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Foreign Policy Research Institute
Over 50 Years of Ideas in Service to Our Nation
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E-Notes
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SOVEREIGNTY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINA'S NATIONAL INTEREST:
A NON-ZERO SUM GAME
by Chen-shen J. Yen
February 14, 2011
Chen-shen J. Yen is the Director of the Institute of
International Relations at National Chengchi University,
Taipei. He is currently working on a manuscript for cross-
strait relations based on the ideas of concurrent majority
and nullification originated in the writing of John C.
Calhoun.
This article is part of a collection of essays assessing
issues in U.S.-China relations in the aftermath of the
January 2011 Obama-Hu summit. The full collection of essays
is available at:
http://www.fpri.org/research/asia/pubs/Obama-Hu.Summit2011.html
This bulletin is available on the web and in pdf format at:
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201102.yen.china.html
SOVEREIGNTY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINA'S NATIONAL INTEREST:
A NON-ZERO SUM GAME
by Chen-shen J. Yen
Zhuquan (sovereignty) or Renquan (human rights)? That seems
to be the question Chinese President Hu Jintao encountered
in his state visit to the United States in January 2011. In
terms of at least one of China's claimed core national
interests-Taiwan-the issue would be better framed as
sovereignty and human rights. Like the unresolved issue of
sovereignty over Taiwan (and other sovereignty issues,
including Tibet), human rights in the mainland is, in
China's view, part of its "core interests." Beijing
considers any statements or actions on these issues that are
contrary to its position to be violations of China's
sovereignty. This reflects a zero-sum conception of China's
national interests that ill serves China's agenda in cross-
strait relations, and more generally.
Mere weeks before the Washington summit, China was put in an
unfavorable international spotlight on the issue of human
rights when jailed dissident Liu Xiaobo was absent from the
ceremony to award him the Nobel Peace Prize. Liu's empty
chair symbolized the lack of human rights and the
continuation of tight political control in China despite the
enormous progress made in economic development during the
last thirty years.
The fact that U.S. President Barack Obama, himself the Nobel
Peace Prize Laureate of 2010, was to receive the foreign
leader who was responsible for Liu's arrest and subsequent
imprisonment was ironic and sharpened the focus on China's
human rights conditions. Observers of U.S.-China relations
wondered whether Obama would raise the question with Hu and
personally call for Liu's release. Obama's earlier reception
of the Dalai Lama was another underlying source of tension
between the two countries over human rights. More broadly,
China's lack of freedom of speech, freedom of the press,
freedom of assembly and freedom of religion have all been a
target of American condemnation and, in turn, bilateral
friction over the years.
Hu's state visit also showed China's unwavering stance on
the issue of sovereignty that has been a perennial point of
disagreement and source of tension in bilateral relations.
In the Joint Statement issued by Obama and Hu at the
Washington summit, China declared that the "Taiwan issue
concerns China's sovereignty and territorial integrity" and
that China expected the United States to adhere to the
bedrock foundations of Sino-American relations in the past
three decades: the One China policy and the Three Joint
Communiques. The United States, not wanting to imply that it
completely accepted China's position, indicated that it
"supports the peaceful development of relations across the
Taiwan Strait and looks forward to efforts by both sides to
increase dialogues and interactions in economic, political,
and other fields, and to develop more positive and stable
cross-Strait relations."[1] The item missing from the usual
list of U.S. positions on the issue was Washington's
commitment to the Taiwan Relations Act, which Obama
reiterated at the two presidents' joint press conference.[2]
As the Obama-Hu summit also reconfirmed, China sees human
rights through much the same lens of "sovereignty" that it
views the question of Taiwan. In the Joint Statement, we
find both Washington and Beijing expressing their shared
commitment to the "protection and promotion of human rights"
despite their acknowledged differences on the issue. China
insisted, however, on the central importance of sovereignty:
"there should be no interference in any country's internal
affairs" and both nations have the right to "choose their
own paths" on human rights.[3]
China, thus, views outside efforts to promote and protect
human rights in China as a Western scheme to destabilize
China and thwart its peaceful rise and thus to weaken or
infringe China's sovereignty. This view is misguided.
Promotion of human rights in China is actually positive for
the most sensitive aspect of sovereignty for China, the
prospect of unification across the Taiwan Strait. In other
words, zhuquan and renquan-sovereignty and human rights-are
potentially part of a positive sum game for what Beijing
identifies as its core national interests.
Understanding this non-zero-sum game also helps explain a
seeming paradox in the impact of Beijing's cross-strait
policy under Hu and since Ma Ying-jeou became president in
Taiwan. Why have China's policy changes and the improvements
in cross-strait relations done so little for Beijing's
agenda on sovereignty over Taiwan?
China's rise in the last three decades and its insistence on
peaceful development have promoted the country's move toward
becoming a responsible stakeholder in the international
community and even a superpower. Although Beijing has not
relinquished its claimed right to use force to unify Taiwan,
its current stance basically rules out such an option if
Taiwan does not move from de facto to de jure independence.
Based on the heping tongyi, yiguo liangzhi ("peaceful
unification and one country, two systems") formula,
introduced in early 1980s, China accepts that the best
scenario for China is to have Taiwan unify with the
motherland via peaceful means.
Beijing can adopt this approach because it knows Taiwan's
options for its relations with China are quite limited. If
Taiwan chose to declare independence, it not only would risk
a military attack from across the Taiwan Strait. It also
would not receive essential international support,
especially from the United States. It is clear that
Washington would consider such a move a unilateral change of
status quo and would not condone it.
If Taiwan chose the lesser option of brinksmanship-taking
provocative actions to antagonize China without officially
proclaiming an independent Republic of Taiwan, the U.S. and
the international community would consider Taiwan a trouble
maker. Taiwan would risk international isolation
diplomatically, polarization politically, reinforcement of
cleavages socially and loss of foreign market access and
investment opportunity economically.
Taiwan has foregone these options in favor of the more
conciliatory approach towards China that President Ma has
been pursuing since he came to power in 2008. This has
prevented further diplomatic setbacks for Taiwan and allowed
greater economic integration across the strait, but it has
failed to eliminate political polarization and reduce social
cleavages in Taiwan. This approach, despite its limitations,
seems to be the most sensible option by far and has the
potential to produce a win-win-win scenario for Taipei,
Beijing and Washington.
The trend in the first two and half years of the Ma
administration has been positive. Talks between Strait
Exchange Foundation (SEF) of Taiwan and the mainland's
Association for Relations across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS)
in 2008 resumed after a more-than-a-decade-hiatus in formal
negotiations. The two sides signed fifteen agreements,
including the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement
(ECFA), which was specifically identified and "applauded" by
the United States in the Joint Statement at the Obama-Hu
Washington summit. ECFA is, and should be, considered a
giant leap forward for cross-strait relations, especially
from Beijing's perspective. ECFA and other developments
affirm that Taiwan is no longer seeking independence and is
not engaging in brinksmanship.
For its part, Beijing has acquiesced in the policy of "three
nos" (butong, budu, buwu or "no unification, no
independence, no war") that Ma set forth in his inaugural
address in May 2008. When Ma's then-newly-installed
Kuomintang-led government announced its desire to establish
direct air links across Taiwan Strait, Beijing allowed ARATS
and SEF to resume talks and negotiate for the links to be
opened on Taipei's announced schedule.
When Ma unilaterally declared a "diplomatic truce" (under
which Beijing and Taipei would not compete for diplomatic
ties with other states) in support of greater international
space for Taiwan, the Beijing government turned down
attempts by several Latin American countries (including
Paraguay, Nicaragua, Panama and Guatemala) to switch
diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. Beijing also
showed diplomatic flexibility in accepting former Vice
President of the Republic of China Lien Chan's participation
in an Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit. In
addition, Beijing did not stand in the way when Taiwan
(under the name Chinese Taipei) sought and received observer
status in the World Health Assembly (WHA) meetings.
Most important of all, with the signing of ECFA, China has
granted more tariff free entry for Taiwan exports that
Taiwan has granted to mainland exports-an arrangement
designed to protect Taiwan's farmers. This policy of rangli
(yielding benefits), announced by Chinese Premier Wen
Jiabao, became a prevalent theme throughout the negotiation.
The term may also be used to describe the spirit of
rapprochement between the Chinese Communist Party and Ma's
Kuomintang and between the mainland and Taiwan since Ma took
office.
Indeed, the Republic of China has maintained the same number
of diplomatic allies (twenty-three) since March 2008,
arresting what could have been an acceleration of a long-
term decline absent the diplomatic truce. The upgrading of
Taiwan's APEC special envoy and the acquisition of an
observer role in the WHA would not have been possible during
the rule of former President Chen Shui-bian from the pro-
independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Taiwan's
quick rebound from the financial crisis of 2008-2010 might
not have been possible without the deepening of integration
with the strong and rising mainland economy-something that
the general improvement in cross-strait relations
facilitated.
Yet, after more than 30 months of improved ties and a more
relaxed atmosphere across the strait, including more than
300 direct flights weekly, over one million Chinese tourists
visiting Taiwan and the continuation of long-building
increases in trade and investment, the percentage of people
in Taiwan who consider themselves Chinese and
Chinese/Taiwanese has declined from over 15 percent to less
than 10 percent since Ma took power.[4] The support for
"national unification" is also stagnating, with total
preference for immediate unification and status quo now,
unification later hovering around 10 percent.[5]
Why, with all the apparent progress in cross-strait
rapprochement, is there no change in Taiwan's identity and
preference for unification? The question is surely puzzling
for leaders in Beijing who see themselves as having
accommodated most of Taiwan's demands and requests for two
and a half years. The answer is easy and has to do with
human rights and the mainland's troubled assessment of the
relationship between human rights and sovereignty.
Beijing's approach to human rights undermines its agenda on
sovereignty over Taiwan. The different political systems on
the two sides of the strait and the absence of basic values
of human rights and democracy on the mainland are key
factors that have dissuaded Taiwanese people from
considering political integration in the future to be
acceptable, even though they do not object to economic
integration.
Beijing's reaction has not been helpful to its own aims. The
weak support for unification in Taiwan has made Chinese
leaders even more suspicious of Taiwan's true intention in
pursuing the relaxation of relations across the strait,
which some on the mainland see as merely an effort to buy
time to stall the unification process. Thus, even with
improvement of cross-strait ties, Beijing has continued to
follow its old practice of protesting vehemently every one
of Taipei's weapons procurements from the United States., in
the most recent case suspending military to military
exchanges with the United States and other aspects of
bilateral strategic dialogue. Such Chinese reactions are not
well-received in Taiwan. The DPP-led Pan Green worries that,
lacking the ability to fight, Taiwan will face forced
incorporation into China. The KMT-led Pan Blue sees arms
procurement as necessary for maintaining confidence among
the Taiwan populace to continue cross-strait dialogue
without fear that it will accelerate into a coerced
settlement of sovereignty issues. Beijing's harsh line on
arms sales suggests Beijing may not fully recognize that,
even though mainland/Chinese identity is still very low and
support for unification remains unenthusiastic in Taiwan, it
is likely in Beijing's interests to see Ma's government
remain in power. A Pan Blue government is at least willing
to provide China an opportunity to win back the island while
a Pan Green government would not. Beijing's seemingly still-
lacking understanding of Taiwan's political dynamics and
social fabric increase the risk that Beijing's stance on
arms sales and other cross-strait-related issues can start
what are, from Beijing's perspective, vicious cycles in
Taiwan's domestic politics.
What, then, should the mainland authorities do? They should
more fully recognize the universality of human rights and
take steps toward adopting a more human rights-protecting
and democratic system on the mainland. Beijing should
recognize that protection and promotion of human rights in
the mainland would help improve China's standing among the
Taiwanese people and thus advance Beijing's goal of national
unification. Even if China became as prosperous as Taiwan
and evolved into a democratic system that respects basic
human rights, this still would not guarantee the necessary
increase of support for unification in Taiwan. But if
Beijing continues to insist on maintaining authoritarian
rule and claiming the legitimacy of its different human
rights standards, the likelihood of peaceful unification
(and protection of what Beijing considers its core interest
in sovereignty) is unlikely to increase.
The Chinese leadership needs to recognize that criticism
from the United States, other Western nations, Taiwan and
elsewhere is not the assault on Chinese sovereignty that
such sources' recognition or assertion of Taiwan's status as
a separate state or their unqualified rejection of China's
claim to sovereignty over the island would be. The
Washington summit showed both the potential of, and the
persisting limits to, such an approach from Beijing. Hu
Jintao, in responding to a question at the two presidents'
joint press conference, proclaimed that China "recognizes
and also respects the "universality of human rights" and
indicated that China will continue its "efforts to promote
democracy and the rule of law" in China. But Hu also
maintained there is a "need to take into account the
different and national circumstances when it comes to the
universal value of human rights."[6] While this
acknowledgement of the universality of human rights,
democracy and the rule of law is still to be applauded, its
seriousness is open to doubt (as a reporter's follow-up
question at the press conference illustrated) and the
qualifying language that Hu added gives reason for
skepticism. It is still regrettably far from clear that
China's leaders understand that it is in China's national
interest to do more to embrace the human rights values urged
by Western critics and that doing so also serves China's
identified core national interest in peaceful unification
with Taiwan. Hu and his successors should understand that
pursuing zhuquan (sovereignty) in human rights and in
territorial integrity and promoting renquan (human rights)
need not be a non-zero sum game after all.
----------------------------------------------------------
Notes
[1] See U.S.-China Joint Statement, January 19, 2011 at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/19/us-china-joint-statement.
[2] See Press Conference with President Obama and President
Hu of the People's Republic of China, January 19, 2011 at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/19/press-conference-president-obama-and-president-hu-peoples-republic-china.
[3] See Joint Statement, ibid.
[4] Minzhong dui zhiwo rentong de kanfa (View of People on
Self-Identity), in Niandu zonghe fenxi baogao (Annual
Analysis of Composite Report), see years 2008 and 2009, at
http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/973944270.pdf and
http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/012517312648.pdf
[5] Zhonghua minguo Taiwan diqu minzhong dui liang'an guanxi
de kanfa (View of People in Taiwan Area, the Republic of
China, on Cross-Strait Relations), at
http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/11718424319.pdf
[6] See Press Conference with President Obama and President
Hu of the People's Republic of China, January 19, 2011 at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/19/press-conference-president-obama-and-president-hu-peoples-republic-china.
----------------------------------------------------------
Copyright Foreign Policy Research Institute
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Over 50 Years of Ideas in Service to Our Nation
www.fpri.org
You can now follow FPRI on Facebook and FPRINews on Twitter
E-Notes
Distributed Exclusively via Email
SOVEREIGNTY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINA'S NATIONAL INTEREST:
A NON-ZERO SUM GAME
by Chen-shen J. Yen
February 14, 2011
Chen-shen J. Yen is the Director of the Institute of
International Relations at National Chengchi University,
Taipei. He is currently working on a manuscript for cross-
strait relations based on the ideas of concurrent majority
and nullification originated in the writing of John C.
Calhoun.
This article is part of a collection of essays assessing
issues in U.S.-China relations in the aftermath of the
January 2011 Obama-Hu summit. The full collection of essays
is available at:
http://www.fpri.org/research/asia/pubs/Obama-Hu.Summit2011.html
This bulletin is available on the web and in pdf format at:
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201102.yen.china.html
SOVEREIGNTY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINA'S NATIONAL INTEREST:
A NON-ZERO SUM GAME
by Chen-shen J. Yen
Zhuquan (sovereignty) or Renquan (human rights)? That seems
to be the question Chinese President Hu Jintao encountered
in his state visit to the United States in January 2011. In
terms of at least one of China's claimed core national
interests-Taiwan-the issue would be better framed as
sovereignty and human rights. Like the unresolved issue of
sovereignty over Taiwan (and other sovereignty issues,
including Tibet), human rights in the mainland is, in
China's view, part of its "core interests." Beijing
considers any statements or actions on these issues that are
contrary to its position to be violations of China's
sovereignty. This reflects a zero-sum conception of China's
national interests that ill serves China's agenda in cross-
strait relations, and more generally.
Mere weeks before the Washington summit, China was put in an
unfavorable international spotlight on the issue of human
rights when jailed dissident Liu Xiaobo was absent from the
ceremony to award him the Nobel Peace Prize. Liu's empty
chair symbolized the lack of human rights and the
continuation of tight political control in China despite the
enormous progress made in economic development during the
last thirty years.
The fact that U.S. President Barack Obama, himself the Nobel
Peace Prize Laureate of 2010, was to receive the foreign
leader who was responsible for Liu's arrest and subsequent
imprisonment was ironic and sharpened the focus on China's
human rights conditions. Observers of U.S.-China relations
wondered whether Obama would raise the question with Hu and
personally call for Liu's release. Obama's earlier reception
of the Dalai Lama was another underlying source of tension
between the two countries over human rights. More broadly,
China's lack of freedom of speech, freedom of the press,
freedom of assembly and freedom of religion have all been a
target of American condemnation and, in turn, bilateral
friction over the years.
Hu's state visit also showed China's unwavering stance on
the issue of sovereignty that has been a perennial point of
disagreement and source of tension in bilateral relations.
In the Joint Statement issued by Obama and Hu at the
Washington summit, China declared that the "Taiwan issue
concerns China's sovereignty and territorial integrity" and
that China expected the United States to adhere to the
bedrock foundations of Sino-American relations in the past
three decades: the One China policy and the Three Joint
Communiques. The United States, not wanting to imply that it
completely accepted China's position, indicated that it
"supports the peaceful development of relations across the
Taiwan Strait and looks forward to efforts by both sides to
increase dialogues and interactions in economic, political,
and other fields, and to develop more positive and stable
cross-Strait relations."[1] The item missing from the usual
list of U.S. positions on the issue was Washington's
commitment to the Taiwan Relations Act, which Obama
reiterated at the two presidents' joint press conference.[2]
As the Obama-Hu summit also reconfirmed, China sees human
rights through much the same lens of "sovereignty" that it
views the question of Taiwan. In the Joint Statement, we
find both Washington and Beijing expressing their shared
commitment to the "protection and promotion of human rights"
despite their acknowledged differences on the issue. China
insisted, however, on the central importance of sovereignty:
"there should be no interference in any country's internal
affairs" and both nations have the right to "choose their
own paths" on human rights.[3]
China, thus, views outside efforts to promote and protect
human rights in China as a Western scheme to destabilize
China and thwart its peaceful rise and thus to weaken or
infringe China's sovereignty. This view is misguided.
Promotion of human rights in China is actually positive for
the most sensitive aspect of sovereignty for China, the
prospect of unification across the Taiwan Strait. In other
words, zhuquan and renquan-sovereignty and human rights-are
potentially part of a positive sum game for what Beijing
identifies as its core national interests.
Understanding this non-zero-sum game also helps explain a
seeming paradox in the impact of Beijing's cross-strait
policy under Hu and since Ma Ying-jeou became president in
Taiwan. Why have China's policy changes and the improvements
in cross-strait relations done so little for Beijing's
agenda on sovereignty over Taiwan?
China's rise in the last three decades and its insistence on
peaceful development have promoted the country's move toward
becoming a responsible stakeholder in the international
community and even a superpower. Although Beijing has not
relinquished its claimed right to use force to unify Taiwan,
its current stance basically rules out such an option if
Taiwan does not move from de facto to de jure independence.
Based on the heping tongyi, yiguo liangzhi ("peaceful
unification and one country, two systems") formula,
introduced in early 1980s, China accepts that the best
scenario for China is to have Taiwan unify with the
motherland via peaceful means.
Beijing can adopt this approach because it knows Taiwan's
options for its relations with China are quite limited. If
Taiwan chose to declare independence, it not only would risk
a military attack from across the Taiwan Strait. It also
would not receive essential international support,
especially from the United States. It is clear that
Washington would consider such a move a unilateral change of
status quo and would not condone it.
If Taiwan chose the lesser option of brinksmanship-taking
provocative actions to antagonize China without officially
proclaiming an independent Republic of Taiwan, the U.S. and
the international community would consider Taiwan a trouble
maker. Taiwan would risk international isolation
diplomatically, polarization politically, reinforcement of
cleavages socially and loss of foreign market access and
investment opportunity economically.
Taiwan has foregone these options in favor of the more
conciliatory approach towards China that President Ma has
been pursuing since he came to power in 2008. This has
prevented further diplomatic setbacks for Taiwan and allowed
greater economic integration across the strait, but it has
failed to eliminate political polarization and reduce social
cleavages in Taiwan. This approach, despite its limitations,
seems to be the most sensible option by far and has the
potential to produce a win-win-win scenario for Taipei,
Beijing and Washington.
The trend in the first two and half years of the Ma
administration has been positive. Talks between Strait
Exchange Foundation (SEF) of Taiwan and the mainland's
Association for Relations across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS)
in 2008 resumed after a more-than-a-decade-hiatus in formal
negotiations. The two sides signed fifteen agreements,
including the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement
(ECFA), which was specifically identified and "applauded" by
the United States in the Joint Statement at the Obama-Hu
Washington summit. ECFA is, and should be, considered a
giant leap forward for cross-strait relations, especially
from Beijing's perspective. ECFA and other developments
affirm that Taiwan is no longer seeking independence and is
not engaging in brinksmanship.
For its part, Beijing has acquiesced in the policy of "three
nos" (butong, budu, buwu or "no unification, no
independence, no war") that Ma set forth in his inaugural
address in May 2008. When Ma's then-newly-installed
Kuomintang-led government announced its desire to establish
direct air links across Taiwan Strait, Beijing allowed ARATS
and SEF to resume talks and negotiate for the links to be
opened on Taipei's announced schedule.
When Ma unilaterally declared a "diplomatic truce" (under
which Beijing and Taipei would not compete for diplomatic
ties with other states) in support of greater international
space for Taiwan, the Beijing government turned down
attempts by several Latin American countries (including
Paraguay, Nicaragua, Panama and Guatemala) to switch
diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. Beijing also
showed diplomatic flexibility in accepting former Vice
President of the Republic of China Lien Chan's participation
in an Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit. In
addition, Beijing did not stand in the way when Taiwan
(under the name Chinese Taipei) sought and received observer
status in the World Health Assembly (WHA) meetings.
Most important of all, with the signing of ECFA, China has
granted more tariff free entry for Taiwan exports that
Taiwan has granted to mainland exports-an arrangement
designed to protect Taiwan's farmers. This policy of rangli
(yielding benefits), announced by Chinese Premier Wen
Jiabao, became a prevalent theme throughout the negotiation.
The term may also be used to describe the spirit of
rapprochement between the Chinese Communist Party and Ma's
Kuomintang and between the mainland and Taiwan since Ma took
office.
Indeed, the Republic of China has maintained the same number
of diplomatic allies (twenty-three) since March 2008,
arresting what could have been an acceleration of a long-
term decline absent the diplomatic truce. The upgrading of
Taiwan's APEC special envoy and the acquisition of an
observer role in the WHA would not have been possible during
the rule of former President Chen Shui-bian from the pro-
independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Taiwan's
quick rebound from the financial crisis of 2008-2010 might
not have been possible without the deepening of integration
with the strong and rising mainland economy-something that
the general improvement in cross-strait relations
facilitated.
Yet, after more than 30 months of improved ties and a more
relaxed atmosphere across the strait, including more than
300 direct flights weekly, over one million Chinese tourists
visiting Taiwan and the continuation of long-building
increases in trade and investment, the percentage of people
in Taiwan who consider themselves Chinese and
Chinese/Taiwanese has declined from over 15 percent to less
than 10 percent since Ma took power.[4] The support for
"national unification" is also stagnating, with total
preference for immediate unification and status quo now,
unification later hovering around 10 percent.[5]
Why, with all the apparent progress in cross-strait
rapprochement, is there no change in Taiwan's identity and
preference for unification? The question is surely puzzling
for leaders in Beijing who see themselves as having
accommodated most of Taiwan's demands and requests for two
and a half years. The answer is easy and has to do with
human rights and the mainland's troubled assessment of the
relationship between human rights and sovereignty.
Beijing's approach to human rights undermines its agenda on
sovereignty over Taiwan. The different political systems on
the two sides of the strait and the absence of basic values
of human rights and democracy on the mainland are key
factors that have dissuaded Taiwanese people from
considering political integration in the future to be
acceptable, even though they do not object to economic
integration.
Beijing's reaction has not been helpful to its own aims. The
weak support for unification in Taiwan has made Chinese
leaders even more suspicious of Taiwan's true intention in
pursuing the relaxation of relations across the strait,
which some on the mainland see as merely an effort to buy
time to stall the unification process. Thus, even with
improvement of cross-strait ties, Beijing has continued to
follow its old practice of protesting vehemently every one
of Taipei's weapons procurements from the United States., in
the most recent case suspending military to military
exchanges with the United States and other aspects of
bilateral strategic dialogue. Such Chinese reactions are not
well-received in Taiwan. The DPP-led Pan Green worries that,
lacking the ability to fight, Taiwan will face forced
incorporation into China. The KMT-led Pan Blue sees arms
procurement as necessary for maintaining confidence among
the Taiwan populace to continue cross-strait dialogue
without fear that it will accelerate into a coerced
settlement of sovereignty issues. Beijing's harsh line on
arms sales suggests Beijing may not fully recognize that,
even though mainland/Chinese identity is still very low and
support for unification remains unenthusiastic in Taiwan, it
is likely in Beijing's interests to see Ma's government
remain in power. A Pan Blue government is at least willing
to provide China an opportunity to win back the island while
a Pan Green government would not. Beijing's seemingly still-
lacking understanding of Taiwan's political dynamics and
social fabric increase the risk that Beijing's stance on
arms sales and other cross-strait-related issues can start
what are, from Beijing's perspective, vicious cycles in
Taiwan's domestic politics.
What, then, should the mainland authorities do? They should
more fully recognize the universality of human rights and
take steps toward adopting a more human rights-protecting
and democratic system on the mainland. Beijing should
recognize that protection and promotion of human rights in
the mainland would help improve China's standing among the
Taiwanese people and thus advance Beijing's goal of national
unification. Even if China became as prosperous as Taiwan
and evolved into a democratic system that respects basic
human rights, this still would not guarantee the necessary
increase of support for unification in Taiwan. But if
Beijing continues to insist on maintaining authoritarian
rule and claiming the legitimacy of its different human
rights standards, the likelihood of peaceful unification
(and protection of what Beijing considers its core interest
in sovereignty) is unlikely to increase.
The Chinese leadership needs to recognize that criticism
from the United States, other Western nations, Taiwan and
elsewhere is not the assault on Chinese sovereignty that
such sources' recognition or assertion of Taiwan's status as
a separate state or their unqualified rejection of China's
claim to sovereignty over the island would be. The
Washington summit showed both the potential of, and the
persisting limits to, such an approach from Beijing. Hu
Jintao, in responding to a question at the two presidents'
joint press conference, proclaimed that China "recognizes
and also respects the "universality of human rights" and
indicated that China will continue its "efforts to promote
democracy and the rule of law" in China. But Hu also
maintained there is a "need to take into account the
different and national circumstances when it comes to the
universal value of human rights."[6] While this
acknowledgement of the universality of human rights,
democracy and the rule of law is still to be applauded, its
seriousness is open to doubt (as a reporter's follow-up
question at the press conference illustrated) and the
qualifying language that Hu added gives reason for
skepticism. It is still regrettably far from clear that
China's leaders understand that it is in China's national
interest to do more to embrace the human rights values urged
by Western critics and that doing so also serves China's
identified core national interest in peaceful unification
with Taiwan. Hu and his successors should understand that
pursuing zhuquan (sovereignty) in human rights and in
territorial integrity and promoting renquan (human rights)
need not be a non-zero sum game after all.
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Notes
[1] See U.S.-China Joint Statement, January 19, 2011 at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/19/us-china-joint-statement.
[2] See Press Conference with President Obama and President
Hu of the People's Republic of China, January 19, 2011 at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/19/press-conference-president-obama-and-president-hu-peoples-republic-china.
[3] See Joint Statement, ibid.
[4] Minzhong dui zhiwo rentong de kanfa (View of People on
Self-Identity), in Niandu zonghe fenxi baogao (Annual
Analysis of Composite Report), see years 2008 and 2009, at
http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/973944270.pdf and
http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/012517312648.pdf
[5] Zhonghua minguo Taiwan diqu minzhong dui liang'an guanxi
de kanfa (View of People in Taiwan Area, the Republic of
China, on Cross-Strait Relations), at
http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/11718424319.pdf
[6] See Press Conference with President Obama and President
Hu of the People's Republic of China, January 19, 2011 at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/19/press-conference-president-obama-and-president-hu-peoples-republic-china.
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