From FPRI:
CAN HEZBOLLAH COPE WITH A CHANGING MIDDLE EAST?
by Benedetta Berti
December 2, 2011
Benedetta Berti is an Associate Fellow at the Institute for
National Security Studies (INSS) ) and a Lecturer at Tel
Aviv University, specializing in terrorism and political
violence in the Middle East, radical Islamic organizations,
and Palestinian and Lebanese politics.
Available on the web and in pdf format at:
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/2011/201111.berti.hezbollah.html
----------------------------------------------------------
Two new audio files on Egypt and North Africa
Friday, December 2
Interview with FPRI Associate Scholar, Eric Trager from Cairo.
He reviewed the historic elections in Egypt, and where Egypt
is headed as a result.
http://www.fpri.org/multimedia/radio/2011/20111202.trager.egypt.html
Wednesday, November 30
Political Transition in North Africa
Featuring
Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, Senior Fellow of FPRI
Audra Grant, Rand Corporation
William Lawrence, International Crisis Group
Peter Schraeder of Loyola University of Chicago
http://www.fpri.org/multimedia/20111130.symposium.nafrica.html
----------------------------------------------------------
CAN HEZBOLLAH COPE WITH A CHANGING MIDDLE EAST?
by Benedetta Berti
While the Middle East undergoes fast-paced, dramatic social
and political change, Hezbollah has been trying its best to
shield itself from the process that has been redefining the
balance of power and reshuffling the political cards in the
region-focusing instead on consolidation and continuity.
However, despite the organization's repeated reassurances to
the contrary, the level of popular and political support for
Hezbollah is not as solid as Hassan Nasrallah, the group's
Secretary General, would like us to believe.
Backed by its formidable military strength and by its
unshakable strategic partnership with Iran, Hezbollah has
spent the past few months repositioning itself at the center
of the Lebanese political arena, which has recently seen
both the rise of a friendly government under PM Najib Mikati
as well as the de facto marginalization of the "pro-Western"
March 14 forces and their "Cedar Revolution."
A remarkable island of stability in a rapidly changing
region, the Lebanese-Shiite militia seems to have managed to
overcome several important challenges and maintained its
position of relative strength and control over Lebanese
political life. Firstly, the group has deftly dealt with
the so-called Arab Spring by adopting an enthusiastic-albeit
selective (the exception being of course Syria)-endorsement
of the "revolutions," combined with a propaganda campaign
linking the protests to the group's agenda of "resistance."
Secondly, Hezbollah's bet on the Assad regime's capacity to
ride out the ongoing protests within Syria has paid off so
far, as the regime is still standing and Hezbollah continues
to benefit from its alliance with its longtime partner.
Finally, the group has been able to withstand the blow dealt
by the UN Special Tribunal's indictments against four
Hezbollah militants, now formally accused of participating
in the assassination of former PM, Rafic Hariri. The delays
and shortcomings of the investigations, combined with
Hezbollah's intensive domestic campaign to undermine the
legitimacy of the STL, have managed to convince the backbone
of Hezbollah's constituency-the Lebanese Shiite community-to
continue to stand by the Party of God.
However, the current success of the Lebanese-Shiite
organization in dodging bullets may well prove to be
ephemeral.
Ideologically, the contrast between the discourses on the
Arab Spring-one which is centered on rights and freedoms and
the other, Hezbollah's, which pays lip service to the
importance of establishing a free society despite its own
staunch support for political repression in Syria-is stark.
Hezbollah strongly rejects the accusation of applying a de
facto double-standard and argues that the Syrian regime is
significantly different from other regimes affected by the
Arab Spring. In fact, Hezbollah asserts that Syria is the
only country able to go against U.S.-Israeli interests in
the region, and it is also the only country where the
population is strongly divided between pro-Assad and anti-
Assad forces.[1] What's more, in the words of Nasrallah,
Assad has been willing to engage in an internal process of
reform, thus complying with the demands of the
protesters.[2] In this sense, the continuation of the
demonstrations is more a consequence of Assad's
unwillingness to "bow" to U.S.-Israeli interests than the
result of concrete and unaddressed social and political
grievances, according to Nasrallah.[3] However, despite
these attempts to rationalize its stance, there has been
widespread criticism with respect to Hezbollah's defense of
the bloodshed in Syria. In turn, this has led to Syrian
demonstrations against Nasrallah and his group (during which
Hezbollah's flags were burned), as well as to harsh
criticism within Lebanon as well as in the Gulf countries.
With time, this may translate into a progressive decline of
the group's appeal within the region. Put simply by the pro-
March 14 newspaper, Now Lebanon, "Any ally of a dictator is
an enemy of the Arab street." [4]
Moreover, from a strategic perspective, even though Assad
has been able to stay in power, the regime is still very
much hanging on by a thread. If the Syrian regime were to
fall, Hezbollah would lose a crucial ally in the region and
may have hard time establishing good relations with the same
opposition forces that it accused earlier of being on the
U.S.' payroll. In addition, regime change could provide the
"Cedar Revolution" and Hezbollah's political opponents in
Lebanon with a powerful second-wind.
But, aside from these very real regional concerns, the most
serious challenge that Hezbollah now faces is domestic, and
it is largely a product of the organization's own hubris in
dealing with its political allies.
In the past few weeks, Hezbollah has in fact taken a series
of positions that may lead the group to lose the support of
its own political allies, while potentially further
alienating the non-Shiite Lebanese population.
First, Hezbollah has firmly stated that it will not allow
the Cabinet to approve funding to the STL-a position that
openly mocks PM Mikati's pledges to the international
community to fulfill all of Lebanon's international
obligations. With the Sunni PM having already been accused
by his political opponents of being a puppet in the hands of
Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shiite organization's intransigence
with respect to funding the STL puts the PM in an quite the
predicament: either to concede to Hezbollah's dictates
regarding the STL-thus losing both credibility in front of
the international community as well as the support of his
own community-or resign and allow Lebanon to fall into yet
another political crisis.
In addition, Hezbollah's behavior has also been problematic
with regard to its unwavering support for the Syrian regime.
While Mikati has been quietly attempting to downplay
Lebanon's support for Syria to the international community
(for example, by abstaining in the UNSC vote on the European
draft resolution condemning the events in Syria); Hezbollah
is making no mystery of its own support for the Syrian
regime. Nasrallah has had a decidedly muted response about
the ongoing cross-border Syrian incursions.[5] Likewise,
Hezbollah's ministers have been contesting the
investigations by Lebanon's Internal Security Services into
the kidnappings of Syrian dissents within Lebanon.[6] This
divergence within Lebanon's political circles indicates,
once again, a growing tension, both between the government
and the opposition forces as well as within the government
itself.
In this context, while the PM continues to clash with the
Lebanese-Shiite group over Lebanon's international standing
and its pre-existing obligations, other voices from within
Hezbollah's political coalition have started to sound more
ambiguous regarding their commitment to the current
government. One such voices is that of Druze leader, Walid
Jumblatt, who, while waiting to see how things turn out in
Syria, has thus far decided to remain in the Hezbollah-led
coalition. Jumblatt has, however, emphasized his personal
differences with Nasrallah's organization, including on STL
funding and on the relationship with Syria.[7]
At the moment, the group's most solid cross-sectarian ally
is certainly Christian leader Michel Aoun, and his Free
Patriotic Movement (FPM). However, given Aoun's growing
unpredictability and his increased political demands, it is
not entirely clear whether this alliance is solely an asset
to Hezbollah. In addition, and despite their long-standing
political partnership, recent reports in the news have given
voice to criticism from within the FPM, quietly questioning
some of Hezbollah's tactics and practices.[8]
In parallel, Hezbollah's uncompromising attitude with
respect to both the STL and to Syria have also brought
existing differences to the fore between the Lebanese Shiite
group and the March 14 coalition and their political
supporters. These tensions further escalated in the past
weeks after Hezbollah allegedly tried to extend its own
telecoms network into the town of Tarshish, south-east of
Beirut in the predominantly Christian district of Zahle. On
that occasion, the alleged attempt by Nasrallah's group to
extend its own private communications network to the town of
Tarshish led to both tensions with the residents, who
actively intervened to stop the Hezbollah members from
continuing their work, as well as to sharp criticism by the
March 14 forces.[9]
These recent clashes, together with mounting internal
criticism of Nasrallah's group, seem to indicate that the
level of popular dissatisfaction with Hezbollah is growing
within Lebanon, and that the party's current attitude with
respect to both the Syrian regime as well as the STL may end
up backfiring.
The possibility of the Party of God losing its current
political backing and of the country falling into yet
another political crisis deeply threatens the group's
political power and position within Lebanon. It also calls
into question Hezbollah's capacity to remain relevant in a
rapidly changing region. This would be especially true in
the case that the group's longtime ally and partner, the
Assad regime, were to fall. In this sense, the Party of God
is now facing one of the most serious challenges since its
foundation in the early 1980s.
Could Hezbollah attempt to initiate a conflict with Israel
to diffuse growing internal tensions? It is possible,
although it seems unlikely that the group would risk
entering another round of hostilities with Israel while in a
position of internal weakness and regional ambiguity. Given
the alternative scenarios, Hezbollah may be stuck with
trying to preserve the current uneasy status quo, while
hoping that Syria rides out the political storm.
----------------------------------------------------------
Notes
[1] "The interview made with Hezbollah Secretary General
Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah by Al-Manar Channel," October 24,
2011, Hezbollah Press Statement, October 25, 2011.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Hanin Ghaddar, "A New Resistance, A New Enemy," October
24, 2011.
http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=325376#ixzz1cv6lf9Av
[5] "The interview made with Hezbollah Secretary General
Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah by Al-Manar Channel," October 24,
2011. Hezbollah Press Statement, October 25, 2011.
[6] "Fatfat Holds Hezbollah Responsible for Threats against
Him," The Daily Star, October 25, 2011.
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/2011/Oct-25/152172-fatfat-holds-hezbollah-responsible-for-threats-against-him.ashx#ixzz1cv9TGVOc
[7] "Jumblatt to Al-Manar: To Remain within Majority Ranks,
but 'With My Own Views,'" Al-Manar, October 15, 2011.
http://www.almanar.com.lb/english/adetails.php?eid=31486&cid=23&fromval=1
[8] Imad Marmal, "Aoun: The resistance is not enough to be
immune from the corruption eating [the group] from inside.
Thus, this is the reason behind increased difference between
the Free Movement and Hezbollah," As-Safir, October 18,
2011. [Arabic]
http://www.assafir.com/Article.aspx?EditionId=1981&ChannelId=46840&ArticleId=1792&Author=%C3%9A%C3%A3%C3%87%C3%8F%20%C3%A3%C3%91%C3%A3%C3%A1
[9] "Hezbollah's Land Communication Network Stops at the
Borders Of Tarshish_" Al-Rai al-Aam, October 23, 2011.
[Translation by MideastWire]
----------------------------------------------------------
Copyright Foreign Policy Research Institute
(http://www.fpri.org/).
CAN HEZBOLLAH COPE WITH A CHANGING MIDDLE EAST?
by Benedetta Berti
December 2, 2011
Benedetta Berti is an Associate Fellow at the Institute for
National Security Studies (INSS) ) and a Lecturer at Tel
Aviv University, specializing in terrorism and political
violence in the Middle East, radical Islamic organizations,
and Palestinian and Lebanese politics.
Available on the web and in pdf format at:
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/2011/201111.berti.hezbollah.html
----------------------------------------------------------
Two new audio files on Egypt and North Africa
Friday, December 2
Interview with FPRI Associate Scholar, Eric Trager from Cairo.
He reviewed the historic elections in Egypt, and where Egypt
is headed as a result.
http://www.fpri.org/multimedia/radio/2011/20111202.trager.egypt.html
Wednesday, November 30
Political Transition in North Africa
Featuring
Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, Senior Fellow of FPRI
Audra Grant, Rand Corporation
William Lawrence, International Crisis Group
Peter Schraeder of Loyola University of Chicago
http://www.fpri.org/multimedia/20111130.symposium.nafrica.html
----------------------------------------------------------
CAN HEZBOLLAH COPE WITH A CHANGING MIDDLE EAST?
by Benedetta Berti
While the Middle East undergoes fast-paced, dramatic social
and political change, Hezbollah has been trying its best to
shield itself from the process that has been redefining the
balance of power and reshuffling the political cards in the
region-focusing instead on consolidation and continuity.
However, despite the organization's repeated reassurances to
the contrary, the level of popular and political support for
Hezbollah is not as solid as Hassan Nasrallah, the group's
Secretary General, would like us to believe.
Backed by its formidable military strength and by its
unshakable strategic partnership with Iran, Hezbollah has
spent the past few months repositioning itself at the center
of the Lebanese political arena, which has recently seen
both the rise of a friendly government under PM Najib Mikati
as well as the de facto marginalization of the "pro-Western"
March 14 forces and their "Cedar Revolution."
A remarkable island of stability in a rapidly changing
region, the Lebanese-Shiite militia seems to have managed to
overcome several important challenges and maintained its
position of relative strength and control over Lebanese
political life. Firstly, the group has deftly dealt with
the so-called Arab Spring by adopting an enthusiastic-albeit
selective (the exception being of course Syria)-endorsement
of the "revolutions," combined with a propaganda campaign
linking the protests to the group's agenda of "resistance."
Secondly, Hezbollah's bet on the Assad regime's capacity to
ride out the ongoing protests within Syria has paid off so
far, as the regime is still standing and Hezbollah continues
to benefit from its alliance with its longtime partner.
Finally, the group has been able to withstand the blow dealt
by the UN Special Tribunal's indictments against four
Hezbollah militants, now formally accused of participating
in the assassination of former PM, Rafic Hariri. The delays
and shortcomings of the investigations, combined with
Hezbollah's intensive domestic campaign to undermine the
legitimacy of the STL, have managed to convince the backbone
of Hezbollah's constituency-the Lebanese Shiite community-to
continue to stand by the Party of God.
However, the current success of the Lebanese-Shiite
organization in dodging bullets may well prove to be
ephemeral.
Ideologically, the contrast between the discourses on the
Arab Spring-one which is centered on rights and freedoms and
the other, Hezbollah's, which pays lip service to the
importance of establishing a free society despite its own
staunch support for political repression in Syria-is stark.
Hezbollah strongly rejects the accusation of applying a de
facto double-standard and argues that the Syrian regime is
significantly different from other regimes affected by the
Arab Spring. In fact, Hezbollah asserts that Syria is the
only country able to go against U.S.-Israeli interests in
the region, and it is also the only country where the
population is strongly divided between pro-Assad and anti-
Assad forces.[1] What's more, in the words of Nasrallah,
Assad has been willing to engage in an internal process of
reform, thus complying with the demands of the
protesters.[2] In this sense, the continuation of the
demonstrations is more a consequence of Assad's
unwillingness to "bow" to U.S.-Israeli interests than the
result of concrete and unaddressed social and political
grievances, according to Nasrallah.[3] However, despite
these attempts to rationalize its stance, there has been
widespread criticism with respect to Hezbollah's defense of
the bloodshed in Syria. In turn, this has led to Syrian
demonstrations against Nasrallah and his group (during which
Hezbollah's flags were burned), as well as to harsh
criticism within Lebanon as well as in the Gulf countries.
With time, this may translate into a progressive decline of
the group's appeal within the region. Put simply by the pro-
March 14 newspaper, Now Lebanon, "Any ally of a dictator is
an enemy of the Arab street." [4]
Moreover, from a strategic perspective, even though Assad
has been able to stay in power, the regime is still very
much hanging on by a thread. If the Syrian regime were to
fall, Hezbollah would lose a crucial ally in the region and
may have hard time establishing good relations with the same
opposition forces that it accused earlier of being on the
U.S.' payroll. In addition, regime change could provide the
"Cedar Revolution" and Hezbollah's political opponents in
Lebanon with a powerful second-wind.
But, aside from these very real regional concerns, the most
serious challenge that Hezbollah now faces is domestic, and
it is largely a product of the organization's own hubris in
dealing with its political allies.
In the past few weeks, Hezbollah has in fact taken a series
of positions that may lead the group to lose the support of
its own political allies, while potentially further
alienating the non-Shiite Lebanese population.
First, Hezbollah has firmly stated that it will not allow
the Cabinet to approve funding to the STL-a position that
openly mocks PM Mikati's pledges to the international
community to fulfill all of Lebanon's international
obligations. With the Sunni PM having already been accused
by his political opponents of being a puppet in the hands of
Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shiite organization's intransigence
with respect to funding the STL puts the PM in an quite the
predicament: either to concede to Hezbollah's dictates
regarding the STL-thus losing both credibility in front of
the international community as well as the support of his
own community-or resign and allow Lebanon to fall into yet
another political crisis.
In addition, Hezbollah's behavior has also been problematic
with regard to its unwavering support for the Syrian regime.
While Mikati has been quietly attempting to downplay
Lebanon's support for Syria to the international community
(for example, by abstaining in the UNSC vote on the European
draft resolution condemning the events in Syria); Hezbollah
is making no mystery of its own support for the Syrian
regime. Nasrallah has had a decidedly muted response about
the ongoing cross-border Syrian incursions.[5] Likewise,
Hezbollah's ministers have been contesting the
investigations by Lebanon's Internal Security Services into
the kidnappings of Syrian dissents within Lebanon.[6] This
divergence within Lebanon's political circles indicates,
once again, a growing tension, both between the government
and the opposition forces as well as within the government
itself.
In this context, while the PM continues to clash with the
Lebanese-Shiite group over Lebanon's international standing
and its pre-existing obligations, other voices from within
Hezbollah's political coalition have started to sound more
ambiguous regarding their commitment to the current
government. One such voices is that of Druze leader, Walid
Jumblatt, who, while waiting to see how things turn out in
Syria, has thus far decided to remain in the Hezbollah-led
coalition. Jumblatt has, however, emphasized his personal
differences with Nasrallah's organization, including on STL
funding and on the relationship with Syria.[7]
At the moment, the group's most solid cross-sectarian ally
is certainly Christian leader Michel Aoun, and his Free
Patriotic Movement (FPM). However, given Aoun's growing
unpredictability and his increased political demands, it is
not entirely clear whether this alliance is solely an asset
to Hezbollah. In addition, and despite their long-standing
political partnership, recent reports in the news have given
voice to criticism from within the FPM, quietly questioning
some of Hezbollah's tactics and practices.[8]
In parallel, Hezbollah's uncompromising attitude with
respect to both the STL and to Syria have also brought
existing differences to the fore between the Lebanese Shiite
group and the March 14 coalition and their political
supporters. These tensions further escalated in the past
weeks after Hezbollah allegedly tried to extend its own
telecoms network into the town of Tarshish, south-east of
Beirut in the predominantly Christian district of Zahle. On
that occasion, the alleged attempt by Nasrallah's group to
extend its own private communications network to the town of
Tarshish led to both tensions with the residents, who
actively intervened to stop the Hezbollah members from
continuing their work, as well as to sharp criticism by the
March 14 forces.[9]
These recent clashes, together with mounting internal
criticism of Nasrallah's group, seem to indicate that the
level of popular dissatisfaction with Hezbollah is growing
within Lebanon, and that the party's current attitude with
respect to both the Syrian regime as well as the STL may end
up backfiring.
The possibility of the Party of God losing its current
political backing and of the country falling into yet
another political crisis deeply threatens the group's
political power and position within Lebanon. It also calls
into question Hezbollah's capacity to remain relevant in a
rapidly changing region. This would be especially true in
the case that the group's longtime ally and partner, the
Assad regime, were to fall. In this sense, the Party of God
is now facing one of the most serious challenges since its
foundation in the early 1980s.
Could Hezbollah attempt to initiate a conflict with Israel
to diffuse growing internal tensions? It is possible,
although it seems unlikely that the group would risk
entering another round of hostilities with Israel while in a
position of internal weakness and regional ambiguity. Given
the alternative scenarios, Hezbollah may be stuck with
trying to preserve the current uneasy status quo, while
hoping that Syria rides out the political storm.
----------------------------------------------------------
Notes
[1] "The interview made with Hezbollah Secretary General
Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah by Al-Manar Channel," October 24,
2011, Hezbollah Press Statement, October 25, 2011.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Hanin Ghaddar, "A New Resistance, A New Enemy," October
24, 2011.
http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=325376#ixzz1cv6lf9Av
[5] "The interview made with Hezbollah Secretary General
Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah by Al-Manar Channel," October 24,
2011. Hezbollah Press Statement, October 25, 2011.
[6] "Fatfat Holds Hezbollah Responsible for Threats against
Him," The Daily Star, October 25, 2011.
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/2011/Oct-25/152172-fatfat-holds-hezbollah-responsible-for-threats-against-him.ashx#ixzz1cv9TGVOc
[7] "Jumblatt to Al-Manar: To Remain within Majority Ranks,
but 'With My Own Views,'" Al-Manar, October 15, 2011.
http://www.almanar.com.lb/english/adetails.php?eid=31486&cid=23&fromval=1
[8] Imad Marmal, "Aoun: The resistance is not enough to be
immune from the corruption eating [the group] from inside.
Thus, this is the reason behind increased difference between
the Free Movement and Hezbollah," As-Safir, October 18,
2011. [Arabic]
http://www.assafir.com/Article.aspx?EditionId=1981&ChannelId=46840&ArticleId=1792&Author=%C3%9A%C3%A3%C3%87%C3%8F%20%C3%A3%C3%91%C3%A3%C3%A1
[9] "Hezbollah's Land Communication Network Stops at the
Borders Of Tarshish_" Al-Rai al-Aam, October 23, 2011.
[Translation by MideastWire]
----------------------------------------------------------
Copyright Foreign Policy Research Institute
(http://www.fpri.org/).
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