From FPRI:
NORTH AFRICA'S DEMOCRATIC PROSPECTS
by Bruce Maddy-Weitzman
December 26, 2011
Bruce Maddy-Weitzman is a Senior Research Fellow at the
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at
Tel Aviv University and FPRI Associate Scholar. His latest
book is The Berber Identity Movement and the Challenge to
North African States (University of Texas Press, 2011). This
essay is based on a presentation to a symposium on
Contemporary Challenges Facing North Africa, sponsored by
the Foreign Policy Research Institute and the Reserve
Officers Association, November 30, 2011
Available on the web and in pdf format at:
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/2011/201112.maddy-weitzman.northafrica.html
Audio of Contemporary Challenges Facing North Africa:
http://www.fpri.org/multimedia/20111130.symposium.nafrica.html
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NORTH AFRICA'S DEMOCRATIC PROSPECTS
by Bruce Maddy-Weitzman
The year 2011 may well be remembered as a transformative one
in the history of modern Arab states, a moment in which
societies across the Middle East and North Africa "kicked
back," after decades of unbridled domination by
authoritarian state structures. But the verdict is still
very much out, and already one can say that those who were
in the vanguard of the protests have been replaced by a
variety of groups, most important of which are Islamist
movements.
The intent here is to discuss the dynamics and challenges
facing Tunisia, Libya, Morocco and Algeria, the countries of
the "Maghreb" (Arab-Islamic "West"), in the wake of the
upheavals of 2011. (Mauritania is also a member of the 5-
nation "Arab Maghreb Union," but is outside of this
analysis). Relevant questions governing the analysis
include:
* Which states have the best prospects for promoting
effective democratization strategies?
* What is the strength of Islamist movements in Maghreb
states?
* Are Morocco and Algeria in pre-revolutionary
situations, or are the prospects for continued regime
stability there good?
* What are the chances the Libya will be able to
constitute itself as a "normal," functioning entity?
* What is the strength of more liberal currents, -- e.g.,
Berber-Amazigh culture movement, women's groups,
secular leftists?
* How might the course of events in Morocco radiate among
other Middle East monarchies?
* What is the overall economic profile of the region, and
what are the prospects for promoting growth and a
greater measure of regional integration?
Owing to its particular mix -- its ethnic composition and
linguistic profile, the various forms of Islamic practice,
and the region's colonial experiences -- the Maghreb has
long been viewed as separate from the broader Middle East.
But in today's hyper-connected world, what happens in one
place can reverberate in many other places. This is what
happened in Tunisia, of all places, where the spark for the
region-wide upheaval popularly known as the "Arab Spring"
was first lit.
A decade later, contemporary Maghrebi societies still face a
host of political, social and economic challenges. The
specifics vary from place to place, often widely, but there
are common themes.
UNDERPINNING THE CHALLENGES
1. Large-scale demographic and economic pressures,
particularly the youth bulge, with all of the resulting
impact on state-society relations and on relations with
Europe. Out of the Maghreb states' eighty million persons,
over 50 percent are under the age of 30, and the growth
rates of their economies can't meet the demands placed upon
it. The result is a high level of alienation, pessimism,
and a desire to emigrate. As it is, the large North African
emigrant communities in Europe bind the two shores of the
Mediterranean together as never before, posing a host of
challenges for both European and North African states.
2. The legacy of authoritarianism and violence, both state-
sponsored and from opposition movements. The Libyan
(Qaddafi) version resulted in the utter emasculation of
political life and the country's institutions, which were
very limited to begin with. Violence has been an enduring
feature of Algerian political life since the colonial era,
coloring both the authoritarian state structures and the
opposition. In addition, smaller jihadist groups, some of
them operating under the banner of al-Qaeda of the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM), continue to operate in Algeria, Morocco and
the Sahel region.
3. The region's geo-strategic importance (straddling the
Mediterranean Sea and Atlantic Ocean, including the Straits
of Gibraltar, as well as its proximity to Europe) and
economic resources (hydrocarbons in Algeria and Libya,
phosphates in Morocco).
4. The geopolitics of the Arab Spring, which cuts different
ways. Algeria came out on the wrong side of the Libyan
conflict, and is now is trying to repair the damage by
developing relations with the new authorities there.
Tunisia, by contrast was on the winning side, and provided
refuge for hundreds of thousands of Libyans, straining
Tunisian resources. Presumably, they will go home. It will
be interesting to see how the relationship between new
governments with strong Islamist components develops.
Meanwhile, the security of the Tunisian-Libyan border
remains an issue. Gulf Arab states, with Qatar in the lead
and Saudi Arabia in the background, provided crucial
political support for the anti-Qaddafi uprising in Libya,
and can be expected to continue to promote their interests
in the new Libya. GCC states also sought to strengthen the
Moroccan monarchy, inviting it, and Jordan as well, to join
the GCC, and extending promises of generous monetary aid.
In that regard, the visit by Qatar's Crown Prince to Morocco
just one day prior to nation-wide parliamentary elections in
late November was a clear signal of support for King
Muhammad VI. Obviously, the destabilization of either
Morocco or Algeria would have repercussions throughout the
Maghreb and beyond; so would the failure of the victorious
Libyan revolutionaries to establish an orderly government.
Already, there is great concern with the proliferation of
weapons which had been in Qaddafi's warehouses, and have
leaked to a variety of radical Islamist groups, in the Sinai
Peninsula, for example.
SPECIFIC ISSUES
1. Regime Legitimacy. Legitimacy is an extremely slippery
concept, particularly in societies which don't choose their
leaders through competitive elections. Nonetheless, it is
fair to say that the generation which led Maghreb states to
independence and ruled for decades afterwards possessed a
good deal of legitimacy, thanks to their efforts to shake
off colonial rule.
In Algeria, the victorious FLN made their successful
revolutionary struggle central to their governing ideology.
Ironically, it lost its legitimacy at the end of the 1980s,
well before its more conservative pro-Western neighbor in
Tunisia. Even if the regime survived the ensuing horrific
civil strife, it has not regained any kind of real
institutional legitimacy.
In Tunisia, the Ben Ali regime, which came to power in
November 1987 in what essentially constituted a palace coup,
failed to take advantage of the extended period of political
calm and unwritten bargain with the country's middle class
that followed the repression of the Islamist current in
1991. Instead, it squandered its legitimacy by privatizing
the state for the benefit of family and cronies. Following
the Jasmine Revolution, Tunisia is now beginning the long
and difficult process of institutionalizing a new, more
genuinely legitimate government, and renewing the country's
social contract.
In Morocco, the monarchy possesses a special measure of
legitimacy owing to its descent from the Prophet Muhammad,
but it is not immutable and requires continued tending to.
The late King Hasan II sought to remake himself during the
1990s into a more benevolent ruler and promoted incremental
change which included the involvement of traditionally
opposition parties. His son, Muhammad VI, who has ruled
since his father's death in 1999, accelerated the pace of
reform, bolstering his legitimacy among large sections of
the public, even though Morocco's underlying socio-economic
problems remain acute.
In Libya, Muammar Qaddafi initially possessed a good deal of
revolutionary legitimacy, after having overthrown the
Idrissi monarchy in 1969, in a military coup modeled after
Nasser's 1952 coup in Egypt. However, he utterly squandered
his legitimacy through brutal repression and bizarre
behavior, and survived for decades thanks only to his oil
wealth. The new Libyan order is highly uncertain. The
National Transitional Council, and the new interim
government, clearly possesses momentary legitimacy, having
spearheaded the overthrow of Qaddafi, but now it's starting
from scratch. Although elections are scheduled, real regime
legitimacy will only come if Libya is able to somehow build
institutions that will channel, contain, and integrate the
various demands emanating from various portions of society.
Given the centrality of tribal identities in Libya,
establishing a functioning system deemed legitimate by the
majority of the society would seem to depend on attaining
some kind of power and wealth sharing among the tribes.
With Libya awash in weapons, achieving a monopoly on the use
of force would seem to be the first daunting task of the new
authorities.
All Maghreb countries are in various stages of the process
of democratizing, but there is no guarantee that this will
result in genuine democracy. Tunisia is farthest along in
establishing the institutional underpinnings of democracy;
Libya, as mentioned above, is only at the beginning; Morocco
has institutionalized political pluralism and undertaken
constitutional reform, but the monarchy maintains
preponderant power, ruling as well as reigning; Algeria also
possesses a certain degree of democratic form-e.g.,
political parties and a lively press, but real power remains
in the shadows, and the regime has only talked about
liberalizing political life, without acting.
2. The Rising Strength of Islamist Movements. For decades,
Maghreb regimes have employed a variety of means to contain
political Islam. However, as one former Moroccan official
told me a few months ago, "the color of the Arab Spring is
green" [the color of Islam]. What this will mean regarding
state-society relations, the chances of instituting lasting
and genuine democratic forms of government, the relations
between different social and cultural forces, and the impact
of all of this on the foreign policies of Maghreb states,
remains to be seen. In any case, the exact meaning of
growing Islamist power differs in each: Tunisia is the
bellwether; in Libya, the Islamist current is sure to have a
prominent position, and in Morocco, the leader of the legal
Islamist party has now assumed the post of prime minister,
while remaining distinctly subordinate to the Palace. The
Algerian authorities, by contrast, appear determined to keep
their own Islamist genie in the proverbial bottle.
3. The unresolved status of the Western Sahara. Spain
evacuated its Saharan colony in 1976. Morocco's claim to
the territory (it controls more than 80 percent of it) is
contested by the Polisario independence movement, which is
backed by Algeria. The territory's juridical status remains
unresolved, the only such ex-colony anywhere in the world.
While there has not been any fighting for decades,
negotiations remain deadlocked. The issue has been the
single biggest obstacle to achieving the normalization of
Algerian-Moroccan relations, which in turn has inhibited the
promotion of regional economic cooperation and integration,
and left the 5-nation Arab Maghreb Union, which was founded
with great fanfare in 1999, frozen.
4. The need to renew and deepen Euro-Maghreb Relations, in
both the economic and political spheres. The Barcelona
Process, initiated in the mid-1990s was supposed to do just
that, but it quickly foundered. Mutual suspicions and
misunderstandings need to be overcome and new mechanisms for
cooperation to promote economic development in the Maghreb
are vital; failure to do so will have negative
repercussions, which will ultimately be felt on the European
side of the Mediterranean.
According to a leading expert on North African economies,
Francis Ghiles, "faster economic growth able to create
desperately needed jobs is essential for stability. Better
governance, let alone democracy, stands little chance of
taking root in the absence of faster growth." Up until now,
he says, the EU's "Neighborhood Policy" has lacked critical
mass of investment. According to him, there exists a
"colossal investment opportunity" in the energy and mineral
sectors, notably phosphates, plastics and renewal energy,
one which has the potential to build competitiveness in the
region's industry and thus raise its place in the global
economy. Given Europe's poor track record thus far and the
burgeoning crisis in the Euro zone, the prospects for a
major increase in European economic investment in North
Africa would seem to be remote. Still, Europeans were
reminded again by the crises in Tunisia and Libya that
instability in the North Africa will generate accelerated
migration to Europe, something which it very much wants to
avoid. Hence, it is in Europe's own interest to assist in
promoting real economic growth and opportunities in the
Maghreb. Germany's recent announcement that it will grant
$100 million to Tunisia for that purpose would seem to be an
acknowledgement of that fact.
Ghiles also recommends joint industrial ventures between
Moroccan and Algerian state and private companies, for
example, that Sonatrach (Algeria's oil and gas company) and
the Moroccan Phosphates Co. buy into each other's capital,
and that leading banks should do the same. Given the long-
standing suspicion and rivalry between the two countries,
the prospects of this actually happening any time soon would
appear to be extremely unlikely
5. The question of language. Language serves as one of the
foundations of political and national identity the world
over. Yet, one of North Africa's particular features is the
existence of several languages spoken in each country.
Although Arabic is the official language, Tamazight (Berber)
and French are widely used as well. Paradoxically, Berber
dialects are more widely spoken in Morocco than among
Algeria's more overtly politicized Berber communities.
French, of course, remains the language of commerce and
science, and is spoken by millions across the region, in
spite of the fact that French was often viewed in the post-
colonial period as an unfortunate relic of the pre-
independence period. The rise of Berber culture movements,
which unceasingly demand that Tamazight be recognized as an
official national language alongside Arabic, adds another
dimension to the complicated North African linguistic
landscape.
DEVELOPMENTS BY COUNTRY
Tunisia
A few background observations regarding Tunisia's particular
cocktail of factors that have shaped its past and present
are in order. Twenty years ago, Samuel Huntington had
identified Tunisia as the most likely candidate among Arab
states to join the "third wave" of democratization among
thirty previously non-democratic states. Tunisia's
"democratic potential" included its historically rooted,
well-defined national identity, socially and territorially
(Tunisians, in Ernest Gellner's memorable phrase, seem
"comfortable in their own skin"); its relatively strong
educated middle class, achievements in promoting the status
of women, and relatively non-traumatic colonial experience,
which further deepened Tunisia's already existing openness
to Mediterranean cross-currents; and a small, non-
politicized military. An additional element in this mix is
the fact that under its first president, Habib Bourguiba,
Tunisia managed to maintain a healthy distance from radical
pan-Arab currents being promoted by Egypt's Gamal Abdel
Nasser and others during the 1950s and 1960s. At the same
time, Tunisia's heritage and social underpinnings were an
integral part of the Arab-Islamic milieu. Taken together,
these elements produced what the political scientist Larbi
Sadiki refers to as Tunisia's "syncretism", which heralds,
in his view, good tidings for Tunisia's emerging, albeit
still fragile democracy. While being careful not to
idealize Tunisia's particular synthesis or its achievements,
one can hardly dismiss them either.
Election Day has now come and gone in Tunisia, marking the
end of the first transitional phase of the post-Ben Ali era
and the beginning of another. The achievements during the
initial interim period were considerable; the challenges
facing the Tunisian polity in the coming period are even
more formidable. Much will depend on how the leadership of
Tunisia's newly empowered political parties conduct
themselves: they are charged with fashioning a viable
institutional framework that will enable the country's
centripetal forces to outweigh its centrifugal ones.
Maintaining political and social stability will also require
signs that Tunisia's economic difficulties are being
ameliorated. Of course, all eyes are focused on Ennahda,
Tunisia's long-repressed Islamist movement, and the big
winner in the elections for a Constituent Assembly charged
with writing a new constitution for the country and
appointing an interim government.
Ennahda's decisive victory (41 percent; 89 seats in the 217-
person assembly), enabled its Secretary-General, Hamadi
Jebali, to be chosen as prime minister for the new interim
government, and confirmed anew that Islamist movements are
among the prime beneficiaries of the "Arab Spring"
upheavals. Guided by Rashid al-Ghannoushi,. Ennahda has
long contended that it is genuinely committed to democracy
and dialogue with other social forces, as it promotes a
modernist-Islamist synthesis, modeled, it says, after
Turkey's ruling AKP party. Sadiki characterizes Ennahda's
worldview as "soft Islamism." This includes a commitment to
maintaining the rights of Tunisian women as laid down by
Tunisia's personal status law, which among other things is
the only one in the Arab world which explicitly bans
polygamy, in contradiction to Islamic law. Nonetheless,
Ennahda's campaign also employed unabashed appeals to
religious sentiment, and with great effect. And when it
comes to hot button, populist issues like the Arab-Israeli
conflict, Ghannoushi's language has been harsh, and even
anti-Semitic, and full of praise for suicide bombers and for
Hamas's strategic goal of eliminating Israel.
Ennahda's decisive victory was due not only to its
popularity and cohesiveness, but also to the splits within
the secular-left camp, which gained nearly as many votes.
What happens now? Ennahda's post-election press briefing was
a model of consensus, emphasizing its commitment to
democratic principles and its wish to cooperate with all
political parties, trade unions and other civil society
bodies, praising the country's civil servants, whose skills
were vitally needed as the country moved forward, and
reassuring international markets and actors. For their part,
two of the three secular left parties (CPR, which won 29
seats, and Ettakol, which won 20 seats) proclaimed their
willingness to work with Ennahda in establishing the new
interim governing authority and beginning the work on the
new constitution. Indeed, the CRP's long-time human rights
advocate, Moncef Marzouk, has been named interim president
of the country, and Ettakol's Mustapha Ben Jaafar the
Speaker of the Constituent Assembly Given the differing
world views on a host of issues, establishing a sustained
working relationship will be no mean feat. There is no
precedent for such a durable secular left-Islamist alliance
anywhere in the region.
Paradoxically, it thus appears that Tunisia has embarked on
a path of more genuine democratization and Islamization.
Amitai Etzioni terms the likely outcome as being a kind of
"Islamocracy," i.e., the combining of democratic
institutions and an active civil society, with some
influence of Islamic law and norms on political and social
life. The struggle to determining what that exact
combination will be promises to be the central issue shaping
Tunisia's democratization experiment. Ennahda now has the
chance to prove that Islamist movements are not, by
definition, antithetical to democratic norms. But the path
is also strewn with obstacles. The bargaining and
compromises which will be required to maintain a broad-based
government and achieving an agreed upon constitutional
framework is likely to be difficult at times for Ennahda and
even more so for its secular coalition partners,
particularly since some of the latter's supporters already
believe that Ennahda is just dissimulating in it proclaimed
fidelity to democracy and the equality of women. In
addition, the actions of a small but provocative salafi
current, which attacks Ennahda for not being sufficiently
"Islamic" has already demonstrated its ability to polarize
society. Nor does the democracy "bounce" of legitimacy
conferred by the elections have an unlimited time frame.
People, particularly the young and unemployed, will want to
see a real change for the better in their everyday lives.
Developing viable economic policies that can begin providing
solutions to its frustrated youthful population will be the
new government's first order of business. Unfortunately, the
economy is experiencing a slowdown, marked by a fall in
exports, investments and tourism, a rise in the current
deficit to 5/7 percent of the GDP, and a fall in hard
currency reserves. The annual growth rate for 2011 is
expected to be 0 percent.
As for the region, Islamist movements and more liberal
advocates of reform were cheered by Tunisia's successful
elections, albeit not always for the same reasons. But while
Tunisia can serve as an inspiration for those in the Arab
world who seek to replace decades of dictatorship with a
democratic regime responsive to people's needs, the
conditions for actually replicating the Tunisian experience
do not exist elsewhere, as recent events in Egypt have
shown.
Libya
In terms of political cohesion and a legacy of "stateness,"
Libya is the polar opposite of Tunisia, possessing very
little of either. The country is currently awash in
weapons, and tribal and factional militias are reluctant to
give them up. The new transitional government contains no
one from the long-marginalized Amazigh community of western
Libya, which played an important role in the war to
overthrow Qaddafi and is clamoring for linguistic and
cultural recognition, and representation at the center so as
to end the decades of deliberate neglect by Qaddafi. There
is significant Islamist sentiment in the NTC; Libyan
Islamists resemble the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the
Salafi current far more than the Turkish Islamist AKP part.
Its insistence on the centrality of the Sharia in the new
Libya has already provoked controversy. Elections have been
scheduled to be held in 8 months' time, and it is hard to
imagine that the process will be orderly. Of course,
controlling the country's oil resources will be the key to
any regime's success, and the involvement of European
powers, the prime consumers of Libyan oil, can be expected.
Morocco
Morocco has thus far dodged upheaval, in spite of the fact
that the country suffers from many of the same underlying
ills that have driven the protests elsewhere-corruption,
poverty, and unemployment; the overwhelming concentration of
wealth in the hands of a small stratum of elite families
intertwined with the authorities; the absence of real
democracy; and closed horizons for its large, youthful
population, suffering from disproportionately high rates of
unemployment and underemployment.
The events in Tunisia and Egypt at the beginning of 2011
were keenly watched in Morocco. Like-minded Facebook protest
groups quickly sprang up among Morocco's Internet-savvy,
mostly politically unaffiliated twenty-something generation.
Unlike their counterparts to the east, their target was not
the "regime, (i.e., the monarch), but the corrupt elites who
benefited from the existing state of affairs.
While mild compared to upheavals in the rest of the region,
the February protests raised the specter of Morocco going
down the same road as so many other Arab states and unnerved
the authorities. From the beginning, and right through the
first half of 2011, the government adopted a multi-pronged
strategy: proactive measures designed to appease popular
frustration with economic conditions (e.g., increasing state
subsidies on basic goods, raising salaries for civil
servants, promising government jobs for recent university
graduates); proclaiming the right of peaceful protests to go
forward while simultaneously working to discredit the
protestors; and using occasional police violence to
intimidate demonstrators.
Most importantly, though, was Mohamed VI's very public
promise of sweeping reforms in an effort to quell the
protests. The centerpiece was the promulgation of a new
constitution that somewhat enhanced the powers of the prime
minister and parliament, while leaving preponderant power in
the hands of the king. A nation-wide referendum confirmed
the adoption of the constitution in early July. This was
followed by the holding of parliamentary elections in late
November. The government was determined that the elections
be a success, and made it very difficult for the advocates
of a boycott to disseminate their message. Still voter
turnout was far lower than it was for the constitutional
referendum in July (45 percent to 97 percent, according to
official, and most likely inflated figures). The low
turnout, and the high number of non-registered eligible
voters, points to a high degree of cynicism and apathy among
Moroccan voters.
The achievement of the Islamist PJD party-coming in first,
winning 107 seats out of a total of 395-was consistent with,
and influenced by developments in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt.
In addition, voters were tired of the same old parliamentary
faces and the country's widespread corruption: by contrast,
the PJD, having been in opposition since its first
appearance in 1997, is untainted, and many voters clearly
wanted to try something else. Paradoxically, the win further
legitimized the monarchy and its top-down reform process.
The PJD's win seemed to be genuine, as the authorities
seemed to have neither sought to block it nor promote it,
allowing the authorities to point to it as additional proof
of its desire to see the system evolve, and to the success
of its strategy. Given that the Palace will continued to
hold preponderant power, the PJD will be challenged to
advance its core principles dealing with the Islamization of
society, as well as its promises to combat poverty and
corruption.
Overall, Muhamad VI has bought further time with his latest
measures, and Morocco does not appear to be on the verge of
major unrest, but there are obviously no guarantees
regarding the future.
Algeria
Algeria has always been unique in the North African
pantheon: possessing a pre-colonial past of being far less
cohesive than Tunisia and Morocco; having the first to be
colonized by France, and in the most thorough-going and
socially destructive manner; experiencing the most violent
and bloody, by far, of the independence struggles; having
vast hydrocarbon resources; and being the first post-
independence regime to lose its legitimacy, resulting in the
end of the army-single party regime and a sudden democratic
explosion followed by a horrific implosion, as the regime's
military-security core beat back an armed Islamist challenge
during the 1990s, at great cost in lives. Since then, the
authorities have sought to establish a veneer of civilian,
multiparty rule and a pluralist process which would provide
legitimacy, while real power remained concentrated in the
shadows, in the hands of a military-security cabal and its
civilian allies, with corruption being rampant.
Algeria is a rich country with many poor and frustrated
people. It is the world's fourth-largest exporter of natural
gas but the central bank recently announced that one-quarter
of the country's 35 million people live under the poverty
line.
The regional upheaval has reverberated in Algeria too. The
country witnesses almost constant protests on a variety of
issues-housing, environmental degradation, lack of water,
housing, electricity or calling for higher wages, etc.
These are often put down forcibly, leading protestors to
compare the authorities' heavy handed violence to France's
behavior in 1950s (a dubious comparison, but the fact that
it is made shows how little legitimacy the regime has).
Until now, however, the widespread anger of ordinary people
over bread and butter issues has not coalesced into a united
call for change. The ordinary Algerian is often just as
suspicious of opposition politicians and democracy activists
as of the authorities. Moreover, having experienced the
horrors of civil strife in the 1990s, many are either
exhausted or unwilling to risk renewed instability and
upheaval.
Like his counterparts elsewhere, Algeria's president
Bouteflika responded to the initial protests by promising
political reform, beginning with the end of the state of
emergency and a freer media. He also extended key subsidies
and boosting wages for the police, army, government
employees and health workers. But concrete reform in the
political field has been absent. Parliament is supposedly
set to vote on a law at the end of December that would
facilitate the creation of parties (dozens are reportedly
waiting approval), while banning ex-Islamic Salvation Front
members from forming a party. (The FIS's electoral successes
in 1990-91 led to the military's cancellation of the
electoral process and the prolonged strife of the 1990s.)
Given the general opaqueness about the inner workings of the
power structures in the country, rumors abound:
Bouteflika's illness (cancer), is worsening, according to
one report. The military has tried, and may try again to
replace him, says another.
Regarding regional issues, Qaddafi's overthrow distressed
Algeria, for it feared (and fears) that its own Islamist
opposition will be emboldened. Algeria is fighting against a
low-level Islamist insurgency, and after 9-11 successfully
rebranded itself as a vital partner to the West in the "war
on terror." Similarly, it is quite distressed over the
events in Syria, and the possible collapse of the Syrian
regime.
Overall, Algeria would seem to be the next prime candidate
for upheaval. It has not been proactive in the reform
process, unlike Morocco, and the public's grievances are
multiple, and genuine. But, as elsewhere, nothing is
certain.
CONCLUSION
To sum up: the old pattern of complete domination by Maghreb
regimes over their societies has been shaken. Two regimes
have been toppled, a third has been compelled to initiate
reform measures, and a fourth is talking about doing so, but
has not yet acted. Islamist forces have risen to the center
of political life (apart from Algeria), while the
consequences differ from country to country. Liberal forces
are present throughout and, while not in the majority and on
the defensive, are not inconsequential. Berber ethnic-
cultural identity has now been recognized officially in
Morocco, and the revived Amazigh current in Libya has been
vocal in demanding recognition. Renewed unrest in Algeria is
likely to include a Kabyle-Amazigh dimension, as it did a
decade ago. Tunisia is best positioned, by far, to achieve
an institutionalization of a democratic political order, but
even there the road will be rocky. Western nations,
especially Europe, have an enormous stake in the evolving
political and social order of Maghreb states, but have not
developed an overall economic and political strategy to
guide its policies and advance their interests. The United
States has a stake in the Maghreb's evolution as well, and
is currently emphasizing the importance of continued
democratization in a way that would ensure the protection of
women and minority rights and the rule of law.
Economically, too, the U.S. is promoting a variety of
development programs, but by themselves will hardly be
sufficient. The U.S. appears to be supportive of the active
role being taken by its Gulf Arab allies in the region, even
if they themselves are hardly democratic. For the time
being, however, their overriding common geopolitical
interests, first and foremost vis-…-vis Iran, outweigh any
differences that they might have regarding the value of
democracy. In any case, the GCC states were keen to see
Qaddafi overthrown, and the U.S. quickly lined up with them
and with Britain and France on the issue; the GCC is a
strong supporter of the Moroccan monarchy, as is the United
States; and is keen to see Sunni Islamist parties achieve
greater prominence through the ballot box. On this last
point, the U.S. Administration has apparently accommodated
itself to the reality that democratization and increased
Islamist political influence go hand in hand, and prefers it
to the previous authoritarian status quo in the region.
----------------------------------------------------------
Author's Note
The analysis draws on recent articles in Middle East
Quarterly
http://www.meforum.org/2977/tunisia-after-revolution
http://www.meforum.org/3114/morocco-upheaval
Euromesco Briefs:
http://www.euromesco.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=a
rticle&id=1271%3Aeuromesco-brief-19-tunisia-the-next-phase-
&catid=62%3Aeuromesco-briefs&Itemid=49&lang=fr
The Jerusalem Report: http://www.dayan.org/frameana.htm
Change and Opportunities in the Emerging Mediterranean
(Stephen Calleya and Monica Wohlfield, eds;
Malta, Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies,
forthcoming
an FPRI E-Note on Tunisia in January 2011:
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201101.maddy-weitzman.tunisia.html
the preface to my co-edited volume, The Maghreb in the New
Century (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2007);
and my book, The Berber Identity Movement and the Challenge
to North African States (Austin: University of Texas Press,
2011).
----------------------------------------------------------
Copyright Foreign Policy Research Institute
(http://www.fpri.org/).
NORTH AFRICA'S DEMOCRATIC PROSPECTS
by Bruce Maddy-Weitzman
December 26, 2011
Bruce Maddy-Weitzman is a Senior Research Fellow at the
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at
Tel Aviv University and FPRI Associate Scholar. His latest
book is The Berber Identity Movement and the Challenge to
North African States (University of Texas Press, 2011). This
essay is based on a presentation to a symposium on
Contemporary Challenges Facing North Africa, sponsored by
the Foreign Policy Research Institute and the Reserve
Officers Association, November 30, 2011
Available on the web and in pdf format at:
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/2011/201112.maddy-weitzman.northafrica.html
Audio of Contemporary Challenges Facing North Africa:
http://www.fpri.org/multimedia/20111130.symposium.nafrica.html
----------------------------------------------------------
Upcoming at FPRI
Wednesday, January 11, 2012: BookTalk
The Struggle for Egypt: From Nasser to Tahrir Square
Steven A. Cook, Council on Foreign Relations
11:30 - 12:30 in FPRI’s Library
1528 Walnut St., Suite 610, Philadelphia
Free for Members of FPRI and Educators
$20 for everyone else
Followed by lunch for FPRI Members at the Patron Level ($500)
RSVP: events@fpri.org
For details, visit:
http://www.fpri.org/events/
----------------------------------------------------------
NORTH AFRICA'S DEMOCRATIC PROSPECTS
by Bruce Maddy-Weitzman
The year 2011 may well be remembered as a transformative one
in the history of modern Arab states, a moment in which
societies across the Middle East and North Africa "kicked
back," after decades of unbridled domination by
authoritarian state structures. But the verdict is still
very much out, and already one can say that those who were
in the vanguard of the protests have been replaced by a
variety of groups, most important of which are Islamist
movements.
The intent here is to discuss the dynamics and challenges
facing Tunisia, Libya, Morocco and Algeria, the countries of
the "Maghreb" (Arab-Islamic "West"), in the wake of the
upheavals of 2011. (Mauritania is also a member of the 5-
nation "Arab Maghreb Union," but is outside of this
analysis). Relevant questions governing the analysis
include:
* Which states have the best prospects for promoting
effective democratization strategies?
* What is the strength of Islamist movements in Maghreb
states?
* Are Morocco and Algeria in pre-revolutionary
situations, or are the prospects for continued regime
stability there good?
* What are the chances the Libya will be able to
constitute itself as a "normal," functioning entity?
* What is the strength of more liberal currents, -- e.g.,
Berber-Amazigh culture movement, women's groups,
secular leftists?
* How might the course of events in Morocco radiate among
other Middle East monarchies?
* What is the overall economic profile of the region, and
what are the prospects for promoting growth and a
greater measure of regional integration?
Owing to its particular mix -- its ethnic composition and
linguistic profile, the various forms of Islamic practice,
and the region's colonial experiences -- the Maghreb has
long been viewed as separate from the broader Middle East.
But in today's hyper-connected world, what happens in one
place can reverberate in many other places. This is what
happened in Tunisia, of all places, where the spark for the
region-wide upheaval popularly known as the "Arab Spring"
was first lit.
A decade later, contemporary Maghrebi societies still face a
host of political, social and economic challenges. The
specifics vary from place to place, often widely, but there
are common themes.
UNDERPINNING THE CHALLENGES
1. Large-scale demographic and economic pressures,
particularly the youth bulge, with all of the resulting
impact on state-society relations and on relations with
Europe. Out of the Maghreb states' eighty million persons,
over 50 percent are under the age of 30, and the growth
rates of their economies can't meet the demands placed upon
it. The result is a high level of alienation, pessimism,
and a desire to emigrate. As it is, the large North African
emigrant communities in Europe bind the two shores of the
Mediterranean together as never before, posing a host of
challenges for both European and North African states.
2. The legacy of authoritarianism and violence, both state-
sponsored and from opposition movements. The Libyan
(Qaddafi) version resulted in the utter emasculation of
political life and the country's institutions, which were
very limited to begin with. Violence has been an enduring
feature of Algerian political life since the colonial era,
coloring both the authoritarian state structures and the
opposition. In addition, smaller jihadist groups, some of
them operating under the banner of al-Qaeda of the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM), continue to operate in Algeria, Morocco and
the Sahel region.
3. The region's geo-strategic importance (straddling the
Mediterranean Sea and Atlantic Ocean, including the Straits
of Gibraltar, as well as its proximity to Europe) and
economic resources (hydrocarbons in Algeria and Libya,
phosphates in Morocco).
4. The geopolitics of the Arab Spring, which cuts different
ways. Algeria came out on the wrong side of the Libyan
conflict, and is now is trying to repair the damage by
developing relations with the new authorities there.
Tunisia, by contrast was on the winning side, and provided
refuge for hundreds of thousands of Libyans, straining
Tunisian resources. Presumably, they will go home. It will
be interesting to see how the relationship between new
governments with strong Islamist components develops.
Meanwhile, the security of the Tunisian-Libyan border
remains an issue. Gulf Arab states, with Qatar in the lead
and Saudi Arabia in the background, provided crucial
political support for the anti-Qaddafi uprising in Libya,
and can be expected to continue to promote their interests
in the new Libya. GCC states also sought to strengthen the
Moroccan monarchy, inviting it, and Jordan as well, to join
the GCC, and extending promises of generous monetary aid.
In that regard, the visit by Qatar's Crown Prince to Morocco
just one day prior to nation-wide parliamentary elections in
late November was a clear signal of support for King
Muhammad VI. Obviously, the destabilization of either
Morocco or Algeria would have repercussions throughout the
Maghreb and beyond; so would the failure of the victorious
Libyan revolutionaries to establish an orderly government.
Already, there is great concern with the proliferation of
weapons which had been in Qaddafi's warehouses, and have
leaked to a variety of radical Islamist groups, in the Sinai
Peninsula, for example.
SPECIFIC ISSUES
1. Regime Legitimacy. Legitimacy is an extremely slippery
concept, particularly in societies which don't choose their
leaders through competitive elections. Nonetheless, it is
fair to say that the generation which led Maghreb states to
independence and ruled for decades afterwards possessed a
good deal of legitimacy, thanks to their efforts to shake
off colonial rule.
In Algeria, the victorious FLN made their successful
revolutionary struggle central to their governing ideology.
Ironically, it lost its legitimacy at the end of the 1980s,
well before its more conservative pro-Western neighbor in
Tunisia. Even if the regime survived the ensuing horrific
civil strife, it has not regained any kind of real
institutional legitimacy.
In Tunisia, the Ben Ali regime, which came to power in
November 1987 in what essentially constituted a palace coup,
failed to take advantage of the extended period of political
calm and unwritten bargain with the country's middle class
that followed the repression of the Islamist current in
1991. Instead, it squandered its legitimacy by privatizing
the state for the benefit of family and cronies. Following
the Jasmine Revolution, Tunisia is now beginning the long
and difficult process of institutionalizing a new, more
genuinely legitimate government, and renewing the country's
social contract.
In Morocco, the monarchy possesses a special measure of
legitimacy owing to its descent from the Prophet Muhammad,
but it is not immutable and requires continued tending to.
The late King Hasan II sought to remake himself during the
1990s into a more benevolent ruler and promoted incremental
change which included the involvement of traditionally
opposition parties. His son, Muhammad VI, who has ruled
since his father's death in 1999, accelerated the pace of
reform, bolstering his legitimacy among large sections of
the public, even though Morocco's underlying socio-economic
problems remain acute.
In Libya, Muammar Qaddafi initially possessed a good deal of
revolutionary legitimacy, after having overthrown the
Idrissi monarchy in 1969, in a military coup modeled after
Nasser's 1952 coup in Egypt. However, he utterly squandered
his legitimacy through brutal repression and bizarre
behavior, and survived for decades thanks only to his oil
wealth. The new Libyan order is highly uncertain. The
National Transitional Council, and the new interim
government, clearly possesses momentary legitimacy, having
spearheaded the overthrow of Qaddafi, but now it's starting
from scratch. Although elections are scheduled, real regime
legitimacy will only come if Libya is able to somehow build
institutions that will channel, contain, and integrate the
various demands emanating from various portions of society.
Given the centrality of tribal identities in Libya,
establishing a functioning system deemed legitimate by the
majority of the society would seem to depend on attaining
some kind of power and wealth sharing among the tribes.
With Libya awash in weapons, achieving a monopoly on the use
of force would seem to be the first daunting task of the new
authorities.
All Maghreb countries are in various stages of the process
of democratizing, but there is no guarantee that this will
result in genuine democracy. Tunisia is farthest along in
establishing the institutional underpinnings of democracy;
Libya, as mentioned above, is only at the beginning; Morocco
has institutionalized political pluralism and undertaken
constitutional reform, but the monarchy maintains
preponderant power, ruling as well as reigning; Algeria also
possesses a certain degree of democratic form-e.g.,
political parties and a lively press, but real power remains
in the shadows, and the regime has only talked about
liberalizing political life, without acting.
2. The Rising Strength of Islamist Movements. For decades,
Maghreb regimes have employed a variety of means to contain
political Islam. However, as one former Moroccan official
told me a few months ago, "the color of the Arab Spring is
green" [the color of Islam]. What this will mean regarding
state-society relations, the chances of instituting lasting
and genuine democratic forms of government, the relations
between different social and cultural forces, and the impact
of all of this on the foreign policies of Maghreb states,
remains to be seen. In any case, the exact meaning of
growing Islamist power differs in each: Tunisia is the
bellwether; in Libya, the Islamist current is sure to have a
prominent position, and in Morocco, the leader of the legal
Islamist party has now assumed the post of prime minister,
while remaining distinctly subordinate to the Palace. The
Algerian authorities, by contrast, appear determined to keep
their own Islamist genie in the proverbial bottle.
3. The unresolved status of the Western Sahara. Spain
evacuated its Saharan colony in 1976. Morocco's claim to
the territory (it controls more than 80 percent of it) is
contested by the Polisario independence movement, which is
backed by Algeria. The territory's juridical status remains
unresolved, the only such ex-colony anywhere in the world.
While there has not been any fighting for decades,
negotiations remain deadlocked. The issue has been the
single biggest obstacle to achieving the normalization of
Algerian-Moroccan relations, which in turn has inhibited the
promotion of regional economic cooperation and integration,
and left the 5-nation Arab Maghreb Union, which was founded
with great fanfare in 1999, frozen.
4. The need to renew and deepen Euro-Maghreb Relations, in
both the economic and political spheres. The Barcelona
Process, initiated in the mid-1990s was supposed to do just
that, but it quickly foundered. Mutual suspicions and
misunderstandings need to be overcome and new mechanisms for
cooperation to promote economic development in the Maghreb
are vital; failure to do so will have negative
repercussions, which will ultimately be felt on the European
side of the Mediterranean.
According to a leading expert on North African economies,
Francis Ghiles, "faster economic growth able to create
desperately needed jobs is essential for stability. Better
governance, let alone democracy, stands little chance of
taking root in the absence of faster growth." Up until now,
he says, the EU's "Neighborhood Policy" has lacked critical
mass of investment. According to him, there exists a
"colossal investment opportunity" in the energy and mineral
sectors, notably phosphates, plastics and renewal energy,
one which has the potential to build competitiveness in the
region's industry and thus raise its place in the global
economy. Given Europe's poor track record thus far and the
burgeoning crisis in the Euro zone, the prospects for a
major increase in European economic investment in North
Africa would seem to be remote. Still, Europeans were
reminded again by the crises in Tunisia and Libya that
instability in the North Africa will generate accelerated
migration to Europe, something which it very much wants to
avoid. Hence, it is in Europe's own interest to assist in
promoting real economic growth and opportunities in the
Maghreb. Germany's recent announcement that it will grant
$100 million to Tunisia for that purpose would seem to be an
acknowledgement of that fact.
Ghiles also recommends joint industrial ventures between
Moroccan and Algerian state and private companies, for
example, that Sonatrach (Algeria's oil and gas company) and
the Moroccan Phosphates Co. buy into each other's capital,
and that leading banks should do the same. Given the long-
standing suspicion and rivalry between the two countries,
the prospects of this actually happening any time soon would
appear to be extremely unlikely
5. The question of language. Language serves as one of the
foundations of political and national identity the world
over. Yet, one of North Africa's particular features is the
existence of several languages spoken in each country.
Although Arabic is the official language, Tamazight (Berber)
and French are widely used as well. Paradoxically, Berber
dialects are more widely spoken in Morocco than among
Algeria's more overtly politicized Berber communities.
French, of course, remains the language of commerce and
science, and is spoken by millions across the region, in
spite of the fact that French was often viewed in the post-
colonial period as an unfortunate relic of the pre-
independence period. The rise of Berber culture movements,
which unceasingly demand that Tamazight be recognized as an
official national language alongside Arabic, adds another
dimension to the complicated North African linguistic
landscape.
DEVELOPMENTS BY COUNTRY
Tunisia
A few background observations regarding Tunisia's particular
cocktail of factors that have shaped its past and present
are in order. Twenty years ago, Samuel Huntington had
identified Tunisia as the most likely candidate among Arab
states to join the "third wave" of democratization among
thirty previously non-democratic states. Tunisia's
"democratic potential" included its historically rooted,
well-defined national identity, socially and territorially
(Tunisians, in Ernest Gellner's memorable phrase, seem
"comfortable in their own skin"); its relatively strong
educated middle class, achievements in promoting the status
of women, and relatively non-traumatic colonial experience,
which further deepened Tunisia's already existing openness
to Mediterranean cross-currents; and a small, non-
politicized military. An additional element in this mix is
the fact that under its first president, Habib Bourguiba,
Tunisia managed to maintain a healthy distance from radical
pan-Arab currents being promoted by Egypt's Gamal Abdel
Nasser and others during the 1950s and 1960s. At the same
time, Tunisia's heritage and social underpinnings were an
integral part of the Arab-Islamic milieu. Taken together,
these elements produced what the political scientist Larbi
Sadiki refers to as Tunisia's "syncretism", which heralds,
in his view, good tidings for Tunisia's emerging, albeit
still fragile democracy. While being careful not to
idealize Tunisia's particular synthesis or its achievements,
one can hardly dismiss them either.
Election Day has now come and gone in Tunisia, marking the
end of the first transitional phase of the post-Ben Ali era
and the beginning of another. The achievements during the
initial interim period were considerable; the challenges
facing the Tunisian polity in the coming period are even
more formidable. Much will depend on how the leadership of
Tunisia's newly empowered political parties conduct
themselves: they are charged with fashioning a viable
institutional framework that will enable the country's
centripetal forces to outweigh its centrifugal ones.
Maintaining political and social stability will also require
signs that Tunisia's economic difficulties are being
ameliorated. Of course, all eyes are focused on Ennahda,
Tunisia's long-repressed Islamist movement, and the big
winner in the elections for a Constituent Assembly charged
with writing a new constitution for the country and
appointing an interim government.
Ennahda's decisive victory (41 percent; 89 seats in the 217-
person assembly), enabled its Secretary-General, Hamadi
Jebali, to be chosen as prime minister for the new interim
government, and confirmed anew that Islamist movements are
among the prime beneficiaries of the "Arab Spring"
upheavals. Guided by Rashid al-Ghannoushi,. Ennahda has
long contended that it is genuinely committed to democracy
and dialogue with other social forces, as it promotes a
modernist-Islamist synthesis, modeled, it says, after
Turkey's ruling AKP party. Sadiki characterizes Ennahda's
worldview as "soft Islamism." This includes a commitment to
maintaining the rights of Tunisian women as laid down by
Tunisia's personal status law, which among other things is
the only one in the Arab world which explicitly bans
polygamy, in contradiction to Islamic law. Nonetheless,
Ennahda's campaign also employed unabashed appeals to
religious sentiment, and with great effect. And when it
comes to hot button, populist issues like the Arab-Israeli
conflict, Ghannoushi's language has been harsh, and even
anti-Semitic, and full of praise for suicide bombers and for
Hamas's strategic goal of eliminating Israel.
Ennahda's decisive victory was due not only to its
popularity and cohesiveness, but also to the splits within
the secular-left camp, which gained nearly as many votes.
What happens now? Ennahda's post-election press briefing was
a model of consensus, emphasizing its commitment to
democratic principles and its wish to cooperate with all
political parties, trade unions and other civil society
bodies, praising the country's civil servants, whose skills
were vitally needed as the country moved forward, and
reassuring international markets and actors. For their part,
two of the three secular left parties (CPR, which won 29
seats, and Ettakol, which won 20 seats) proclaimed their
willingness to work with Ennahda in establishing the new
interim governing authority and beginning the work on the
new constitution. Indeed, the CRP's long-time human rights
advocate, Moncef Marzouk, has been named interim president
of the country, and Ettakol's Mustapha Ben Jaafar the
Speaker of the Constituent Assembly Given the differing
world views on a host of issues, establishing a sustained
working relationship will be no mean feat. There is no
precedent for such a durable secular left-Islamist alliance
anywhere in the region.
Paradoxically, it thus appears that Tunisia has embarked on
a path of more genuine democratization and Islamization.
Amitai Etzioni terms the likely outcome as being a kind of
"Islamocracy," i.e., the combining of democratic
institutions and an active civil society, with some
influence of Islamic law and norms on political and social
life. The struggle to determining what that exact
combination will be promises to be the central issue shaping
Tunisia's democratization experiment. Ennahda now has the
chance to prove that Islamist movements are not, by
definition, antithetical to democratic norms. But the path
is also strewn with obstacles. The bargaining and
compromises which will be required to maintain a broad-based
government and achieving an agreed upon constitutional
framework is likely to be difficult at times for Ennahda and
even more so for its secular coalition partners,
particularly since some of the latter's supporters already
believe that Ennahda is just dissimulating in it proclaimed
fidelity to democracy and the equality of women. In
addition, the actions of a small but provocative salafi
current, which attacks Ennahda for not being sufficiently
"Islamic" has already demonstrated its ability to polarize
society. Nor does the democracy "bounce" of legitimacy
conferred by the elections have an unlimited time frame.
People, particularly the young and unemployed, will want to
see a real change for the better in their everyday lives.
Developing viable economic policies that can begin providing
solutions to its frustrated youthful population will be the
new government's first order of business. Unfortunately, the
economy is experiencing a slowdown, marked by a fall in
exports, investments and tourism, a rise in the current
deficit to 5/7 percent of the GDP, and a fall in hard
currency reserves. The annual growth rate for 2011 is
expected to be 0 percent.
As for the region, Islamist movements and more liberal
advocates of reform were cheered by Tunisia's successful
elections, albeit not always for the same reasons. But while
Tunisia can serve as an inspiration for those in the Arab
world who seek to replace decades of dictatorship with a
democratic regime responsive to people's needs, the
conditions for actually replicating the Tunisian experience
do not exist elsewhere, as recent events in Egypt have
shown.
Libya
In terms of political cohesion and a legacy of "stateness,"
Libya is the polar opposite of Tunisia, possessing very
little of either. The country is currently awash in
weapons, and tribal and factional militias are reluctant to
give them up. The new transitional government contains no
one from the long-marginalized Amazigh community of western
Libya, which played an important role in the war to
overthrow Qaddafi and is clamoring for linguistic and
cultural recognition, and representation at the center so as
to end the decades of deliberate neglect by Qaddafi. There
is significant Islamist sentiment in the NTC; Libyan
Islamists resemble the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the
Salafi current far more than the Turkish Islamist AKP part.
Its insistence on the centrality of the Sharia in the new
Libya has already provoked controversy. Elections have been
scheduled to be held in 8 months' time, and it is hard to
imagine that the process will be orderly. Of course,
controlling the country's oil resources will be the key to
any regime's success, and the involvement of European
powers, the prime consumers of Libyan oil, can be expected.
Morocco
Morocco has thus far dodged upheaval, in spite of the fact
that the country suffers from many of the same underlying
ills that have driven the protests elsewhere-corruption,
poverty, and unemployment; the overwhelming concentration of
wealth in the hands of a small stratum of elite families
intertwined with the authorities; the absence of real
democracy; and closed horizons for its large, youthful
population, suffering from disproportionately high rates of
unemployment and underemployment.
The events in Tunisia and Egypt at the beginning of 2011
were keenly watched in Morocco. Like-minded Facebook protest
groups quickly sprang up among Morocco's Internet-savvy,
mostly politically unaffiliated twenty-something generation.
Unlike their counterparts to the east, their target was not
the "regime, (i.e., the monarch), but the corrupt elites who
benefited from the existing state of affairs.
While mild compared to upheavals in the rest of the region,
the February protests raised the specter of Morocco going
down the same road as so many other Arab states and unnerved
the authorities. From the beginning, and right through the
first half of 2011, the government adopted a multi-pronged
strategy: proactive measures designed to appease popular
frustration with economic conditions (e.g., increasing state
subsidies on basic goods, raising salaries for civil
servants, promising government jobs for recent university
graduates); proclaiming the right of peaceful protests to go
forward while simultaneously working to discredit the
protestors; and using occasional police violence to
intimidate demonstrators.
Most importantly, though, was Mohamed VI's very public
promise of sweeping reforms in an effort to quell the
protests. The centerpiece was the promulgation of a new
constitution that somewhat enhanced the powers of the prime
minister and parliament, while leaving preponderant power in
the hands of the king. A nation-wide referendum confirmed
the adoption of the constitution in early July. This was
followed by the holding of parliamentary elections in late
November. The government was determined that the elections
be a success, and made it very difficult for the advocates
of a boycott to disseminate their message. Still voter
turnout was far lower than it was for the constitutional
referendum in July (45 percent to 97 percent, according to
official, and most likely inflated figures). The low
turnout, and the high number of non-registered eligible
voters, points to a high degree of cynicism and apathy among
Moroccan voters.
The achievement of the Islamist PJD party-coming in first,
winning 107 seats out of a total of 395-was consistent with,
and influenced by developments in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt.
In addition, voters were tired of the same old parliamentary
faces and the country's widespread corruption: by contrast,
the PJD, having been in opposition since its first
appearance in 1997, is untainted, and many voters clearly
wanted to try something else. Paradoxically, the win further
legitimized the monarchy and its top-down reform process.
The PJD's win seemed to be genuine, as the authorities
seemed to have neither sought to block it nor promote it,
allowing the authorities to point to it as additional proof
of its desire to see the system evolve, and to the success
of its strategy. Given that the Palace will continued to
hold preponderant power, the PJD will be challenged to
advance its core principles dealing with the Islamization of
society, as well as its promises to combat poverty and
corruption.
Overall, Muhamad VI has bought further time with his latest
measures, and Morocco does not appear to be on the verge of
major unrest, but there are obviously no guarantees
regarding the future.
Algeria
Algeria has always been unique in the North African
pantheon: possessing a pre-colonial past of being far less
cohesive than Tunisia and Morocco; having the first to be
colonized by France, and in the most thorough-going and
socially destructive manner; experiencing the most violent
and bloody, by far, of the independence struggles; having
vast hydrocarbon resources; and being the first post-
independence regime to lose its legitimacy, resulting in the
end of the army-single party regime and a sudden democratic
explosion followed by a horrific implosion, as the regime's
military-security core beat back an armed Islamist challenge
during the 1990s, at great cost in lives. Since then, the
authorities have sought to establish a veneer of civilian,
multiparty rule and a pluralist process which would provide
legitimacy, while real power remained concentrated in the
shadows, in the hands of a military-security cabal and its
civilian allies, with corruption being rampant.
Algeria is a rich country with many poor and frustrated
people. It is the world's fourth-largest exporter of natural
gas but the central bank recently announced that one-quarter
of the country's 35 million people live under the poverty
line.
The regional upheaval has reverberated in Algeria too. The
country witnesses almost constant protests on a variety of
issues-housing, environmental degradation, lack of water,
housing, electricity or calling for higher wages, etc.
These are often put down forcibly, leading protestors to
compare the authorities' heavy handed violence to France's
behavior in 1950s (a dubious comparison, but the fact that
it is made shows how little legitimacy the regime has).
Until now, however, the widespread anger of ordinary people
over bread and butter issues has not coalesced into a united
call for change. The ordinary Algerian is often just as
suspicious of opposition politicians and democracy activists
as of the authorities. Moreover, having experienced the
horrors of civil strife in the 1990s, many are either
exhausted or unwilling to risk renewed instability and
upheaval.
Like his counterparts elsewhere, Algeria's president
Bouteflika responded to the initial protests by promising
political reform, beginning with the end of the state of
emergency and a freer media. He also extended key subsidies
and boosting wages for the police, army, government
employees and health workers. But concrete reform in the
political field has been absent. Parliament is supposedly
set to vote on a law at the end of December that would
facilitate the creation of parties (dozens are reportedly
waiting approval), while banning ex-Islamic Salvation Front
members from forming a party. (The FIS's electoral successes
in 1990-91 led to the military's cancellation of the
electoral process and the prolonged strife of the 1990s.)
Given the general opaqueness about the inner workings of the
power structures in the country, rumors abound:
Bouteflika's illness (cancer), is worsening, according to
one report. The military has tried, and may try again to
replace him, says another.
Regarding regional issues, Qaddafi's overthrow distressed
Algeria, for it feared (and fears) that its own Islamist
opposition will be emboldened. Algeria is fighting against a
low-level Islamist insurgency, and after 9-11 successfully
rebranded itself as a vital partner to the West in the "war
on terror." Similarly, it is quite distressed over the
events in Syria, and the possible collapse of the Syrian
regime.
Overall, Algeria would seem to be the next prime candidate
for upheaval. It has not been proactive in the reform
process, unlike Morocco, and the public's grievances are
multiple, and genuine. But, as elsewhere, nothing is
certain.
CONCLUSION
To sum up: the old pattern of complete domination by Maghreb
regimes over their societies has been shaken. Two regimes
have been toppled, a third has been compelled to initiate
reform measures, and a fourth is talking about doing so, but
has not yet acted. Islamist forces have risen to the center
of political life (apart from Algeria), while the
consequences differ from country to country. Liberal forces
are present throughout and, while not in the majority and on
the defensive, are not inconsequential. Berber ethnic-
cultural identity has now been recognized officially in
Morocco, and the revived Amazigh current in Libya has been
vocal in demanding recognition. Renewed unrest in Algeria is
likely to include a Kabyle-Amazigh dimension, as it did a
decade ago. Tunisia is best positioned, by far, to achieve
an institutionalization of a democratic political order, but
even there the road will be rocky. Western nations,
especially Europe, have an enormous stake in the evolving
political and social order of Maghreb states, but have not
developed an overall economic and political strategy to
guide its policies and advance their interests. The United
States has a stake in the Maghreb's evolution as well, and
is currently emphasizing the importance of continued
democratization in a way that would ensure the protection of
women and minority rights and the rule of law.
Economically, too, the U.S. is promoting a variety of
development programs, but by themselves will hardly be
sufficient. The U.S. appears to be supportive of the active
role being taken by its Gulf Arab allies in the region, even
if they themselves are hardly democratic. For the time
being, however, their overriding common geopolitical
interests, first and foremost vis-…-vis Iran, outweigh any
differences that they might have regarding the value of
democracy. In any case, the GCC states were keen to see
Qaddafi overthrown, and the U.S. quickly lined up with them
and with Britain and France on the issue; the GCC is a
strong supporter of the Moroccan monarchy, as is the United
States; and is keen to see Sunni Islamist parties achieve
greater prominence through the ballot box. On this last
point, the U.S. Administration has apparently accommodated
itself to the reality that democratization and increased
Islamist political influence go hand in hand, and prefers it
to the previous authoritarian status quo in the region.
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Author's Note
The analysis draws on recent articles in Middle East
Quarterly
http://www.meforum.org/2977/tunisia-after-revolution
http://www.meforum.org/3114/morocco-upheaval
Euromesco Briefs:
http://www.euromesco.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=a
rticle&id=1271%3Aeuromesco-brief-19-tunisia-the-next-phase-
&catid=62%3Aeuromesco-briefs&Itemid=49&lang=fr
The Jerusalem Report: http://www.dayan.org/frameana.htm
Change and Opportunities in the Emerging Mediterranean
(Stephen Calleya and Monica Wohlfield, eds;
Malta, Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies,
forthcoming
an FPRI E-Note on Tunisia in January 2011:
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201101.maddy-weitzman.tunisia.html
the preface to my co-edited volume, The Maghreb in the New
Century (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2007);
and my book, The Berber Identity Movement and the Challenge
to North African States (Austin: University of Texas Press,
2011).
----------------------------------------------------------
Copyright Foreign Policy Research Institute
(http://www.fpri.org/).
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