From FPRI:
THE VALUE OF THE VISEGRAD FOUR
by Adrian A. Basora
March 7, 2011
Adrian A. Basora was U.S. Ambassador to Czechoslovakia from
July 1992 to December 1992, and then U.S. Ambassador to the
Czech Republic from 1993 to 1995. Currently, he serves as a
FPRI Senior Fellow and is Director of the Project on
Democratic Transitions at FPRI. This essay is a slightly
edited version of an article which appeared in the Atlantic
Council's Issue Brief.
Available on the web and in pdf format at:
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201103.basora.centraleurope.html
THE VALUE OF THE VISEGRAD FOUR
by Adrian A. Basora
Relations between the United States and Central Europe have
stabilized after a period punctuated by tensions over Iraq,
fears of a resurgent Russia and uncertainty about U.S.
policy toward the region. Critical to this outcome was
sustained outreach by the Obama Administration over the past
year-and-a-half, including support for NATO contingency
planning and military exercises in the Baltics-all designed
to provide highly sought "strategic reassurance." At the
same time, it is clear that the full potential of the
relationship has not been realized. What had once seemed
like immutable ties have frayed through mutual inattention,
plus factors ranging from Central Europe's deepening
integration into European structures to America's intense
focus on the Middle East and South Asia. However, the time
is now ripe to explore avenues for deeper cooperation.
The year 2011 is without precedent in terms of Central
European[1] leadership, with Hungary and Poland holding the
rotating European Union (EU) presidencies and Lithuania
taking up the OSCE Chairmanship-in-Office in the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
This "Year of Central Europe" coincides with recent efforts
by Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic to
revitalize the "Visegrad" cooperation framework, in the hope
of gaining greater influence in Europe and a renewed channel
for U.S.-Central European dialogue. Although skeptics might
wonder whether this initiative can realistically make a
significant contribution to transatlantic relations, U.S.
officials are in fact engaging with the "Visegrad Four" at
senior levels. So are leading policy thinkers outside of
government, whose parallel efforts to engage the region have
played a role in reassuring Central European partners of
U.S. commitment.
VISEGRAD AT TWENTY: A MATURE PARTNER?
The Visegrad group was launched in February 1991 by the
first generation of Central Europe's post-communist
transition leaders: Lech Walesa, Joszef Antall and Vaclav
Havel (before Czechoslovakia's "Velvet Divorce" in 1993).
At that point, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia had
emerged as the clear front-runners of democratization in the
post-communist region. Their leaders wanted to strengthen
the reform momentum by working together. And, despite strong
initial U.S and Western European support for their
transitions, they also feared that Moscow might once again
become a threat to their newly-won freedoms.
A decade later, with internal reforms far more consolidated
and NATO and EU membership either imminent or already
achieved, Visegrad cooperation lost momentum. By the mid-
2000s, however, Central European perspectives had once again
begun to change-as Vladimir Putin consolidated his power and
sought to undercut Western-style democracy in Russia's "near
abroad." The Russian military intervention in Georgia in
August 2008 and what the Central Europeans saw as a weak
NATO and EU responses sharply heightened their concerns.
These renascent fears of potential abandonment by the West
were exacerbated just a few months later, when the Obama
Administration announced its "reset" policy toward Moscow
and its decision not to deploy ground-based anti-ballistic
missile systems in Poland and the Czech Republic.
These concerns led former Presidents Havel, Walesa and
several other respected leaders of the early stages of
Central Europe's transformation to co-sign an open letter to
President Obama in July 2009. They said, in effect: "Do not
abandon us now, after all you have done to enable our
successful democratization, and after all we have done to
prove ourselves loyal allies when you needed us" (read: Iraq
and Afghanistan). In this context, regional leaders
undertook to reinvigorate the V4 - efforts given further
impetus by the election of center-right, Atlanticist
governments in Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.
A year-and-a-half later, following consistent U.S.
engagement, V4 Political Directors came to Washington in
December 2010 for high-level meetings with U.S. government
officials. The list of issues that they brought to discuss
bespoke progress and confidence Rather than dwelling
primarily on fears of Russia and a desire for more emphatic
U.S. security guarantees (along the lines of the 2009 open
letter to President Obama), the Political Directors' agenda
and approach were forward looking and results-oriented They
addressed a range of issues including Afghanistan and
Turkey, energy security for all of Europe, potential U.S.-EU
cooperation regarding the EU's Eastern Partnership, and
integration of the Western Balkans into NATO and the EU.
ANOTHER "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP"?
Despite the enthusiasm surrounding these meetings, questions
remain as to whether there is a realistic basis for the kind
of "special relationship" that the four Visegrad countries
seek with the United States. The answers revolve around four
key issues:
1. Can the Visegrad Four hope to gain significantly more
by working with the United States as a group rather than
by dealing with Washington separately?
2. From a Washington perspective, would the potential
benefits justify the efforts that overburdened senior
U.S. government officials would have to expend on this
new "special cooperative framework" for it to produce a
real impact?
3. Could the V4 countries, by acting together, become a
more significant factor inside the European Union and
thus exert leverage within the overall transatlantic
community that is disproportionate to their countries'
size?
4. Do the V4 have common long-term interests that are
sufficiently compelling to sustain their current
cooperation through future electoral cycles and changes
of government? (Recent efforts to re-energize the V4
have been undertaken by four relatively new center-right
governments with Atlanticist leanings.)
THE GAINS OF A GROUP
On the first question, the answer to would seem to be a
clear "yes." Given Washington's fiscal crisis and the many
urgent challenges that the United States faces around the
world, American policymakers will inevitably have fewer
resources and less time than in the past to devote to small,
individual European countries. This is true even for a
country the size of Poland, with its traditional special
ties to the United States and strategic location. But the
Poland-Plus-Three combination embodied in the Visegrad Four
initiative might have a chance for greater
resonance-particularly if the V4 are also seen as often
speaking for like-minded countries in Central Europe and
beyond.
THE VALUE TO WASHINGTON
The second question is the potential value for Washington.
That will depend in large part on the extent to which the
Visegrad countries can gain support for their own positions
within Europe, and on how complementary these positions are
with U.S. goals. In other words, the V4 countries are much
more likely to have an impact on Washington if they focus
their attention on issues on which they have some traction
within Europe, which are of significant interest to the
United States, and on which U.S. and V4 goals overlap
substantially.
Recent events in Belarus, disturbing trends in Ukraine, the
Russia-Georgia war and the Russia-Ukraine gas confrontation
serve to remind that the work of creating a Europe "whole
and free" is unfinished, and that the stakes involved in the
post-communist space are of global import. The region today
is less settled, less secure, and less in synch with the
United States than it was in the 1990s. Thus, the United
States should pursue any promising opportunity to
reinvigorate and consolidate democratic progress in the
post-communist regions of Europe.[2] This means working
more closely with those, such as the V4, who place a high
priority on these goals. In fact, given budgetary trends,
leveraging such partnerships may be the best way for the
United States to remain meaningfully engaged.
GREATER LEVERAGE
Regarding the third question-the V4's potential to exert
greater influence on selected EU policies-it is less than
evident that four new members with a combined population of
65 million can exercise broad influence in a European Union
of 500 million. However, the V4 are not without assets.
Under Council of Ministers' rules, if Poland, Hungary,
Slovakia and the Czech Republic vote as a bloc, their total
voting weight equals that of France and Germany combined.
Obviously, voting rights are not the sole determinant of
political influence within the EU, and additional leverage
would be needed. For starters, it would be helpful if the
V4 were frequently able to speak for like-minded countries
such as the Baltic States, Romania and other post-communist
EU members. And they would also need to gain support among
some of their Western European partners. (There have in fact
already been successful "V4-Plus" meetings to coordinate
positions on specific topics of clear common interest.)
While it is hard to imagine the V4 carrying the day against
France and Germany on major controversial issues, many of
their priorities in fact seem unlikely to provoke such
opposition. Integration of the Western Balkans into Western
structures (Kosovo aside) meets with little opposition
within the EU; and diversification of Europe's energy
supplies has begun to garner broader support as well. These
are both areas of considerable interest to the United
States-and areas in which the United States can make a
contribution complementary to that of the EU. To the extent
that the V4 can enliven the European Union's interest in
pursuing these goals, U.S. interests will be served, all the
more so if the resources Washington has available to support
democracy and other reforms in the region continue to
decline.
For similar reasons, the EU's Eastern Partnership Program
(EaP) is an area of particularly strong complementarity
between V4 and U.S. objectives. What started as a
Polish/Swedish initiative to offer Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus
and the Caucasian republics an attractive alternative to
near-term EU membership has gradually gained wider support,
not only among the ten new post-communist members of the
Union, but also in Scandinavia and elsewhere. The United
States maintains substantial democracy-assistance programs
in several of these countries. Closer U.S.-V4-EU cooperation
could help encourage their movement toward Western political
and economic systems.
While successful U.S.-V4 coordination along the lines of
these two examples would require a careful choice of issues,
skillful diplomacy, and a bit of patience, the payoff could
be highly worthwhile.
HOW LONG WILL IT LAST?
This leads to our fourth question: the likelihood of long-
term policy consensus among the four Visegrad countries
themselves. To gain and retain the type of influence
discussed above, the V4 countries would have to remain
united on certain key issues over time.
Based on their track record of the past 21 years, however,
it is not a given that the V4's current united front will
survive changing electoral coalitions in coming years. While
post-communist Poland has consistently pursued strongly
Atlanticist policies under both conservative and social
democratic governments, this has not always been the case
with Slovakia. Bratislava's interest in pursuing a close
relationship with the United States and NATO has waxed and
waned as governments have alternated between strongly
Western-oriented center-right coalitions and Slovakia's more
nationalistic and populist political parties. Hungary and
the Czech Republic, while more consistent in their Western
orientation than Slovakia under populist governments, have
not always been quite as energetically Atlanticist as
Poland.
Fortunately, the current center-right Slovak coalition
government is strongly committed to transatlantic
cooperation, as are the Czech and Hungarian governments,
which explains the current high degree of consensus and
enthusiasm of the Visegrad Four. Slovakia holds the rotating
presidency of the V4 into summer 2011, and the recently-
installed Radicova government has given high priority to
making a success of its current V4 presidency. In a small
country like Slovakia, considerable prestige attaches to
foreign policy achievements, and this could prove to be a
classic opportunity of "success breeding success."
The present Visegrad constellation is also blessed with a
tantalizing short-term opportunity: this year's back-to-back
EU presidencies of Hungary and Poland. This combines with
the V4's current high internal cohesion and commitment to
use their "trifecta" presidencies to full effect to give
them a unique advantage. If the Slovaks and Hungarians can
parlay their presidencies into even a few tangible results
during 2011, this would demonstrate the V4's potential for
impact in the longer term. Such success, in turn, could be
used to help mold domestic opinion in its favor of close
Visegrad cooperation, particularly in Slovakia and Hungary,
thus creating a positive political dynamic that might
further consolidate longer-term cohesion among the V4 and
between the V4 and the United States
A positive and creative U.S. response to V4 policy
initiatives would also be very helpful. Furthermore, a
forthcoming U.S. government response would be further
amplified if there were similarly positive engagement by
non-government circles in the United States. This could take
the form of new business investment; increased educational,
cultural and leadership exchanges; high-profile conferences,
and other events that put the spotlight on the V4 and on
their mutual interests with the United States.
CONCLUSION
In sum, for the V4-U.S. relationship to take on lasting
momentum, many things would have to go right over the coming
year. However, 2011 seems to offer abundant possibilities.
Given that the Visegrad Four have identified key areas of
shared interest and conveyed their desire to use the EU's
"Year of Central Europe" to enhance transatlantic relations,
a reciprocal effort on this side of the Atlantic, to include
a broad range of non-governmental actors, might well prove
worth the effort.
President George H.W. Bush stated in his famous "Europe
Whole and Free" speech of May, 1989: "If we are to fulfill
our vision-our European vision-the challenges of the next 40
years will ask no less of us." As we begin the second half
of these 40 post-Cold War years, we should refocus on this
challenge. The V4-U.S. dialogue looks like a good place to
start.
----------------------------------------------------------
Notes
[1] Author's note: Although this article focuses largely on
the Visegrad Group and recent U.S.-V4 consultations, many of
the issues pertain to U.S. relations with a more broadly
construed Central Europe, i.e., the post-communist members
of the EU.
[2] Although it is outside the scope of this paper, examples
of democratic backsliding and reform fatigue are occurring
not only on Europe's margins, but in the EU's ten newest
members, including the V4. Problems with corruption, rule
of law, media freedom and the treatment of minorities.
These phenomena argue for more, not less U.S. engagement
with Central European allies.
----------------------------------------------------------
Copyright Foreign Policy Research Institute
(http://www.fpri.org/).
THE VALUE OF THE VISEGRAD FOUR
by Adrian A. Basora
March 7, 2011
Adrian A. Basora was U.S. Ambassador to Czechoslovakia from
July 1992 to December 1992, and then U.S. Ambassador to the
Czech Republic from 1993 to 1995. Currently, he serves as a
FPRI Senior Fellow and is Director of the Project on
Democratic Transitions at FPRI. This essay is a slightly
edited version of an article which appeared in the Atlantic
Council's Issue Brief.
Available on the web and in pdf format at:
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201103.basora.centraleurope.html
THE VALUE OF THE VISEGRAD FOUR
by Adrian A. Basora
Relations between the United States and Central Europe have
stabilized after a period punctuated by tensions over Iraq,
fears of a resurgent Russia and uncertainty about U.S.
policy toward the region. Critical to this outcome was
sustained outreach by the Obama Administration over the past
year-and-a-half, including support for NATO contingency
planning and military exercises in the Baltics-all designed
to provide highly sought "strategic reassurance." At the
same time, it is clear that the full potential of the
relationship has not been realized. What had once seemed
like immutable ties have frayed through mutual inattention,
plus factors ranging from Central Europe's deepening
integration into European structures to America's intense
focus on the Middle East and South Asia. However, the time
is now ripe to explore avenues for deeper cooperation.
The year 2011 is without precedent in terms of Central
European[1] leadership, with Hungary and Poland holding the
rotating European Union (EU) presidencies and Lithuania
taking up the OSCE Chairmanship-in-Office in the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
This "Year of Central Europe" coincides with recent efforts
by Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic to
revitalize the "Visegrad" cooperation framework, in the hope
of gaining greater influence in Europe and a renewed channel
for U.S.-Central European dialogue. Although skeptics might
wonder whether this initiative can realistically make a
significant contribution to transatlantic relations, U.S.
officials are in fact engaging with the "Visegrad Four" at
senior levels. So are leading policy thinkers outside of
government, whose parallel efforts to engage the region have
played a role in reassuring Central European partners of
U.S. commitment.
VISEGRAD AT TWENTY: A MATURE PARTNER?
The Visegrad group was launched in February 1991 by the
first generation of Central Europe's post-communist
transition leaders: Lech Walesa, Joszef Antall and Vaclav
Havel (before Czechoslovakia's "Velvet Divorce" in 1993).
At that point, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia had
emerged as the clear front-runners of democratization in the
post-communist region. Their leaders wanted to strengthen
the reform momentum by working together. And, despite strong
initial U.S and Western European support for their
transitions, they also feared that Moscow might once again
become a threat to their newly-won freedoms.
A decade later, with internal reforms far more consolidated
and NATO and EU membership either imminent or already
achieved, Visegrad cooperation lost momentum. By the mid-
2000s, however, Central European perspectives had once again
begun to change-as Vladimir Putin consolidated his power and
sought to undercut Western-style democracy in Russia's "near
abroad." The Russian military intervention in Georgia in
August 2008 and what the Central Europeans saw as a weak
NATO and EU responses sharply heightened their concerns.
These renascent fears of potential abandonment by the West
were exacerbated just a few months later, when the Obama
Administration announced its "reset" policy toward Moscow
and its decision not to deploy ground-based anti-ballistic
missile systems in Poland and the Czech Republic.
These concerns led former Presidents Havel, Walesa and
several other respected leaders of the early stages of
Central Europe's transformation to co-sign an open letter to
President Obama in July 2009. They said, in effect: "Do not
abandon us now, after all you have done to enable our
successful democratization, and after all we have done to
prove ourselves loyal allies when you needed us" (read: Iraq
and Afghanistan). In this context, regional leaders
undertook to reinvigorate the V4 - efforts given further
impetus by the election of center-right, Atlanticist
governments in Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.
A year-and-a-half later, following consistent U.S.
engagement, V4 Political Directors came to Washington in
December 2010 for high-level meetings with U.S. government
officials. The list of issues that they brought to discuss
bespoke progress and confidence Rather than dwelling
primarily on fears of Russia and a desire for more emphatic
U.S. security guarantees (along the lines of the 2009 open
letter to President Obama), the Political Directors' agenda
and approach were forward looking and results-oriented They
addressed a range of issues including Afghanistan and
Turkey, energy security for all of Europe, potential U.S.-EU
cooperation regarding the EU's Eastern Partnership, and
integration of the Western Balkans into NATO and the EU.
ANOTHER "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP"?
Despite the enthusiasm surrounding these meetings, questions
remain as to whether there is a realistic basis for the kind
of "special relationship" that the four Visegrad countries
seek with the United States. The answers revolve around four
key issues:
1. Can the Visegrad Four hope to gain significantly more
by working with the United States as a group rather than
by dealing with Washington separately?
2. From a Washington perspective, would the potential
benefits justify the efforts that overburdened senior
U.S. government officials would have to expend on this
new "special cooperative framework" for it to produce a
real impact?
3. Could the V4 countries, by acting together, become a
more significant factor inside the European Union and
thus exert leverage within the overall transatlantic
community that is disproportionate to their countries'
size?
4. Do the V4 have common long-term interests that are
sufficiently compelling to sustain their current
cooperation through future electoral cycles and changes
of government? (Recent efforts to re-energize the V4
have been undertaken by four relatively new center-right
governments with Atlanticist leanings.)
THE GAINS OF A GROUP
On the first question, the answer to would seem to be a
clear "yes." Given Washington's fiscal crisis and the many
urgent challenges that the United States faces around the
world, American policymakers will inevitably have fewer
resources and less time than in the past to devote to small,
individual European countries. This is true even for a
country the size of Poland, with its traditional special
ties to the United States and strategic location. But the
Poland-Plus-Three combination embodied in the Visegrad Four
initiative might have a chance for greater
resonance-particularly if the V4 are also seen as often
speaking for like-minded countries in Central Europe and
beyond.
THE VALUE TO WASHINGTON
The second question is the potential value for Washington.
That will depend in large part on the extent to which the
Visegrad countries can gain support for their own positions
within Europe, and on how complementary these positions are
with U.S. goals. In other words, the V4 countries are much
more likely to have an impact on Washington if they focus
their attention on issues on which they have some traction
within Europe, which are of significant interest to the
United States, and on which U.S. and V4 goals overlap
substantially.
Recent events in Belarus, disturbing trends in Ukraine, the
Russia-Georgia war and the Russia-Ukraine gas confrontation
serve to remind that the work of creating a Europe "whole
and free" is unfinished, and that the stakes involved in the
post-communist space are of global import. The region today
is less settled, less secure, and less in synch with the
United States than it was in the 1990s. Thus, the United
States should pursue any promising opportunity to
reinvigorate and consolidate democratic progress in the
post-communist regions of Europe.[2] This means working
more closely with those, such as the V4, who place a high
priority on these goals. In fact, given budgetary trends,
leveraging such partnerships may be the best way for the
United States to remain meaningfully engaged.
GREATER LEVERAGE
Regarding the third question-the V4's potential to exert
greater influence on selected EU policies-it is less than
evident that four new members with a combined population of
65 million can exercise broad influence in a European Union
of 500 million. However, the V4 are not without assets.
Under Council of Ministers' rules, if Poland, Hungary,
Slovakia and the Czech Republic vote as a bloc, their total
voting weight equals that of France and Germany combined.
Obviously, voting rights are not the sole determinant of
political influence within the EU, and additional leverage
would be needed. For starters, it would be helpful if the
V4 were frequently able to speak for like-minded countries
such as the Baltic States, Romania and other post-communist
EU members. And they would also need to gain support among
some of their Western European partners. (There have in fact
already been successful "V4-Plus" meetings to coordinate
positions on specific topics of clear common interest.)
While it is hard to imagine the V4 carrying the day against
France and Germany on major controversial issues, many of
their priorities in fact seem unlikely to provoke such
opposition. Integration of the Western Balkans into Western
structures (Kosovo aside) meets with little opposition
within the EU; and diversification of Europe's energy
supplies has begun to garner broader support as well. These
are both areas of considerable interest to the United
States-and areas in which the United States can make a
contribution complementary to that of the EU. To the extent
that the V4 can enliven the European Union's interest in
pursuing these goals, U.S. interests will be served, all the
more so if the resources Washington has available to support
democracy and other reforms in the region continue to
decline.
For similar reasons, the EU's Eastern Partnership Program
(EaP) is an area of particularly strong complementarity
between V4 and U.S. objectives. What started as a
Polish/Swedish initiative to offer Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus
and the Caucasian republics an attractive alternative to
near-term EU membership has gradually gained wider support,
not only among the ten new post-communist members of the
Union, but also in Scandinavia and elsewhere. The United
States maintains substantial democracy-assistance programs
in several of these countries. Closer U.S.-V4-EU cooperation
could help encourage their movement toward Western political
and economic systems.
While successful U.S.-V4 coordination along the lines of
these two examples would require a careful choice of issues,
skillful diplomacy, and a bit of patience, the payoff could
be highly worthwhile.
HOW LONG WILL IT LAST?
This leads to our fourth question: the likelihood of long-
term policy consensus among the four Visegrad countries
themselves. To gain and retain the type of influence
discussed above, the V4 countries would have to remain
united on certain key issues over time.
Based on their track record of the past 21 years, however,
it is not a given that the V4's current united front will
survive changing electoral coalitions in coming years. While
post-communist Poland has consistently pursued strongly
Atlanticist policies under both conservative and social
democratic governments, this has not always been the case
with Slovakia. Bratislava's interest in pursuing a close
relationship with the United States and NATO has waxed and
waned as governments have alternated between strongly
Western-oriented center-right coalitions and Slovakia's more
nationalistic and populist political parties. Hungary and
the Czech Republic, while more consistent in their Western
orientation than Slovakia under populist governments, have
not always been quite as energetically Atlanticist as
Poland.
Fortunately, the current center-right Slovak coalition
government is strongly committed to transatlantic
cooperation, as are the Czech and Hungarian governments,
which explains the current high degree of consensus and
enthusiasm of the Visegrad Four. Slovakia holds the rotating
presidency of the V4 into summer 2011, and the recently-
installed Radicova government has given high priority to
making a success of its current V4 presidency. In a small
country like Slovakia, considerable prestige attaches to
foreign policy achievements, and this could prove to be a
classic opportunity of "success breeding success."
The present Visegrad constellation is also blessed with a
tantalizing short-term opportunity: this year's back-to-back
EU presidencies of Hungary and Poland. This combines with
the V4's current high internal cohesion and commitment to
use their "trifecta" presidencies to full effect to give
them a unique advantage. If the Slovaks and Hungarians can
parlay their presidencies into even a few tangible results
during 2011, this would demonstrate the V4's potential for
impact in the longer term. Such success, in turn, could be
used to help mold domestic opinion in its favor of close
Visegrad cooperation, particularly in Slovakia and Hungary,
thus creating a positive political dynamic that might
further consolidate longer-term cohesion among the V4 and
between the V4 and the United States
A positive and creative U.S. response to V4 policy
initiatives would also be very helpful. Furthermore, a
forthcoming U.S. government response would be further
amplified if there were similarly positive engagement by
non-government circles in the United States. This could take
the form of new business investment; increased educational,
cultural and leadership exchanges; high-profile conferences,
and other events that put the spotlight on the V4 and on
their mutual interests with the United States.
CONCLUSION
In sum, for the V4-U.S. relationship to take on lasting
momentum, many things would have to go right over the coming
year. However, 2011 seems to offer abundant possibilities.
Given that the Visegrad Four have identified key areas of
shared interest and conveyed their desire to use the EU's
"Year of Central Europe" to enhance transatlantic relations,
a reciprocal effort on this side of the Atlantic, to include
a broad range of non-governmental actors, might well prove
worth the effort.
President George H.W. Bush stated in his famous "Europe
Whole and Free" speech of May, 1989: "If we are to fulfill
our vision-our European vision-the challenges of the next 40
years will ask no less of us." As we begin the second half
of these 40 post-Cold War years, we should refocus on this
challenge. The V4-U.S. dialogue looks like a good place to
start.
----------------------------------------------------------
Notes
[1] Author's note: Although this article focuses largely on
the Visegrad Group and recent U.S.-V4 consultations, many of
the issues pertain to U.S. relations with a more broadly
construed Central Europe, i.e., the post-communist members
of the EU.
[2] Although it is outside the scope of this paper, examples
of democratic backsliding and reform fatigue are occurring
not only on Europe's margins, but in the EU's ten newest
members, including the V4. Problems with corruption, rule
of law, media freedom and the treatment of minorities.
These phenomena argue for more, not less U.S. engagement
with Central European allies.
----------------------------------------------------------
Copyright Foreign Policy Research Institute
(http://www.fpri.org/).
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