Monday, November 15, 2010

Turkey: Between Islamism And Secularism--Is There Room For Religious Freedom In Turkey?

From New Europe and Alliance Defense Fund:

Between Islamism and secularism


Is there room left for religious freedom in Turkey?





Author: Jay Sekulow and Grégor Puppinck

15 November 2010 - Issue : 911

















Turkey is the only Member State of the Council of Europe where, in peace time, assaults and assassinations motivated by religious hatred is not uncommon, as was witnessed in the recent ritual murder of Msgr Luigi Padovese, the personal representative of the Pope in Turkey. Anti-Semitism and Christianophobia are widespread in public opinion. Many people are questioning whether there is room in Turkey for religious liberty as it is torn between islamism and secularism.



These extreme approaches of the role of religion in society seem to be omnipresent in Turkey and to occupy all political space to the point where moderation seems impossible. The European Institutions such as those in Brussels and Strasbourg have been increasingly attempting to promote religious moderation in Turkish politics for over ten years. Because of the sociological and cultural specificity of Turkey, the European Institutions have not always required the same standard of protection for the rights of minorities that is required in European countries. This low level of requirement from the West can be explained by different factors: the geopolitical importance of Turkey, the low number of non-Muslim minorities remaining in Turkey, and finally, the hidden belief that religious moderation might not be in the nature of the current Muslim culture.



The European Court of Human Rights has been led to adopt a different approach depending on whether the case before it is aimed at religious minority or not. Because these religious communities cannot constitute a threat to the secularism of the State and are inherently victims simply by being a minority, the court accords them a certain attention if not a special protection.



Thus the Court is effective in this regard. The Court rules regularly on important issues, particularly relating to property rights, and it is the jurisprudence of the Court that has led to reform the law governing associations and foundations in order to provide the beginning of a legal framework for the churches properties. However, the non-Muslim minorities of Turkey still not have a legal personality. The consequences of this are many and well-known. Communities that have had land and buildings for centuries cannot still be registered as their direct owners. This situation, justified in the name of the principle of secularism, also has a symbolic meaning: if one cannot legally own the land, they remain a foreigner. This is a way to keep the minorities in a condition of subjection.



The religious context is so sensitive in Turkey that it had, in some extent, destabilised the jurisprudence of the European court of human right. In attempting to preserve the social and institutional balance of Turkey, the Court of Strasbourg has adopted a jurisprudence of exception for them. This is exemplified by well-known Leyla Şahin and Refah Partisi cases acknowledging teh legitimacy of the dissolution of a religious political party and the prohibition on wearing the head scarf.



The impact of this destabilising effect reaches far beyond the initial problem from where it originated. Thus, it is through the case law on Islam and Turkey in particular that the Court has gradually raised the principle of secularism to heights never before achieved, making it one of the principles underlying any democratic and pluralistic society. Thus, the Turkish specific situation contributes to shaping in a quite radical way, for all of Europe, the jurisprudence of the European Court in the matter of State and Religions. This phenomenon is increased by the Turkey’s wave of immigration across Europe. The Turkish diaspora exports its religiosity within Western culture. The response of Western legislatures and of the Court of Strasbourg to the risk of ‘islamisation’ of western society has been again to strengthen secularism, so that in certain respects, Turkish secularism could be a foreshadowing of an increasingly secularised Europe.



Thus, Turkey is a real cause of concern for religious freedom¸ both in Turkey and in Europe. The ECLJ, as an NGO dedicated to the promotion of Religious freedom, we believe secularism is not the appropriate response to contend with Islamism and Pluralism.

An empty public space has nothing to propose and even less to oppose. In this regard, the promotion of the European spiritual and moral and morals is essential, and the advocacy for the rights and of Turkish religious minorities is a real duty, especially for Europe.



Jay Sekulow is Chief Counsel to the American Center for Law and Justice, Washington D.C.

and to the European Center for Law and Justice in Strasbourg,

Grégor Puppinck is Director of the European Center for Law and Justice



And this, related, also from New Europe and Alliance Defense Fund:
 
Endangered Species: Religious minorities in Turkey






Author: Renate Sommer

15 November 2010 - Issue : 911

















In his recent visit to Turkey, German president Christian Wulff correctly stated that Christianity belongs to Turkey. In the Turkish city of Antakya, Jesus` devotees for the first time called themselves as Christians. Anatolia was the heartland of the Christian Byzantine Empire and millions of Christians and other religious minorities lived in the Ottoman Empire.



In light of this history, the situation of Christians and other religious minorities in Turkey today is alarming. Having suffered genocide, displacement and discrimination, the number of religious minorities from Christian and Jewish decent has diminished significantly. Today, only 1% of the Turkish population is Christian or Jewish constituting only 92.000 citizens of Armenian Orthodox, Greek Orthodox or Jewish belief. In addition, the Muslim minority of the 15 to 20 million Alevis in Turkey faces major impediments with regard to the exercise of their belief.



While Atatürk`s foundation of a modern Turkish nation is based on the principle of laicism, placing religion in the private sphere, the definition of the "Turkish" nation was always equated with a "Muslim" nation. Accordingly, devotees of an alien religion were considered as danger to national unity. Although the Treaty of Lausanne grants special legal minority status to "non-Muslim minorities" and even the Turkish Constitution enshrines freedom of belief, worship and prohibition of discrimination on religious grounds, these principles were invalidated by contradictory articles and the adoption of problematic laws, such as the law on foundations.



As a consequence, religious minorities in Turkey experience significant hurdles in exercising their religion: Up until today, churches do not have a legal status. They are considered as foundations, whose rights are strictly regulated by the General Directorate for Foundations. Despite of the amendments on the law of foundation, minority foundations still face problems in the acquisition of properties and the building of new churches. Many congregations, monastery Mor Gabriel being the most popular example, still struggle with unlawful expropriations. The religious affiliation is clearly stated in the I.D. card opening the floodgates to harassment by state officials and policemen. Furthermore, the prohibition of the training of priests by non-Turkish citizens accompanied with the closing of several seminaries makes it almost impossible to train young priests.



The Turkish government does not only accept these hindrances in silence, but openly contributes to the process. Despite of all awovels to improve the situation of religious minorities, there is continuing reluctance to guarantee the position of these minorities in the law. The reform of the law of foundations, which is a cornerstone for the economic survival of religious communities, falls short of the expectations: it fails to address the issue of restitution for properties sold to third-parties and does not explicitly abrogate the status of "confiscated" foundations.

Furthermore, there are no government programmes that address the prejudice towards religious minorities in Turkish society. The growing amount of misinformative and contemptuous media coverage stirs social harassment and violence. Muslims, who convert to another religion, increasingly become targets of violence. The killing of Hrant Dink and the three Protestant Christians in Malatya in April 2007 are sad examples for the excesses of violence.



Given this situation, it does not come as a surprise that more and more Christians and members of other religious minorities decide to leave the country. If the delaying tactics of the government continue, religious minorities in Turkey might even become extinct. The behaviour of the Turkish government and public authorities casts serious doubt on their willingness to avert such a situation. The state controlled authority on religious affairs, Diyanet, which pays the salaries of all imams and other mosque officials, has no interest in sharing its 1.3 billion USD government funds with other religious groups. Furthermore, the ruling AK-party has undertaken several steps that are a sign of subtle islamization. Proposals such as the criminalization of adultery, the lifting of the age limit for children in quran schools or the establishment of seperated beaches for women and men are only some examples. Currently, the AK-Party is successful in lifting the headscarf ban in public buildings under the disguise to preserve individual basic rights.



The disrespect for the EU demand to guarantee religious freedom is also evident in statements and actions by many government officials. The establishment of a new EU-Center in a building, that was unlawfully expropriated from the Greek-Orthodox church foundation, was a slap in the face of the EU and religious minorities in Turkey. The recent authorizations of Armenian and Greek Orthodox church services in Sümela-monastery and in Van, which have been intensly solicited by Egeman Bagis in Turkish and EU-media, is nothing more than a clumsy attempt to butter up the European Commission before the release of the upcoming progress report.



It is time to stop this deception! Freedom of religion is a fundamental principle of the community of values in the EU and cannot be negotiated. The mere mentioning of shortcomings in the Commission progress reports is not sufficient. If the Commission and the member states do not bear clear consequences, the exodus of minority groups and the destruction of some of the oldest archaeological evidence will make Christian and Jewish heritage in Turkey disappear. If we accept this, we betray our own principle of "Unity in Diversity!"



Renate Sommer is a Member of the European Parliament with the European People’s Party from Germany. She is also a member of the Delegation to the EU-Turkey JPC and the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs

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