From FPRI:
LIBYA IN CRISIS ... WHAT'S NEXT?
by Dana Moss
February 23, 2011
Dana Moss is an adjunct scholar at the Washington Institute
for Near East Policy. Her latest publication is a study of
US.-Libyan relations entitled "Reforming the Rogue: Lessons
from the U.S.-Libyan Rapprochement" available at
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC04.php?CID=330.
Available on the web and in pdf format at:
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201102.moss.libya.html
LIBYA IN CRISIS ... WHAT'S NEXT?
by Dana Moss
Following in the footsteps of the revolutions first in
Tunisia and then in Egypt, the protests currently taking
place in Libya have entered their second week, casting doubt
on the continuation of Qaddafi's rule. While reports coming
out Libya are conflicting-and a partial media blackout is in
effect-it appears that the eastern part of the country has
fallen into the hands of protesters while Qaddafi has
maintained control of Tripoli.
For Libya, the size of these protests is unprecedented. In
order to decipher the direction in which Libya is heading,
it is important to examine both the origins of the protests
and the regime's response. Libya is very different from both
Tunisia and Egypt, with geographical and tribal divisions
overlaying the country and indeed encouraged by Qaddafi, and
with the Great Leader holding near-absolute power, providing
for a dearth of other political players. This has impacted
both the nature of the uprising and the reaction of the
regime. What is clear is that Qaddafi is more than willing
to put up a very violent fight to retain control of the
country, and that unfortunately, the West and the
international community are unlikely to do much to stop him.
BEGINNINGS OF PROTESTS
Libya had experienced mounting political activities by
activists planning a "day of Rage" on February 17, the
anniversary of a 2006 protest in Benghazi. Exiled opposition
groups and activists built on cyber-activism within Libya to
get the word out, with Facebook groups such as "the Day of
Anger in Libya against Corruption and Nepotism." The
protests actually began two days earlier, sparked by the
arrest of Fathi Tarbel, a lawyer for the families of
prisoners killed in the 1996 massacre in Tripoli's Abu Slim
prison. These families held a sit-in in front of the police
headquarters in Benghazi and drew strength from Benghazi
residents, with reports of over a thousand demonstrators.
From the outset, the protests have appeared not to have a
united leadership, a massive youth led-presence, or a
specific political platform. Libya does not have an
independent civil society, strictly speaking, as all
existing non-governmental organizations are headed by those
close to the regime. No real unified opposition exists in
the country, as political parties and movements are banned.
Moreover, Libya itself is an artificial construct, where,
partly as a result of Qaddafi's policies over years, tribal
and provincial identity has trumped nationalism and a sense
of citizenship, with consequent implications for the end
result of these protests.
REGIME RESPONSE
From the beginning of the revolts in the Arab world, Qaddafi
threw his lot in with Ben Ali, announcing that he was the
"best person who could rule Tunisia," thereby indicating
some concern about the prospect of Libyan unrest on the
heels of the events in Tunisia. Nevertheless, it is clear
that Qaddafi did not seem to have envisaged the extent of
the opposition in Libya or the potential for events to
unravel as they have.
Prior to the outbreak of protests, the regime had taken
various preventative measures, including the outlawing of
soccer matches. (In previous years, these matches,
particularly in the East, had turned into opportunities for
protesting the regime, on occasion.) Apparently, as reported
on Libya al Youm, an opposition website, such action was
matched by outreach to imams, to ensure that they warned
against demonstrations during Friday prayers.
Such preventative measures came hand in hand with financial
inducements and cooptation, targeting the specific needs of
the Libyan population and weaknesses in the Libyan
system-primarily in the lack of public housing. As Turkish
companies were unexpectedly placed under heavy pressure to
complete housing projects, Qaddafi, on state television,
asked Libyans to claim rights to public housing, reportedly
leading thousands to rush into the as yet uncompleted
housing units.[1]
Qaddafi also activated the pre-existing tribal structures in
the country, apparently holding meetings with-and offering
incentives to-the members of the "People's Social Leadership
Committee," a grouping of tribal leaders that forms a
backbone structure to Qaddafi's regime, to prevent the "Day
of Rage" from taking place. Meetings were also reportedly
held with journalists and media figures to ensure damage
limitation on the media front. Some personnel changes were
also made to mollify potential protestors, such as the
replacement of the Dean of Qar Younis University.
Meanwhile, even before the protests began, repression
appeared-as always in Libya-a key factor in Qaddafi's
reaction to opposition. Before the protests, such repression
remained under the cover of the legal system-not just
Terbil's arrest but also human rights activist Jamal al
Hajji's detainment, in early February. Though he was accused
of hitting a man with his car, the probable reason for his
arrest was his call for peaceful protests, and the arresting
officers are assumed to be members of the internal security
agency.[2]
PROTESTS SPREAD
The February 15 demonstrators were met with rubber bullets
and water cannons. Over the next few days, the numbers of
protesters grew, with concomitant numbers of deaths. By
February 18, over 40 people had been reported killed and
that number has risen to over 300. Some victims were
reported to have been shot dead during funerals and marches
for those killed in anti-government demonstrations by
security personnel. Meanwhile, the uprising spread to cities
such as Bayda, Derna, Toburk and Misrata. Reports have been
sketchy and witness accounts difficult to verify as a result
of the media lockdown on Bengazi and the rest of the
country, with conflicting accounts given by opposition
activists. By February 20, it appeared that much of the East
had fallen to the opposition, with army officers and police
reportedly siding with people in the street and al Jazeera
reporting that a group of army officers, and figures such as
Major General Suleiman Mahmoud had reportedly issued a
statement vowing their support for the protesters.
Meanwhile, in recent days protests had taken a new turn and
begun to cross over to Tripoli, a very different landscape.
TRENDS BOTH OLD AND NEW
That the protests began in Benghazi is no surprise. The
Eastern part of Libya had been affiliated with the monarchy
and traditionally opposed to Qaddafi's regime. Although
initially Qaddafi and the Revolutionary Command Council were
in theory opposed to the predominance of tribes and tribal
affiliation in Libya, over time Qaddafi came to rely on the
tribal system to safeguard his revolution in the face of
political opposition. The tribes Qaddafi relied on were not
those from the East, but rather his own tribe-the
Qaddadfa-from the Sirt region, as well as the Maqraha tribe
from the Fezzan and the Warfalla tribe from West
Tripolitania. These were promoted to positions of political
power to the exclusion of tribes from Cyrenaica, previously
affiliated with the monarchy. To this political exclusion
has been added economic woes, with rife unemployment and
underemployment and ever-erratic economic policies issued by
Qaddafi, which-especially against the backdrop of the
relative hydrocarbon riches of the country-created a sense
of instability and resentment.
These troubles reached a head in the mid-1990s when an
Islamist uprising originated from the East, with gun clashes
between Islamists and security services in the streets of
Benghazi. In reaction to political opponents, especially
since facing the Islamist opposition, Qaddafi began relying
more narrowly on his own tribal community. Sensitive
positions-therefore political power and financial
incentives-were given to members of his own tribe, to the
exclusion of other tribal allies, rendering the regime more
stable in some ways, but also narrowing the basis of its
support.
This may have led to the Warfallah tribe-which holds a blood
tie to Qaddafi's own tribe-declaring on al Jazeera that they
now side with the protestors. Assuming this is a clear
decision, it is a new and unexpected development that adds
to the regime's woes.
In addition, in recent days there have seen a spate of
resignations by relatively high-level representatives of the
regime leading to speculation that Qaddafi's days are
numbered. As well as Ambassador Ali Aujali, Libya's
Ambassador to the U.S.-a crucial posting-Libyan Ambassadors
from Poland to Belgium left their posts, with others-such as
deputy UN Ambassador Ibrahim Dabbashi, the deputy UN
Ambassador, accusing Qaddafi of carrying out a "genocide"
against his own people.
These diplomatic figures were joined by Justice Minister
Mustafa Mohamed Abud al Jaleil, who opposed the "excessive
use of violence." Increasingly, reports came in of the
resignation of military figures, particularly in the East of
the country. Most significantly, General Abdul Fatah
Younis-a former secretary of the General People's Committee
for Public Security, effectively Libya's interior
minister-delivered his resignation on February 22, claiming
in an interview with al Arabiyya that he had "begged Qaddafi
not to send in planes" (against the protestors).
In all likelihood, these figures are driven not by
ideological opposition to the regime, but by calculating
that the regime is teetering on the brink of a fall and that
it is best to leave this sinking ship. Yet it is unclear to
what extent their abandoning the regime is likely to impact
its stability. After all, the majority of these people are
not part of Qaddafi's inner circle nor are they crucial for
the security of the regime. Heads of the various security
elements have made little public pronouncement, leading to
the assumption that, for the moment, they are sticking with
the regime, while pro-regime sources-by no means objective
informants-have indicated to media outlets that allied
tribes are also holding steadfast to Qaddafi.[3] However,
should some of these people reach decide that Qaddafi's
regime has reached a tipping point, they too may be tempted
to turn on the Great Leader in order to save their own skin,
if indeed that is still possible.
REGIME REACTION POST BEGINNING OF PROTESTS
As the protests continued and grew in strength, the earlier
regime response intensified. More emphasis was placed on
repression, with the subsequent death toll mounting to over
300. There have been reports of sniper shootings and
airstrikes by war planes and helicopters. Meanwhile, rumours
of repressive action against those political power holders
who have tried to break with regime are emerging, with
reports that General Abdul Fatah Younis had been kidnapped.
Unlike in Egypt and Tunisia, the army is relatively
unimportant as both a mainstay of the regime and as an
institution. Qaddafi does not seem to trust the rank and
file of his army, which is criss-crossed and divided by
tribal affiliations. Reportedly, foreign mercenaries have
been flown in to help quell the uprising. Qaddafi, through
his own route into power-through an army coup-is naturally
suspicious of power of the army. He has faced coup attempts
before, including one in 1975 by the Revolutionary Command
Council. In more recent times, an Islamist uprising in
Bengazi in the 1990s reportedly evoked sympathy from the
conscript army. And in the mid-2000s rumors of coup attempts
circulated-a major factor for this is the inlaying of the
army by tribal and provincial divisions.
Yet in any case, key players in the Qaddafi regime,
including his children, have been placed in charge of
special brigades essentially responsible for protecting the
regime, such as Khamees, who leads a special forces unit
(the 32nd brigade) and had previously requested the purchase
of military hardware from the United States. There is also
Muatassim, who has functioned as national security advisor.
Meanwhile the army's overall importance to regime stability
pales beside that of overlapping security services, often
headed by Qaddafi's kin and family members. These-from the
Jamahiriyya Security Organization (Hai'at amn al-jamahiriya)
to the military secret service (Al-Istikhbarat al-
askariya)-were created in response to threats to the regime
to safeguard it and are led by those with a personal tie to
Qaddafi. It is likely that these are groups that Qaddafi is
relying on regardless of conscript army sympathy with the
protestors in the Eastern part of the country. It is these
security services that are guarding key installations and
sensitive buildings-a central factor in assessing regime
longevity.
Indeed, these overlying organizations traditionally have
been part of the regime's crucial divide and rule calculus.
Part of the assumption for Qaddafi is that they will defend
the regime as they are competing for political and economic
goods with other groups and should the regime collapse, they
will face vicious reprisals by the protestors, leading to a
life and death battle for control between pro and anti-
regime voices.
Aside from resorting to violence, the regime also imposed a
media blackout in the country, initially cutting off
citizens' access to Facebook and other Internet websites.
Meanwhile, the official regime response has come primarily
through two channels- Saif al Islam, Qaddafi's son and the
reported "reformer" of the country and Qaddafi himself.
These responses have reflected the various tried and tested
strategies of the regime: divide and rule, repression, and -
primarily in the case of Qaddafi senior-relying on anti-
imperialist rhetoric to gain legitimacy. These speeches
appeared to be aimed both at an internal Libyan audience and
at the international community. Although each of these
addresses differed in terms of delivery and tone, much of
their underlying message was the same, despite the
assumption by many in the West that Saif is the more
moderate face of the regime.
Saif's address on state-television took place on February
20. That the "reformist" face of the regime was the one that
first captured the media discourse appears to indicate that
Qaddafi has seen the need to mollify and respond to
protestors' demands. Nevertheless, the speech itself seemed
woefully out of touch with Libyans' demands. In it, Saif
promised political reforms, including much of the same
platform that had been part of Saif's Libya al Ghad
(Tomorrow's Libya) program that he has purported to push
since about 2005, but which has seen little advancement.
Yet the speech itself provoked more than pacified, as
political concessions were just a small part. Saif tried to
frame protestors as drug addicts, and blamed the presence of
outsiders-including Arabs and Africans-that were threatening
Libya's unity and aiming to break up the country into small
states, as well as using the threat of Islamist radicals.
Such a strategy was much in line with JANA news, the
official media channel, which argued that "foreign networks"
intended to "destabilize Libya's security and national
unity." Saif also tried to conjure up the (very real) demon
of instability-much as his father had done in the case of
Ben Ali. In his speech, he spoke of the threat of "civil
war," while JANA news spoke of "attacks aimed at blundering
banks and burning of files of criminal cases in courts" in
an attempt to convince Libyans of their need for their
strong leader. Meanwhile, much like Libya's deputy foreign
minister, Khaled al Ghaa'eem, he attempted to frame the
deaths of protestors as mistakes on the army and police, as
opposed to on the regime's strategies.
Saif al Islam also hinted at the threat of repression,
arguing that "We will fight to the last minute, until the
last bullet'' to safeguard the regime. Within the speech
were allusions to economic repercussions of the current
instability, including the loss of foreign investment,
perhaps intimating at the use of an economic stick against
protestors.
Qaddafi, meanwhile, made two separate speeches. The first
was a brief one, allegedly against the background of the
"House of Strength" museum, a former Tripoli residence that
was bombed in the U.S. attack in 1986. The speech, with
little fanfare, seemed to be primarily aimed at assuring
Libyans that, despite rumors, he remained in the country.
Framed in the context of Libya's former struggles, the short
statement aimed to both invoke the legitimacy of his rule
through its struggle against foreign "oppressors" and, in
picturing Qaddafi in a car, free of security personnel, to
show that his rule was safe and that opposition was limited
and non-threatening.
Qaddafi's second speech, an hour long address on state
television, reflected many of the usual Qaddafi strategies
and again took place against the background of the 1986
bombing. Qaddafi attempted to position himself as separate
from the politics of the country, arguing that "I am not a
president to step down." Such a tactic in the past allowed
him to disassociate from any political and economic crises,
in order to cast blame on other actors and manipulate actors
from a safe political position.
Ominously threatening is his use of force against
protestors, who he called "greasy rats." Qaddafi's discourse
had not changed since the 1980s, when he encouraged extra-
judicial killings of political opponents, known as "stray
dogs." Here, too, Qaddafi called on Libyans to arm
themselves to "cleanse Libya house by house." This echoes
Qaddafi's strategy in the late 1970s, when facing political
opposition, he inaugurated the Revolutionary Committee's
structure as a way for out-sourcing ideological compliance
with the Jamahiriyya and a means to stabilize his rule.
The appeal to national symbols again reflects Qaddafi's
long-term strategy in cloaking himself in an anti-Western
and anti-imperialist mantle. In the wake of the brutal
colonial occupation of Libya by Italy, such a strategy has
in the past found popular appeal and bestowed upon Qaddafi
much-needed legitimacy. Indeed, Qaddafi continued in this
vein, asking Libyans "do you want America to come and occupy
you? Our country will become like Afghanistan. Is that what
you want?" Qaddafi has always seen himself as a leader
beyond that of the borders of Libya, having viewed himself
as the symbol of pan-Arabism and later anointing himself as
"King of Kings" of Africa. In his speech, this quest
appeared to be a bulwark against his removal from power as
"I am the glory that cannot be abandoned by Libya, the
Arabs, the United Stated and Latin America."
Lastly, Qaddafi appeared to resort to divide and rule
mechanisms, primarily through the use of the Islamist
specter. Like Saif, he blamed the uprising on Islamists that
wanted to "create another Afghanistan," mistakenly followed
by "drugged" youth. To invoke religious legitimacy, as he
has tried to do whenever he has faced religious opposition,
Qaddafi took to citing the Qur'an, claiming the protestors'
acts were punishable by religious edicts.
The one concession Qaddafi seems to have been willing to
grant is the formation of a constitution. Long advocated by
Saif, the advancement of such as document had been blocked,
most likely by Qaddafi, who opposed such an instrument in
his Green Book. This, together with Saif's earlier address
and Qaddafi's mention of his son during his television
address, appears to hint at increasing reliance on the son
to ensure stability. It may also be a realization, a little
too late, that an earlier adoption of Saif's proposed
reforms would have undercut some of the current opposition.
Although Saif was rumored to be making a follow-up speech,
it has not taken place to date, showing confusion in the
upper echelons of the regime as to how to best handle the
uprising.
WHAT NEXT FOR LIBYA
The next steps for Libya are as yet unclear. Although
Qaddafi seems to have maintained control in Tripoli, the
East of the country currently seems beyond his reach. Yet
the lack of institutions in the country bodes badly for
stability, whatever way the situation pans out. Any number
of scenarios could take place:
* A successful crackdown on Tripoli, and the regime
later gaining control of the East of the country through
economic repression, including perhaps a siege. A
subsequent bloodbath may take place, with violent
revenge being exacted on regime opponents.
* Continued chaos and a de-facto separation of the
country into smaller states.
* A realization by some within Qaddafi's inner circle
that to best preserve their power they must jettison the
Great Leader, with his subsequent death or departure
from the country. This may lead to inter-regime
struggles, as well as potential internecine struggles,
with increasing violence. Previously documented rivalry
between Saif and his brother Muatassim, affiliated with
security organizations, may end up playing a role here.
* The presence of oil in the Eastern part of the country
will no doubt play into Libya's final scenarios, as the
hydrocarbon industry functions as the cash cow of the
regime. Saif al Islam slyly referenced this in his
speech, noting that "Who has the ability to manage oil
in Libya? How can we split the oil_ there will be major
and bloody conflicts over it."
Either way, as for the past 40 years under Qaddafi, the
Libyan people will be the ultimate losers, with stability
and a functioning government nowhere in sight. Meanwhile,
the West will have its own repercussions, with increased
illegal immigration to Europe, higher oil prices, and
possibly a freer operating area for terrorists, including al
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.
----------------------------------------------------------
Notes
[1] http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=libya-urges-turkish-companies-to-finish-projects-quickly-2011-02-02
[2] http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/libyan-writer-detained-following-protest-call-2011-02-08
[3]
http://www.aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=1&id=24246
----------------------------------------------------------
Copyright Foreign Policy Research Institute
(http://www.fpri.org/).
LIBYA IN CRISIS ... WHAT'S NEXT?
by Dana Moss
February 23, 2011
Dana Moss is an adjunct scholar at the Washington Institute
for Near East Policy. Her latest publication is a study of
US.-Libyan relations entitled "Reforming the Rogue: Lessons
from the U.S.-Libyan Rapprochement" available at
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC04.php?CID=330.
Available on the web and in pdf format at:
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201102.moss.libya.html
LIBYA IN CRISIS ... WHAT'S NEXT?
by Dana Moss
Following in the footsteps of the revolutions first in
Tunisia and then in Egypt, the protests currently taking
place in Libya have entered their second week, casting doubt
on the continuation of Qaddafi's rule. While reports coming
out Libya are conflicting-and a partial media blackout is in
effect-it appears that the eastern part of the country has
fallen into the hands of protesters while Qaddafi has
maintained control of Tripoli.
For Libya, the size of these protests is unprecedented. In
order to decipher the direction in which Libya is heading,
it is important to examine both the origins of the protests
and the regime's response. Libya is very different from both
Tunisia and Egypt, with geographical and tribal divisions
overlaying the country and indeed encouraged by Qaddafi, and
with the Great Leader holding near-absolute power, providing
for a dearth of other political players. This has impacted
both the nature of the uprising and the reaction of the
regime. What is clear is that Qaddafi is more than willing
to put up a very violent fight to retain control of the
country, and that unfortunately, the West and the
international community are unlikely to do much to stop him.
BEGINNINGS OF PROTESTS
Libya had experienced mounting political activities by
activists planning a "day of Rage" on February 17, the
anniversary of a 2006 protest in Benghazi. Exiled opposition
groups and activists built on cyber-activism within Libya to
get the word out, with Facebook groups such as "the Day of
Anger in Libya against Corruption and Nepotism." The
protests actually began two days earlier, sparked by the
arrest of Fathi Tarbel, a lawyer for the families of
prisoners killed in the 1996 massacre in Tripoli's Abu Slim
prison. These families held a sit-in in front of the police
headquarters in Benghazi and drew strength from Benghazi
residents, with reports of over a thousand demonstrators.
From the outset, the protests have appeared not to have a
united leadership, a massive youth led-presence, or a
specific political platform. Libya does not have an
independent civil society, strictly speaking, as all
existing non-governmental organizations are headed by those
close to the regime. No real unified opposition exists in
the country, as political parties and movements are banned.
Moreover, Libya itself is an artificial construct, where,
partly as a result of Qaddafi's policies over years, tribal
and provincial identity has trumped nationalism and a sense
of citizenship, with consequent implications for the end
result of these protests.
REGIME RESPONSE
From the beginning of the revolts in the Arab world, Qaddafi
threw his lot in with Ben Ali, announcing that he was the
"best person who could rule Tunisia," thereby indicating
some concern about the prospect of Libyan unrest on the
heels of the events in Tunisia. Nevertheless, it is clear
that Qaddafi did not seem to have envisaged the extent of
the opposition in Libya or the potential for events to
unravel as they have.
Prior to the outbreak of protests, the regime had taken
various preventative measures, including the outlawing of
soccer matches. (In previous years, these matches,
particularly in the East, had turned into opportunities for
protesting the regime, on occasion.) Apparently, as reported
on Libya al Youm, an opposition website, such action was
matched by outreach to imams, to ensure that they warned
against demonstrations during Friday prayers.
Such preventative measures came hand in hand with financial
inducements and cooptation, targeting the specific needs of
the Libyan population and weaknesses in the Libyan
system-primarily in the lack of public housing. As Turkish
companies were unexpectedly placed under heavy pressure to
complete housing projects, Qaddafi, on state television,
asked Libyans to claim rights to public housing, reportedly
leading thousands to rush into the as yet uncompleted
housing units.[1]
Qaddafi also activated the pre-existing tribal structures in
the country, apparently holding meetings with-and offering
incentives to-the members of the "People's Social Leadership
Committee," a grouping of tribal leaders that forms a
backbone structure to Qaddafi's regime, to prevent the "Day
of Rage" from taking place. Meetings were also reportedly
held with journalists and media figures to ensure damage
limitation on the media front. Some personnel changes were
also made to mollify potential protestors, such as the
replacement of the Dean of Qar Younis University.
Meanwhile, even before the protests began, repression
appeared-as always in Libya-a key factor in Qaddafi's
reaction to opposition. Before the protests, such repression
remained under the cover of the legal system-not just
Terbil's arrest but also human rights activist Jamal al
Hajji's detainment, in early February. Though he was accused
of hitting a man with his car, the probable reason for his
arrest was his call for peaceful protests, and the arresting
officers are assumed to be members of the internal security
agency.[2]
PROTESTS SPREAD
The February 15 demonstrators were met with rubber bullets
and water cannons. Over the next few days, the numbers of
protesters grew, with concomitant numbers of deaths. By
February 18, over 40 people had been reported killed and
that number has risen to over 300. Some victims were
reported to have been shot dead during funerals and marches
for those killed in anti-government demonstrations by
security personnel. Meanwhile, the uprising spread to cities
such as Bayda, Derna, Toburk and Misrata. Reports have been
sketchy and witness accounts difficult to verify as a result
of the media lockdown on Bengazi and the rest of the
country, with conflicting accounts given by opposition
activists. By February 20, it appeared that much of the East
had fallen to the opposition, with army officers and police
reportedly siding with people in the street and al Jazeera
reporting that a group of army officers, and figures such as
Major General Suleiman Mahmoud had reportedly issued a
statement vowing their support for the protesters.
Meanwhile, in recent days protests had taken a new turn and
begun to cross over to Tripoli, a very different landscape.
TRENDS BOTH OLD AND NEW
That the protests began in Benghazi is no surprise. The
Eastern part of Libya had been affiliated with the monarchy
and traditionally opposed to Qaddafi's regime. Although
initially Qaddafi and the Revolutionary Command Council were
in theory opposed to the predominance of tribes and tribal
affiliation in Libya, over time Qaddafi came to rely on the
tribal system to safeguard his revolution in the face of
political opposition. The tribes Qaddafi relied on were not
those from the East, but rather his own tribe-the
Qaddadfa-from the Sirt region, as well as the Maqraha tribe
from the Fezzan and the Warfalla tribe from West
Tripolitania. These were promoted to positions of political
power to the exclusion of tribes from Cyrenaica, previously
affiliated with the monarchy. To this political exclusion
has been added economic woes, with rife unemployment and
underemployment and ever-erratic economic policies issued by
Qaddafi, which-especially against the backdrop of the
relative hydrocarbon riches of the country-created a sense
of instability and resentment.
These troubles reached a head in the mid-1990s when an
Islamist uprising originated from the East, with gun clashes
between Islamists and security services in the streets of
Benghazi. In reaction to political opponents, especially
since facing the Islamist opposition, Qaddafi began relying
more narrowly on his own tribal community. Sensitive
positions-therefore political power and financial
incentives-were given to members of his own tribe, to the
exclusion of other tribal allies, rendering the regime more
stable in some ways, but also narrowing the basis of its
support.
This may have led to the Warfallah tribe-which holds a blood
tie to Qaddafi's own tribe-declaring on al Jazeera that they
now side with the protestors. Assuming this is a clear
decision, it is a new and unexpected development that adds
to the regime's woes.
In addition, in recent days there have seen a spate of
resignations by relatively high-level representatives of the
regime leading to speculation that Qaddafi's days are
numbered. As well as Ambassador Ali Aujali, Libya's
Ambassador to the U.S.-a crucial posting-Libyan Ambassadors
from Poland to Belgium left their posts, with others-such as
deputy UN Ambassador Ibrahim Dabbashi, the deputy UN
Ambassador, accusing Qaddafi of carrying out a "genocide"
against his own people.
These diplomatic figures were joined by Justice Minister
Mustafa Mohamed Abud al Jaleil, who opposed the "excessive
use of violence." Increasingly, reports came in of the
resignation of military figures, particularly in the East of
the country. Most significantly, General Abdul Fatah
Younis-a former secretary of the General People's Committee
for Public Security, effectively Libya's interior
minister-delivered his resignation on February 22, claiming
in an interview with al Arabiyya that he had "begged Qaddafi
not to send in planes" (against the protestors).
In all likelihood, these figures are driven not by
ideological opposition to the regime, but by calculating
that the regime is teetering on the brink of a fall and that
it is best to leave this sinking ship. Yet it is unclear to
what extent their abandoning the regime is likely to impact
its stability. After all, the majority of these people are
not part of Qaddafi's inner circle nor are they crucial for
the security of the regime. Heads of the various security
elements have made little public pronouncement, leading to
the assumption that, for the moment, they are sticking with
the regime, while pro-regime sources-by no means objective
informants-have indicated to media outlets that allied
tribes are also holding steadfast to Qaddafi.[3] However,
should some of these people reach decide that Qaddafi's
regime has reached a tipping point, they too may be tempted
to turn on the Great Leader in order to save their own skin,
if indeed that is still possible.
REGIME REACTION POST BEGINNING OF PROTESTS
As the protests continued and grew in strength, the earlier
regime response intensified. More emphasis was placed on
repression, with the subsequent death toll mounting to over
300. There have been reports of sniper shootings and
airstrikes by war planes and helicopters. Meanwhile, rumours
of repressive action against those political power holders
who have tried to break with regime are emerging, with
reports that General Abdul Fatah Younis had been kidnapped.
Unlike in Egypt and Tunisia, the army is relatively
unimportant as both a mainstay of the regime and as an
institution. Qaddafi does not seem to trust the rank and
file of his army, which is criss-crossed and divided by
tribal affiliations. Reportedly, foreign mercenaries have
been flown in to help quell the uprising. Qaddafi, through
his own route into power-through an army coup-is naturally
suspicious of power of the army. He has faced coup attempts
before, including one in 1975 by the Revolutionary Command
Council. In more recent times, an Islamist uprising in
Bengazi in the 1990s reportedly evoked sympathy from the
conscript army. And in the mid-2000s rumors of coup attempts
circulated-a major factor for this is the inlaying of the
army by tribal and provincial divisions.
Yet in any case, key players in the Qaddafi regime,
including his children, have been placed in charge of
special brigades essentially responsible for protecting the
regime, such as Khamees, who leads a special forces unit
(the 32nd brigade) and had previously requested the purchase
of military hardware from the United States. There is also
Muatassim, who has functioned as national security advisor.
Meanwhile the army's overall importance to regime stability
pales beside that of overlapping security services, often
headed by Qaddafi's kin and family members. These-from the
Jamahiriyya Security Organization (Hai'at amn al-jamahiriya)
to the military secret service (Al-Istikhbarat al-
askariya)-were created in response to threats to the regime
to safeguard it and are led by those with a personal tie to
Qaddafi. It is likely that these are groups that Qaddafi is
relying on regardless of conscript army sympathy with the
protestors in the Eastern part of the country. It is these
security services that are guarding key installations and
sensitive buildings-a central factor in assessing regime
longevity.
Indeed, these overlying organizations traditionally have
been part of the regime's crucial divide and rule calculus.
Part of the assumption for Qaddafi is that they will defend
the regime as they are competing for political and economic
goods with other groups and should the regime collapse, they
will face vicious reprisals by the protestors, leading to a
life and death battle for control between pro and anti-
regime voices.
Aside from resorting to violence, the regime also imposed a
media blackout in the country, initially cutting off
citizens' access to Facebook and other Internet websites.
Meanwhile, the official regime response has come primarily
through two channels- Saif al Islam, Qaddafi's son and the
reported "reformer" of the country and Qaddafi himself.
These responses have reflected the various tried and tested
strategies of the regime: divide and rule, repression, and -
primarily in the case of Qaddafi senior-relying on anti-
imperialist rhetoric to gain legitimacy. These speeches
appeared to be aimed both at an internal Libyan audience and
at the international community. Although each of these
addresses differed in terms of delivery and tone, much of
their underlying message was the same, despite the
assumption by many in the West that Saif is the more
moderate face of the regime.
Saif's address on state-television took place on February
20. That the "reformist" face of the regime was the one that
first captured the media discourse appears to indicate that
Qaddafi has seen the need to mollify and respond to
protestors' demands. Nevertheless, the speech itself seemed
woefully out of touch with Libyans' demands. In it, Saif
promised political reforms, including much of the same
platform that had been part of Saif's Libya al Ghad
(Tomorrow's Libya) program that he has purported to push
since about 2005, but which has seen little advancement.
Yet the speech itself provoked more than pacified, as
political concessions were just a small part. Saif tried to
frame protestors as drug addicts, and blamed the presence of
outsiders-including Arabs and Africans-that were threatening
Libya's unity and aiming to break up the country into small
states, as well as using the threat of Islamist radicals.
Such a strategy was much in line with JANA news, the
official media channel, which argued that "foreign networks"
intended to "destabilize Libya's security and national
unity." Saif also tried to conjure up the (very real) demon
of instability-much as his father had done in the case of
Ben Ali. In his speech, he spoke of the threat of "civil
war," while JANA news spoke of "attacks aimed at blundering
banks and burning of files of criminal cases in courts" in
an attempt to convince Libyans of their need for their
strong leader. Meanwhile, much like Libya's deputy foreign
minister, Khaled al Ghaa'eem, he attempted to frame the
deaths of protestors as mistakes on the army and police, as
opposed to on the regime's strategies.
Saif al Islam also hinted at the threat of repression,
arguing that "We will fight to the last minute, until the
last bullet'' to safeguard the regime. Within the speech
were allusions to economic repercussions of the current
instability, including the loss of foreign investment,
perhaps intimating at the use of an economic stick against
protestors.
Qaddafi, meanwhile, made two separate speeches. The first
was a brief one, allegedly against the background of the
"House of Strength" museum, a former Tripoli residence that
was bombed in the U.S. attack in 1986. The speech, with
little fanfare, seemed to be primarily aimed at assuring
Libyans that, despite rumors, he remained in the country.
Framed in the context of Libya's former struggles, the short
statement aimed to both invoke the legitimacy of his rule
through its struggle against foreign "oppressors" and, in
picturing Qaddafi in a car, free of security personnel, to
show that his rule was safe and that opposition was limited
and non-threatening.
Qaddafi's second speech, an hour long address on state
television, reflected many of the usual Qaddafi strategies
and again took place against the background of the 1986
bombing. Qaddafi attempted to position himself as separate
from the politics of the country, arguing that "I am not a
president to step down." Such a tactic in the past allowed
him to disassociate from any political and economic crises,
in order to cast blame on other actors and manipulate actors
from a safe political position.
Ominously threatening is his use of force against
protestors, who he called "greasy rats." Qaddafi's discourse
had not changed since the 1980s, when he encouraged extra-
judicial killings of political opponents, known as "stray
dogs." Here, too, Qaddafi called on Libyans to arm
themselves to "cleanse Libya house by house." This echoes
Qaddafi's strategy in the late 1970s, when facing political
opposition, he inaugurated the Revolutionary Committee's
structure as a way for out-sourcing ideological compliance
with the Jamahiriyya and a means to stabilize his rule.
The appeal to national symbols again reflects Qaddafi's
long-term strategy in cloaking himself in an anti-Western
and anti-imperialist mantle. In the wake of the brutal
colonial occupation of Libya by Italy, such a strategy has
in the past found popular appeal and bestowed upon Qaddafi
much-needed legitimacy. Indeed, Qaddafi continued in this
vein, asking Libyans "do you want America to come and occupy
you? Our country will become like Afghanistan. Is that what
you want?" Qaddafi has always seen himself as a leader
beyond that of the borders of Libya, having viewed himself
as the symbol of pan-Arabism and later anointing himself as
"King of Kings" of Africa. In his speech, this quest
appeared to be a bulwark against his removal from power as
"I am the glory that cannot be abandoned by Libya, the
Arabs, the United Stated and Latin America."
Lastly, Qaddafi appeared to resort to divide and rule
mechanisms, primarily through the use of the Islamist
specter. Like Saif, he blamed the uprising on Islamists that
wanted to "create another Afghanistan," mistakenly followed
by "drugged" youth. To invoke religious legitimacy, as he
has tried to do whenever he has faced religious opposition,
Qaddafi took to citing the Qur'an, claiming the protestors'
acts were punishable by religious edicts.
The one concession Qaddafi seems to have been willing to
grant is the formation of a constitution. Long advocated by
Saif, the advancement of such as document had been blocked,
most likely by Qaddafi, who opposed such an instrument in
his Green Book. This, together with Saif's earlier address
and Qaddafi's mention of his son during his television
address, appears to hint at increasing reliance on the son
to ensure stability. It may also be a realization, a little
too late, that an earlier adoption of Saif's proposed
reforms would have undercut some of the current opposition.
Although Saif was rumored to be making a follow-up speech,
it has not taken place to date, showing confusion in the
upper echelons of the regime as to how to best handle the
uprising.
WHAT NEXT FOR LIBYA
The next steps for Libya are as yet unclear. Although
Qaddafi seems to have maintained control in Tripoli, the
East of the country currently seems beyond his reach. Yet
the lack of institutions in the country bodes badly for
stability, whatever way the situation pans out. Any number
of scenarios could take place:
* A successful crackdown on Tripoli, and the regime
later gaining control of the East of the country through
economic repression, including perhaps a siege. A
subsequent bloodbath may take place, with violent
revenge being exacted on regime opponents.
* Continued chaos and a de-facto separation of the
country into smaller states.
* A realization by some within Qaddafi's inner circle
that to best preserve their power they must jettison the
Great Leader, with his subsequent death or departure
from the country. This may lead to inter-regime
struggles, as well as potential internecine struggles,
with increasing violence. Previously documented rivalry
between Saif and his brother Muatassim, affiliated with
security organizations, may end up playing a role here.
* The presence of oil in the Eastern part of the country
will no doubt play into Libya's final scenarios, as the
hydrocarbon industry functions as the cash cow of the
regime. Saif al Islam slyly referenced this in his
speech, noting that "Who has the ability to manage oil
in Libya? How can we split the oil_ there will be major
and bloody conflicts over it."
Either way, as for the past 40 years under Qaddafi, the
Libyan people will be the ultimate losers, with stability
and a functioning government nowhere in sight. Meanwhile,
the West will have its own repercussions, with increased
illegal immigration to Europe, higher oil prices, and
possibly a freer operating area for terrorists, including al
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.
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Notes
[1] http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=libya-urges-turkish-companies-to-finish-projects-quickly-2011-02-02
[2] http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/libyan-writer-detained-following-protest-call-2011-02-08
[3]
http://www.aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=1&id=24246
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Copyright Foreign Policy Research Institute
(http://www.fpri.org/).
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