From FPRI:
~MIDDLE EAST MEDIA MONITOR~
THE RISE AND (FUTURE) FALL OF A TURKISH-IRANIAN AXIS
by Gallia Lindenstrauss and Yoel Guzansky
April 27, 2011
Middle East Media Monitor is a new FPRI E-Note series,
designed to review once a month a current topic from the
perspective of the foreign language press in such countries
as Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, and Turkey. These articles
will focus on providing FPRI's readership with an inside
view on how some of the most important countries in the
Middle East are covering issues of importance to the
American foreign policy community.
Dr. Gallia Lindenstrauss and Yoel Guzansky are research
associates at the Institute for National Security Studies
(INSS), Tel Aviv University, Israel. Several arguments
presented here have also appeared in their joint piece,
"Turkey and Iran: The Politics of Strange Bedfellows,"
published in the April 2011 issue of the INSS Strategic
Assessment.
Available on the web and in pdf format at:
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201104.lindenstrauss_guzansky.turkey_iran.html
~MIDDLE EAST MEDIA MONITOR~
THE RISE AND (FUTURE) FALL OF A TURKISH-IRANIAN AXIS
by Gallia Lindenstrauss and Yoel Guzansky
The continuing rise of Turkey and Iran at the expense of the
Arab states is troubling to the West. This is particularly
the case because the parallel rise to power has been
expressed in a warming of relations between these two
states-a sharp contrast to the mutual suspicion that
characterized the bilateral relationship in the past. These
trends have also been interpreted in the West as a turn
eastward in Turkish foreign policy, and Turkey is no longer
seen as the dependable ally it used to be during the Cold
War.
The current thawing of the relations between Turkey and Iran
has been articulated in different ways. In public
statements, the Turks and the Iranians have stressed the
longstanding peaceful nature of their shared border. For
example, the Iranian ambassador to Turkey, in a public
speech, stated that "400-year peace and stability on the
Iranian-Turkish Borders, indicates positive and progressive
relations in the fields of political, economic and cultural
arena between two countries."[1] Indeed, neither state has
any territorial claim against the other. Trade relations
have been greatly expanded, leading the two states to
consider signing a free-trade agreement. Finally, Iran has
allowed Turkish mediation on the nuclear issue and is
cooperating, more than ever, in their fight against the
Kurdish separatists.
However, despite the present cooperation, there remains
great potential for dispute between Iran and Turkey, and
there exists the possibility of long-term competition for
regional dominance developing. Over time, certainly if Iran
acquires a nuclear weapon capability, Ankara is less likely
to strengthen its cooperation with Tehran and existing
differences between the two countries will rise to the
surface. In fact, the basic interests of Ankara and
Tehran-in some if not most issues-collide, which could lead
to disagreements, and in the long run even conflict, between
these two non-Arab powers in the Middle East.
NUCLEAR CONCERNS
Progress in the Iranian nuclear program may have negative
implications on Turkish-Iranian relations. The Turks have
stated repeatedly that they oppose nuclear weapons
proliferation in the Middle East. Western reactions to
Iranian nuclear development have already presented Turkey
with a number of dilemmas, including forcing the Turks to
decide whether to vote for or against further UN sanctions
against Iran. Likewise, the advance of the Iranian nuclear
program translates, in some respects, to a failure of
Turkey's mediation efforts.
IRAQ
The future of Iraq, in light of the imminent withdrawal of
U.S. forces, may also create problems between Turkey and
Iran. While neither country wishes to see Iraq disintegrate,
they each have their own preferences for how the future
Iraqi state should take shape. While Iran would benefit from
having a weak state on its border that maintains Shiite
political dominance and is virtually cut off from Western
influence, Turkey would prefer for Iraq to be ruled by a
broad-based coalition with adequate Sunni minority
representation. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan's visit to Iraq in March 2011, in which he made
historic excursions to the Kurdish regions and to Shiite
holy sites, clearly demonstrated Turkey's active interest in
Iraq's future. During his visit, Erdogan declared that "Iraq
is a brotherly nation_For years we have felt in our hearts
the ordeals and pain, and we have been following the
developments since then with admiration."[2]
SYRIA
Competing interests might also arise concerning developments
in Syria. While both Iran and Turkey would like to see
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's rule continue, they want
this outcome for different reasons. Turkey, as part of its
"Zero Problems (with its neighbors) Policy," has worked in
recent years to improve relations with Syria, based in part
on strong economic incentives. Turkey is also concerned with
the potential spillover effect that an intra-state conflict
involving the 1.4 million Kurds in Syria might have on its
own Kurdish population. In light of the wave of protest in
Syria, Erdogan advised al-Assad to "answer the people's
calls with a reformist, positive approach" and explained
that "We have a border of 800 kilometers [with Syria] and we
have family relations. We cannot remain silent."[3] Iran, on
the other hand, has built its relations with Syria on
resisting Israel and its efforts to strengthen Hezbollah as
a proxy against the "Zionist entity." Accordingly, it has no
desire to see major changes in Syrian policies.
LEBANON
Turkey is also trying to increase its influence in Lebanon,
which could be understood as being at the expense of Iranian
influence there. In November 2010, Erdogan visited Lebanon-a
visit that attracted extensive media coverage-shortly
following Ahmadinejad's own visit to the country. During his
visit, Erdogan, in an effort to be seen as Lebanon's
champion, criticized Israel harshly and even threatened to
respond should Israel have the audacity to attack Lebanon.
"We will not be silent and we will support justice by all
means available to us," declared Erdogan.[4] Turkey has also
tried, thus far to no avail, to mediate between the various
factions vying for control of Lebanon. In this vein, Turkish
Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, has met both with
Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri and with Hezbollah
Secretary General, Hassan Nasrallah. Conversely, Iran
continues to staunchly support only Hezbollah, which is one
of the main sources of instability within Lebanon.
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT
As for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Turkey still
supports a settlement while Iran does not accept the
legitimacy of Israel's existence. Iran, by supporting terror
groups like Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, is
trying its best to prevent the two sides from reaching an
agreement. In contrast, the dealings between Turkey and
Hamas do not necessarily stem from a desire to strengthen
the organization's control over the Gaza Strip, but rather
from Turkey's belief that promoting negotiations between
Israel and the Palestinians means treating Hamas as a
legitimate actor. Turkish President, Abdullah G�l, speaking
at a joint press conference with Russian President Dmitry
Medvedev in May 2010 stated, "When Turkey talked [with
Hamas], it faced threats but it emerged that Turkey was
right. You cannot achieve peace by excluding people."[5]
ARAB GULF STATES
Another source of friction between Iran and Turkey may
result from Ankara's efforts towards closer relations with
the Arab Gulf states. These states fear Iran and seek to
prevent it from attaining nuclear capabilities. As such, a
growing strategic partnership between Turkey and the Gulf
states may help in balancing Iran's power in the Gulf. In
line with these efforts, Turkey's status in the Gulf was
made official in 2008 when a security memorandum of
understanding was signed. In this document, Turkey was the
first state to be recognized as a strategic partner of the
Gulf Cooperation Council. Differences in the Turkish and
Iranian stances towards the Gulf states were made apparent
during the recent upheavals in Bahrain. When Saudi forces
entered Bahrain to stabilize the situation at the Bahraini
royal family's request, Iran decried Saudi actions, labeling
them an "invasion."[6] Alternatively, Turkey held high-level
meetings with all the relevant parties, attempting to
prevent a spillover of local grievances into a regional
conflict along the Sunni-Shiite divide.[7]
LIBYA
The two states also differ in their approach to the Libya
situation. While at first, Turkey strongly rejected military
intervention, it has since been taking part in NATO efforts.
These initiatives are in line with United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1973, adopted on March 17, 2011,
authorizing the use of all means short of occupation to
protect Libyan citizens. Iran, on the other hand, has called
the NATO intervention "a big stupidity" and predicted "that
the NATO-US invasion would throw them to the depth of an
abyss_"[8] Turkey cannot be pleased with such statements.
Not only do they condemn Turkey's actions, as a NATO member,
but they also highlight a reversal of Turkish policies
toward Libya.
LEADERSHIP OF THE MUSLIM WORLD
An additional area of friction between the two countries may
be over leadership of the Muslim world. In a poll conducted
in Muslim countries shortly after Gaza flotilla incident,
Erdogan was elected the most popular leader, earning the
support of 20 percent of the respondents.[9] The editor of
the daily al-Quds al-Arabi who, after the flotilla event
criticized the impotence of Arab regimes vis-�-vis Israel,
praised the Turkish Prime Minister saying, he was "more Arab
than the Arabs."[10] The fact that Turkey's critical stance
towards Israel is exercised for the most part rhetorically
and by means of "soft power," yet puts pressure on Israel,
implies that this may be a better route than the violent
path promoted by Iran. In addition, it has been suggested
that the "Turkish model," in terms of its domestic
character, might be appropriate for Arab countries
experiencing revolution. This model becomes especially
relevant when considering the Iranian alternative, which
views recent events as an opportunity to improve its
regional standing. Indeed, the current uprisings have been
described by Iran as "_part of the fruits of the Iranian
nation's resistance."[11]
CONCLUSION
Despite the major changes in Turkish foreign policy in
recent years, Turkey remains a partner of the West. With its
potential role in mediating diverse issues, Turkey could
still be helpful on several fronts: Iraq, where it has
played a major role in the handling of the Kurdish issue and
in protecting the Sunni minority against discrimination;
Afghanistan and Libya, where Turkey, as a NATO member, can
continue its involvement in line with American and coalition
aims; and even the Iranian nuclear issue, where it shares
the basic interest with the West to prevent Iran from
becoming a nuclear state.
The United States should continue to involve Turkey actively
in forming its policies towards the Middle East. Frequent
consultations should take place, as in the recent relatively
successful example regarding developments in Egypt and in
Libya. Turkey's so-called "shift to the East," if it
occurred at all, is neither fixed nor inevitable. Hence, it
can still be influenced, and it is vital that the West, led
by the United States, not give Turkey a cold shoulder.
Recommending that the West engage more with Turkey is not
motivated by a fear of a strong Turkish-Iranian axis-for as
we have shown, this alliance can be seen as both temporary
and limited-but because of Turkey's increased strength as a
regional actor. Its growing influence on regional players
can serve not only to promote certain U.S. policies but also
to add legitimacy to what might otherwise seem as Western,
"outside" interference.
----------------------------------------------------------
Notes
[1] "Turkish-Iranian Relations and Recent Development in the
Region," Turkish Weekly, February 22, 2010,
www.turkishweekly.net/article/342/turkish-iranian-relations-and-recent-development-in-the-region.html
See also, "Erdogan Emphasizes 400-Years of Friendship with Iran,
" TRT-world.com, September 17, 2010,
www.trtturkmence.com/trtworld/en/newsDetail.aspx?HaberKodu=7bb760dd-5c8b-4e8f-abfa-a6f6eb88fc07
[2] "Erdogan Given a Hero's Welcome in Streets of Arbil,
Najaf," Today's Zaman, March 30, 2011
www.todayszaman.com/news-239553-erdogan-given-heros-welcome-in-streets-of-arbil-najaf.html
[3] "Turkey's Erdogan Urges Syria to go ahead with Reforms,"
Hurriyet Daily News and Economic Review, March 28, 2011
www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=the-head-of-intelligence-visited-syria-2011-03-28
[4] "In Lebanon's Beirut, Shift of Turkey's Axis is
Welcomed," Hurriyet Daily News and Economic Review, November
25, 2010
www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=turkey-will-not-remain-silent-if-israel-attacks-lebanon-2010-11-25
[5] "Turkey, Russia find Common Ground on Iran, Hamas
Role," Today's Zaman, May 13, 2010
www.todayszaman.com/news-210093-102-turkey-russia-find-common-ground-on-iran-hamas-role.html
[6] "Cleric Lambasts Saudi Military Intervention in
Bahrain," Fars News Agency, April 2, 2011
http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9001134080
[7] "Ankara Moves to Broker Libya Deal," Hurriyet Daily News
and Economic Review, April 4, 2011
www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=turkeys-libya-cease-fire-diplomacy--2011-04-04
[8] "Ahmadinejad Deplores NATO Militaristic Approach in
Libya," Fars News Agency, April 5, 2011
http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9001160654
[9] Shibley Telhami, "2010 Arab Public Opinion Poll,"
Brookings Institute, August 5, 2010
www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2010/08_arab_opinion_poll_telhami/08_arab_opinion_poll_telhami.pdf
slide no.66.
[10] "Attitude of the Arab World to Turkey after the
Flotilla," MEMRI, June 19, 2010
www.memri.org.il/cgi-webaxy/sal/sal.pl?lang=he&ID=107345_memri&dbid=articles&act=show3&dataid=2425
[11] "Leader: Region to Experience More Developments in the
Future," Fars News Agency, April 3, 2011
http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9001141125
----------------------------------------------------------
Copyright Foreign Policy Research Institute
(http://www.fpri.org/)
~MIDDLE EAST MEDIA MONITOR~
THE RISE AND (FUTURE) FALL OF A TURKISH-IRANIAN AXIS
by Gallia Lindenstrauss and Yoel Guzansky
April 27, 2011
Middle East Media Monitor is a new FPRI E-Note series,
designed to review once a month a current topic from the
perspective of the foreign language press in such countries
as Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, and Turkey. These articles
will focus on providing FPRI's readership with an inside
view on how some of the most important countries in the
Middle East are covering issues of importance to the
American foreign policy community.
Dr. Gallia Lindenstrauss and Yoel Guzansky are research
associates at the Institute for National Security Studies
(INSS), Tel Aviv University, Israel. Several arguments
presented here have also appeared in their joint piece,
"Turkey and Iran: The Politics of Strange Bedfellows,"
published in the April 2011 issue of the INSS Strategic
Assessment.
Available on the web and in pdf format at:
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201104.lindenstrauss_guzansky.turkey_iran.html
~MIDDLE EAST MEDIA MONITOR~
THE RISE AND (FUTURE) FALL OF A TURKISH-IRANIAN AXIS
by Gallia Lindenstrauss and Yoel Guzansky
The continuing rise of Turkey and Iran at the expense of the
Arab states is troubling to the West. This is particularly
the case because the parallel rise to power has been
expressed in a warming of relations between these two
states-a sharp contrast to the mutual suspicion that
characterized the bilateral relationship in the past. These
trends have also been interpreted in the West as a turn
eastward in Turkish foreign policy, and Turkey is no longer
seen as the dependable ally it used to be during the Cold
War.
The current thawing of the relations between Turkey and Iran
has been articulated in different ways. In public
statements, the Turks and the Iranians have stressed the
longstanding peaceful nature of their shared border. For
example, the Iranian ambassador to Turkey, in a public
speech, stated that "400-year peace and stability on the
Iranian-Turkish Borders, indicates positive and progressive
relations in the fields of political, economic and cultural
arena between two countries."[1] Indeed, neither state has
any territorial claim against the other. Trade relations
have been greatly expanded, leading the two states to
consider signing a free-trade agreement. Finally, Iran has
allowed Turkish mediation on the nuclear issue and is
cooperating, more than ever, in their fight against the
Kurdish separatists.
However, despite the present cooperation, there remains
great potential for dispute between Iran and Turkey, and
there exists the possibility of long-term competition for
regional dominance developing. Over time, certainly if Iran
acquires a nuclear weapon capability, Ankara is less likely
to strengthen its cooperation with Tehran and existing
differences between the two countries will rise to the
surface. In fact, the basic interests of Ankara and
Tehran-in some if not most issues-collide, which could lead
to disagreements, and in the long run even conflict, between
these two non-Arab powers in the Middle East.
NUCLEAR CONCERNS
Progress in the Iranian nuclear program may have negative
implications on Turkish-Iranian relations. The Turks have
stated repeatedly that they oppose nuclear weapons
proliferation in the Middle East. Western reactions to
Iranian nuclear development have already presented Turkey
with a number of dilemmas, including forcing the Turks to
decide whether to vote for or against further UN sanctions
against Iran. Likewise, the advance of the Iranian nuclear
program translates, in some respects, to a failure of
Turkey's mediation efforts.
IRAQ
The future of Iraq, in light of the imminent withdrawal of
U.S. forces, may also create problems between Turkey and
Iran. While neither country wishes to see Iraq disintegrate,
they each have their own preferences for how the future
Iraqi state should take shape. While Iran would benefit from
having a weak state on its border that maintains Shiite
political dominance and is virtually cut off from Western
influence, Turkey would prefer for Iraq to be ruled by a
broad-based coalition with adequate Sunni minority
representation. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan's visit to Iraq in March 2011, in which he made
historic excursions to the Kurdish regions and to Shiite
holy sites, clearly demonstrated Turkey's active interest in
Iraq's future. During his visit, Erdogan declared that "Iraq
is a brotherly nation_For years we have felt in our hearts
the ordeals and pain, and we have been following the
developments since then with admiration."[2]
SYRIA
Competing interests might also arise concerning developments
in Syria. While both Iran and Turkey would like to see
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's rule continue, they want
this outcome for different reasons. Turkey, as part of its
"Zero Problems (with its neighbors) Policy," has worked in
recent years to improve relations with Syria, based in part
on strong economic incentives. Turkey is also concerned with
the potential spillover effect that an intra-state conflict
involving the 1.4 million Kurds in Syria might have on its
own Kurdish population. In light of the wave of protest in
Syria, Erdogan advised al-Assad to "answer the people's
calls with a reformist, positive approach" and explained
that "We have a border of 800 kilometers [with Syria] and we
have family relations. We cannot remain silent."[3] Iran, on
the other hand, has built its relations with Syria on
resisting Israel and its efforts to strengthen Hezbollah as
a proxy against the "Zionist entity." Accordingly, it has no
desire to see major changes in Syrian policies.
LEBANON
Turkey is also trying to increase its influence in Lebanon,
which could be understood as being at the expense of Iranian
influence there. In November 2010, Erdogan visited Lebanon-a
visit that attracted extensive media coverage-shortly
following Ahmadinejad's own visit to the country. During his
visit, Erdogan, in an effort to be seen as Lebanon's
champion, criticized Israel harshly and even threatened to
respond should Israel have the audacity to attack Lebanon.
"We will not be silent and we will support justice by all
means available to us," declared Erdogan.[4] Turkey has also
tried, thus far to no avail, to mediate between the various
factions vying for control of Lebanon. In this vein, Turkish
Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, has met both with
Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri and with Hezbollah
Secretary General, Hassan Nasrallah. Conversely, Iran
continues to staunchly support only Hezbollah, which is one
of the main sources of instability within Lebanon.
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT
As for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Turkey still
supports a settlement while Iran does not accept the
legitimacy of Israel's existence. Iran, by supporting terror
groups like Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, is
trying its best to prevent the two sides from reaching an
agreement. In contrast, the dealings between Turkey and
Hamas do not necessarily stem from a desire to strengthen
the organization's control over the Gaza Strip, but rather
from Turkey's belief that promoting negotiations between
Israel and the Palestinians means treating Hamas as a
legitimate actor. Turkish President, Abdullah G�l, speaking
at a joint press conference with Russian President Dmitry
Medvedev in May 2010 stated, "When Turkey talked [with
Hamas], it faced threats but it emerged that Turkey was
right. You cannot achieve peace by excluding people."[5]
ARAB GULF STATES
Another source of friction between Iran and Turkey may
result from Ankara's efforts towards closer relations with
the Arab Gulf states. These states fear Iran and seek to
prevent it from attaining nuclear capabilities. As such, a
growing strategic partnership between Turkey and the Gulf
states may help in balancing Iran's power in the Gulf. In
line with these efforts, Turkey's status in the Gulf was
made official in 2008 when a security memorandum of
understanding was signed. In this document, Turkey was the
first state to be recognized as a strategic partner of the
Gulf Cooperation Council. Differences in the Turkish and
Iranian stances towards the Gulf states were made apparent
during the recent upheavals in Bahrain. When Saudi forces
entered Bahrain to stabilize the situation at the Bahraini
royal family's request, Iran decried Saudi actions, labeling
them an "invasion."[6] Alternatively, Turkey held high-level
meetings with all the relevant parties, attempting to
prevent a spillover of local grievances into a regional
conflict along the Sunni-Shiite divide.[7]
LIBYA
The two states also differ in their approach to the Libya
situation. While at first, Turkey strongly rejected military
intervention, it has since been taking part in NATO efforts.
These initiatives are in line with United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1973, adopted on March 17, 2011,
authorizing the use of all means short of occupation to
protect Libyan citizens. Iran, on the other hand, has called
the NATO intervention "a big stupidity" and predicted "that
the NATO-US invasion would throw them to the depth of an
abyss_"[8] Turkey cannot be pleased with such statements.
Not only do they condemn Turkey's actions, as a NATO member,
but they also highlight a reversal of Turkish policies
toward Libya.
LEADERSHIP OF THE MUSLIM WORLD
An additional area of friction between the two countries may
be over leadership of the Muslim world. In a poll conducted
in Muslim countries shortly after Gaza flotilla incident,
Erdogan was elected the most popular leader, earning the
support of 20 percent of the respondents.[9] The editor of
the daily al-Quds al-Arabi who, after the flotilla event
criticized the impotence of Arab regimes vis-�-vis Israel,
praised the Turkish Prime Minister saying, he was "more Arab
than the Arabs."[10] The fact that Turkey's critical stance
towards Israel is exercised for the most part rhetorically
and by means of "soft power," yet puts pressure on Israel,
implies that this may be a better route than the violent
path promoted by Iran. In addition, it has been suggested
that the "Turkish model," in terms of its domestic
character, might be appropriate for Arab countries
experiencing revolution. This model becomes especially
relevant when considering the Iranian alternative, which
views recent events as an opportunity to improve its
regional standing. Indeed, the current uprisings have been
described by Iran as "_part of the fruits of the Iranian
nation's resistance."[11]
CONCLUSION
Despite the major changes in Turkish foreign policy in
recent years, Turkey remains a partner of the West. With its
potential role in mediating diverse issues, Turkey could
still be helpful on several fronts: Iraq, where it has
played a major role in the handling of the Kurdish issue and
in protecting the Sunni minority against discrimination;
Afghanistan and Libya, where Turkey, as a NATO member, can
continue its involvement in line with American and coalition
aims; and even the Iranian nuclear issue, where it shares
the basic interest with the West to prevent Iran from
becoming a nuclear state.
The United States should continue to involve Turkey actively
in forming its policies towards the Middle East. Frequent
consultations should take place, as in the recent relatively
successful example regarding developments in Egypt and in
Libya. Turkey's so-called "shift to the East," if it
occurred at all, is neither fixed nor inevitable. Hence, it
can still be influenced, and it is vital that the West, led
by the United States, not give Turkey a cold shoulder.
Recommending that the West engage more with Turkey is not
motivated by a fear of a strong Turkish-Iranian axis-for as
we have shown, this alliance can be seen as both temporary
and limited-but because of Turkey's increased strength as a
regional actor. Its growing influence on regional players
can serve not only to promote certain U.S. policies but also
to add legitimacy to what might otherwise seem as Western,
"outside" interference.
----------------------------------------------------------
Notes
[1] "Turkish-Iranian Relations and Recent Development in the
Region," Turkish Weekly, February 22, 2010,
www.turkishweekly.net/article/342/turkish-iranian-relations-and-recent-development-in-the-region.html
See also, "Erdogan Emphasizes 400-Years of Friendship with Iran,
" TRT-world.com, September 17, 2010,
www.trtturkmence.com/trtworld/en/newsDetail.aspx?HaberKodu=7bb760dd-5c8b-4e8f-abfa-a6f6eb88fc07
[2] "Erdogan Given a Hero's Welcome in Streets of Arbil,
Najaf," Today's Zaman, March 30, 2011
www.todayszaman.com/news-239553-erdogan-given-heros-welcome-in-streets-of-arbil-najaf.html
[3] "Turkey's Erdogan Urges Syria to go ahead with Reforms,"
Hurriyet Daily News and Economic Review, March 28, 2011
www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=the-head-of-intelligence-visited-syria-2011-03-28
[4] "In Lebanon's Beirut, Shift of Turkey's Axis is
Welcomed," Hurriyet Daily News and Economic Review, November
25, 2010
www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=turkey-will-not-remain-silent-if-israel-attacks-lebanon-2010-11-25
[5] "Turkey, Russia find Common Ground on Iran, Hamas
Role," Today's Zaman, May 13, 2010
www.todayszaman.com/news-210093-102-turkey-russia-find-common-ground-on-iran-hamas-role.html
[6] "Cleric Lambasts Saudi Military Intervention in
Bahrain," Fars News Agency, April 2, 2011
http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9001134080
[7] "Ankara Moves to Broker Libya Deal," Hurriyet Daily News
and Economic Review, April 4, 2011
www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=turkeys-libya-cease-fire-diplomacy--2011-04-04
[8] "Ahmadinejad Deplores NATO Militaristic Approach in
Libya," Fars News Agency, April 5, 2011
http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9001160654
[9] Shibley Telhami, "2010 Arab Public Opinion Poll,"
Brookings Institute, August 5, 2010
www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2010/08_arab_opinion_poll_telhami/08_arab_opinion_poll_telhami.pdf
slide no.66.
[10] "Attitude of the Arab World to Turkey after the
Flotilla," MEMRI, June 19, 2010
www.memri.org.il/cgi-webaxy/sal/sal.pl?lang=he&ID=107345_memri&dbid=articles&act=show3&dataid=2425
[11] "Leader: Region to Experience More Developments in the
Future," Fars News Agency, April 3, 2011
http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9001141125
----------------------------------------------------------
Copyright Foreign Policy Research Institute
(http://www.fpri.org/)
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