From FPRI:
TURKEY'S CHANGING FOREIGN POLICY
AND ITS INTERNATIONAL RAMIFICATIONS
by Efraim Inbar
February 22, 2011
Efraim Inbar is professor of political studies at Bar-Ilan
University and director of the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for
Strategic Studies. This essay is excerpted from his Winter
2011 Orbis article. The author acknowledges the research
help of Elizabeth Stull.
Available on the web and in pdf format at:
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201102.inbar.turkey.html
TURKEY'S CHANGING FOREIGN POLICY
AND ITS INTERNATIONAL RAMIFICATIONS
by Efraim Inbar
Turkey's geographical location and size bestows on the state
strategic importance. Indeed, Turkey carries great regional
and international weight. Diverging from the West has
serious consequences for the balance of power in the Greater
Middle East and for global politics. Currently, the Middle
East is divided between ascending Islamic Iran and its
radical allies, and pro-Western moderate forces-Israel and
most Arab states. Until recently, Turkey appeared to belong
to the pro-Western camp, but it crossed the Rubicon when
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Iran in October
2009. Turkey sided with Iran on the nuclear issue when its
Foreign Minister, Davutoglu, in a meeting with Secretary of
Iran's Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Saeed
Jalili, stressed his country's support for Tehran's
"peaceful nuclear program." During the meeting held in
Tehran, Ahmet Davutoglu also announced Turkey's capital
Ankara's firm stance on the consolidation of ties with
Tehran.[1] The relationship with Iran remains the litmus
test for Turkey's Islamist leanings. During a state visit
to Tehran earlier this month, the Turkish president,
Abdullah Gull, declared Turkey's desire for further
improvement of bilateral relations, unperturbed by the
violent repression of opposition demonstrators by the
Iranian regime.
With Turkey crossing over, it will be more difficult for the
international community to contain Iran and curb its nuclear
program. Indeed, Turkey, a nonpermanent member of the UN
Security Council, angered the West by refusing in March 2010
to support additional sanctions on Iran.[2] In June 2010, it
voted against sanctions. Since Turkey borders Iran, its
failure to cooperate in the economic sanctions against Iran
undermines the West's policy. Ankara's current stance allows
Iran to become more immune to economic pressure and enhances
Iranian power in the region, which will likely prove to be
Turkey's largest strategic miscalculation in the future.
Nevertheless, Erdogan's government views cooperation between
Iran, Syria, and Turkey as an important element in regional
stability.[3] The three agree on the Kurdish issue since all
fear an independent Kurdish state. The U.S. exit from Iraq
brings the three even closer. They are also intent on
weakening the position of Israel-perceived as a Western
outpost-in the region. The political elites of the three
states believe the West, and particularly the United States,
to be in decline. Their common perception of President
Barack Obama as very weak makes their alliance less likely
to elicit costly countermeasures from a West in strategic
disarray.
Turkey's shift in foreign policy will undoubtedly strengthen
Iran's grip over Syria and Lebanon. The "Hizballization" of
Lebanon is a corollary process, allowing Iran to establish a
"Shiite corridor" to the Mediterranean. Iran will gain an
even greater influence in Shiite southern Iraq after the
U.S. departure and will strengthen its presence in the
Levant (the Eastern Mediterranean at large) through
territorial links via Iraq to Syria and Hizballah in
Lebanon. Furthermore, Turkey's shift will end any Western
illusions about snatching Syria away from the radical camp
in order to strengthen democratic forces in Lebanon or to
facilitate a peace treaty between Syria and Israel. Backed
by Turkey, Syria can more easily resist Western pressures
and continue its alliance with Iran.
Such a development will enhance Iran's capability to project
power in the Eastern Mediterranean and even further west
into the Balkans, whose three Muslim states already show
signs of Iranian presence. Turkey has also developed a keen
interest in the Balkans-once an integral part of the Ottoman
Empire. Muslim communities in European states are in
constant danger of radicalization and Iranian encroachment
could reinforce such a process. Similarly, northern Cyprus,
occupied by Turkey since 1974, could again become a base for
Muslim influence in the Mediterranean.
An Ankara-Tehran axis would pressure the pro-Western Arab
states to the south. In addition to the current tensions
between Egypt and Iran, hostilities are also growing between
Egypt and Turkey. While Turkey's international behavior has
gained sympathy on the Arab street, the pro-Western Arab
leaders seem less enchanted. They view Turkey's current pro-
Iranian foreign policy as extremely concerning. Egypt in
particular sees the Turkish approach to the Hamas regime in
Gaza as a threat to Egyptian vital interests.[4] Moreover,
Turkey's open support for the demonstrators against the
Mubarak regime was seen as another indication of the Turkish
attempt to weaken Egypt, a traditional rival in struggle for
influence in the Middle East. The Ankara-Tehran axis that
weakens the pro-U.S. Arab states, Egypt and Saudi Arabia,
also hinders U.S. influence in the region, particularly when
everyone expects the United States to withdraw in the near
future from Iraq.
An attempted rapprochement with Armenia is part of the
Turkish desire for "zero problems" with its neighbors, but
it is important to recognize that Armenia receives support
from Iran and Russia. The geopolitical consequence of better
relations between Yerevan and Ankara is problematic. Indeed,
the new, maybe temporary, Turkish-Armenian understandings
have put strains on the Turkish-Azerbaijani strategic
partnership.[5] The latter alliance has been the backbone of
the East-West energy corridor, and the geo-strategic balance
in the region that has allowed for Turkish (or Western)
entrance into the Caspian. Without the Turkish-Azerbaijani
strategic partnership, Turkish, European Union and U.S.
influence in the South Caucasus is at risk. Baku has feared
Iranian influence and hoped that Turkey and the West could
balance the proximity of Iran, whom it borders. Similarly,
Georgia's pro-Western orientation is at stake. If Turkey and
Russia reach an agreement over Georgia, its independence is
doomed.
The change in Ankara's foreign policy similarly threatens
the Central Asian states, which all have Muslim majorities
as well as cultural and linguistic links to Turkey (with the
exception of Tajikistan). After independence, following the
dissolution of the Soviet Empire, these states adopted a
pro-Western orientation and looked at Turkey as a secular
model for development. [6] If Turkey becomes an Islamist
country, the pressure for Islamization from Iran (and also
from Saudi Arabia) will grow in Central Asia. These states
may succumb to political Islam, or alternatively, may look
to regional powers, Russia or China, thereby abandoning
their pro-Western orientation.
Turkey's new positioning will undoubtedly facilitate the
ability of Russia to penetrate the Middle East. During the
Cold War, Turkey prevented Russian divisions from pouring
southward and participating in the wars conducted by its
Arab allies. Thus, a Russian-Turkish alignment could expose
the heart of the Middle East to greater Russian
encroachment, especially since Vladimir Putin has revived
the country's imperial ambitions in many regions, including
in the Middle East.
If Turkey becomes increasingly Islamist, Europe could lose a
great buffer from the turbulent Middle East. Indeed, if the
Islamist tendencies in Turkey become entrenched, a strong
Muslim revisionist state that is also an heir to the Ottoman
Empire could emerge at the edge of Europe, with aspirations
to extend its influence toward the West. NATO, which may
reacquire an active defensive mission, would be
significantly weakened by losing the Turkish army, an
important component on its eastern flank. Already Turkey has
shown reluctance to host U.S. interceptor missiles (part of
a planned NATO collective missile defense system) for fear
of upsetting Iran.[7] NATO probably needs to adopt greater
caution in sharing with Turkey sensitive information and
technologies to stop potential leaks and technology transfer
to Iran.
Finally, the new direction of Turkish foreign policy raises
the question of whether Turkey will continue its nuclear
abstinence. Granting legitimacy to Iranian nuclear
aspirations might indicate a desire to emulate its nuclear
behavior. Pakistan, the main source for the nuclear know-how
in Iran has even better relations with Turkey. Russia has
already agreed to sell a nuclear power plant. The road to a
nuclear bomb is indeed a long one, but it has a starting
point, which usually is not very clear.
Even if the nuclear appetite has not been whetted yet in
Ankara, the loss of Turkey as a Western ally will inevitably
become a strategic disaster even larger than the Islamic
revolution in Iran.
The reorientation of Turkey's foreign policy should be of
great concern to the West. Western capitals are slow in
gauging the changes in the domestic and foreign politics of
Turkey. Washington still plays with the idea that Ankara
represents "moderate Islam." Yet, Turkey's preferences and
policies are anything but moderate. Seeking good relations
with Iran and Sudan, as well as with Hamas and Hizballah,
puts Turkey in a radical Islamist camp. Turkey, along with
Iran and other radicals, cherishes the current turmoil in
the Middle East. Turkey is an important country whose
foreign policy reorientation changes the balance of power in
the Middle East in favor of the radical Islamist forces. It
affects negatively the pro-Western orientation of the
Central Asian republics. It considerably weakens the Western
alliance and NATO. Turkey could also revive the historic
Muslim threat to Europe from the East.
Thanks to the Islamic roots of its ruling party, Turkey is
undergoing an identity crisis. At the same time, the quality
of Turkish democracy is deteriorating. Hopefully, Turkish
democracy will be strong enough to choose the progress and
prosperity that only a Western anchor can grant. The nation
is scheduled to hold elections in June 2011, and the current
polls show that a secular party should become part of the
next coalition government, limiting Islamist influence,
despite the remarkable political skills of Erdogan. These
skills helped him win the September 2010 referendum on
constitutional changes, which will strengthen the AKP grip
over the judiciary and the military. The West must grasp
that Turkey does not represent "moderate Islam" and should
do everything possible to bolster the secularist parties in
order to prevent an Islamist triumph in the elections.
Turkey's drift to Islamism would be a great strategic loss
to Israel and the West, and a tragedy for the Turks.
----------------------------------------------------------
Notes
[1] Turkish FM: Ankara Supports Iran's Peaceful N.
Activities, News number: 881128095314:35, February 17, 2010,
http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8811280953
[2] Burak Ege Bekdil and Umit Enginsoy, "Turkey Rejects More
Sanctions on Iran," March 25, 2010,
www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4555173&c=MID&s=TOP.
[3] H. Sabbagh, "Erdogan: Cooperation between Syria, Turkey
and Iran is Important for Peace in the Region," Syrian Arab
News Agency, October 27, 2009.
[4] Fulya �zerkan, "Aid convoy spurs crisis between Turkey
and Egypt, H�rriyet Daily News, January 6, 2010,
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=aid-convoy-spurs-crisis-between-turkey-and-egypt-2010-01-06.
[5] Fariz Ismailzade, "Azerbaijan Nervously Watching
Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement," The Jamestown Foundation,
September 11, 2009, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 6, Issue
166.
[6] Daniel Pipes, "The Event of Our Era: Former Soviet
Muslim Republics Change the Middle East," in Michael
Mandelbaum, ed., In Central Asia and the World: Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan (New York:
Council of Foreign Affairs, 1994).
[7] Umit Eginsoy and Burak Eke Bekdil, Defense News,
September 13, 2010.
----------------------------------------------------------
Copyright Foreign Policy Research Institute
(http://www.fpri.org/).
TURKEY'S CHANGING FOREIGN POLICY
AND ITS INTERNATIONAL RAMIFICATIONS
by Efraim Inbar
February 22, 2011
Efraim Inbar is professor of political studies at Bar-Ilan
University and director of the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for
Strategic Studies. This essay is excerpted from his Winter
2011 Orbis article. The author acknowledges the research
help of Elizabeth Stull.
Available on the web and in pdf format at:
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201102.inbar.turkey.html
TURKEY'S CHANGING FOREIGN POLICY
AND ITS INTERNATIONAL RAMIFICATIONS
by Efraim Inbar
Turkey's geographical location and size bestows on the state
strategic importance. Indeed, Turkey carries great regional
and international weight. Diverging from the West has
serious consequences for the balance of power in the Greater
Middle East and for global politics. Currently, the Middle
East is divided between ascending Islamic Iran and its
radical allies, and pro-Western moderate forces-Israel and
most Arab states. Until recently, Turkey appeared to belong
to the pro-Western camp, but it crossed the Rubicon when
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Iran in October
2009. Turkey sided with Iran on the nuclear issue when its
Foreign Minister, Davutoglu, in a meeting with Secretary of
Iran's Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Saeed
Jalili, stressed his country's support for Tehran's
"peaceful nuclear program." During the meeting held in
Tehran, Ahmet Davutoglu also announced Turkey's capital
Ankara's firm stance on the consolidation of ties with
Tehran.[1] The relationship with Iran remains the litmus
test for Turkey's Islamist leanings. During a state visit
to Tehran earlier this month, the Turkish president,
Abdullah Gull, declared Turkey's desire for further
improvement of bilateral relations, unperturbed by the
violent repression of opposition demonstrators by the
Iranian regime.
With Turkey crossing over, it will be more difficult for the
international community to contain Iran and curb its nuclear
program. Indeed, Turkey, a nonpermanent member of the UN
Security Council, angered the West by refusing in March 2010
to support additional sanctions on Iran.[2] In June 2010, it
voted against sanctions. Since Turkey borders Iran, its
failure to cooperate in the economic sanctions against Iran
undermines the West's policy. Ankara's current stance allows
Iran to become more immune to economic pressure and enhances
Iranian power in the region, which will likely prove to be
Turkey's largest strategic miscalculation in the future.
Nevertheless, Erdogan's government views cooperation between
Iran, Syria, and Turkey as an important element in regional
stability.[3] The three agree on the Kurdish issue since all
fear an independent Kurdish state. The U.S. exit from Iraq
brings the three even closer. They are also intent on
weakening the position of Israel-perceived as a Western
outpost-in the region. The political elites of the three
states believe the West, and particularly the United States,
to be in decline. Their common perception of President
Barack Obama as very weak makes their alliance less likely
to elicit costly countermeasures from a West in strategic
disarray.
Turkey's shift in foreign policy will undoubtedly strengthen
Iran's grip over Syria and Lebanon. The "Hizballization" of
Lebanon is a corollary process, allowing Iran to establish a
"Shiite corridor" to the Mediterranean. Iran will gain an
even greater influence in Shiite southern Iraq after the
U.S. departure and will strengthen its presence in the
Levant (the Eastern Mediterranean at large) through
territorial links via Iraq to Syria and Hizballah in
Lebanon. Furthermore, Turkey's shift will end any Western
illusions about snatching Syria away from the radical camp
in order to strengthen democratic forces in Lebanon or to
facilitate a peace treaty between Syria and Israel. Backed
by Turkey, Syria can more easily resist Western pressures
and continue its alliance with Iran.
Such a development will enhance Iran's capability to project
power in the Eastern Mediterranean and even further west
into the Balkans, whose three Muslim states already show
signs of Iranian presence. Turkey has also developed a keen
interest in the Balkans-once an integral part of the Ottoman
Empire. Muslim communities in European states are in
constant danger of radicalization and Iranian encroachment
could reinforce such a process. Similarly, northern Cyprus,
occupied by Turkey since 1974, could again become a base for
Muslim influence in the Mediterranean.
An Ankara-Tehran axis would pressure the pro-Western Arab
states to the south. In addition to the current tensions
between Egypt and Iran, hostilities are also growing between
Egypt and Turkey. While Turkey's international behavior has
gained sympathy on the Arab street, the pro-Western Arab
leaders seem less enchanted. They view Turkey's current pro-
Iranian foreign policy as extremely concerning. Egypt in
particular sees the Turkish approach to the Hamas regime in
Gaza as a threat to Egyptian vital interests.[4] Moreover,
Turkey's open support for the demonstrators against the
Mubarak regime was seen as another indication of the Turkish
attempt to weaken Egypt, a traditional rival in struggle for
influence in the Middle East. The Ankara-Tehran axis that
weakens the pro-U.S. Arab states, Egypt and Saudi Arabia,
also hinders U.S. influence in the region, particularly when
everyone expects the United States to withdraw in the near
future from Iraq.
An attempted rapprochement with Armenia is part of the
Turkish desire for "zero problems" with its neighbors, but
it is important to recognize that Armenia receives support
from Iran and Russia. The geopolitical consequence of better
relations between Yerevan and Ankara is problematic. Indeed,
the new, maybe temporary, Turkish-Armenian understandings
have put strains on the Turkish-Azerbaijani strategic
partnership.[5] The latter alliance has been the backbone of
the East-West energy corridor, and the geo-strategic balance
in the region that has allowed for Turkish (or Western)
entrance into the Caspian. Without the Turkish-Azerbaijani
strategic partnership, Turkish, European Union and U.S.
influence in the South Caucasus is at risk. Baku has feared
Iranian influence and hoped that Turkey and the West could
balance the proximity of Iran, whom it borders. Similarly,
Georgia's pro-Western orientation is at stake. If Turkey and
Russia reach an agreement over Georgia, its independence is
doomed.
The change in Ankara's foreign policy similarly threatens
the Central Asian states, which all have Muslim majorities
as well as cultural and linguistic links to Turkey (with the
exception of Tajikistan). After independence, following the
dissolution of the Soviet Empire, these states adopted a
pro-Western orientation and looked at Turkey as a secular
model for development. [6] If Turkey becomes an Islamist
country, the pressure for Islamization from Iran (and also
from Saudi Arabia) will grow in Central Asia. These states
may succumb to political Islam, or alternatively, may look
to regional powers, Russia or China, thereby abandoning
their pro-Western orientation.
Turkey's new positioning will undoubtedly facilitate the
ability of Russia to penetrate the Middle East. During the
Cold War, Turkey prevented Russian divisions from pouring
southward and participating in the wars conducted by its
Arab allies. Thus, a Russian-Turkish alignment could expose
the heart of the Middle East to greater Russian
encroachment, especially since Vladimir Putin has revived
the country's imperial ambitions in many regions, including
in the Middle East.
If Turkey becomes increasingly Islamist, Europe could lose a
great buffer from the turbulent Middle East. Indeed, if the
Islamist tendencies in Turkey become entrenched, a strong
Muslim revisionist state that is also an heir to the Ottoman
Empire could emerge at the edge of Europe, with aspirations
to extend its influence toward the West. NATO, which may
reacquire an active defensive mission, would be
significantly weakened by losing the Turkish army, an
important component on its eastern flank. Already Turkey has
shown reluctance to host U.S. interceptor missiles (part of
a planned NATO collective missile defense system) for fear
of upsetting Iran.[7] NATO probably needs to adopt greater
caution in sharing with Turkey sensitive information and
technologies to stop potential leaks and technology transfer
to Iran.
Finally, the new direction of Turkish foreign policy raises
the question of whether Turkey will continue its nuclear
abstinence. Granting legitimacy to Iranian nuclear
aspirations might indicate a desire to emulate its nuclear
behavior. Pakistan, the main source for the nuclear know-how
in Iran has even better relations with Turkey. Russia has
already agreed to sell a nuclear power plant. The road to a
nuclear bomb is indeed a long one, but it has a starting
point, which usually is not very clear.
Even if the nuclear appetite has not been whetted yet in
Ankara, the loss of Turkey as a Western ally will inevitably
become a strategic disaster even larger than the Islamic
revolution in Iran.
The reorientation of Turkey's foreign policy should be of
great concern to the West. Western capitals are slow in
gauging the changes in the domestic and foreign politics of
Turkey. Washington still plays with the idea that Ankara
represents "moderate Islam." Yet, Turkey's preferences and
policies are anything but moderate. Seeking good relations
with Iran and Sudan, as well as with Hamas and Hizballah,
puts Turkey in a radical Islamist camp. Turkey, along with
Iran and other radicals, cherishes the current turmoil in
the Middle East. Turkey is an important country whose
foreign policy reorientation changes the balance of power in
the Middle East in favor of the radical Islamist forces. It
affects negatively the pro-Western orientation of the
Central Asian republics. It considerably weakens the Western
alliance and NATO. Turkey could also revive the historic
Muslim threat to Europe from the East.
Thanks to the Islamic roots of its ruling party, Turkey is
undergoing an identity crisis. At the same time, the quality
of Turkish democracy is deteriorating. Hopefully, Turkish
democracy will be strong enough to choose the progress and
prosperity that only a Western anchor can grant. The nation
is scheduled to hold elections in June 2011, and the current
polls show that a secular party should become part of the
next coalition government, limiting Islamist influence,
despite the remarkable political skills of Erdogan. These
skills helped him win the September 2010 referendum on
constitutional changes, which will strengthen the AKP grip
over the judiciary and the military. The West must grasp
that Turkey does not represent "moderate Islam" and should
do everything possible to bolster the secularist parties in
order to prevent an Islamist triumph in the elections.
Turkey's drift to Islamism would be a great strategic loss
to Israel and the West, and a tragedy for the Turks.
----------------------------------------------------------
Notes
[1] Turkish FM: Ankara Supports Iran's Peaceful N.
Activities, News number: 881128095314:35, February 17, 2010,
http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8811280953
[2] Burak Ege Bekdil and Umit Enginsoy, "Turkey Rejects More
Sanctions on Iran," March 25, 2010,
www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4555173&c=MID&s=TOP.
[3] H. Sabbagh, "Erdogan: Cooperation between Syria, Turkey
and Iran is Important for Peace in the Region," Syrian Arab
News Agency, October 27, 2009.
[4] Fulya �zerkan, "Aid convoy spurs crisis between Turkey
and Egypt, H�rriyet Daily News, January 6, 2010,
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=aid-convoy-spurs-crisis-between-turkey-and-egypt-2010-01-06.
[5] Fariz Ismailzade, "Azerbaijan Nervously Watching
Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement," The Jamestown Foundation,
September 11, 2009, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 6, Issue
166.
[6] Daniel Pipes, "The Event of Our Era: Former Soviet
Muslim Republics Change the Middle East," in Michael
Mandelbaum, ed., In Central Asia and the World: Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan (New York:
Council of Foreign Affairs, 1994).
[7] Umit Eginsoy and Burak Eke Bekdil, Defense News,
September 13, 2010.
----------------------------------------------------------
Copyright Foreign Policy Research Institute
(http://www.fpri.org/).
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