From FPRI:
MOROCCAN DEMOCRACY AND THE FUTURE OF THE SAHARA
by Ahmed Charai
March 11, 2011
Ahmed Charai is chairman of Med Radio, a national broadcast
network in Morocco, and publisher of the weekly Moroccan
newspaper L'observateur as well as the French edition of
Foreign Policy magazine. He sits on the board of trustees
of the Foreign Policy Research Institute and the Advisory
Board of the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
and serves on the board of directors of the Search for
Common Ground.
Available on the web and in pdf format at:
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201103.charai.morocco.html
MOROCCAN DEMOCRACY AND THE FUTURE OF THE SAHARA
by Ahmed Charai
Over the past three months, Arab heads of state have
responded to mass protests in their respective countries by
either fleeing or fighting. Egypt's Mubarak and Tunisia's
Bin Ali decided that their positions were untenable and
promptly surrendered their rule. Meanwhile in Algeria,
Bahrain, Yemen, and, most brutally, in Libya, rulers are
cracking down hard on domestic unrest to try and maintain
their authority the old fashioned way. In all these cases,
Arab leaders appear to have ruled out a third option: share
power with their people through serious, aggressive reform
of the political system.
Until this week, that is-when Moroccan King Muhammad VI made
a stunning speech to his people in which he committed to
doing just that. His supporters in the country have dubbed
the new plan for sweeping constitutional reform "The King's
Revolution," while skeptics are voicing doubts as to whether
his promises will actually be put into effect. While most
sectors of Moroccan society responded with enthusiasm to the
king's proposals, some were critical. The radical Islamist
group al-Adl wa 'l-lhasan, which aims to overthrow the
monarchy and establish an Islamist regime, rejected the plan
outright. So did a relatively small number of youth
protesters. In light of continuing unrest throughout North
Africa and the Middle East, the Moroccan leader's novel
approach bears examining. What has he really offered? What
are the chances he will deliver? What are the implications
for the rest of the region? Each question is further
complicated by the long-simmering conflict between Algeria
and Morocco over the Western Sahara. The tension over that
disputed desert land has stymied political and economic
progress in both countries for the past three decades-and
any serious political initiative by the king must somehow
address the Sahara's future.
The 47-year-old monarch announced his new plan on national
television this past Wednesday. Flanked by his brother and
son, he called for a new constitution that would reduce his
own authority vis a vis the elected parliament, effect a
separation of powers, enshrine individual liberties and
human rights, and distribute governance more evenly over the
country. According to the plan, the judiciary, currently
under the control of the executive branch, would be elevated
to the status of an independent power. An elected prime
minister-no longer appointed by the king-would assume
control over most aspects of the executive branch of
government. New amendments would enshrine individual rights
and gender equality as well as make the Berber mother tongue
of Amazigh an official language alongside Arabic. Finally,
for the first time, regional elected bodies would supersede
appointed governors as the principal decision-makers in
regional affairs.
The credibility of these commitments may be assessed in
three ways: first, in terms of the monarchy's track record
on implementing reform; second, whether the Moroccan people
themselves appear to believe the king will make good on his
promises; and third, whether the "regionalization" of
elected power will apply equally to the Sahara, and what
that would mean for the longstanding conflict.
First, as to the track record, since assuming the throne in
1999 King Muhammad VI has indeed made substantial changes in
the way the country is governed. He persuaded opposition
parties to return from exile and play a robust role in
parliamentary politics and government. He built a kingdom-
wide network of civil society institutions to foster civic
leadership, empower women, and assist the poor. He also
created the Arab world's first-ever truth and reconciliation
commission to help redress the people's grievances against
the brutality of his father's regime. Though far from
ideal, the commission delivered official acknowledgment of
the monarchy's historic brutality as well as compensation to
victims for their suffering. The kingdom subsequently won
accolades from international human rights organizations for
bolstering individual liberties. On the other hand, critics
of the king have rightly observed that the past few years
have seen a reversal of key reforms, particularly in the
wake of the monarchy's tough counter-terrorist measures. So
on balance, the king deserves a passing grade for his track
record on reform, even if he did not pass with flying
colors.
Second, in terms of the Moroccan people's trust in the
king's proposal, it appears to be relatively strong. While
some Islamist groups rejected the speech, key members of the
elected opposition in parliament have praised it as taking
into account their demands for constitutional reform. As for
the country's youth, popular unrest has markedly ebbed in
the wake of the king's address. On the streets of Casablanca
and Rabat, fewer people are taking to the streets-and there
are virtually no calls for the ouster of the king. This
degree of civil peace is unique among the Arab world's
populous countries today.
Third, perhaps the lynchpin of the plan's credibility and
success, is the question of the interplay between the
proposed political reforms and the Sahara conflict. Since
2007 the Moroccan government has offered autonomy to the
people of the Sahara as a compromise to the Algerian demand
of a separate Saharan state. As people who follow the
Saharan conflict know, a relatively small number of Saharans
live in refugee camps on Algerian soil controlled by the
Polisario militia, which aspires to control all Saharan
territory. But now the king's reform agenda appears to be
overtaking political deliberations with Algeria and the
Polisario at the UN. Consider the implication, after all, of
the king's new plan to supersede the authority of appointed
governors by empowering elected regional councils. An
elected council in Morocco's Saharan region would amount, in
effect, to Saharan autonomy-with or without a settlement
between Morocco, Algeria, and the Polisario. This prospect
underscores that the king's new plan poses geopolitical as
well as a domestic risks to the monarchy. It will be
extremely difficult for the king to take such risks unless a
peace settlement with Algeria is achieved at the UN. Such a
settlement, in turn, requires American and European support.
The possibility of sweeping reform in Morocco, in any event,
also raises the question of broader implications across
North Africa and the Middle East. Would the king's plan
provide a new model for autocrats to follow in other
countries? Would it raise expectations among Arab youth
outside Morocco that their leaders, too, will promise
similar reforms?
The answer to these questions will vary dramatically from
country to country. In Bahrain, for example, the impact of
the Moroccan king's speech will likely be to embolden
protestors to demand similar commitments from their own
king. The same may be true in the kingdom of Jordan. Nor
will the loosening of autocracy in Morocco serve to reduce
seething tensions inside military republics such as Algeria,
Syria, and Yemen, to say nothing of Libya. But for heads of
state in each of these countries, the Moroccan initiative
may also provide a viable alternative to fighting or
fleeing. It is the choice that every leader should make: to
harness his formidable powers in the service of his
people-whatever the risk, whatever the outcome.
----------------------------------------------------------
Editor's Note:
For background on the Western Sahara issue, see:
A Note on the Western Sahara, by Harvey Sicherman,
E-Notes, April 2010
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201004.sicherman.westernsahara.html
Struggle in the Sandbox: The Western Sahara and the
International Community, by Michael Radu,
E-Notes, September 2007
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200709.radu.sandboxwesternsahara.html
----------------------------------------------------------
Copyright Foreign Policy Research Institute
(http://www.fpri.org/).
MOROCCAN DEMOCRACY AND THE FUTURE OF THE SAHARA
by Ahmed Charai
March 11, 2011
Ahmed Charai is chairman of Med Radio, a national broadcast
network in Morocco, and publisher of the weekly Moroccan
newspaper L'observateur as well as the French edition of
Foreign Policy magazine. He sits on the board of trustees
of the Foreign Policy Research Institute and the Advisory
Board of the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
and serves on the board of directors of the Search for
Common Ground.
Available on the web and in pdf format at:
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201103.charai.morocco.html
MOROCCAN DEMOCRACY AND THE FUTURE OF THE SAHARA
by Ahmed Charai
Over the past three months, Arab heads of state have
responded to mass protests in their respective countries by
either fleeing or fighting. Egypt's Mubarak and Tunisia's
Bin Ali decided that their positions were untenable and
promptly surrendered their rule. Meanwhile in Algeria,
Bahrain, Yemen, and, most brutally, in Libya, rulers are
cracking down hard on domestic unrest to try and maintain
their authority the old fashioned way. In all these cases,
Arab leaders appear to have ruled out a third option: share
power with their people through serious, aggressive reform
of the political system.
Until this week, that is-when Moroccan King Muhammad VI made
a stunning speech to his people in which he committed to
doing just that. His supporters in the country have dubbed
the new plan for sweeping constitutional reform "The King's
Revolution," while skeptics are voicing doubts as to whether
his promises will actually be put into effect. While most
sectors of Moroccan society responded with enthusiasm to the
king's proposals, some were critical. The radical Islamist
group al-Adl wa 'l-lhasan, which aims to overthrow the
monarchy and establish an Islamist regime, rejected the plan
outright. So did a relatively small number of youth
protesters. In light of continuing unrest throughout North
Africa and the Middle East, the Moroccan leader's novel
approach bears examining. What has he really offered? What
are the chances he will deliver? What are the implications
for the rest of the region? Each question is further
complicated by the long-simmering conflict between Algeria
and Morocco over the Western Sahara. The tension over that
disputed desert land has stymied political and economic
progress in both countries for the past three decades-and
any serious political initiative by the king must somehow
address the Sahara's future.
The 47-year-old monarch announced his new plan on national
television this past Wednesday. Flanked by his brother and
son, he called for a new constitution that would reduce his
own authority vis a vis the elected parliament, effect a
separation of powers, enshrine individual liberties and
human rights, and distribute governance more evenly over the
country. According to the plan, the judiciary, currently
under the control of the executive branch, would be elevated
to the status of an independent power. An elected prime
minister-no longer appointed by the king-would assume
control over most aspects of the executive branch of
government. New amendments would enshrine individual rights
and gender equality as well as make the Berber mother tongue
of Amazigh an official language alongside Arabic. Finally,
for the first time, regional elected bodies would supersede
appointed governors as the principal decision-makers in
regional affairs.
The credibility of these commitments may be assessed in
three ways: first, in terms of the monarchy's track record
on implementing reform; second, whether the Moroccan people
themselves appear to believe the king will make good on his
promises; and third, whether the "regionalization" of
elected power will apply equally to the Sahara, and what
that would mean for the longstanding conflict.
First, as to the track record, since assuming the throne in
1999 King Muhammad VI has indeed made substantial changes in
the way the country is governed. He persuaded opposition
parties to return from exile and play a robust role in
parliamentary politics and government. He built a kingdom-
wide network of civil society institutions to foster civic
leadership, empower women, and assist the poor. He also
created the Arab world's first-ever truth and reconciliation
commission to help redress the people's grievances against
the brutality of his father's regime. Though far from
ideal, the commission delivered official acknowledgment of
the monarchy's historic brutality as well as compensation to
victims for their suffering. The kingdom subsequently won
accolades from international human rights organizations for
bolstering individual liberties. On the other hand, critics
of the king have rightly observed that the past few years
have seen a reversal of key reforms, particularly in the
wake of the monarchy's tough counter-terrorist measures. So
on balance, the king deserves a passing grade for his track
record on reform, even if he did not pass with flying
colors.
Second, in terms of the Moroccan people's trust in the
king's proposal, it appears to be relatively strong. While
some Islamist groups rejected the speech, key members of the
elected opposition in parliament have praised it as taking
into account their demands for constitutional reform. As for
the country's youth, popular unrest has markedly ebbed in
the wake of the king's address. On the streets of Casablanca
and Rabat, fewer people are taking to the streets-and there
are virtually no calls for the ouster of the king. This
degree of civil peace is unique among the Arab world's
populous countries today.
Third, perhaps the lynchpin of the plan's credibility and
success, is the question of the interplay between the
proposed political reforms and the Sahara conflict. Since
2007 the Moroccan government has offered autonomy to the
people of the Sahara as a compromise to the Algerian demand
of a separate Saharan state. As people who follow the
Saharan conflict know, a relatively small number of Saharans
live in refugee camps on Algerian soil controlled by the
Polisario militia, which aspires to control all Saharan
territory. But now the king's reform agenda appears to be
overtaking political deliberations with Algeria and the
Polisario at the UN. Consider the implication, after all, of
the king's new plan to supersede the authority of appointed
governors by empowering elected regional councils. An
elected council in Morocco's Saharan region would amount, in
effect, to Saharan autonomy-with or without a settlement
between Morocco, Algeria, and the Polisario. This prospect
underscores that the king's new plan poses geopolitical as
well as a domestic risks to the monarchy. It will be
extremely difficult for the king to take such risks unless a
peace settlement with Algeria is achieved at the UN. Such a
settlement, in turn, requires American and European support.
The possibility of sweeping reform in Morocco, in any event,
also raises the question of broader implications across
North Africa and the Middle East. Would the king's plan
provide a new model for autocrats to follow in other
countries? Would it raise expectations among Arab youth
outside Morocco that their leaders, too, will promise
similar reforms?
The answer to these questions will vary dramatically from
country to country. In Bahrain, for example, the impact of
the Moroccan king's speech will likely be to embolden
protestors to demand similar commitments from their own
king. The same may be true in the kingdom of Jordan. Nor
will the loosening of autocracy in Morocco serve to reduce
seething tensions inside military republics such as Algeria,
Syria, and Yemen, to say nothing of Libya. But for heads of
state in each of these countries, the Moroccan initiative
may also provide a viable alternative to fighting or
fleeing. It is the choice that every leader should make: to
harness his formidable powers in the service of his
people-whatever the risk, whatever the outcome.
----------------------------------------------------------
Editor's Note:
For background on the Western Sahara issue, see:
A Note on the Western Sahara, by Harvey Sicherman,
E-Notes, April 2010
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201004.sicherman.westernsahara.html
Struggle in the Sandbox: The Western Sahara and the
International Community, by Michael Radu,
E-Notes, September 2007
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200709.radu.sandboxwesternsahara.html
----------------------------------------------------------
Copyright Foreign Policy Research Institute
(http://www.fpri.org/).
No comments:
Post a Comment