The PRC: Splits In The Politburo Leadership

From The Hoover Institution and The Heritage Foundation:

Splits in the Politburo Leadership?


Alice Miller

Several events in recent months—remarks by Premier Wen Jiabao on

political reform, foreign travels of party security chief Zhou Yongkang,

and the elevation of Xi Jinping to a key military policy-making post—

have prompted conjectures about splits among China’s top leadership.

This article assesses the evidence for these speculations.

In some measure, perceptions of splits in the top party leadership have been catalyzed

and complemented by impressions among both domestic and foreign observers of

intensifying competition within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as it prepares to

convene its 18th Congress in the fall of 2012. Even though the party leadership will not

formally place convocation of the party congress on its agenda until its annual Central

Committee plenum in the fall of 2011, politically attuned Chinese and foreign observers

are ever more ready—and not always without reason—to read ongoing events and trends

as portending implications for the expected leadership transition at the party congress two

years hence.

In this context, insistent remarks on the need for “democracy” by Wen Jiabao—in

Shenzhen in August and again in an interview with CNN’s Fareed Zakaria while

attending the United Nations session in New York City in September—have been read as

contrasting starkly with tepid remarks by Hu Jintao on political reform (also made in

Shenzhen), and so as indicating a fundamental split on the future of reform between the

premier and the CCP’s top leader, and perhaps its broader Politburo leadership as well.

Also, travels by internal security chief and Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou

Yongkang have been seen as indicating efforts of a conservative bloc in the party

leadership from the security, military, and propaganda sectors to assert itself in PRC

foreign policy, an interpretation that may aid in explaining the uneven but persistent

evidence of hard-line trends in that arena over the past year and a half. Finally, the

appointment of Xi Jinping to the post of vice chairman of the party Central Military

Commission (CMC) at the 17th Central Committee’s Fifth Plenum in October, a year

after the unexpected failure of the Fourth Plenum to do so, has been seen as the

denouement of a prolonged and apparently failed attempt by party General Secretary Hu

Jintao to derail Xi’s succession of him as China’s paramount leader in favor of Hu’s

crony Vice Premier Li Keqiang.

These are the most plausible interpretations of the recent events described above, or

at leastthe most plausible from among those interpretations that posit leadership conflict


in explaining the events and their significance. In one case, however—that of Xi

Jinping’s promotion to the CMC—available evidence is inconclusive. And in the other

two cases, inferences of leadership conflict are not supported by available evidence.
 
Wen Jiabao and Political Reform


In his remarks in Shenzhen on 20 August, Wen underscored the necessity of political

reform, according to the official news agency Xinhua:

Wen Jiabao pointed out that the nature of a long duration of the initial

stage of socialism has required us to unswervingly push forward reform

and opening up. Our country has made achievements in modernization

that have attracted worldwide attention, but our country is still in the

initial stage of socialism and will continue to be so for a very long time to

come. It is necessary for us to unswervingly struggle for the realization of

the magnificent goal of modernization. It is necessary to remove various

kinds of structural obstacles to economic and social development and the

comprehensive development of man through deepening reform and

opening up, liberate and develop the productive forces to the greatest

extent, and provide an inexhaustible source of strength for the

modernization of the country.

He emphasized the arduousness of perfecting the socialist system and

urged us to unswervingly push forward reform and opening up. He said:

The basic system of socialism of our country has tremendous advantages,

but various mechanisms and structures are not yet sound enough. Only by

continuously emancipating the mind, advancing with the times,

comprehensively pushing forward reform in a sustained manner will it be

possible to build sound and mature socialism with Chinese characteristics.

It is necessary to push forward the reform of the economic structure and it

is also necessary to push forward the reform of the political structure.

Without the guarantee of the reform of the political structure, the

achievements made in the reform of the economic structure will be lost

and it will be impossible to realize the goal of modernization. It is

necessary to protect the people’s democratic rights and interests and their
 
legitimate rights and interests; it is necessary to most extensively mobilize


and organize the people to manage state affairs and economic, social and

cultural affairs according to law; it is necessary to resolve the issue of the

excessive concentration of unrestrained power, create conditions for the

people to criticize and supervise the government and resolutely punish

corruption; it is necessary to build a society with fairness and justice and it

is especially necessary to ensure judicial justice, pay attention to

protecting and helping the easily vulnerable groups, and enable the people

to live with a sense of security and to have confidence in the development

of the country. (Xinhua, 21 August 2010)
 
In an interview with CNN commentator Fareed Zakaria in New York City on 23


September, Wen renewed his stress on the importance of political reform:

ZAKARIA: You have given a series of very interesting speeches in the last few

weeks, in the last few months. I was particularly struck by one you gave in

Shenzhen, where you said, “along with economic reform, we must keep doing

political reform.”

This is a point you made in our last interview, but a lot of people I know in China,

Chinese people, say there has been economic reform over the last six or seven

years, but there has not been much political reform.

What do you say to people who listen to your speeches and they say we love

everything Wen Jiabao says, but we don’t see the actions of political reform.

WEN (through translator): Actually, this is a viewpoint that was put forward by

Mr. Deng Xiaoping a long time ago and I think anyone who has a sense of

responsibility for his country should have deep thinking about this topic, and put

what he believes into action.

I have done some deeper thinking about this topic, since we last met. My view is

that a political party after it becomes a ruling party should be somewhat different

from the one when it was struggling for power.

The biggest difference should be that this political party should act in accordance

with the constitution and the law. The policies and propositions of a political party

can be translated into parts of the constitution and the laws through appropriate

legal procedures.

All political parties, organizations, and all people should abide by the constitution

and laws without any exception. They must all act in accordance with the

constitution and laws. I see that as a defining feature of modern political system
 
development.


I have summed up my political ideals into the following four sentences, to let

everyone lead a happy life with dignity, to let everyone feel safe and secure, to let

the society be one with equity and justice and to let everyone have confidence in

the future.

In spite of the various discussions and views in society, and in spite of some

resistance, I will act in accordance with these ideals unswervingly, and advance

within the realm of my capabilities political restructuring. I would like to tell you

the following two sentences to reinforce my case on this, or my view on this

point, that is I will not fall in spite of the strong wind and harsh rain, and I will not

yield until the last day of my life.1
 
Arguments that Wen’s remarks on political reform and the need for democracy both


in Shenzhen and to Fareed Zakaria reflected a split between the premier and others in the

CCP’s top leadership have rested on several inferences:

• Wen’s remarks stand out because they depart from the prevailing party line on

“political restructuring” in calling for “democracy” consistent with Western

understanding of the term;

• the heterodoxy of Wen’s remarks is evident because they were censored in China;

• Wen’s divergence from the rest of the top leadership is evident from the paltry,

passing comments of Hu Jintao, also in Shenzhen, only two weeks later, on 6

September;

• broader leadership endorsement of Hu’s views is indicated by a series of

authoritative “Commentator Articles” articles endorsing his Shenzhen speech in

the party newspaper People’s Daily, in contrast to the quarantine on Wen’s

speech; and

• leadership condemnation of Wen’s views is evident in commentaries in the party

journal Seeking Truth and People’s Daily.

Each of these inferences is unfounded. First, the substance of Wen’s comments in

Shenzhen and New York City is not new, either in comparison with Wen’s own

statements in the past or with the prevailing party line on political reform. As the sample

of statements appended to this article shows, Wen has made comparable remarks on the

necessity of political reform for new progress in economic reform and on the need for

advances in “democracy” in the past. Such remarks have become particularly routine in

the reports Wen delivers to the annual sessions of the National People’s Congress (NPC)

on the work of the State Council, over which he presides. Nor do his comments deviate

from the party line, as indicated by a comparison with the report on the work of the

Central Committee delivered by General Secretary Hu Jintao at the 17th Party Congress in

October 2007, the relevant portions of which are also included in the appendix.

Second, Wen’s remarks in Shenzhen were not censored in China. The most

extensive account of his Shenzhen statements is from the Xinhua News Agency itself, in
 
its Chinese-language transmission on 21 August. Under Xinhua’s headline “Only with


Resolute Reform and Opening Will the Country Have a Bright Future,” People’s Daily

published that account in full and in pride of place position on front page on 22 August.

In addition, the Xinhua account was published in full in several nationally circulating

newspapers—including the united front and intellectuals paper Enlightenment Daily

(􀜻􀫼􀲰􀐑) and Economy Daily (􀣜􀠶􀲰􀐑)—and in many provincial party newspapers,

including those in Shanghai, Chengdu, and Guangzhou. The single exception to this

wide coverage was the PLA newspaper Liberation Army Daily, which carried a truncated

version of the Xinhua account that excised, among other things, Wen’s comments on

political reform.
 
It is true that Wen’s remarks to Fareed Zakaria on 23 September were not reported in


China. Xinhua reported the fact of the interview without the substance at the end of a

dispatch that also reported Wen’s meeting with former president Bill Clinton in New

York the same day, merely recounting that Wen had “answered questions on issues

including the world’s economic situation, China-U.S. relations, China’s reforms and

development.” PRC media, however, do not as a rule report the substance of Chinese

leaders’ interviews with foreign media. Xinhua’s terse report on Wen’s interview with

Zakaria thus paralleled, for example, its account of Wen’s last interview with Zakaria, in

New York in September 2008, which also reported only the fact but not the substance of

the interview.
 
Third, the contrast between Wen Jiabao’s remarks on political reform in Shenzhen


and the passing reference to the need for reform in Hu Jintao’s speech on 6 September,

also in Shenzhen, does not indicate that Wen and Hu have split over the issue. For one

thing, the context of each leader’s remarks was fundamentally different. Hu’s speech

marked the 30th anniversary of the inauguration of Shenzhen and the other special

economic zones (SEZs). As such, it was not a recitation of his personal views on the

occasion but rather a recital of consensus views of the broader leadership, almost

certainly reviewed by the Politburo prior to its delivery. Wen’s words, by contrast, were

delivered in the course of a routine inspection tour, during which he expounded—as

leaders normally do on such tours—views both broadly reflective of the leadership as a

whole and on issues directly under his purview within the leadership as they pertain to

the particular locale. In this case, Wen addressed issues of both economic and political

reform as they pertain to Shenzhen and the other SEZs, questions that fall under his

authority as premier. Over the same period, the other members of the Politburo Standing

Committee were also undertaking inspection tours of different regions of China and

offering guidance on the policy areas that each supervises.

The difference in occasion also accounts for the differences in media treatment of

Wen’s and Hu’s remarks in Shenzhen. Xinhua’s account of Wen Jiabao’s remarks was

typical of its normal treatment of comments made by other Politburo Standing Committee

members while making inspection tours of the provinces. Hu Jintao’s Shenzhen speech,

however, was made to commemorate an important anniversary on behalf of the broader

leadership, and so was marked with an editorial in People’s Daily on 6 September and a

series of commentator articles thereafter to facilitate intra-party study of it.

In addition, the elaborate coverage of Wen’s Shenzhen remarks in Guangdong media

underscored their local relevance and undercuts the argument that they diverged from the

views of Hu Jintao. Wen’s remarks received heavy treatment in Guangdong media such

as the Guangdong party newspaper Southern Daily (􀬲􀙚􀲰􀐑), which emphasized their

importance for further reform in Shenzhen and in the other SEZs (two of the remaining

three are in Guangdong). Wen delivered his remarks in Shenzhen in the presence of

Wang Yang, Guangdong party chief and Politburo member, who accompanied Wen

throughout his Guangdong tour. As the top party official in Guangdong, Wang presides
 
over the media in the province, and by all accounts he is a close crony of Hu Jintao’s.


That Wen’s remarks on political reform in Shenzhen and New York do not diverge

from the broader leadership consensus on this topic is suggested by the absence of media

publicity to contrasting views by any other Politburo leader. Wen does regularly take the

topic up, while other members of the Politburo Standing Committee do not. And so

Wen’s pronouncements on the issue appear unique among the leadership. But that may

be better understood in terms of a division of policy labor among members of the

Politburo Standing Committee rather than as indicating Wen’s isolation from other

leaders. That is, Wen regularly addresses issues of “socialist democracy” (referring to

the institutions and processes of the PRC state) while “inner-party democracy” issues

(involving CCP institutions and processes) are frequently addressed separately by Hu

Jintao. Under such a division of policy labor, Wen’s reports on the work of the State
 
Council to the annual NPC sessions have always included a section on “socialist


democracy” and associated government reforms since he began delivering them in 2004.

Wen of course has a strong role in shaping these annual reports, but they are also subject

to prior review and amendment by the full Politburo, as is clear from Xinhua’s reports of

Politburo meetings preceding the opening of the annual NPC sessions. As such, they

bear the imprint of the entire party leadership, not just of Wen Jiabao.

“Zheng Qingyuan”

That Wen’s remarks on political reform in August and September sparked controversy

among the broader public in China is without doubt.2 In particular, liberal intellectuals,

as they have often done in the past on the eve of major party and state meetings, took

Wen’s remarks as an opportunity to try to press their own agenda in favor of

democratizing political reform. Several liberal newspapers and Internet comments called

for new steps toward “democracy,” calls that grew louder when Oslo announced in early

October that imprisoned dissident Liu Xiaobo would be the recipient of the 2010 Nobel

Peace Prize and as the convocation approached of the party Central Committee’s Fifth

Plenum, scheduled to review proposals for a new five-year plan. One such call was a

letter posted on the Internet and signed by 23 party veterans—including Mao Zedong’s

former personal secretary Li Rui—that, without irony, called on the party propaganda

authorities to cease censoring the premier’s views on political reform. “What right does

the Central Propaganda Department have,” the open letter asked, “to place itself even

above the Communist Party Central Committee and above the State Council?”3

In that context, on 27 October the party newspaper People’s Daily published a frontpage

commentary under the by-line “Zheng Qingyuan” (􁆢􀱝􁃰), an evident pseudonym

homophonous with a phrase meaning “setting the record straight” (􁆞􀐧􀱢􁃷). The article

launched a scathing attack on views calling for Western-style democratizing reforms.

Although widely seen as a direct repudiation of Wen Jiabao for his breaking with the

party line on the issue of political reform, the “Zheng” article was much more likely an

effort by the party leadership together to push back against the far more liberal calls for

democracy from liberal intellectuals. For one thing, the article was the third of a five-part

series of articles under the hitherto unknown by-line “Zheng Qingyuan” and under the

overall heading of “Seizing the Historical Opportunities to Build a Well-Off Society in an
 
All-Round Way,” each of which was dedicated to explicating aspects of the new fiveyear


plan proposal adopted at the Fifth Plenum. On the face of it, a five-article campaign

in which only one article seems vaguely relevant to Wen’s comments on political reform

seems a peculiar way to chastise an errant premier.4

In addition, the article did not take to task even indirectly “comrades” in the party

holding erroneous views—a usual tactic in intra-party disputes—nor did the article take

on any of the specifics of Wen’s views on political reform as enunciated in Shenzhen or

New York City (or anywhere previously, for that matter). In its specifics, the article

seemed instead aimed at views circulating in the broader public controversy sparked by

Wen’s comments. Thus, it explicitly attacked four or five “views,” none of which was

evident in Wen’s remarks: (1) that China has had lots of economic reform but no political

reform; (2) that in advancing political reform the party’s leading role may be abandoned;
 
(3) that political reform does not require upholding the socialist system; (4) that political


reform need not “adhere to the road of socialist political development with Chinese

characteristics”; and (5) that political reform need not proceed “gradually and orderly.”

In attacking the fourth target, the article asserts specifically, “we must persistently take

our own road and should never mechanically copy the mode of Western political

structure or practice such things as multiple parties holding office in rotation and the

separation of powers.”

Finally, there has been no indication in succeeding weeks and months that Wen’s

remarks on political reform in September and August have hurt his standing in the

leadership. He continued normal domestic activities and foreign travel as premier in

those months and has done so since, including delivery at the Fifth Plenum of a long

report on the proposals for a new five-year plan.

Zhou Yongkang on the Road

Speculation about possible splits in the top leadership has also been sparked by the recent

travels of Zhou Yongkang, the Politburo Standing Committee member who presides over

internal security. From 9 to 11 October, Zhou visited Pyongyang, and from 31 October

to 2 November he undertook a three-day visit to New Delhi. Foreign travel by China’s

top internal security official—particularly to two capitals with which Beijing’s relations

are particularly sensitive—struck some observers as out of place. This observation

therefore invited the inference that Zhou’s travels were evidence of the insertion of a

conservative coalition of internal security, propaganda, and military leaders into the

conduct of Chinese foreign relations, a conclusion that lent explanatory value to

impressions of a more assertive, hard-line foreign policy in the past two years.

Zhou’s travels to North Korea and India were not, however, a departure from

routine. Since his appointment to the Politburo Standing Committee in October 2007,

Zhou has traveled to Vietnam, Indonesia, and Australia (October–November 2008), to

Sudan and South Africa (November 2009), and to Italy and Norway (June 2010). Luo

Gan, who preceded Zhou Yongkang in the internal security slot on the Politburo Standing
 
Committee, also traveled during his tenure. Luo led party delegations to Iceland,


Finland, Armenia, and Moldova in September 2003 and to Argentina, Uruguay, and Cuba

in December 2005.

The fact is that all members of the Politburo Standing Committee—including those

in exclusively internal party roles—engage in foreign travel. For example, Li

Changchun, the fifth-ranked Standing Committee member who presides over the party’s

propaganda system, led delegations to Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Syria in March

2008, to Burma and Australia in March 2009, to Japan and the ROK in March–April

2009, to Germany in April 2010, and to Estonia, Montenegro, Ireland, and Iran in

September 2010. Similarly, He Guoqiang, head of the party’s internal disciplinary body,

led delegations to Cuba, Trinidad & Tobago, Brazil, and Angola in June and July 2008,

to Egypt, Spain, and Greece in June 2009, and to Italy, Iceland, Norway, Lithuania, and

Turkmenistan in June 2010. In that light, Zhou’s recent foreign travels are not
 
exceptional and so do not seem to bear out the conjecture that supposedly conservative


members of the leadership are injecting themselves into the processes of foreign

relations.

Zhou’s visit to Pyongyang in October does seem interesting in another light,

however. Zhou’s delegation was sent to represent Beijing in Pyongyang’s celebrations of

the 65th anniversary of the founding of the Korean Workers Party (KWP). For the 60th

KWP anniversary in 2005—a more important anniversary on communist calendars—

Beijing had sent a lower-level delegation led by Politburo member Wu Yi. And in 2000,

Beijing had sent no delegation at all to mark the KWP’s 55th anniversary. From that

perspective, the Zhou visit to Pyongyang may have been undertaken as a token effort to

play up solidarity with Pyongyang in a critical period of tensions on the Korean peninsula

and of apparent transition in North Korea’s leadership.

Xi Jinping and the CMC

Finally, the promotion of Xi Jinping as vice chairman of the party CMC at the Fifth

Plenum in October invites speculation about leadership controversy over Xi’s apparent

status as Hu Jintao’s successor to the positions of party general secretary, PRC president,

and chairman of the party and PRC CMCs in 2012 and after. Such speculation seems

warranted only because Xi’s promotion was anticipated to take place at the Central

Committee’s Fourth Plenum in September 2009. But that plenum closed without making

any leadership appointments, and subsequent commentary on the plenum offered no

explanation as to why Xi was not promoted, contrary to widespread expectations. And so

among competing speculations, a last-stage effort by Hu Jintao to derail Xi’s candidacy

in favor of his own favorite, Politburo Standing Committee member and executive Vice

Premier Li Keqiang, was cited as a possible explanation for the delay.

Expectations that Xi would be named to the party CMC at the Fourth Plenum in

2009 were based on the observation that Xi’s growing constellation of high-level

appointments since the 17th Party Congress in 2007 appeared to replicate precisely the

precedents established in the 1990s by Hu Jintao’s preparation to succeed Jiang to the top
 
party, state, and military positions in the 2002–2005 period. Xi was thus elevated onto


the Politburo Standing Committee and made executive secretary of the party Secretariat

at the 17th Central Committee’s First Plenum in October 2007 and soon thereafter he was

made president of the Central Party School, all posts that Hu Jintao had been given at the

14th Party Congress in 1992. Xi was appointed PRC vice president in March 2008 at the

11th NPC, paralleling Hu’s appointment to that post in March 1993. After being

reconfirmed in those posts in 1997–98, Hu was finally added to the party CMC at the 15th

Central Committee’s Fourth Plenum in 1999. Based on that precedent, therefore, it

seemed likely that Xi would be named to the party CMC at the 17th Central Committee’s

Fourth Plenum in 2009. In addition, with a single exception, all high-level leadership

changes since 1992 have been made at the fourth plenums of successive Central

Committees, in what have seemed mid-term adjustments to the leadership between party

congresses.5 But Xi’s promotion to the CMC did not follow the Hu precedent. After the

plenum, mid-level party officials—mostly from the Central Party School, over which Xi
 
presides—were cited in the media pointing out that nothing in the party’s rules requires


leadership appointments be made in any particular Central Committee plenum.

Nevertheless, in subsequent months, nothing in Xi’s continuing duties indicated that

he had been displaced as presumed successor.6 As the Fifth Plenum loomed in October

2010, PRC media hinted that Xi would indeed be promoted at the party meeting. The

Xinhua-sponsored weekly news magazine Outlook (􀨒􀺬) cited Central Party School

Professor Ye Duchu intimating that the plenum “would involve some leadership

changes.”

In the wake of the plenum, on 19 October, the Hong Kong communist newspaper

Wen Wei Po—often a reliable source of information on internal party affairs not found in

the media of the PRC proper—cited observers as stating that Xi’s promotion was part of

a broader reshuffle of the military preceding the 18th Party Congress in the fall of 2012.

Broader changes in the leadership of the PLA’s headquarters departments, services, and

military regions have been under way in recent months, and so it is indeed plausible that

Xi’s promotion was deferred until these pre-congress adjustments in the military brass

began. It is notable in that regard that the only exception to the pattern since 1992 of

high-level leadership changes taking place at mid-term fourth plenums of successive

Central Committees was in 1995, when the 14th Central Committee’s Fifth Plenum

promoted two PLA leaders—Chi Haotian and Zhang Wannian—as vice chairmen of the

CMC, in anticipation of the retirement two years later of veteran CMC Vice Chairmen

Liu Huaqing and Zhang Zhen at the 15th Party Congress in 1997.

In addition, there has been no evidence in the public media of resistance in the PLA

to Xi’s promotion to the CMC. The revelation in Xinhua’s official profile of Xi after his

appointment to the CMC that he had held military posts as political commissar during his

tenure as a party and government official in Fujian, Zhejiang, and Shanghai followed the

precedent of comparable attention by Xinhua to Hu Jintao’s comparable military posts in

its profile of him after his appointment to the CMC in 1999. And so the attention to Xi’s

previous military posts in the provinces did not reflect a particular effort to play up his

military credentials in the face of PLA criticism. Finally, a 21 October commentator
 
article on the Fifth Plenum in the army newspaper Liberation Army Daily saluted Xi’s


appointment to the CMC as “a significant decision made by the Central Committee and

Chairman Hu from the perspective of strengthening national defense construction, army

building, and construction of the CMC leadership group.”

In conclusion, while there is no clear evidence demonstrating that there have been

leadership splits over the succession of Xi Jinping since the 17th Party Congress, neither

is there compelling evidence—including the indications that Xi’s promotion to the CMC

at the Fifth Plenum is part of a larger reshuffle of the military heading into the 18th Party

Congress—to disprove the possibility either.
 
 
Conclusion


Among the three conjectures about splits in the Politburo leadership assessed above, two

lack support from available evidence and alternative explanations are far more

compelling. In the third case—the circumstances of Xi Jinping’s promotion to the

CMC—evidence is inconclusive.

These results do not demonstrate that conflict over power and policy does not exist

in China’s leadership. This author believes on first principles—namely, that Chinese

leaders are human and so as ambitious, competitive, and differing in outlook and policy

preferences as politicians everywhere else—that leadership splits do indeed exist among

China’s top leaders. In a context in which the interests of the various contending

constituencies in China’s political order have multiplied and become increasingly

complex as China’s wealth and power have grown, in which the stakes of leadership

decisions have correspondingly increased, and as China’s leaders confront such episodic

stresses as the world economic downturn since 2008, the potential for splits among

China’s leaders can only have grown.

Nevertheless, China’s leadership under Hu Jintao has functioned as an oligarchic

collective that appears to make decisions on the basis of consensus. The policy processes

and rules by which the Hu leadership operates were implanted by Deng Xiaoping in the

early 1980s, effectively the restoration of an effort to establish collective leadership

procedures in the mid-1950s that was derailed thereafter by Mao’s growing antagonism

toward his veteran colleagues. The processes and rules evolved under Jiang Zemin’s

leadership in the 1990s, and have taken stronger hold under Hu’s leadership in the past

decade. They were implanted by Deng and his colleagues in part to inhibit a return to the

intense free-for-all factional conflicts that characterized the last two decades of Mao

Zedong’s leadership and in part to facilitate governance of a rapidly modernizing

country. The necessity of such a collective leadership politics of consensus was

reinforced as a lesson in 1989, when months of leadership splits over economic policy led

to a paralysis among the leadership in its ability to deal with the demonstrations as they

emerged in Tiananmen Square.
 
As a consequence, leadership differences over power and policy have since been


fought out behind a rigorously sustained public façade of leadership unity and discipline.

In that context, the notion that the party’s third-ranking leader, Wen Jiabao, would air

personal preferences for “Western-style democracy” in opposition to the prevailing views

of the rest of the Chinese leadership in an interview abroad with a foreign journalist

ought to seem farfetched, given the highly negative precedent set by then party General

Secretary Zhao Ziyang breaking party discipline in comparable fashion during the 1989

Tiananmen crisis. Similarly, the public intrusion of the party’s top internal security

leader into foreign relations processes ought to invite a measure of skepticism in a

context of two decades of leadership discipline in that arena.

The upshot is, therefore, that while splits certainly exist among China’s leaders

today, they work themselves out in a significantly different political setting. And so the
 
premises and methods used to identify them in the good old days of the Cultural


Revolution and its aftermath—when “left” was left and “sham left” was really “ultraright”—

must evolve in step.

Appendix: Wen Jiabao on Political Reform

The following are excerpts of past statements on political reform incorporated into State

Council reports delivered by Premier Wen Jiabao to successive sessions of the NPC since

2006 and in the report on the work of the 16th Central Committee delivered at the 17th

Party Congress by party General Secretary Hu Jintao in October 2007. Together, they

offer an authoritative baseline against which to judge the degree to which Wen Jiabao’s

remarks on political reform in Shenzhen on 20 August and in his interview with Fareed

Zakaria in New York City on 23 September 2010 departed from the prevailing party line.

Report on the Work of the State Council to the 11th NPC Third

Session, delivered by Wen Jiabao, 5 March 2010 (Xinhua, 15 March

2010)

The reforms we are undertaking, including economic and political restructuring and

reforms in all other areas are comprehensive. Without political restructuring, it would

not be possible for economic restructuring and the modernization drive to succeed. We

will develop socialist democracy and effectively safeguard the democratic rights of the

people as masters of the country, particularly their right to vote and to stay informed

about, participate in, express views on, and oversee government affairs. We will further

expand primary-level democracy, strengthen primary-level self-governing bodies, and

improve the system of democratic administration at the primary level so that people can

better participate in the management of local public affairs. We will follow the rule of

law and improve the legal system, particularly laws concerning the standardization and

oversight of the exercise of power. We will creatively revise the methods and

mechanisms of the government’s legislative work and expand public participation in it.
 
Report on the Work of the State Council to the 11th NPC Second


Session, delivered by Wen Jiabao, 5 March 2009 (Xinhua, 14 March

2009)

We will strengthen the building of democracy and the legal system. We will actively and

soundly push forward the political system reform and develop socialist democracy. We

must improve the democratic system, enrich the forms of democracy, expand channels

for democracy, and implement democratic elections, decision-making, administration,

and supervision according to the law. We must improve the self-governance mechanisms

of grassroots masses, expand the scope of self-governance by grassroots masses, improve

the system of democratic administration at grassroots levels, and ensure that the masses

directly exercise their democratic rights and administer public affairs and undertakings at
 
grassroots levels in accordance with the law. We will thoroughly carry out propaganda


and education on the legal system, strengthen citizenship education, and establish the

concept of socialist democracy and rule-by-law, freedom and equality, and equity and

justice. We will make overall planning to push forward the building of urban and rural

communities, and promote the healthy development of social organizations. We will

strengthen the government’s work on the legal system, increase transparency and public

participation in the government’s legislation work, and achieve standardized, fair, and

civilized law enforcement.

We will strengthen social management to maintain harmony and stability in the

society. We need to pay special attention to safeguarding people’s legitimate rights and

interests, correctly handle problems among the people, properly resolve their complaints

in a timely manner, and resolutely correct all actions that harm the interests of the

masses. We will improve the mechanism for mediating, handling, and resolving social

tensions and disputes, and guide the people to express concerns related to their interests

by reasonable and lawful means. We will follow the system of having leading cadres,

especially principal ones, to handle people’s letters and receive people’s visits in order to

serve the people and resolve conflicts. We will improve the early warning system for

social stability to actively prevent and properly handle all types of mass incidents. We

will launch intensive campaigns to ensure peace and security and maintain law and order

through a full range of measures. We will be on high alert for and severely crack down on

all kinds of offenses and crimes in accordance with the law to safeguard national security

and social stability.

Report on the Work of the State Council to the 11th NPC First

Session, delivered by Wen Jiabao, 5 March 2008 (Xinhua, 18 March

2008)

8. Step up the building of a socialist democratic legal system and promote social equality

and justice.
 
We will deepen the reform of the political system, develop socialist political


civilization. We will expand people’s democracy, improve the democratic system, and

diversify forms of democracy, and expand its channels. We will carry out democratic

elections, decision-making, administration and oversight in accordance with the law to

ensure the people’s rights of knowledge, participation, expression and supervision. We

will develop democracy, improve the system of autonomy, expand the scope of autonomy

at the grassroots level, strengthen the building of urban and rural communities, bring mo

re transparency to government, village and factory operations, give play to the active role

of civic organizations in expanding public participation in government affairs and

reflecting public appeals, and improve the autonomy function of society.

We will fully carry out the guiding principle of governing the nation by the rule of

law. We will step up government legislation and improve the quality of such legislation.

The year, the government will focus on legislation aimed at improving people’s
 
livelihood, promoting social development, conserving energy and resources and


protecting the eco-system. The work of government legislation should seek views from

various sources. In enacting administrative laws and regulations closely connected with

interests of the public, we should in principal release drafts to solicit public opinions. We

will rationally define and adjust the limits of administrative law enforcement power, and

strengthen oversight and fully implement the responsibility system of law enforcement.

We will improve the system of government administration in accordance with the law at

the city and county levels. We will ensure that administrative charges are collected in a

standardized manner. We will reform and improve the mechanism for the adequate

funding for the judiciary system and for law enforcement. We will improve the filing and

inspection procedures for rules, regulations and regulatory documents. We will improve

the administrative reconsideration system and the administrative reparation and

compensation system. We will ensure the work of providing legal services and assistance.

We will increase publicity and education concerning the law to create a good social

environment for people to consciously study, abide by and apply the law.

We will improve social management. We will step up social organizational

development and improve social management mechanism at the grassroots level. We will

do a good job of handling petitions and ameliorate the petition system. We will improve

the mechanism for mediating social contradictions, properly deal with internal

contradictions among the people, and protect their legitimate rights and interests. We will

improve the social security system for the prevention and control of crime, strengthen the

comprehensive management of social order, and extensively launch campaigns aimed at

creating a safe environment. We will reform and intensify neighborhood police work in

urban and rural areas and beef up migrant population services and management. We will

focus on rectifying prominent social order issues and districts where social order is

chaotic, prevent and clamp down on illegal and criminal activities in accordance with

law, protect the public lives, properties and safety, ensure overall stability of society, and

strengthen the work of national security.
 
Report on the Work of the State Council to the 10th NPC Fifth


Session, delivered by Wen Jiabao, 5 March 2007 (Xinhua, 17 March

2007)

4. We will promote socialist democratic legal system building.

Developing democracy and perfecting the legal system are the intrinsic requirements of

the socialist system. The most important thing about building a harmonious society is

strengthening democratic legal system building and promoting social fairness and justice.

We will actively and steadily promote political system reform and accelerate the

democratic political building with Chinese characteristics. It is necessary to perfect the

system on protecting the people’s democratic rights, and ensuring the people to manage

state affairs, economic and cultural undertakings, and social affairs according to the law.

We will step up the grassroots autonomous organization building in urban and rural areas.

We will expand grassroots democracy and perfect the system of transparency in public

affairs, in factory affairs, and in village affairs. We will ensure that the people can

directly exercise their democratic rights according to the law. Various levels of
 
governments are urged to insist on the scientific and democratic decision-making process,


protect the citizens’ right to information, participation, expression, and supervision.

We will comprehensively promote administration according to the law. In enhancing

the government’s legislative work, the emphasis should be placed on formulating laws on

developing social undertakings, perfecting social protection, enhancing social

management, conserving energy resources, and on protecting the ecological environment.

We will strengthen and improve administration and law enforcement, and actualize

accountability systems in administration and law enforcement. Law enforcement

departments must exercise their power and carry out their duties strictly in accordance

with purviews and procedures stipulated by law. We will further strengthen

administrative supervision. Governments at all levels and their staffs must all take the

lead in abiding by the Constitution and laws, and perform their work strictly in

accordance with the law. They must consciously accept the supervision of the National

People’s Congress and its Standing Committee, accept the democratic supervision of the

Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, and earnestly listen to the opinions

of the democratic parties, industry and commerce unions, personages without party

affiliation, and all civic organizations. They must accept the supervision of the news

media and the general public, and support the supervision and audit departments

independently carrying out their supervisory duties in accordance with the law, thereby

strengthening the checks and supervision over the exercise of power, and ensuring that

the power invested by the people is used in the public interest. We will launch universal

law education in an in-depth manner, and properly undertake the work of administrative

reconsiderations, legal service, and legal support. We will continue to push forward

judicial restructuring and safeguard judicial impartiality.

We will properly undertake ethnic, religious, and overseas Chinese affairs work,

comprehensively implement the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law, and consolidate and

develop an equal, united, mutually helpful, and harmonious socialist ethnic relations. We

will comprehensively implement the party’s basic guiding principles for religious work,

and earnestly actualize the Regulations on Religious Affairs. We will comprehensively

implement the party’s overseas Chinese affairs policies, and give full play to the unique

role of overseas Chinese brethren as well as returned overseas Chinese and their families

in promoting the reunification of the Motherland and national rejuvenation.
 
Report on the Work of the State Council to the 10th NPC Fourth


Session, delivered by Wen Jiabao, 5 March 2006 (Xinhua, 16 March

2006)

(8) Strengthening the Development of Democratic Politics and Safeguarding Social

Stability

We need to consolidate and develop the political situation of democracy, solidarity,

vitality, stability, and harmony. We will improve the democratic system, enrich the

forms of democracy, expand the orderly participation of citizens in politics, and ensure

that the people can exercise democratic elections, democratic decision-making,
 
democratic management, and democratic oversight in accordance with the law. We will


comprehensively push forward administration in accordance with the law, strengthen and

improve the government’s legislative work, with a focus on strengthening legislation in

the areas of resource conservation, ecological and environmental protection, employment,

social security, handling public contingencies, promoting social stability, and

safeguarding market order.

We will improve the mechanisms, procedures, and methods for the public’s

participation in legislative work. We will actively launch follow-up reviews of the

implementation of laws and regulations. We will continue to strengthen specialized

supervision such as auditing and oversight work. We will expand comprehensive law

education in an in-depth manner. We will offer effective legal services and legal aid so as

to provide effective help to people who have difficulty filing litigations. We will

implement various judicial restructuring measures, further regulate law enforcement

activities, promote judicial impartiality, safeguard judicial authority, and realize strict,

impartial, and civilized enforcement of the law.

We will pay close attention to social stability, and promote peace and security in an

extensive and in-depth manner. We will correctly handle conflicts in society in the new

era, and earnestly actualize all the policies involving the people’s interests. We will pay

attention to resolving the problems reported by the people and resolving conflicts in a

timely manner. We will properly undertake the letters and visits work. We will

strengthen and consolidate grassroots political authority, and push forward the

development of harmonious communities as well as harmonious villages and townships.

We will improve social stability early-warning systems and mechanisms for handling

contingencies. We will properly undertake comprehensive law and order management,

accelerate the development of prevention and control systems to ensure law and order,

and in accordance with the law rigorously crack down on serious violent crimes,

economic crimes, and frequent crimes involving encroachment on property, such as theft

and robbery. We will strengthen the national security work.
 
It is the common wish of all ethnic groups throughout the nation to strengthen the


solidarity among the ethnic groups, and safeguard the unity of the motherland and social

stability. We will comprehensively implement policies relevant to ethnic minorities and

related laws and regulations, earnestly actualize the rules promulgated by the State

Council for implementing the law on the autonomy of ethnic minority regions, and

promote unity, joint effort, and shared prosperity and development among all ethnic

groups. We will vigorously cultivate ethnic minority cadres and talents in various areas.

We will implement the party’s basic guidelines for religious work, and increase the

ability to manage religious affairs in accordance with the law. We will further undertake

overseas Chinese work properly under the new circumstances.
 
17th Party Congress Report section on Political Reform, delivered by


CCP General Secretary on 15 October 2007 (Xinhua English

translation, 24 October 2007)

VI. Unswervingly Developing Socialist Democracy

People’s democracy is the lifeblood of socialism. The Party has been consistently

pursuing the goal of developing socialist democracy. Since China began its reform and

opening up, we have made vigorous yet steady efforts to promote political restructuring,

and socialist democracy has demonstrated greater vitality in the country. As an important

part of the overall reform, political restructuring must be constantly deepened along with

economic and social development to adapt to the growing enthusiasm of the people for

participation in political affairs. We must keep to the path of political development under

socialism with Chinese characteristics, and integrate the leadership of the Party, the

position of the people as masters of the country, and the rule of law. We must uphold and

improve the system of people’s congresses, the system of multiparty cooperation and

political consultation under the leadership of the CPC, the system of regional ethnic

autonomy, and the system of self-governance at the primary level of society. All this will

promote continuous self-improvement and development of the socialist political system.

In deepening political restructuring, we must keep to the correct political orientation.

On the basis of ensuring the people’s position as masters of the country, we will expand

socialist democracy, build a socialist country under the rule of law and develop socialist

political civilization to enhance the vitality of the Party and the state and arouse the

initiative of the people. We must uphold the Party’s role as the core of leadership in

directing the overall situation and coordinating the efforts of all quarters, and improve its

capacity for scientific, democratic and law-based governance to ensure that the Party

leads the people in effectively governing the country. We must ensure that all power of

the state belongs to the people, expand the citizens’ orderly participation in political

affairs at each level and in every field, and mobilize and organize the people as

extensively as possible to manage state and social affairs as well as economic and cultural

programs in accordance with the law. We must uphold the rule of law as a fundamental

principle and adopt the socialist concept of law-based governance to ensure that all work
 
of the state is based on the law and that the legitimate rights and interests of citizens are


safeguarded. We must maintain the features and advantages of the socialist political

system and define institutions, standards and procedures for socialist democracy to

provide political and legal guarantees of lasting stability for the Party and the country.

1. Expand people’s democracy and ensure that they are masters of the country. The

essence and core of socialist democracy are that the people are masters of the country.

We need to improve institutions for democracy, diversify its forms and expand its

channels, and we need to carry out democratic election, decision-making, administration

and oversight in accordance with the law to guarantee the people’s rights to be informed,

to participate, to be heard, and to oversee. We must support people’s congresses in

performing their functions pursuant to law and effectively turn the Party’s propositions

into the will of the state through legal procedures. We must ensure that deputies to

people’s congresses exercise their functions and powers in accordance with the law an
 
maintain close ties with the general public. We propose that both urban and rural areas


gradually adopt the same ratio of deputies to the represented population in elections of

deputies to people’s congresses. We must strengthen the institutions of standing

committees of people’s congresses and improve their membership composition in terms

of intellectual background and age. We will support the Chinese People’s Political

Consultative Conference (CPPCC) in performing its functions centered on the two major

themes of unity and democracy and improve the system of political consultation,

democratic oversight, and participation in the deliberation and administration of state

affairs. We will incorporate political consultation in decision-making procedures,

improve democratic oversight and ensure that the CPPCC participates in the deliberation

and administration of state affairs more effectively. The CPPCC is encouraged to

improve itself and play its important role in coordinating relations, pooling strengths,

making proposals and serving the overall interests of the country. We must ensure

equality among all ethnic groups and guarantee the right of ethnic autonomous areas to

exercise autonomy pursuant to law. To ensure scientific and democratic decision-making,

we will improve the information and intellectual support for it, increase its transparency

and expand public participation in it. In principle, public hearings must be held for the

formulation of laws, regulations and policies that bear closely on the interests of the

public. We need to step up education about citizenship and establish socialist concepts of

democracy, the rule of law, freedom, equality, equity and justice. We support trade

unions, the Communist Youth League, women’s federations and other people’s

organizations in functioning in accordance with the law and their respective charters,

participating in social management and public services and helping protect the people’s

legitimate rights and interests.

2. Develop primary-level democracy and ensure that the people enjoy democratic rights

in a more extensive and practical way. The most effective and extensive way for the

people to be masters of the country is that they directly exercise their democratic rights in

accordance with the law to manage public affairs and public service programs at the

primary level, practice self-management, self-service, self-education and self-oversight,

and exercise democratic oversight over cadres. Such practices must be emphasized and

promoted as the groundwork for developing socialist democracy. We need to improve the
 
dynamic mechanism of people’s self-governance at the primary level under the


leadership of primary Party organizations, expand the scope of self-governance, and

improve the institution for democratic management, with a view to turning urban and

rural neighborhoods into communities of social life that are well managed, supported by

complete services, and filled with civility and harmony. We must rely wholeheartedly on

the working class, improve the democratic management system in enterprises and public

institutions with workers’ conferences as its basic form and increase transparency in

factory affairs to support workers’ participation in management and to safeguard their

legitimate rights and interests. We need to deepen institutional reforms at the town and

township level to strengthen government authorities there and improve the systems for

transparency in government and village affairs to bring about effective connection and

beneficial interaction between government administration and primary-level selfgovernance.

We also encourage social organizations to help expand the participation by
 
the public and report on their petitions to improve the self-governance capability of


society.

3. Comprehensively implement the rule of law as a fundamental principle and speed up

the building of a socialist country under the rule of law. The rule of law constitutes the

essential requirement of socialist democracy. We must persist in scientific and

democratic legislation to improve the socialist law system with Chinese characteristics.

We will strengthen the enforcement of the Constitution and laws, ensure that all citizens

are equal before the law, and safeguard social equity and justice and the consistency,

sanctity and authority of the socialist legal system. We need to carry out government

administration in accordance with the law. We need to deepen the reform of the judiciary

system, optimize the distribution of judicial functions and powers, standardize judicial

practices, and build a fair, efficient and authoritative socialist judiciary system to ensure

that courts and procuratorates exercise their respective powers independently and

impartially in accordance with the law. We need to improve the overall quality of

judicial, procuratorial and public security personnel to ensure that law enforcement is

strict, impartial and civilized. We need to step up the education campaign to increase

public awareness of law, and promote the spirit of the rule of law, creating a social

environment in which people study, abide by and apply laws of their own accord. We

must respect and safeguard human rights, and ensure the equal right to participation and

development for all members of society in accordance with the law. Party organizations

at all levels and all Party members must act under the Constitution and laws on their own

initiative and take the lead in upholding the authority of the Constitution and laws.

4. Expand the patriotic united front and unite with all forces that can be united.

Promoting harmony in relations between political parties, between ethnic groups,

between religions, between social strata, and between our compatriots at home and

overseas plays an irreplaceable role in enhancing unity and pooling strengths. Acting on

the principle of long-term coexistence, mutual oversight, sincerity, and sharing of both

good and bad times, we will strengthen our cooperation with the democratic parties,

support them and personages without party affiliation in better performing their functions

of participation in the deliberation and administration of state affairs and democratic
 
oversight, and select and recommend a greater number of outstanding non-CPC persons


for leading positions. Keeping in mind the objective of all ethnic groups working together

for common prosperity and development, we must guarantee the legitimate rights and

interests of ethnic minorities, and strengthen and develop socialist ethnic relations based

on equality, solidarity, mutual assistance and harmony. We will fully implement the

Party’s basic principle for its work related to religious affairs and bring into play the

positive role of religious personages and believers in promoting economic and social

development. We encourage members of emerging social strata to take an active part in

building socialism with Chinese characteristics. We will conscientiously follow the

Party’s policy on overseas Chinese affairs and support overseas Chinese nationals,

returned overseas Chinese and their relatives in caring about and participating in the

modernization drive and the great cause of peaceful reunification of the motherland.
 
5. Accelerate the reform of the administrative system and build a service-oriented


government. The administrative reform is an important part of the efforts to deepen

China’s overall reform. We must lose no time in working out a master plan for it, with

the focus on changing functions, straightening out relations, optimizing the setup and

raising efficiency, and bring about a system which matches powers with responsibilities,

divides work in a rational way, fosters scientific decision-making, and ensures smooth

enforcement and effective oversight. We need to improve the government responsibility

system and the public service system, promote e-government and strengthen social

management and public services. We will accelerate the separation of the functions of the

government from those of enterprises, state assets management authorities, public

institutions and market-based intermediaries, standardize administrative practices,

strengthen administrative law-enforcement agencies, reduce the number of matters

requiring administrative examination and approval and standardize such procedures, and

reduce government intervention in microeconomic operations. We will standardize the

relationship between local departments directly under central government organs and

local governments. We will step up our efforts to streamline government organs, explore

ways to establish greater departments with integrated functions, and improve the

mechanism of coordination and collaboration between government departments. We will

downsize and standardize various organs for deliberation and coordination and their

working offices, cut down levels of administration, minimize its costs, and address the

problems of overlapping organizations and functions and conflicting policies from

different departments. We will give overall consideration to the setup of Party

committees and governments as well as that of people’s congresses and CPPCC

committees, reduce the number of their leading positions and strictly control their

staffing. We will step up the restructuring of different categories of public institutions.

6. Improve the mechanism of restraint and oversight and ensure that power entrusted by

the people is always exercised in their interests. Power must be exercised in the sunshine

to ensure that it is exercised correctly. We must have institutions to govern power, work

and personnel, and establish a sound structure of power and a mechanism for its

operation in which decision-making, enforcement and oversight powers check each other
 
and function in coordination. We will improve organic laws and rules of procedure to


ensure that state organs exercise their powers and perform their functions and

responsibilities within their statutory jurisdiction and in accordance with legal

procedures. We will improve the open administrative system in various areas and

increase transparency in government work, thus enhancing the people’s trust in the

government. We will focus on tightening oversight over leading cadres and especially

principal ones, over the management and use of human, financial and material resources,

and over key positions. We will improve the systems of inquiries, accountability,

economic responsibility auditing, resignation and recall. We will implement the intra-

Party oversight regulations, strengthen democratic oversight and give scope to the

oversight role of public opinion, pooling forces of oversight from all sides to make it

more effective.

Democracy will keep developing along with the progress of socialism. In the

historical course of developing socialism with Chinese characteristics, Chinese
 
Communists and the Chinese people will surely advance socialist democracy that is full


of vitality.

Notes

1 CNN transcript of Fareed Zakaria interview with Wen Jiabao, aired 3 October 2010, accessed at

http://archives.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1010/03/fzgps.01.html.

2 For broader treatment of this public controversy and other aspects of the reaction to Wen’s comments on

political reform heading into the Fifth Plenum, see the article by Joseph Fewsmith in this issue, “Political

Reform Was Never on the Agenda.”

3 South China Morning Post online, 13 Oct 2010.

4 The five “Zheng Qingyuan” articles appeared in People’s Daily on 21, 25, 27, and 29 October and 2

November 2010.

5 See “Xi Jinping and the Case of the Mysterious Succession,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 30 (Fall

2009).

6 See “The Preparation of Li Keqiang,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 31 (Winter 2010).