The Cheonan Incident and North Korea’s Northern Limit Line Strategy by Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr.
On March 26, 2010, a North Korean mini-sub slipped past the Northern Limit Line (NLL), the de facto western sea border separating the two Koreas, and fired what has now been identified as a CHT-02D, indigenously produced, wake-homing torpedo at the Cheonan South Korean Navy ship. The torpedo exploded just below the hull of the Cheonan, producing a “shockwave bubble effect” that literally split the South Korean ship in half. The results of the attack were both compelling and tragic for South Korea. Forty-six sailors (out of a crew of 104 aboard) perished as the ship sank, and more people were killed in the salvage and rescue efforts that followed.
Since 1999, the NLL has been a growing source of contention between the two Koreas, and the Cheonan attack is easily the most deadly manifestation of the competition over the disputed border. But it was certainly not the first provocation initiated by the North Koreans, and it is unlikely to be the last. Most of the previous incidents in the vicinity of the NLL, described in detail below, have had four things in common: 1) they are intentionally initiated at moments when they have the likelihood of garnering the greatest attention on the regional and perhaps even the world stage; 2) they initially appear to be incidents that are relatively small, easily contained, and quickly “resolved;” 3) they involve continuously changing tactics and techniques; and 4) North Korea denies responsibility for the event. Certainly, this most recent violent provocation fulfills all four of the key factors listed above.
A leadership shuffle in early 2009 accompanied the start of the latest period of tension over the NLL, when in January the North Koreans stepped up their rhetoric with regard to the disputed area, threatening an “all out confrontational posture” against the South in response to what they called violations of the sea border. Just weeks later, General Kim Kyok-sik, who had been Chief of the General Staff, was transferred to command of the Fourth Corps of the North Korean army, whose area of responsibility borders the NLL. Kim Kyok-sik is known to be one of Kim Jong-il’s most trusted generals, and was likely put in his new position so that he could help plan activities in the NLL area. Soon thereafter, the head of the Operations Department (which at the time was under the authority of the Korean Workers’ Party), General O Kuk-ryol, was moved to a senior position on the National Defense Commission (NDC), the chief command and control organ of the DPRK’s armed forces. Within weeks of this move, the Operations Department was then placed under the control of the Reconnaissance Bureau — the DPRK’s military intelligence organization — and the NDC. It is now apparent that O Kuk-ryol was also likely involved in the planning of the recent NLL brinkmanship, as it appears the mini-sub that attacked the Cheonan may have been a Reconnaissance Bureau vessel, and not subordinate to the North Korean navy. Thus, it appears that planning for incidents in the NLL began as early as January of 2009, involved shifts in the leadership positions of key personnel within the party and the military, and took several months to build up for events that occurred in the late fall and winter of 2009 and in 2010.
The first incident that occurred near the NLL during this latest spate of tensions took place on November 10, 2009, and was largely ignored by the public: a North Korean ship crossed the the NLL and was involved in a brief skirmish with South Korean craft; the ship was eventually chased back across the line and is rumored to have suffered heavy damage and casualties. Months later, in January of 2010, the North Korean army fired nearly 400 live artillery rounds of various calibers at points as close as a kilometer and a half to the NLL. This incident raised considerable angst in South Korea at the time. The March 26 Cheonan attack is thus only the most violent and extreme of what have now been several North Korean provocations within the last six months.
Analysts and pundits have attributed several motivations to the most recent North Korean attack. Some have suggested it stemmed from Kim Jong-il’s efforts to push his son, Kim Jong-eun, forward by getting him involved in incidents that intimidate the South (and that the Cheonan attack is thus part of the succession process). Others have said that the incident may be the result of “hardliners” in the military who are trying to expand their power within the government. Some have even opined that this could be North Korea’s attempt to push the U.S. and South Korea back to the bargaining table for a “peace regime.”
While all of these theories are interesting (and unproven), I believe the existing evidence points to motivations that are, in fact, quite clear. Since 1999, the DPRK has been employing violent and non-violent means in an effort to change the de facto western sea border that separates the two Koreas to boundaries that are more favorable to Pyongyang. During Roh Moo-hyun’s visit to North Korea (near the end of his Presidency) he agreed in principle to many of the concessions the North Koreans were seeking. But as the leadership of South Korea transitioned to the more pragmatic Lee Myung-bak government, these concessions were (with good reason) cast aside because of very real security concerns — both for the residents of the five islands that sit astride the NLL and for the maritime shipping that transits near the area. It is very conceivable that Kim Jong-il ordered the latest set of provocations in order to once again convince Seoul that the current paradigm of the NLL that has existed since 1953 must change. (For an example of the border the North Koreans recognize and would like see officially implemented, see the illustration below).
Source: ROK Ministry of Unification 2007
South Korea has now taken what in my view is a series of very appropriate actions:
•President Lee announced that he will take the issue to the UN Security Council; the United States has already said it will support Seoul’s position.
•President Lee also announced that the South will sever all economic ties with the North, with the exception of the Kaesong Industrial Complex (but this too is under review and could come under the axe next if further provocations ensue). This leaves the South still yet another stick to wield, if necessary, as the Kaesong Industrial Complex comprises roughly 63% of the profits that North Korea gains in trade with the South.
•The South Korean and United States Navies will enhance anti-submarine warfare activities and take other key deterrence measures against North Korean provocations.
•South Korea will place increased emphasis on participation in the U.S.- led Proliferation Security Initiative.
The United States can take a number of key actions as well. Certainly the measures called for under UNSC 1874 can be enhanced and expanded, to include not only efforts to counter North Korean proliferation, but also to target (with the help of the international community) North Korea’s large-scale illicit activities — including illegal drug trafficking and counterfeit currency schemes, among other activities. The United States can also re-list North Korea as a state-sponsor of terrorism, as Pyongyang’s proliferation to groups like Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps — groups which are already on the State Department list — is well known.
And what can we expect from North Korea? Probably much more. There are likely to be more provocations to come — though the tactics, techniques, and procedures will likely be much different than anything we have yet seen (as these past two provocations were). Though there will likely be a great deal of chatter in diplomatic circles about how best to deal with the North, the Six-Party talks are of course dead (at least for now). It is likely that in coming months we could see another set of long- and/or mid-range ballistic missile test launches. It is also very possible that Pyongyang could conduct another underground nuclear test — perhaps a Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) test, as opposed to the Plutonium tests that we have witnessed previously (thus showing the world that North Korea has yet another type of “nuclear deterrent”).
The bottom line is that things are likely to get difficult in coming months. But Kim Jong-il’s government knew this in advance. They surely anticipated much of what is happening now when they planned for and deployed a submarine to sink a South Korean ship on a peaceful mission in its own sovereign waters. And thus, as the tension remains thick in the air in coming months, we should not forget the main culprit in all of this: the DPRK. Unless and until Pyongyang ends it rogue-state behavior, containment is the only practical solution for maintaining security and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia.
Bruce E. Bechtol Jr. is a professor of International Relations at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. The views he expresses are his own and do not necessarily represent the policy or position of the Marine Corps University or the United States Government.
(Photo: flickr/yeowatzup)
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