Saturday, March 12, 2011

Morroccan Democracy And The Future Of The Sahara

From FPRI:

MOROCCAN DEMOCRACY AND THE FUTURE OF THE SAHARA


by Ahmed Charai



March 11, 2011



Ahmed Charai is chairman of Med Radio, a national broadcast

network in Morocco, and publisher of the weekly Moroccan

newspaper L'observateur as well as the French edition of

Foreign Policy magazine. He sits on the board of trustees

of the Foreign Policy Research Institute and the Advisory

Board of the Center for Strategic and International Studies,

and serves on the board of directors of the Search for

Common Ground.



Available on the web and in pdf format at:

http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201103.charai.morocco.html



MOROCCAN DEMOCRACY AND THE FUTURE OF THE SAHARA



by Ahmed Charai



Over the past three months, Arab heads of state have

responded to mass protests in their respective countries by

either fleeing or fighting. Egypt's Mubarak and Tunisia's

Bin Ali decided that their positions were untenable and

promptly surrendered their rule. Meanwhile in Algeria,

Bahrain, Yemen, and, most brutally, in Libya, rulers are

cracking down hard on domestic unrest to try and maintain

their authority the old fashioned way. In all these cases,

Arab leaders appear to have ruled out a third option: share

power with their people through serious, aggressive reform

of the political system.



Until this week, that is-when Moroccan King Muhammad VI made

a stunning speech to his people in which he committed to

doing just that. His supporters in the country have dubbed

the new plan for sweeping constitutional reform "The King's

Revolution," while skeptics are voicing doubts as to whether

his promises will actually be put into effect. While most

sectors of Moroccan society responded with enthusiasm to the

king's proposals, some were critical. The radical Islamist

group al-Adl wa 'l-lhasan, which aims to overthrow the

monarchy and establish an Islamist regime, rejected the plan

outright. So did a relatively small number of youth

protesters. In light of continuing unrest throughout North

Africa and the Middle East, the Moroccan leader's novel

approach bears examining. What has he really offered? What

are the chances he will deliver? What are the implications

for the rest of the region? Each question is further

complicated by the long-simmering conflict between Algeria

and Morocco over the Western Sahara. The tension over that

disputed desert land has stymied political and economic

progress in both countries for the past three decades-and

any serious political initiative by the king must somehow

address the Sahara's future.



The 47-year-old monarch announced his new plan on national

television this past Wednesday. Flanked by his brother and

son, he called for a new constitution that would reduce his

own authority vis a vis the elected parliament, effect a

separation of powers, enshrine individual liberties and

human rights, and distribute governance more evenly over the

country. According to the plan, the judiciary, currently

under the control of the executive branch, would be elevated

to the status of an independent power. An elected prime

minister-no longer appointed by the king-would assume

control over most aspects of the executive branch of

government. New amendments would enshrine individual rights

and gender equality as well as make the Berber mother tongue

of Amazigh an official language alongside Arabic. Finally,

for the first time, regional elected bodies would supersede

appointed governors as the principal decision-makers in

regional affairs.



The credibility of these commitments may be assessed in

three ways: first, in terms of the monarchy's track record

on implementing reform; second, whether the Moroccan people

themselves appear to believe the king will make good on his

promises; and third, whether the "regionalization" of

elected power will apply equally to the Sahara, and what

that would mean for the longstanding conflict.



First, as to the track record, since assuming the throne in

1999 King Muhammad VI has indeed made substantial changes in

the way the country is governed. He persuaded opposition

parties to return from exile and play a robust role in

parliamentary politics and government. He built a kingdom-

wide network of civil society institutions to foster civic

leadership, empower women, and assist the poor. He also

created the Arab world's first-ever truth and reconciliation

commission to help redress the people's grievances against

the brutality of his father's regime. Though far from

ideal, the commission delivered official acknowledgment of

the monarchy's historic brutality as well as compensation to

victims for their suffering. The kingdom subsequently won

accolades from international human rights organizations for

bolstering individual liberties. On the other hand, critics

of the king have rightly observed that the past few years

have seen a reversal of key reforms, particularly in the

wake of the monarchy's tough counter-terrorist measures. So

on balance, the king deserves a passing grade for his track

record on reform, even if he did not pass with flying

colors.



Second, in terms of the Moroccan people's trust in the

king's proposal, it appears to be relatively strong. While

some Islamist groups rejected the speech, key members of the

elected opposition in parliament have praised it as taking

into account their demands for constitutional reform. As for

the country's youth, popular unrest has markedly ebbed in

the wake of the king's address. On the streets of Casablanca

and Rabat, fewer people are taking to the streets-and there

are virtually no calls for the ouster of the king. This

degree of civil peace is unique among the Arab world's

populous countries today.



Third, perhaps the lynchpin of the plan's credibility and

success, is the question of the interplay between the

proposed political reforms and the Sahara conflict. Since

2007 the Moroccan government has offered autonomy to the

people of the Sahara as a compromise to the Algerian demand

of a separate Saharan state. As people who follow the

Saharan conflict know, a relatively small number of Saharans

live in refugee camps on Algerian soil controlled by the

Polisario militia, which aspires to control all Saharan

territory. But now the king's reform agenda appears to be

overtaking political deliberations with Algeria and the

Polisario at the UN. Consider the implication, after all, of

the king's new plan to supersede the authority of appointed

governors by empowering elected regional councils. An

elected council in Morocco's Saharan region would amount, in

effect, to Saharan autonomy-with or without a settlement

between Morocco, Algeria, and the Polisario. This prospect

underscores that the king's new plan poses geopolitical as

well as a domestic risks to the monarchy. It will be

extremely difficult for the king to take such risks unless a

peace settlement with Algeria is achieved at the UN. Such a

settlement, in turn, requires American and European support.



The possibility of sweeping reform in Morocco, in any event,

also raises the question of broader implications across

North Africa and the Middle East. Would the king's plan

provide a new model for autocrats to follow in other

countries? Would it raise expectations among Arab youth

outside Morocco that their leaders, too, will promise

similar reforms?



The answer to these questions will vary dramatically from

country to country. In Bahrain, for example, the impact of

the Moroccan king's speech will likely be to embolden

protestors to demand similar commitments from their own

king. The same may be true in the kingdom of Jordan. Nor

will the loosening of autocracy in Morocco serve to reduce

seething tensions inside military republics such as Algeria,

Syria, and Yemen, to say nothing of Libya. But for heads of

state in each of these countries, the Moroccan initiative

may also provide a viable alternative to fighting or

fleeing. It is the choice that every leader should make: to

harness his formidable powers in the service of his

people-whatever the risk, whatever the outcome.



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Editor's Note:

For background on the Western Sahara issue, see:



A Note on the Western Sahara, by Harvey Sicherman,

E-Notes, April 2010



http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201004.sicherman.westernsahara.html



Struggle in the Sandbox: The Western Sahara and the

International Community, by Michael Radu,

E-Notes, September 2007



http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200709.radu.sandboxwesternsahara.html



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Copyright Foreign Policy Research Institute

(http://www.fpri.org/).

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