From FPRI:
~MIDDLE EAST MEDIA MONITOR~
QARADAWI'S RETURN AND ISLAMIC LEADERSHIP IN EGYPT
by Aaron Rock
March 18, 2011
Middle East Media Monitor is a new FPRI E-Note series,
designed to review once a month a current topic from the
perspective of the foreign language press in such countries
as Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, and Turkey. These articles
will focus on providing FPRI's readership with an inside
view on how some of the most important countries in the
Middle East are covering issues of importance to the
American foreign policy community.
Aaron Rock is a Foreign Language and Area Studies Fellow in
Princeton University's Department of Near Eastern Studies,
where he is pursuing a Ph.D. His research focuses on Islamic
religious authority in twenty to twenty-first century Egypt.
Available on the web and in pdf format at:
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201103.rock.egypt.html
~MIDDLE EAST MEDIA MONITOR~
QARADAWI'S RETURN AND ISLAMIC LEADERSHIP IN EGYPT
by Aaron Rock
The revolution in Egypt has raised the specter of an
Islamist takeover and theocratic rule, a repetition of the
1979 Islamic revolution in Iran in which Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini rose to power. Such fears were worsened by the
triumphant return to Egypt of Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the
most prominent Sunni scholar in the Arab world with
longstanding ties to the Muslim Brotherhood. Yet, the
Egyptian press, for the most part, has not drawn this
parallel.
This essay will analyze the Egyptian centrist daily al-Masri
al-Yom's coverage of two key moves by Qaradawi that evoke
parallels with Khomeini's return to Tehran in 1979: his
February 18 Friday sermon which drew three million Egyptians
to Tahrir Square, and his "death fatwa" three days later
against Libyan dictator, Muammar Gaddafi. It will explore
both how Qaradawi's actions injected an "Islamic" vision
into the revolution, and why his actions were not perceived
as reflecting theocratic ambitions.
Qaradawi is a product of al-Azhar University, which is
located in Cairo and is a premier center of Islamic
scholarship in the Arab world. He received his Master's
degree in Quranic studies in 1960 and his doctorate in 1973.
Yet, Qaradawi was not just a scholar; he was also a
political activist of the Muslim Brotherhood. This activism
prompted Gamal Nasser to arrest him on several occasions. In
response, Qaradawi left Egypt for Qatar in 1961, remaining
there until the revolution. Yet, exile did not produce
alienation. During the last half-century, Qaradawi
maintained his ties to the Brotherhood, and his theoretical
vision of how an "Islamic" state would function is a key
source of the Brotherhood's political vision today.
The influence Qaradawi's enjoys extends beyond the
Brotherhood and Egypt. In Qatar, he has built a successful
career and has become arguably the most prominent Sunni
scholar in the Arab world-and perhaps beyond. He is the
President of the International Union of Islamic Scholars
(al-Itihad al-'Alami li'l 'Ulama al-Muslimin) and the
European Council for Fatwa and Research. While Qaradawi's
scholarly credentials are widely acknowledged, he has also
pioneered online "Islamic" media. He hosts the most popular
"Islamic" talk show, Al-Sharia' wa al-Haya' (Sharia and
Life) and leads the high volume website "Islam Online." In
short, he possesses both the credibility and media savvy to
influence both scholarly and political debates.
Qaradawi's success suggests that he has situated himself
within the mainstream of the Arab world, yet his ideas defy
painting him as a "moderate" or "radical." On the one hand,
he rejects Islamic "extremism," supports dialogue with non-
Muslims, and argues that democracy is the best existing
political system. On the other hand, he supports suicide
bombings against all Israelis, including women and children.
He has also declared Shi'ites to be "heretics" (mubtadi'un).
His February 18 sermon was a hybrid of religious vision and
nationalist concerns.[1] He began by altering a formulaic
element of the opening of the Friday sermon by addressing
both Muslims and Christians. He then proceeded to analyze
the failures of the Mubarak regime and called for a civil
state (dawla madaniyya)[2], the lifting of the Emergency law
(in effect since Anwar al-Sadat's 1981 assassination), and
the freeing of political prisoners. Yet, his sermon was also
deeply inflected by specifically Islamic religious language
and imagery. He declared that "Tahrir square should be
renamed the Square of the Martyrs of January 25th" and that
the revolution was not just a "victory over Mubarak_but
[also a victory] over oppression (dhulm), falsehood (batil),
[and] thieves (sarika)_." While the frames of martyrdom,
oppression and falsehood are not uniquely Islamic, their
political usage comes out of the struggle of Egypt's
Islamist opposition, both violent and non-violent. They
paint a binary between freedom, truth and ethics on the one
hand and oppression, tyranny and theft on the other. Three
days later, Qaradawi's opposition to oppression and
falsehood was put into practice. He argued that Gaddafi's
despotism was a sin against God, and that, because there is
"no obedience to the created one [i.e. man] in sinning
against the Creator," Gaddafi's blood was licit. He then,
quite animatedly, called on any Libyan soldier "to neither
listen nor obey" (aleh yasma'u wa le yuti'u) and stated: "I
issue a fatwa (ufti) to the officers and troops who are able
to kill Mu'mar al-Qadaffi_.to do so."[3]
The parallels between Khomeini and Qaradawi are striking.
Both returned from exile to galvanize a revolution through
powerful religious imagery and tropes that depict the former
regime as an affront to God. Both were successful in
animating the masses, In addition, Qaradawi, like Khomeini
before him, appeared to be angling for a leadership role
within the revolution. Finally, no transnational "death
Fatwa" has been issued by a prominent Islamic scholar since
1989 when Khomeini declared British novelist Salman
Rushdie's blood licit for his book, Satanic Verses. Yet,
notwithstanding these similarities, the parallels are not
exact. Qaradawi has never articulated a vision of Islamic
leadership that is theocratic, whereas Khomeini's Vilayet
al-Faqih (Guardianship of the Jurists) was fundamentally
theocratic. Moreover, Qaradawi, unlike Khomeini, is not
considered a candidate for political office.
Nonetheless, al-Masri al-Yom seemingly ignored the parallels
that do exist between Khomeini and Qaradawi. The newspaper
praised Qaradawi in a February 19 editorial titled, "Al-
Qaradawi, in one of the Greatest Speeches of the Modern Age,
Asserts the Continuation of the Revolution." The editorial
proceeded to compare this speech to famous orations by such
figures as Martin Luther King, Mahatma Ghandi and Nelson
Mandela.[4] It declared that Qaradawi's sermon was "not just
to the millions in Tahrir square, but also to all Egyptians,
Arabs, Muslims and the world, so that it will know what true
Islam is." It declared that any parallels with Khomeini
were absurd because "Khomeini returned to rule and erect a
religious state, whereas al-Qaradawi returned to express the
revolution of the Egyptian people, Muslim and Christian, for
the sake of the building of a civil state_" Following
Qaradawi's February 21 fatwa, the paper's editorial
page-known for its diversity-overlooked the parallel between
Khomeini and Qaradawi in their "death Fatwas." Indeed, the
only response in the paper to this fatwa was an approving
cartoon by Jamal al-Sharbini in which Qaradawi says "We
permit the spilling of al-Qadaffi's blood in response to the
killing of protestors" and a questioner asks, "But what
about Mubarak and the blood of the martyrs of January 25th
2011?"[5]
How should we understand this "non-reaction" to the
parallels between Qaradawi and Khomeini? How should we
understand al-Masri al-Yom's coverage? While there
certainly were reactions in Egypt that drew this parallel-an
editorial in Al-Akhbar al-Kubtiya (Coptic News) was titled,
"The Khomeini of Egypt"-this was not the dominant reaction.
Instead, the "Islamization" of the national narrative by
Qaradawi was largely accepted as unproblematic by non-
Islamists such as the editorial board of al-Masri al-Yom.
Indeed, it was mimicked, in key respects, in the paper's
coverage. For example, the editorial piece which praised
Qaradawi's sermon, like its subject, assumed an Islamic
frame for a national event. It compared Tahrir Square to the
Ka'ba in Mecca, but this Ka'ba was one of "Muslims and
Christians, drawing close to God to bless their revolution
for justice and freedom."
A useful way to understand an "Islam" that is not "Islamism"
is to distinguish between "public" and "political" Islam.
Both emerged out of the Islamic modernist movement of late
nineteenth-early twentieth century Egypt which was led by
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh. "Public Islam"
concerns itself with "practical considerations of public
welfare and social justice" while "Political Islam" has been
understood as focusing on "issues of rulers' legitimacy" [6]
and on political rule. In light of the latter's grassroots
Islamization/culturalization project (Aslama/Tathqif),
though, the two can overlap substantially. As for Qaradawi,
he has long been understood to be a representative of
"public" Islam and revered as such. Moreover, a shared
conception of "public Islam" emerged in Qaradawi's claims to
Islamic/nationalist legitimacy and the unproblematic
acceptance of this "frame" by the editorial board of al-
Masri al-Yom.
Post-revolution, though, the political sphere has suddenly
been opened up to the Muslim Brotherhood, of which Qaradawi
is a one-time member and for which he is an intellectual
inspiration. Qaradawi now faces a choice of how far to
venture into the new possibilities that have emerged in
Egypt. While his incentives to take a leading role in the
Brotherhood are unclear -he is 84 years old and has already
been offered and turned down the post of General Guide on
several occasions -will he make a shift to issues of
political debate, such as the role of Sharia in Egypt's
legal system or more broadly of the state in creating an
"Islamic" environment? Will he lend his charisma to the
Brotherhood's political efforts? Or will he remain as a
constellation in his own right-tied to the Brotherhood, Al-
Azhar and an international network of Islamic scholars-and
continue to pursue the issues of public welfare and social
justice on which he has built his following? If he
explicitly enters politics, his success would depend on the
Egyptian public's willingness to follow him.
What does this debate reveal about a Revolution largely
described as "secular," one in which the Brotherhood has
played a role but not the dominant one? Is there a
meaningful long-term difference between "public" and
"political" Islam? While the two visions are certainly not
mutually exclusive, Qaradawi drew millions to Tahrir Square
because he is an icon of "public" Islam. Neither Qaradawi's
popularity nor his rhetoric should distract from the fact
that Egyptian revolution's grievances were based on a desire
for political liberty and economic opportunity. That said,
Islam remains an important framework for public debate and a
reservoir of political symbolism. Accordingly, Qaradawi's
return indicates neither a theocratic turn nor the all-
encompassing "Islamization" of the revolution. Instead, it
underlines the power of religious leadership and language
that will remain important components of any popularly-
legitimate democratic transition in Egypt. Future policy
towards Egypt must resist the temptation to attempt to
decouple "Islam" from political and economic grievances;
rather, it should focus on creating the institutions through
which those grievances can be successfully pursued.
OF RELATED INTEREST
Islam and Islamism Today: The Case of Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, by
Samuel Helfont, FPRI E-Notes, January 2010
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201001.helfonts.islammodernityqaradawi.html
----------------------------------------------------------
Notes
[1] For video of the sermon, see
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Haxwcqa2btA.
[2] As distinguished from a theocracy; Qaradawi still
supports a state which acts as a moral force in creating the
conditions in which Islam can be realized in practice. For
more information, see Bruce K. Rutherford, Egypt after
Mubarak: Liberalism, Islam, and Democracy in the Arab World
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 122.
[3] For video of the fatwa, see
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2bMNmLvAk9k
[4] Al-Masri al-Yom, "Al-Qaradawi, in one of the Greatest
Speechs of the Modern Era, Asserts the Continuation of the
Revolution" (Al-Qaradawi, fi Ihda A'azham Khutub al-Asr
Yu'akid Istimrar al-Thawra), al-Masri al-Yom, February 19,
2011, p. 16.
[5] Jamal Al-Sharbini, "The Fatwa Which Makes Qadaffi's
Blood Licit: Is it an Exclusive Fatwa?" (Fatwa Ihdir Dam al-
Qadaffi_.Hal hiya Fatwa Khususi?)" al-Masri al-Yom, online
edition www.almasryalyoum.com/node/326261
[6] Armando Salvatore, "Qaradawi's Maslaha" in Graff,
Bettina and Jacob Skovgaard-Petersen, eds. Global Mufti: The
Phenomenon of Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2009), p. 247.
----------------------------------------------------------
Copyright Foreign Policy Research Institute
(http://www.fpri.org/).
~MIDDLE EAST MEDIA MONITOR~
QARADAWI'S RETURN AND ISLAMIC LEADERSHIP IN EGYPT
by Aaron Rock
March 18, 2011
Middle East Media Monitor is a new FPRI E-Note series,
designed to review once a month a current topic from the
perspective of the foreign language press in such countries
as Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, and Turkey. These articles
will focus on providing FPRI's readership with an inside
view on how some of the most important countries in the
Middle East are covering issues of importance to the
American foreign policy community.
Aaron Rock is a Foreign Language and Area Studies Fellow in
Princeton University's Department of Near Eastern Studies,
where he is pursuing a Ph.D. His research focuses on Islamic
religious authority in twenty to twenty-first century Egypt.
Available on the web and in pdf format at:
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201103.rock.egypt.html
~MIDDLE EAST MEDIA MONITOR~
QARADAWI'S RETURN AND ISLAMIC LEADERSHIP IN EGYPT
by Aaron Rock
The revolution in Egypt has raised the specter of an
Islamist takeover and theocratic rule, a repetition of the
1979 Islamic revolution in Iran in which Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini rose to power. Such fears were worsened by the
triumphant return to Egypt of Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the
most prominent Sunni scholar in the Arab world with
longstanding ties to the Muslim Brotherhood. Yet, the
Egyptian press, for the most part, has not drawn this
parallel.
This essay will analyze the Egyptian centrist daily al-Masri
al-Yom's coverage of two key moves by Qaradawi that evoke
parallels with Khomeini's return to Tehran in 1979: his
February 18 Friday sermon which drew three million Egyptians
to Tahrir Square, and his "death fatwa" three days later
against Libyan dictator, Muammar Gaddafi. It will explore
both how Qaradawi's actions injected an "Islamic" vision
into the revolution, and why his actions were not perceived
as reflecting theocratic ambitions.
Qaradawi is a product of al-Azhar University, which is
located in Cairo and is a premier center of Islamic
scholarship in the Arab world. He received his Master's
degree in Quranic studies in 1960 and his doctorate in 1973.
Yet, Qaradawi was not just a scholar; he was also a
political activist of the Muslim Brotherhood. This activism
prompted Gamal Nasser to arrest him on several occasions. In
response, Qaradawi left Egypt for Qatar in 1961, remaining
there until the revolution. Yet, exile did not produce
alienation. During the last half-century, Qaradawi
maintained his ties to the Brotherhood, and his theoretical
vision of how an "Islamic" state would function is a key
source of the Brotherhood's political vision today.
The influence Qaradawi's enjoys extends beyond the
Brotherhood and Egypt. In Qatar, he has built a successful
career and has become arguably the most prominent Sunni
scholar in the Arab world-and perhaps beyond. He is the
President of the International Union of Islamic Scholars
(al-Itihad al-'Alami li'l 'Ulama al-Muslimin) and the
European Council for Fatwa and Research. While Qaradawi's
scholarly credentials are widely acknowledged, he has also
pioneered online "Islamic" media. He hosts the most popular
"Islamic" talk show, Al-Sharia' wa al-Haya' (Sharia and
Life) and leads the high volume website "Islam Online." In
short, he possesses both the credibility and media savvy to
influence both scholarly and political debates.
Qaradawi's success suggests that he has situated himself
within the mainstream of the Arab world, yet his ideas defy
painting him as a "moderate" or "radical." On the one hand,
he rejects Islamic "extremism," supports dialogue with non-
Muslims, and argues that democracy is the best existing
political system. On the other hand, he supports suicide
bombings against all Israelis, including women and children.
He has also declared Shi'ites to be "heretics" (mubtadi'un).
His February 18 sermon was a hybrid of religious vision and
nationalist concerns.[1] He began by altering a formulaic
element of the opening of the Friday sermon by addressing
both Muslims and Christians. He then proceeded to analyze
the failures of the Mubarak regime and called for a civil
state (dawla madaniyya)[2], the lifting of the Emergency law
(in effect since Anwar al-Sadat's 1981 assassination), and
the freeing of political prisoners. Yet, his sermon was also
deeply inflected by specifically Islamic religious language
and imagery. He declared that "Tahrir square should be
renamed the Square of the Martyrs of January 25th" and that
the revolution was not just a "victory over Mubarak_but
[also a victory] over oppression (dhulm), falsehood (batil),
[and] thieves (sarika)_." While the frames of martyrdom,
oppression and falsehood are not uniquely Islamic, their
political usage comes out of the struggle of Egypt's
Islamist opposition, both violent and non-violent. They
paint a binary between freedom, truth and ethics on the one
hand and oppression, tyranny and theft on the other. Three
days later, Qaradawi's opposition to oppression and
falsehood was put into practice. He argued that Gaddafi's
despotism was a sin against God, and that, because there is
"no obedience to the created one [i.e. man] in sinning
against the Creator," Gaddafi's blood was licit. He then,
quite animatedly, called on any Libyan soldier "to neither
listen nor obey" (aleh yasma'u wa le yuti'u) and stated: "I
issue a fatwa (ufti) to the officers and troops who are able
to kill Mu'mar al-Qadaffi_.to do so."[3]
The parallels between Khomeini and Qaradawi are striking.
Both returned from exile to galvanize a revolution through
powerful religious imagery and tropes that depict the former
regime as an affront to God. Both were successful in
animating the masses, In addition, Qaradawi, like Khomeini
before him, appeared to be angling for a leadership role
within the revolution. Finally, no transnational "death
Fatwa" has been issued by a prominent Islamic scholar since
1989 when Khomeini declared British novelist Salman
Rushdie's blood licit for his book, Satanic Verses. Yet,
notwithstanding these similarities, the parallels are not
exact. Qaradawi has never articulated a vision of Islamic
leadership that is theocratic, whereas Khomeini's Vilayet
al-Faqih (Guardianship of the Jurists) was fundamentally
theocratic. Moreover, Qaradawi, unlike Khomeini, is not
considered a candidate for political office.
Nonetheless, al-Masri al-Yom seemingly ignored the parallels
that do exist between Khomeini and Qaradawi. The newspaper
praised Qaradawi in a February 19 editorial titled, "Al-
Qaradawi, in one of the Greatest Speeches of the Modern Age,
Asserts the Continuation of the Revolution." The editorial
proceeded to compare this speech to famous orations by such
figures as Martin Luther King, Mahatma Ghandi and Nelson
Mandela.[4] It declared that Qaradawi's sermon was "not just
to the millions in Tahrir square, but also to all Egyptians,
Arabs, Muslims and the world, so that it will know what true
Islam is." It declared that any parallels with Khomeini
were absurd because "Khomeini returned to rule and erect a
religious state, whereas al-Qaradawi returned to express the
revolution of the Egyptian people, Muslim and Christian, for
the sake of the building of a civil state_" Following
Qaradawi's February 21 fatwa, the paper's editorial
page-known for its diversity-overlooked the parallel between
Khomeini and Qaradawi in their "death Fatwas." Indeed, the
only response in the paper to this fatwa was an approving
cartoon by Jamal al-Sharbini in which Qaradawi says "We
permit the spilling of al-Qadaffi's blood in response to the
killing of protestors" and a questioner asks, "But what
about Mubarak and the blood of the martyrs of January 25th
2011?"[5]
How should we understand this "non-reaction" to the
parallels between Qaradawi and Khomeini? How should we
understand al-Masri al-Yom's coverage? While there
certainly were reactions in Egypt that drew this parallel-an
editorial in Al-Akhbar al-Kubtiya (Coptic News) was titled,
"The Khomeini of Egypt"-this was not the dominant reaction.
Instead, the "Islamization" of the national narrative by
Qaradawi was largely accepted as unproblematic by non-
Islamists such as the editorial board of al-Masri al-Yom.
Indeed, it was mimicked, in key respects, in the paper's
coverage. For example, the editorial piece which praised
Qaradawi's sermon, like its subject, assumed an Islamic
frame for a national event. It compared Tahrir Square to the
Ka'ba in Mecca, but this Ka'ba was one of "Muslims and
Christians, drawing close to God to bless their revolution
for justice and freedom."
A useful way to understand an "Islam" that is not "Islamism"
is to distinguish between "public" and "political" Islam.
Both emerged out of the Islamic modernist movement of late
nineteenth-early twentieth century Egypt which was led by
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh. "Public Islam"
concerns itself with "practical considerations of public
welfare and social justice" while "Political Islam" has been
understood as focusing on "issues of rulers' legitimacy" [6]
and on political rule. In light of the latter's grassroots
Islamization/culturalization project (Aslama/Tathqif),
though, the two can overlap substantially. As for Qaradawi,
he has long been understood to be a representative of
"public" Islam and revered as such. Moreover, a shared
conception of "public Islam" emerged in Qaradawi's claims to
Islamic/nationalist legitimacy and the unproblematic
acceptance of this "frame" by the editorial board of al-
Masri al-Yom.
Post-revolution, though, the political sphere has suddenly
been opened up to the Muslim Brotherhood, of which Qaradawi
is a one-time member and for which he is an intellectual
inspiration. Qaradawi now faces a choice of how far to
venture into the new possibilities that have emerged in
Egypt. While his incentives to take a leading role in the
Brotherhood are unclear -he is 84 years old and has already
been offered and turned down the post of General Guide on
several occasions -will he make a shift to issues of
political debate, such as the role of Sharia in Egypt's
legal system or more broadly of the state in creating an
"Islamic" environment? Will he lend his charisma to the
Brotherhood's political efforts? Or will he remain as a
constellation in his own right-tied to the Brotherhood, Al-
Azhar and an international network of Islamic scholars-and
continue to pursue the issues of public welfare and social
justice on which he has built his following? If he
explicitly enters politics, his success would depend on the
Egyptian public's willingness to follow him.
What does this debate reveal about a Revolution largely
described as "secular," one in which the Brotherhood has
played a role but not the dominant one? Is there a
meaningful long-term difference between "public" and
"political" Islam? While the two visions are certainly not
mutually exclusive, Qaradawi drew millions to Tahrir Square
because he is an icon of "public" Islam. Neither Qaradawi's
popularity nor his rhetoric should distract from the fact
that Egyptian revolution's grievances were based on a desire
for political liberty and economic opportunity. That said,
Islam remains an important framework for public debate and a
reservoir of political symbolism. Accordingly, Qaradawi's
return indicates neither a theocratic turn nor the all-
encompassing "Islamization" of the revolution. Instead, it
underlines the power of religious leadership and language
that will remain important components of any popularly-
legitimate democratic transition in Egypt. Future policy
towards Egypt must resist the temptation to attempt to
decouple "Islam" from political and economic grievances;
rather, it should focus on creating the institutions through
which those grievances can be successfully pursued.
OF RELATED INTEREST
Islam and Islamism Today: The Case of Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, by
Samuel Helfont, FPRI E-Notes, January 2010
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201001.helfonts.islammodernityqaradawi.html
----------------------------------------------------------
Notes
[1] For video of the sermon, see
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Haxwcqa2btA.
[2] As distinguished from a theocracy; Qaradawi still
supports a state which acts as a moral force in creating the
conditions in which Islam can be realized in practice. For
more information, see Bruce K. Rutherford, Egypt after
Mubarak: Liberalism, Islam, and Democracy in the Arab World
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 122.
[3] For video of the fatwa, see
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2bMNmLvAk9k
[4] Al-Masri al-Yom, "Al-Qaradawi, in one of the Greatest
Speechs of the Modern Era, Asserts the Continuation of the
Revolution" (Al-Qaradawi, fi Ihda A'azham Khutub al-Asr
Yu'akid Istimrar al-Thawra), al-Masri al-Yom, February 19,
2011, p. 16.
[5] Jamal Al-Sharbini, "The Fatwa Which Makes Qadaffi's
Blood Licit: Is it an Exclusive Fatwa?" (Fatwa Ihdir Dam al-
Qadaffi_.Hal hiya Fatwa Khususi?)" al-Masri al-Yom, online
edition www.almasryalyoum.com/node/326261
[6] Armando Salvatore, "Qaradawi's Maslaha" in Graff,
Bettina and Jacob Skovgaard-Petersen, eds. Global Mufti: The
Phenomenon of Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2009), p. 247.
----------------------------------------------------------
Copyright Foreign Policy Research Institute
(http://www.fpri.org/).
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