurred in April
2006, in a meeting between PRC Vice President Zeng Qinghong and the prime minister
of Sri Lanka.35
Similarly, Chinese officials have often referred to Xinjiang’s sovereign status as an
important Chinese interest. The earliest use of the term “core interest” in reference to that
Chinese region apparently also dates from 2006. In November of that year, in a speech in
Pakistan, Hu Jintao first identified “the fight against East Turkestan” terrorist forces as a
Chinese “core interest,” alongside Taiwan, Tibet, and human rights. This clearly implies
that the defense of China’s sovereignty over Xinjiang (which the East Turkestan terrorist
forces violently contest) is a PRC core interest.36 On subsequent occasions (beginning
largely in 2009, it seems), Chinese officials have referred simply to “Xinjiang” as being
among China’s core interests.37
As far as we can surmise from the official PRC sources used in this study, references
to the defense of the Yellow Sea, Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands, bilateral trade, and the value
of China’s currency as Chinese core interests are entirely unofficial. In other words, we
can find no official source stating that such concepts are among China’s “core
interests.”38
The reference to the South China Sea as a Chinese core interest is a more complex
matter. The New York Times apparently first reported that Chinese officials had identified
the defense of China’s territorial claims to the South China Sea as a “core interest” in a
private meeting held in Beijing in March 2010 with two senior U.S. officials, NSC Asia
Director Jeffrey Bader and Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg.39 Many other
media sources (and other New York Times reporters) subsequently repeated this initial
New York Times story, often without citing it as the original source (or perhaps in some
cases merely duplicating the story by interviewing the same U.S. official paraphrased in
the New York Times story),40 thus creating the impression that the report came from
multiple sources. At least one media source subsequently asserted that Dai Bingguo had
also identified the South China Sea in this manner to Hillary Clinton, at the May 2010
meeting of the S&ED in Washington.41 Clinton herself repeated this during a recent press
interview in Australia.42
However, a close examination of the official Chinese sources consulted for this study
failed to unearth a single example of a PRC official or an official PRC document or
media source that publicly and explicitly identifies the South China Sea as a PRC “core
interest.” In fact, when given the opportunity to clarify the official record on this issue,
Chinese officials have avoided doing so.43 During their October 11, 2010, meeting in
Hanoi, Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie apparently did not mention the issue of
the South China Seas to U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates.44 And when President Hu
Jintao traveled to Washington for his state visit in January 2011, he explicitly identified
only Taiwan and Tibet as core interests.45
In addition, personal communications with very knowledgeable U.S. officials
confirm that Chinese officials did not explicitly identify China’s territorial claims to the
South China Sea as a “core interest” in the March 2010 meeting with Steinberg and
Bader. In that meeting, the PRC officials listed the issue as one among several about
which they were attempting to elicit U.S. understanding and deference for Beijing’s
position. Although this effort was viewed as a clear attempt to raise the importance of the
South China Sea issue in China’s overall hierarchy of concerns, it did not explicitly
constitute an effort to brand it as a “core interest.”46
Regarding Dai Bingguo’s comment to Clinton at the May 2010 S&ED, a review of
Dai’s remarks at the opening and closing sessions reveals no reference to the South China
Sea issue as a PRC “core interest.”47 Moreover, one very well-placed U.S. official
confirmed to the author in a personal correspondence (conveyed prior to Clinton’s recent
remark in Australia) that Dai indeed did not describe the South China Sea issue in this
manner. In fact, all Chinese remarks regarding the South China Sea made at the S&ED
were presented spontaneously by a lower-level official, and thus should not be regarded
as authoritative, according to the U.S. official.48
What then about Clinton’s recent remark, noted above? It is possible that Dai
actually made the remark to Clinton in a private, offline, and unofficial conversation, or
that Clinton: a) did not accurately recall what Dai said; b) mistook the abovementioned
lower-level official for Dai Bingguo; or c) made the remark, knowing it was not true, to
add to existing U.S. efforts to deter China from attempting to add the South China Sea to
its list of core interests.
In any event, the foregoing information strongly suggests three conclusions: first, at
the very least, Beijing has not unambiguously identified the South China Sea issue as one
of its core interests, as it has done with Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang. Second, even if
Beijing did identify the issue as a core interest on one occasion (at the May 2010 S&ED),
this was done in a decidedly unofficial manner. Third, although Beijing originally
attempted in the March 2010 Steinberg/Bader meeting to raise the importance of the
South China Sea issue as a Chinese interest in U.S. eyes, it has deliberately avoided
clarifying its stance on the matter since that time, thus creating the impression that it is
backing away from the controversy.
Perhaps for some observers, the issue of whether or not Beijing has identified the
South China Sea as a core interest is a purely semantic one, of little real significance,
especially given China’s apparent attempt to raise its relevance in March 2010. However,
as noted above, the Chinese application of the term “core interest” to an issue is intended
to convey a very high level of commitment to managing or resolving that issue on
Chinese terms, without much if any discussion or negotiation (at least regarding basic
questions such as China’s ultimate sovereign authority, as in the case of Taiwan, Tibet,
and Xinjiang). In other words, it conveys a high level of resolve, and to some extent a
warning of sorts to other powers. In this particular instance, labeling China’s claims to
the South China Sea as a core interest would have signaled a significant, and alarming,
shift in China’s historical stance toward the issue. That stance not only recognizes the
multinational nature of the South China Sea issue as a sovereignty dispute among several
countries (albeit one that Beijing wishes to handle on a bilateral basis, with each
claimant), but also seeks to convey Beijing’s willingness to negotiate the ultimate nature
and extent of Chinese sovereignty over the region. In contrast, Taiwan, Tibet, and
Xinjiang are described as purely Chinese internal affairs not subject to dispute or
negotiation.49
But if the term “core interests” has such significance, why has Beijing avoided
clarifying whether or not it applies to the South China Sea issue? Although it is
impossible to say with certainty, it is probably because confirming the association would
signal a clear shift in position that would likely provoke an even stronger international
reaction than has occurred thus far (as indicated above), while an official denial of the
association might convey an impression of weakness and retreat from China’s basic
stance on sovereignty and territorial issues, thus inviting domestic attack.50 Moreover, in
reality, Beijing has not clearly confirmed the precise nature and extent of its sovereignty
claims to the South China Sea; hence, clarifying its stance on whether the issue
constitutes a core interest could generate confusion and thereby force China to make such
a clarification.51
Some unofficial Chinese observers have also argued that Beijing should not
officially confirm that the South China Sea is a core interest because to do so would not
only sow confusion among other nations, but also “ . . . be used by unfriendly forces in
the international community in a bid to contain China.”52 Some Chinese academics even
suggest that the United States was falsely accusing China of elevating the South China
Sea to the level of a “core interest” in order to hype the China threat among China’s
neighbors, culminating in Secretary Clinton’s orchestrated pushback against the Chinese
at the ASEAN Regional Forum in late July 2010.53 Other Chinese observers more
broadly argue that China should be extremely cautious in describing any specific issues
(including the South China Sea) as a “core interest,” given the potentially provocative
nature of the term to other nations.54 However, as suggested in endnote 32, many
unofficial Chinese observers argue that the South China Sea issue is or should be
declared a core Chinese interest.
The preceding unofficial differences in viewpoint, along with the likely dilemma
involved in confirming whether the South China Sea is a core interest, together suggest
the possibility of disagreement among the Chinese leadership on this matter. If such
disagreement exists, it is probably not along civil-military lines, however, since some
PLA officers (such as Han Xudong and Yin Zhuo) oppose declaring the South China Sea
a core interest, while others (such as Luo Yuan) support such a move.55
Conclusion
As the foregoing analysis shows, Beijing’s use of the term “core interest” with regard to
issues involving the international community, and the United States in particular, is a
relatively recent phenomenon. Its usage probably derives from growing Chinese concerns
over the Taiwan issue in the early 2000s. However, the term has since been
unambiguously applied to two other sovereignty-related issues (Tibet and Xinjiang), and
its general coverage has been expanded to include three other general sets of state
interests: the Chinese political system, national security, and socioeconomic
development. Despite much reporting to the contrary, Beijing’s territorial claims with
regard to the South China Sea have not been clearly identified officially and publicly as a
“core interest.” Moreover, the application of the term by senior PRC officials to other
general issues such as “independence,” “human rights,” and “national unity” or
“reunification” seem intended to reinforce the existing primary emphasis placed on
sovereignty and territorial issues as core Chinese interests.
The term “core interests” has its precursors and draws on long-held stances toward
sovereignty and territorial issues. However, its increasing use in official statements and
diplomatic documents, and its explicit application to specific contentious policy issues
(most notably Taiwan) arguably signals an attempt by a stronger, more assertive Chinese
leadership to elicit greater respect and deference from other nations for China’s position
on those issues. Equally important, as suggested in CLM 32, this effort is perhaps also
motivated by a belief that the United States and other powers are increasingly challenging
some of China’s core interests, thus requiring a more assertive PRC response. In addition,
Beijing’s apparent refusal to “haggle” or compromise, and its stated willingness to
employ extreme measures—including force—to defend its position with regard to
China’s core interests, arguably constitute a warning to other nations that should not be
ignored.
Of course, every nation has its national interests, many of which are described as
“vital” or “core.”56 China is obviously no exception. Nonetheless, Beijing’s explicit and
growing emphasis on the term, its adoption of a seemingly rigid negotiating stance on
core interests, the application of the phrase to contentious issues such as Taiwan, and,
perhaps most importantly, the possibility that a stronger China might expand the scope
and sharpen the definition of its core interests further to include other issues of
contention, together pose a significant challenge to U.S. (and Chinese) efforts to maintain
a stable and mutually productive bilateral relationship.
Notes
1 The Joint Statement included the following phrase: “The two sides agreed that respecting each other’s
core interests is extremely important to ensure steady progress in China-US relations.” See “U.S.-China
Joint Statement,” White House, Office of the Press Secretary, November 17, 2009, Beijing, China,
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/us-china-joint-statement; and “China-US Joint
Statement,” November 17, 2009, Beijing, China, available at
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/bmdyzs/xwlb/t629497.htm. The language about core interests was
absent from the January 2011 joint statement issued during President Hu Jintao’s state visit to Washington,
as discussed further below. U.S.-China Joint Statement, January 19, 2011, Washington, D.C., available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/19/us-china-joint-statement.
2 The major primary sources employed in this study to chart the official use of the concept of “core
interests” and related terms include: The official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s
Republic of China ( ), Chinese and English versions (http:www.fmprc.gov.cn and
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng, respectively); the archives of People’s Daily (), at PeopleData
(http://data.people.com.cn, ); the archives of PLA Daily () at East View
Information Services (http://www.eastview.com); and the databases of the Chinese Government and the
Communist Party of China (CPC), both at PeopleData. We are also grateful to Professor Alastair Iain
Johnston of Harvard University for providing his unpublished data on the PRC usage of the term “core
interests.”
3 For example, People’s Daily apparently first employed the term “core interests” () in June 1980,
in discussing how the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Soviet support of Vietnam’s invasion of
Cambodia threatened the “core interests” of the West (). See ; , “,”
(Xiang Qian and Xiao Xi, “Critical Appeasement Undercurrent,” People’s Daily), June 21, 1980,
http://data.people.com.cn.
The second reference to the phrase in the People’s Daily database discusses Vice President Al Gore’s
five-part formulation of America’s national interests and describes how Gore explained that a technology
policy would serve the U.S. “core interests.” See , “,
,” (Xu Yong, “U.S. government declaration of scientific policy states the transfer of military
technology to civilian use,” People’s Daily), August 6, 1994, 6th edition, http://data.people.com.cn.
For similar usages, see , “,” (Huang Zequang, “Technology Creates Wealth,”
People’s Daily), July 14, 1995, 7th edition, http://data.people.com.cn; “
,” (“U.S. Treasury Secretary indicates in his speech that U.S.-China relations are critical to
global economic prosperity,” People’s Daily), October 14, 1999, 6th edition, available at
http://data.people.com.cn); and , “,” (Ou Can, “Warning Lee Teng-hui
not to have any illusions,” PLA Daily), August 29, 1999, available at
http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/14557759.
4 For example, see “,” , (“U.S. Embassy held
important talks with General Secretary Hu Jintao,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of
China), January 11, 2009, available at http://www.mfa.gov.cn/chn/gxh/tyb/zwbd/t531443.htm: “ . .
. . . . ”
(“Ambassador Zhou . . . stated that . . . grasping fundamental interests and core national interests reflects
the truth-seeking spirit of respect for history, respect for reality, and respect for the wishes of the people.”)
A 1995 article from the PLA Daily specifically discusses the adjustment from a focus on “fundamental
interests” to “core interests” in the process of economic and social reform. However, it does not clearly
define the difference between the two terms. Based on a reading of the article, it is possible that the former
referred to the basic interest of promoting overall national economic development while the latter was
intended to focus on the attainment of greater economic and social equality and common prosperity.
Nonetheless, both concepts were at the time applied to domestic issues. See “,”
(“Picture/Photo/Other,” PLA Daily), February 17, 1995, available at
http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/14466790. For a similar usage, also see “
‘’,” (“Qiushi published a signed article by Hua Qing: ‘Four
Major Boundaries of Theoretical and Practical Issues,’” PLA Daily), August 17, 2001, available at
http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/22327893.
5 Apparently, the first time the two terms were used together () was in 2007, in a report
on a meeting between Hu Jintao and German president Angela Merkel. See “,”
(“Hu Jintao meets German Prime Minister Merkel,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
People’s Republic of China), August 27, 2007, available at
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/gjhdq/gjhdqzz/mzblwelm/xgxw/t355870.htm.
6 The first reference to “major concerns” on the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs website is from 2000, in a
report on a meeting between Jiang Zemin and President Chirac of France. See “
,” (“Chairman Jiang Zemin and French President Chirac held meeting,” Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China), November 7, 2000, available at
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/gjhdq/gjhdqzz/mzblwelm/xgxw/t7275.htm.
“
21 . ” (“China and
France share many common interests; the prospect for bilateral cooperation is strong. As long as the two
countries start from the strategic perspective and the pattern of long-term development of the bilateral
relationship, maintain mutual respect, equality, and mutual benefits, especially respecting each other’s
major concerns, Sino-French relations can be raised to a new level in the 21st century.”) In a 2003 Policy
Paper on the European Union, “major concerns” is used to directly refer to the Taiwan issue in a paragraph
on the one-China policy. See “,” , (“White Paper on
Chinese policy toward the EU,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, October
2003), available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/ziliao/tytj/zcwj/t27700.htm.
7 Wang Jisi, a well-known scholar of U.S.-China relations, wrote an article in People’s Daily in February
2002 suggesting that both sides seek common ground in order to prevent differences from developing into
serious crises or conflicts that would damage the “core interests” () of either party. This is the first
time that a People’s Daily article referred to the “core interests” of China (in a foreign policy context) and
not only the “core interests” of other countries. See , “ ()—
30 ,” (Wang Jisi, “Seek common ground and stability (monograph)—celebrating the 30th
anniversary of the China-U.S. ‘Shanghai Communiqué’,” People’s Daily), February 28, 2002, 7th edition,
available at http://data.people.com.cn).
A second similar reference in the same source occurred in December 2002. See , “
,” (Yin Chengde, “Progress and Transformation of Great Power Relations,” People’s Daily),
November 19, 2002, 7th edition, available at http://data.people.com.cn. In this article, Yin, a regular
contributor to People’s Daily and possibly a Foreign Ministry official, referred to China in discussing the
“core interests” of great powers.
8 See , “,” (Ding Gang, “Tang Jiaxuan Meets U.S. Secretary of State,”
People’s Daily), January 21, 2003, 3rd edition, available at http://data.people.com.cn. At that time, “Tang
Jiaxuan said, the Taiwan issue concerns China’s core interests” (“ .”) A
month later, Colin Powell visited China and again held talks with Tang Jiaxuan, who again reiterated the
point. See “Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan Held Talks With Powell,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
People’s Republic of China, February 25, 2003, available at
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t19583.htm.
9 See “,” (Foreign Ministry
spokesperson Kong Quan warns the U.S. for its decision to sell Taiwan the long-range radar system at a
press conference),” January 1, 2004, available at
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/gxh/tyb/fyrbt/dhdw/t82122.htm.
10 Most notably, on the official level, such usage occurred at several press conferences held by Foreign
Ministry spokespersons Zhang Qiyue and Kong Quan, in speeches by such senior PRC diplomats as Yang Jiechi, Zhang Yesui, and Zhong Jianhua, in a meeting between Tang Jiaxuan and then-National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice in July 2004, in meetings between Li Zhaoxing and Colin Powell in October
2004, by Wen Jiabao in a speech at the October 2004 Asia-Europe Meeting and in remarks to Prime
Minister Shaukat Aziz of Pakistan in December 2004, and in remarks by Hu Jintao at meetings with
President Bush and Australian prime minister John Howard in November 2004. “2004 2 19
,” (“Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhang Qiyue’s
regular press conference on February 19, 2004,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of
China), February 19, 2004, available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/gxh/tyb/fyrbt/dhdw/t66764.htm;
“2004 4 1 ,” (“Foreign Ministry
Spokesperson Kong Quan’s regular press conference on February 19, 2004,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
the People’s Republic of China), April 1, 2004, available at
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/gxh/mtb/fyrbt/jzhsl/t82128.htm; “,”
(“Ambassador Yang Jiechi visits Los Angeles and receives the award for Distinguished
Diplomat,” Los Angeles General Consulate press release), April 5, 2004, available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/gjhdq/gj/bmz/1206_22/1206x2/t441607.htm; “2004 4 8
,” (“Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Kong Quan’s Regular
Press Conference on April 8, 2004,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China), April
8, 2004, available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/gxh/tyb/fyrbt/dhdw/t83827.htm; “2004 4 27
,” (“Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Kong Quan’s regular press conference on April 27, 2004,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of
China), April 27, 2004, available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/gxh/tyb/fyrbt/t93544.htm “
( 10/ 05/ 04) ,” (“Yang Jiechi, Ambassador to the United States,
delivered a speech on current Sino-U.S. relations in Arkansas,” press release of the Chinese Embassy to the
United States), May 10, 2004, available at
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/gjhdq/gj/bmz/1206_22/1206x2/t431003.htm; “,”
China’s Assertive Behavior
Part One: On “Core Interests”
Michael D. Swaine
(I am deeply indebted to Rachel Odell and Tan Weilu, Carnegie Junior Fellows, for their
invaluable research assistance in the preparation of this article.)
Among both casual observers and experts alike, the single most dominant
theme in Sino-U.S. relations of the past year or more has been the
emergence of a more “assertive China.” In CLM 32, we examined how
both Chinese and outside observers look at China’s growing assertiveness
on the international stage, that is, the purely perceptual dimensions of the
issue. In this and several subsequent CLMs, we intend to assess whether,
to what extent, and in what manner, the Chinese government is becoming
more assertive in several major areas of relevance to the United States:
First, in defining and promoting the concept of “core interests”; second,
with regard to U.S. political and military behavior along China’s maritime
periphery; third, concerning a variety of economic, trade, and finance
issues, from so-called indigenous innovation to global standards regarding
reserve currencies; and fourth, with regard to several issues related to
international security, from counter-proliferation to climate change.
In each of these four areas, we shall to varying degrees attempt to
answer several basic questions regarding Chinese assertiveness that build
on those addressed in CLM 32: In what ways are Chinese leaders
becoming more assertive, employing what methods, and to what apparent
ends? Is Chinese assertiveness a “new” and highly significant
phenomenon for U.S. interests, and if so, in what manner? What
misconceptions, if any, exist about China’s assertiveness? What internal
and external forces are driving China’s assertive behavior? In particular, is
Chinese assertiveness associated with particular interest groups or factions
within Chinese state and society? How is China’s assertiveness evolving
in response to both inside and outside pressures? And finally, what do the
answers to the foregoing questions tell us about the likely future direction
and strength of China’s assertiveness over the next several years?
What Kind of Assertive Behavior?
As indicated in CLM 32, China’s assertiveness means different things to different people.
As a result, the concept, in describing Chinese behavior, is somewhat vague and
ambiguous, potentially encompassing everything from attempts to play a more active role
in a wide variety of international regimes, to deliberate efforts to alter basic international
norms and challenge the fundamental national interests or policies of the United States. In
addition, there are many forms of assertiveness, from mere verbal statements or
comments, to concerted official actions that appear designed to intimidate or even to
force other nations or foreign entities to change their behavior. As this typology suggests,
some forms of Chinese assertiveness are probably beneficial to the workings of the
international system and U.S. interests while others are not. Indeed, U.S. officials
welcome a more active, engaged China that seeks both to strengthen and to shape
international institutions and norms in ways that advance prosperity, stability, and the
peaceful resolution of problems. They presumably do not welcome a China that desires or
appears to do otherwise.
In addition, not all indications of Chinese assertiveness (whether “good” or “bad” for
the United States and other Western powers) are sanctioned or supported by the Chinese
government. Indeed, as we have seen in CLM 32, many unofficial Chinese observers and
pundits express or advocate various levels and types of assertiveness that are not reflected
in official Chinese statements or documents.
Thus, any assessment of Chinese assertiveness must distinguish between official and
unofficial actions or utterances, productive or creative assertiveness (what one might call
“positive activism”) and confrontational, destabilizing, or threatening (from a Western or
U.S. perspective) assertiveness. This essay, and those that follow, focuses primarily on
identifying, measuring, and assessing official or governmental forms of negative or
potentially threatening Chinese assertiveness, given its clear significance for future Sino-
American relations and the obvious attention that it has received among outside
observers.
Why “Core Interests”?
Since at least November of 2009, when it was inserted in the U.S.-China Joint Statement
between Hu Jintao and Barack Obama during the latter’s state visit to China,1 the notion
of China’s “core interests” has received enormous attention among both media
pundits and experts alike. Many observers interpret the use of this concept by the PRC
government as an indication of strong (and growing) Chinese assertiveness in the
international arena, for three apparent reasons: first, because in recent years the concept
has been more formally defined and included in official PRC (and at least one bilateral
U.S.-PRC) statements and documents to a greater extent than in the past; second, because
some Chinese officials and unofficial observers have apparently asserted that China’s
“core interests” are essentially nonnegotiable in nature, thus conveying a level of rigidity
and perhaps militancy toward whatever issue might be defined as a core interest; and
third, because China is allegedly steadily defining more and more controversial
international issues as affecting its “core interests,” including U.S. arms sales to Taiwan,
meetings between foreign leaders and the Dalai Lama, and disputed territories in the
South China Sea, thus by implication challenging an array of foreign activities relating to
such issues. In the remainder of this essay, we shall examine these observations in turn.
Increasing Usage and an Official Definition
An examination of the historical record indicates that the Chinese government has indeed
in recent years invoked China’s “core interests” far more frequently, and presented
publicly a more explicit definition of the term, than it has done in the past.2 In fact,
official Chinese sources only began referring to China’s “core interests” on a fairly
frequent basis in 2003–2004. The term was initially used in Chinese official media during
the 1980s and ’90s only in reference to the interests of other nations.3
It was first used with reference to China in the mid-’90s and in the first years of the
new century, but primarily in a domestic context. At that time, the term was closely
associated with and seemed to emerge from the term “fundamental interests” ()
as applied to China’s economic- and social-reform policies and the general maintenance
of domestic order and stability.4
The term “core interests” has also been used in official PRC media alongside the
term “major concerns” ().5 The latter term was in fact employed earlier than
“core interests” in official PRC media and at times was used in joint statements between
China and foreign governments, for example, in a report on a meeting between Jiang
Zemin and President Chirac of France in 2000. It has also been used to refer to the
Taiwan issue and the one-China principle.6
The term “core interests” was apparently first applied to China in a foreign context in
PRC media in early 2002, but in an unofficial capacity, in an article written by a Chinese
scholar.7 The first official foreign-oriented reference to the term “core interests” appeared
in the report of a meeting between Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan and Secretary of State
Colin Powell on January 19, 2003, in which Tang identified Taiwan as among China’s
“core interests.” (See below for more on the link between Taiwan and the emergence of
the official PRC use of “core interests”).8
The first apparent official identification of the oft-espoused concepts of “sovereignty
and territorial integrity” () as a Chinese “core interest” occurred in April
2004, again in the context of a discussion of Taiwan.9 During the remainder of 2004, both
official and unofficial Chinese usage of the term “core interests” in reference to
sovereignty and territorial interests (and Taiwan in particular) increased significantly.10
The related issue of “national security” () was apparently first explicitly
identified officially as a core interest in a speech given by then Foreign Minister Li
Zhaoxing in September 2006 and reported in the People’s Daily.11
As one might surmise from the above references, major official and unofficial PRC
media mentions of China’s core interests in a foreign-policy context increased notably
beginning in the early 2000s, from a mention in one People’s Daily article in 2001 to 260
articles in 2009 and 325 articles in 2010.
Moreover, by 2004, Chinese officials had begun routinely mentioning the need for
countries to respect and accommodate one another’s “core interests” in speeches with
foreign officials and dignitaries, thus indicating that the term had not only entered the
official lexicon but also become an important element of PRC diplomacy.12
It is therefore not surprising that the senior Chinese official responsible for PRC
foreign policy (State Councilor Dai Bingguo) publicly defined the general elements of
China’s core interests in July 2009, during a session of the U.S.-China Strategic and
Economic Dialogue (S&ED). Dai stated in his closing remarks at the S&ED that the term
includes three components: 1) preserving China’s basic state system and national security
(); 2) national sovereignty and territorial integrity (
); and 3) the continued stable development of China’s economy and society (
).13 Variations of this multi-part definition have occurred officially since
that time, and have been repeated by unofficial Chinese sources as well.14
In addition, Chinese officials have also at times identified “national unity” or
“reunification” (/ / ) as a Chinese core interest, as well as
“independence” (), in some instances alongside the three elements listed above.
However, the former references were almost invariably intended to buttress the Chinese
position regarding issues associated with territorial integrity, such as Taiwan, and hence
can be taken as largely duplicative of an element contained in Dai Bingguo’s list.15 In the
case of “independence,” references have been very few in number and have always
occurred in a bilateral or multilateral context (with regard to the “core interests” of both
countries or of countries in general); in some cases the word was inserted within the
phrase “sovereignty and territorial integrity,” as in: “The defense of sovereignty,
independence and territorial integrity is the core interest of every country.”16 Thus, the
concept is, as with “national unity” or “reunification,” most closely associated with the
general category of sovereignty and territorial integrity as a core interest.
Chinese officials have also identified “human rights” as a Chinese core interest.
However, this has only occurred nine times in official Foreign Ministry sources. Hu
Jintao used it twice, in November 2006, during state visits to Laos and Pakistan. In both
instances, he was expressing China’s appreciation for the support the two countries have
extended to Beijing’s position on “ . . . Taiwan, Tibet, human rights and other major
questions involving China’s state sovereignty and core interests.”17 The seven other
references include two from Yang Jiechi in 2008 and five from various ambassadors,
including statements by Zhou Wenzhong, ambassador to the United States, in November
2009, and Song Zhe, ambassador to the EU, in December 2008.18 Moreover, overall, this
context seems to suggest that human rights as a core interest refers primarily to Beijing’s
right to determine how the lives of China’s citizenry will be promoted, especially in
contested regions such as Taiwan and Tibet, for example, via the advancement of local
economic and social conditions. In other words, the issue is again associated with
domestic interests or other core interests involving sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Therefore, the most common and authoritative formulation of the general concepts
comprising China’s core interests appears to remain that of Dai Bingguo, presented in
July 2009. That said, since Dai articulated his definition, Chinese officials have continued
to place the most emphasis on “sovereignty and territorial integrity” as the most
important characteristic of China’s core interests. The first and third elements of Dai’s
definition—“basic state system and national security,” and “continued stable social and
economic development”—are still only infrequently mentioned in the context of China’s
“core interests.”
Motivated by the Taiwan Issue?
It is not entirely clear what prompted official Chinese sources to begin employing the
term “core interests” to such a degree and in this manner. Of course, the defense or
protection of China’s national security, the PRC system or regime, and Chinese
sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as the protection and advancement of China’s
economy and society, has been a staple of PRC foreign policy for decades. Indeed, they
are basic to any nation’s definition of its national interests.
That said, it is quite likely that Beijing began to sharpen and promote vigorously the
concept of “core interests” in response to growing concerns over the Taiwan issue. By
2004–2005, Beijing had become extremely worried about what it regarded as the efforts
of former Taiwan president Chen Shuibian to achieve de jure Taiwan independence,
possibly with U.S. backing. In response, during that time, the National People’s Congress
promulgated the so-called Anti-Secession Law (ASL, in March 2005), and PRC officials
began pressing (or warning) the United States and other countries to reject Chen’s efforts
and to recognize China’s vital interests on the issue.19 As indicated above, it is precisely
at this time that Chinese officials began to emphasize China’s core interests, and to
specify Taiwan as a primary example.20 Indeed, for some unofficial Chinese observers,
Beijing’s “core interests” are primarily about sovereignty and territorial integrity.21
Used as a Warning and for Diplomatic Leverage
As suggested above, China’s relatively recent and repeated invocation of the phrase “core
interests” generates concern among both foreigners and some Chinese in large part
because of: 1) Beijing’s efforts to pressure foreign governments (and especially the
United States) to officially acknowledge acceptance of the general concept and the
specific policy issues to which it applies (such as Taiwan—discussed below); and, more
importantly, 2) its apparent association with a rigid, uncompromising diplomatic or
military stance. In other words, the appearance of the term appears to signal a more
vigorous attempt to lay down a marker, or type of warning, regarding the need for the
United States and other countries to respect (indeed, accept with little if any negotiation)
China’s position on certain issues
Regarding the first point, beginning in the early 2000s, Chinese officials increasingly
pressed the United States to issue formal statements indicating a willingness to respect
one another’s core interests (as indicated above), and even, in recent years, to explicitly
and formally recognize the category of “core interests and major concerns” in general, as
a necessary basis for the advancement of the bilateral relationship.22 This pressure
campaign culminated in the inclusion of the term in the November 2009 U.S.-China Joint
Statement. This was the first time that it had been used in an official, high-level Sino-
American statement or communiqué. In fact, even in past meetings where senior Chinese
officials were pressing their U.S. counterparts to respect China’s “core interests,” U.S.
officials never repeated the phrase, but instead merely conveyed support for various longstanding
U.S. policies, such as the “one China” principle and the three joint
communiqués.23
The 1972 and 1982 Sino-U.S. joint communiqués do affirm “respect for the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states” and “respect for each other’s sovereignty
and territorial integrity” (respectively), which Beijing has since identified as one of its
core interests.24 However, by November 2009 Beijing had significantly expanded its
definition of core interests to include several other general categories, as indicated in the
July 2009 statement by Dai Bingguo, discussed above. Therefore, such past U.S.
acknowledgments (of respect for China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity) could not
be viewed as a precedent for the U.S. acceptance of Beijing’s “core interests” in the Hu-
Obama joint statement.
Since the signing of the November 2009 Joint Statement, Beijing has repeatedly and
emphatically cited the mutual commitment to respect one another’s “core interests”
contained in that document as a basis for its demands that Washington alter its behavior
in a variety of areas, from arms sales to Taiwan to presidential meetings with the Dalai
Lama. Indeed, the Chinese have branded the joint statement as an “important consensus”
that is a major step in the development of a “new era” () in U.S.-China relations. It
is often mentioned in official Chinese sources alongside the three Sino-U.S. joint
communiqués.25 However, the reference to “core interests” was not included in the joint
statement issued after Hu Jintao’s state visit to Washington in January 2011.26 The reason
for this omission is not entirely clear, but most likely reflects, at least partly, a U.S. desire
to avoid the controversy that followed the inclusion of the term in the 2009 joint
statement. At that time, some observers argued that the Obama administration had shown
undue weakness in allegedly acceding to a Chinese demand to include a phrase closely
associated with Beijing’s claim to sovereignty over Taiwan, and other supposed territorial
ambitions.27
Regarding the association of “core interests” with an uncompromising official PRC
stance, the historical record suggests that, although Chinese officials have not to our
knowledge used the phrase “non-negotiable” ( ) to
describe China’s stance toward its “core interests,” they have certainly employed similar
terms on many occasions. For example, officials have stated that China will “never
waver, compromise, or yield” ( ), will not haggle or
bargain (), and “must stand firm, be clear-cut, have courage to fight, and never
trade away principles” ( )
when dealing with its core interests, and with issues involving sovereignty and territorial
integrity in particular.28
Moreover, Chinese officials and official media sources have at times separately used
the term “non-negotiable” to refer to issues that Beijing has described as a “core interest,”
notably, sovereignty and territorial integrity, involving, for example, Hong Kong,
Taiwan, and Tibet.29 And in some cases, Chinese officials have explicitly connected the
defense of specific core interests (again, most notably sovereignty and territorial
integrity) with the possible use of force. Such language has been used quite consistently
for years.30 Of course, even official (and unofficial) statements of strong resolve and a
refusal to compromise do not necessarily guarantee that Beijing would in reality in every
instance employ such a rigid approach (including, perhaps the use of force) to defend
what it has defined as its core interests. Yet, at least with regard to sovereignty and
territorial issues, the historical record of China’s behavior suggests that such a possibility
would be extremely high, and certainly cannot be dismissed.31
Hence, what China labels as its “core interest” is certainly significant. And so,
perhaps the most important issue becomes, what specific policy areas does Beijing
include among its core interests?
Territorial Issues (and Especially Taiwan) are at the Core
A large number of unofficial Chinese and foreign observers have identified a range of
issues as being among China’s “core interests.” These include Taiwan, Tibet and
Xinjiang-related issues; territories in the South China Seas; the defense of the Yellow
Sea; the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands; bilateral trade; and the value of China’s currency.
Some of these issues (such as Taiwan and access to international waters near China)
directly concern critical U.S. security interests.32 In truth, much of the unofficial
commentary contains inaccuracies, distortions, and misconceptions. A close examination
of the historical record, along with personal conversations with knowledgeable senior
U.S. officials, confirms that thus far the Chinese government has officially, and
repeatedly, identified only three closely related issues as specific core interests: the
defense of China’s sovereignty claims regarding Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang.
As indicated above, the Taiwan issue probably originally triggered official use of the
term “core interests” in the realm of foreign affairs and has clearly been most often
associated with its official use.33 On the subject of Tibet, Chinese officials have of course
for many years referred to Tibet’s status as part of China as an important or fundamental
sovereignty issue. For example, the 1992 PRC white paper on Tibet stated that “there is
no room for haggling” () on the fundamental principle () that “Tibet is an
inalienable part of China.”34 However, perhaps the first (or at least an early) occurrence
of an official, explicit reference to Tibet as a Chinese “core interest” occurred in April
2006, in a meeting between PRC Vice President Zeng Qinghong and the prime minister
of Sri Lanka.35
Similarly, Chinese officials have often referred to Xinjiang’s sovereign status as an
important Chinese interest. The earliest use of the term “core interest” in reference to that
Chinese region apparently also dates from 2006. In November of that year, in a speech in
Pakistan, Hu Jintao first identified “the fight against East Turkestan” terrorist forces as a
Chinese “core interest,” alongside Taiwan, Tibet, and human rights. This clearly implies
that the defense of China’s sovereignty over Xinjiang (which the East Turkestan terrorist
forces violently contest) is a PRC core interest.36 On subsequent occasions (beginning
largely in 2009, it seems), Chinese officials have referred simply to “Xinjiang” as being
among China’s core interests.37
As far as we can surmise from the official PRC sources used in this study, references
to the defense of the Yellow Sea, Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands, bilateral trade, and the value
of China’s currency as Chinese core interests are entirely unofficial. In other words, we
can find no official source stating that such concepts are among China’s “core
interests.”38
The reference to the South China Sea as a Chinese core interest is a more complex
matter. The New York Times apparently first reported that Chinese officials had identified
the defense of China’s territorial claims to the South China Sea as a “core interest” in a
private meeting held in Beijing in March 2010 with two senior U.S. officials, NSC Asia
Director Jeffrey Bader and Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg.39 Many other
media sources (and other New York Times reporters) subsequently repeated this initial
New York Times story, often without citing it as the original source (or perhaps in some
cases merely duplicating the story by interviewing the same U.S. official paraphrased in
the New York Times story),40 thus creating the impression that the report came from
multiple sources. At least one media source subsequently asserted that Dai Bingguo had
also identified the South China Sea in this manner to Hillary Clinton, at the May 2010
meeting of the S&ED in Washington.41 Clinton herself repeated this during a recent press
interview in Australia.42
However, a close examination of the official Chinese sources consulted for this study
failed to unearth a single example of a PRC official or an official PRC document or
media source that publicly and explicitly identifies the South China Sea as a PRC “core
interest.” In fact, when given the opportunity to clarify the official record on this issue,
Chinese officials have avoided doing so.43 During their October 11, 2010, meeting in
Hanoi, Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie apparently did not mention the issue of
the South China Seas to U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates.44 And when President Hu
Jintao traveled to Washington for his state visit in January 2011, he explicitly identified
only Taiwan and Tibet as core interests.45
In addition, personal communications with very knowledgeable U.S. officials
confirm that Chinese officials did not explicitly identify China’s territorial claims to the
South China Sea as a “core interest” in the March 2010 meeting with Steinberg and
Bader. In that meeting, the PRC officials listed the issue as one among several about
which they were attempting to elicit U.S. understanding and deference for Beijing’s
position. Although this effort was viewed as a clear attempt to raise the importance of the
South China Sea issue in China’s overall hierarchy of concerns, it did not explicitly
constitute an effort to brand it as a “core interest.”46
Regarding Dai Bingguo’s comment to Clinton at the May 2010 S&ED, a review of
Dai’s remarks at the opening and closing sessions reveals no reference to the South China
Sea issue as a PRC “core interest.”47 Moreover, one very well-placed U.S. official
confirmed to the author in a personal correspondence (conveyed prior to Clinton’s recent
remark in Australia) that Dai indeed did not describe the South China Sea issue in this
manner. In fact, all Chinese remarks regarding the South China Sea made at the S&ED
were presented spontaneously by a lower-level official, and thus should not be regarded
as authoritative, according to the U.S. official.48
What then about Clinton’s recent remark, noted above? It is possible that Dai
actually made the remark to Clinton in a private, offline, and unofficial conversation, or
that Clinton: a) did not accurately recall what Dai said; b) mistook the abovementioned
lower-level official for Dai Bingguo; or c) made the remark, knowing it was not true, to
add to existing U.S. efforts to deter China from attempting to add the South China Sea to
its list of core interests.
In any event, the foregoing information strongly suggests three conclusions: first, at
the very least, Beijing has not unambiguously identified the South China Sea issue as one
of its core interests, as it has done with Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang. Second, even if
Beijing did identify the issue as a core interest on one occasion (at the May 2010 S&ED),
this was done in a decidedly unofficial manner. Third, although Beijing originally
attempted in the March 2010 Steinberg/Bader meeting to raise the importance of the
South China Sea issue as a Chinese interest in U.S. eyes, it has deliberately avoided
clarifying its stance on the matter since that time, thus creating the impression that it is
backing away from the controversy.
Perhaps for some observers, the issue of whether or not Beijing has identified the
South China Sea as a core interest is a purely semantic one, of little real significance,
especially given China’s apparent attempt to raise its relevance in March 2010. However,
as noted above, the Chinese application of the term “core interest” to an issue is intended
to convey a very high level of commitment to managing or resolving that issue on
Chinese terms, without much if any discussion or negotiation (at least regarding basic
questions such as China’s ultimate sovereign authority, as in the case of Taiwan, Tibet,
and Xinjiang). In other words, it conveys a high level of resolve, and to some extent a
warning of sorts to other powers. In this particular instance, labeling China’s claims to
the South China Sea as a core interest would have signaled a significant, and alarming,
shift in China’s historical stance toward the issue. That stance not only recognizes the
multinational nature of the South China Sea issue as a sovereignty dispute among several
countries (albeit one that Beijing wishes to handle on a bilateral basis, with each
claimant), but also seeks to convey Beijing’s willingness to negotiate the ultimate nature
and extent of Chinese sovereignty over the region. In contrast, Taiwan, Tibet, and
Xinjiang are described as purely Chinese internal affairs not subject to dispute or
negotiation.49
But if the term “core interests” has such significance, why has Beijing avoided
clarifying whether or not it applies to the South China Sea issue? Although it is
impossible to say with certainty, it is probably because confirming the association would
signal a clear shift in position that would likely provoke an even stronger international
reaction than has occurred thus far (as indicated above), while an official denial of the
association might convey an impression of weakness and retreat from China’s basic
stance on sovereignty and territorial issues, thus inviting domestic attack.50 Moreover, in
reality, Beijing has not clearly confirmed the precise nature and extent of its sovereignty
claims to the South China Sea; hence, clarifying its stance on whether the issue
constitutes a core interest could generate confusion and thereby force China to make such
a clarification.51
Some unofficial Chinese observers have also argued that Beijing should not
officially confirm that the South China Sea is a core interest because to do so would not
only sow confusion among other nations, but also “ . . . be used by unfriendly forces in
the international community in a bid to contain China.”52 Some Chinese academics even
suggest that the United States was falsely accusing China of elevating the South China
Sea to the level of a “core interest” in order to hype the China threat among China’s
neighbors, culminating in Secretary Clinton’s orchestrated pushback against the Chinese
at the ASEAN Regional Forum in late July 2010.53 Other Chinese observers more
broadly argue that China should be extremely cautious in describing any specific issues
(including the South China Sea) as a “core interest,” given the potentially provocative
nature of the term to other nations.54 However, as suggested in endnote 32, many
unofficial Chinese observers argue that the South China Sea issue is or should be
declared a core Chinese interest.
The preceding unofficial differences in viewpoint, along with the likely dilemma
involved in confirming whether the South China Sea is a core interest, together suggest
the possibility of disagreement among the Chinese leadership on this matter. If such
disagreement exists, it is probably not along civil-military lines, however, since some
PLA officers (such as Han Xudong and Yin Zhuo) oppose declaring the South China Sea
a core interest, while others (such as Luo Yuan) support such a move.55
Conclusion
As the foregoing analysis shows, Beijing’s use of the term “core interest” with regard to
issues involving the international community, and the United States in particular, is a
relatively recent phenomenon. Its usage probably derives from growing Chinese concerns
over the Taiwan issue in the early 2000s. However, the term has since been
unambiguously applied to two other sovereignty-related issues (Tibet and Xinjiang), and
its general coverage has been expanded to include three other general sets of state
interests: the Chinese political system, national security, and socioeconomic
development. Despite much reporting to the contrary, Beijing’s territorial claims with
regard to the South China Sea have not been clearly identified officially and publicly as a
“core interest.” Moreover, the application of the term by senior PRC officials to other
general issues such as “independence,” “human rights,” and “national unity” or
“reunification” seem intended to reinforce the existing primary emphasis placed on
sovereignty and territorial issues as core Chinese interests.
The term “core interests” has its precursors and draws on long-held stances toward
sovereignty and territorial issues. However, its increasing use in official statements and
diplomatic documents, and its explicit application to specific contentious policy issues
(most notably Taiwan) arguably signals an attempt by a stronger, more assertive Chinese
leadership to elicit greater respect and deference from other nations for China’s position
on those issues. Equally important, as suggested in CLM 32, this effort is perhaps also
motivated by a belief that the United States and other powers are increasingly challenging
some of China’s core interests, thus requiring a more assertive PRC response. In addition,
Beijing’s apparent refusal to “haggle” or compromise, and its stated willingness to
employ extreme measures—including force—to defend its position with regard to
China’s core interests, arguably constitute a warning to other nations that should not be
ignored.
Of course, every nation has its national interests, many of which are described as
“vital” or “core.”56 China is obviously no exception. Nonetheless, Beijing’s explicit and
growing emphasis on the term, its adoption of a seemingly rigid negotiating stance on
core interests, the application of the phrase to contentious issues such as Taiwan, and,
perhaps most importantly, the possibility that a stronger China might expand the scope
and sharpen the definition of its core interests further to include other issues of
contention, together pose a significant challenge to U.S. (and Chinese) efforts to maintain
a stable and mutually productive bilateral relationship.
Notes
1 The Joint Statement included the following phrase: “The two sides agreed that respecting each other’s
core interests is extremely important to ensure steady progress in China-US relations.” See “U.S.-China
Joint Statement,” White House, Office of the Press Secretary, November 17, 2009, Beijing, China,
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/us-china-joint-statement; and “China-US Joint
Statement,” November 17, 2009, Beijing, China, available at
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/bmdyzs/xwlb/t629497.htm. The language about core interests was
absent from the January 2011 joint statement issued during President Hu Jintao’s state visit to Washington,
as discussed further below. U.S.-China Joint Statement, January 19, 2011, Washington, D.C., available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/19/us-china-joint-statement.
2 The major primary sources employed in this study to chart the official use of the concept of “core
interests” and related terms include: The official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s
Republic of China ( ), Chinese and English versions (http:www.fmprc.gov.cn and
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng, respectively); the archives of People’s Daily (), at PeopleData
(http://data.people.com.cn, ); the archives of PLA Daily () at East View
Information Services (http://www.eastview.com); and the databases of the Chinese Government and the
Communist Party of China (CPC), both at PeopleData. We are also grateful to Professor Alastair Iain
Johnston of Harvard University for providing his unpublished data on the PRC usage of the term “core
interests.”
3 For example, People’s Daily apparently first employed the term “core interests” () in June 1980,
in discussing how the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Soviet support of Vietnam’s invasion of
Cambodia threatened the “core interests” of the West (). See ; , “,”
(Xiang Qian and Xiao Xi, “Critical Appeasement Undercurrent,” People’s Daily), June 21, 1980,
http://data.people.com.cn.
The second reference to the phrase in the People’s Daily database discusses Vice President Al Gore’s
five-part formulation of America’s national interests and describes how Gore explained that a technology
policy would serve the U.S. “core interests.” See , “,
,” (Xu Yong, “U.S. government declaration of scientific policy states the transfer of military
technology to civilian use,” People’s Daily), August 6, 1994, 6th edition, http://data.people.com.cn.
For similar usages, see , “,” (Huang Zequang, “Technology Creates Wealth,”
People’s Daily), July 14, 1995, 7th edition, http://data.people.com.cn; “
,” (“U.S. Treasury Secretary indicates in his speech that U.S.-China relations are critical to
global economic prosperity,” People’s Daily), October 14, 1999, 6th edition, available at
http://data.people.com.cn); and , “,” (Ou Can, “Warning Lee Teng-hui
not to have any illusions,” PLA Daily), August 29, 1999, available at
http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/14557759.
4 For example, see “,” , (“U.S. Embassy held
important talks with General Secretary Hu Jintao,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of
China), January 11, 2009, available at http://www.mfa.gov.cn/chn/gxh/tyb/zwbd/t531443.htm: “ . .
. . . . ”
(“Ambassador Zhou . . . stated that . . . grasping fundamental interests and core national interests reflects
the truth-seeking spirit of respect for history, respect for reality, and respect for the wishes of the people.”)
A 1995 article from the PLA Daily specifically discusses the adjustment from a focus on “fundamental
interests” to “core interests” in the process of economic and social reform. However, it does not clearly
define the difference between the two terms. Based on a reading of the article, it is possible that the former
referred to the basic interest of promoting overall national economic development while the latter was
intended to focus on the attainment of greater economic and social equality and common prosperity.
Nonetheless, both concepts were at the time applied to domestic issues. See “,”
(“Picture/Photo/Other,” PLA Daily), February 17, 1995, available at
http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/14466790. For a similar usage, also see “
‘’,” (“Qiushi published a signed article by Hua Qing: ‘Four
Major Boundaries of Theoretical and Practical Issues,’” PLA Daily), August 17, 2001, available at
http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/22327893.
5 Apparently, the first time the two terms were used together () was in 2007, in a report
on a meeting between Hu Jintao and German president Angela Merkel. See “,”
(“Hu Jintao meets German Prime Minister Merkel,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
People’s Republic of China), August 27, 2007, available at
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/gjhdq/gjhdqzz/mzblwelm/xgxw/t355870.htm.
6 The first reference to “major concerns” on the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs website is from 2000, in a
report on a meeting between Jiang Zemin and President Chirac of France. See “
,” (“Chairman Jiang Zemin and French President Chirac held meeting,” Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China), November 7, 2000, available at
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/gjhdq/gjhdqzz/mzblwelm/xgxw/t7275.htm.
“
21 . ” (“China and
France share many common interests; the prospect for bilateral cooperation is strong. As long as the two
countries start from the strategic perspective and the pattern of long-term development of the bilateral
relationship, maintain mutual respect, equality, and mutual benefits, especially respecting each other’s
major concerns, Sino-French relations can be raised to a new level in the 21st century.”) In a 2003 Policy
Paper on the European Union, “major concerns” is used to directly refer to the Taiwan issue in a paragraph
on the one-China policy. See “,” , (“White Paper on
Chinese policy toward the EU,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, October
2003), available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/ziliao/tytj/zcwj/t27700.htm.
7 Wang Jisi, a well-known scholar of U.S.-China relations, wrote an article in People’s Daily in February
2002 suggesting that both sides seek common ground in order to prevent differences from developing into
serious crises or conflicts that would damage the “core interests” () of either party. This is the first
time that a People’s Daily article referred to the “core interests” of China (in a foreign policy context) and
not only the “core interests” of other countries. See , “ ()—
30 ,” (Wang Jisi, “Seek common ground and stability (monograph)—celebrating the 30th
anniversary of the China-U.S. ‘Shanghai Communiqué’,” People’s Daily), February 28, 2002, 7th edition,
available at http://data.people.com.cn).
A second similar reference in the same source occurred in December 2002. See , “
,” (Yin Chengde, “Progress and Transformation of Great Power Relations,” People’s Daily),
November 19, 2002, 7th edition, available at http://data.people.com.cn. In this article, Yin, a regular
contributor to People’s Daily and possibly a Foreign Ministry official, referred to China in discussing the
“core interests” of great powers.
8 See , “,” (Ding Gang, “Tang Jiaxuan Meets U.S. Secretary of State,”
People’s Daily), January 21, 2003, 3rd edition, available at http://data.people.com.cn. At that time, “Tang
Jiaxuan said, the Taiwan issue concerns China’s core interests” (“ .”) A
month later, Colin Powell visited China and again held talks with Tang Jiaxuan, who again reiterated the
point. See “Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan Held Talks With Powell,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
People’s Republic of China, February 25, 2003, available at
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t19583.htm.
9 See “,” (Foreign Ministry
spokesperson Kong Quan warns the U.S. for its decision to sell Taiwan the long-range radar system at a
press conference),” January 1, 2004, available at
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/gxh/tyb/fyrbt/dhdw/t82122.htm.
10 Most notably, on the official level, such usage occurred at several press conferences held by Foreign
Ministry spokespersons Zhang Qiyue and Kong Quan, in speeches by such senior PRC diplomats as Yang Jiechi, Zhang Yesui, and Zhong Jianhua, in a meeting between Tang Jiaxuan and then-National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice in July 2004, in meetings between Li Zhaoxing and Colin Powell in October
2004, by Wen Jiabao in a speech at the October 2004 Asia-Europe Meeting and in remarks to Prime
Minister Shaukat Aziz of Pakistan in December 2004, and in remarks by Hu Jintao at meetings with
President Bush and Australian prime minister John Howard in November 2004. “2004 2 19
,” (“Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhang Qiyue’s
regular press conference on February 19, 2004,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of
China), February 19, 2004, available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/gxh/tyb/fyrbt/dhdw/t66764.htm;
“2004 4 1 ,” (“Foreign Ministry
Spokesperson Kong Quan’s regular press conference on February 19, 2004,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
the People’s Republic of China), April 1, 2004, available at
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/gxh/mtb/fyrbt/jzhsl/t82128.htm; “,”
(“Ambassador Yang Jiechi visits Los Angeles and receives the award for Distinguished
Diplomat,” Los Angeles General Consulate press release), April 5, 2004, available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/gjhdq/gj/bmz/1206_22/1206x2/t441607.htm; “2004 4 8
,” (“Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Kong Quan’s Regular
Press Conference on April 8, 2004,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China), April
8, 2004, available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/gxh/tyb/fyrbt/dhdw/t83827.htm; “2004 4 27
,” (“Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Kong Quan’s regular press conference on April 27, 2004,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of
China), April 27, 2004, available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/gxh/tyb/fyrbt/t93544.htm “
( 10/ 05/ 04) ,” (“Yang Jiechi, Ambassador to the United States,
delivered a speech on current Sino-U.S. relations in Arkansas,” press release of the Chinese Embassy to the
United States), May 10, 2004, available at
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/gjhdq/gj/bmz/1206_22/1206x2/t431003.htm; “,”
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