From FPRI:
UNDERSTANDING TURKEY'S 2011 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS
by Gerald Robbins
June 28, 2011
Gerald Robbins is a Senior Fellow of the Foreign Policy
Research Institute, specializing in analyzing Turkey, the
Caucasus region, and Central Asia.
Available on the web and in pdf format at:
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201106.robbins.turkey.html
UNDERSTANDING TURKEY'S 2011 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS
by Gerald Robbins
Now that the results are known from Turkey's June 12 general
election, it is an appropriate time to discern this
strategically important nation's state of affairs. Turkey-
watching is never an easy matter, especially given the
current government's fluctuating ways which confound many
analysts. Nearly a decade has passed since the Justice and
Development came to power with its heavily-inspired Islamist
thinking. Detractors see the AKP's methodology as a stealth
jihad that's gradually eroding the country's secularist
bearings. Conversely, AKP's proponents applaud the various
reforms which the party has enacted, ostensibly projecting
it as a "bridge" between Western and Muslim civilizations.
Whatever the case may be, the Turkish post-electoral
environment is at a critical crossroad with far-reaching
implications for its society and beyond.
The election was essentially a foregone conclusion. The main
issue wasn't whether the AKP would win, but by how much.
Such a tacit acknowledgement was aptly reflected in
secularist newspapers and other opposition outlets.
Columnists were noticeably subdued in their criticisms of
AKP programs and their leader, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan. While part of this reticence was due to a growing
governmental crackdown against journalists questioning Mr.
Erdogan's motives (thereby causing deep concern about AKP's
commitment to democracy), the general population wasn't
afflicted by an immediate problem or crisis. Compared to its
anemic Western counterparts, the Turkish economy had
expanded by 8.9 percent in 2010, reflecting a near-decade of
strong growth since the AKP assumed control in 2002. Among
G-20 countries, only China has grown at a faster pace. This
sustained economic boom provides Turkish citizenry with a
sense of confidence both at home and abroad towards their
Muslim brethren. Additionally, considering that Turkey's per
capita income has almost tripled during Erdogan's tenure,
it's not hard to realize why AKP captured 50 percent of the
vote and once again rules without having to form a coalition
government.
However, dominating the popular vote didn't automatically
translate into a political mandate. Prime Minister Erdogan's
campaign aim was to secure a two thirds majority or 367 of
the 550 seats in the Turkish Meclis (assembly). Instead AKP
won 326 seats, which was five less than what it had in the
previous parliament. While the result still gave Mr. Erdogan
an absolute majority, it prevented him from having the
ability to rule by decree. Unhindered, the AKP could have
changed Turkey's constitution to fit their philosophical
outlook. It is unanimously agreed across Turkey's political
spectrum that a new doctrine needs to replace the existing
version, which had been installed by the military following
its 1980 coup d'etat. A constitutional referendum
incorporating several philosophical viewpoints besides AKP's
perspective is now likely. Taking heed of the electoral
result, Mr. Erdogan stated "the people gave us a message to
build the new constitution through consensus and
negotiation."
AKP's tempered victory wasn't due to a noticeable growth in
secularist support. Secularism's standard bearer, the
Republican Peoples Party (CHP), minimally improved upon
their prior 2007 general election performance. Despite new
leadership and a publicized shift from etatist ideology to
Europhilic Social Democracy, the CHP was able to garner only
26 percent of the total vote. Many political observers were
disappointed by the result, expecting the party which was
established by Kemal Ataturk, Turkey's founding father, to
get around 30% of the ballots cast. Furthermore, CHP's
national appeal continued to deteriorate. Save for the Izmir
region and European Turkey, nearly all of the Anatolian
peninsula (except the Kurdish-dominated Southeast) went AKP.
Once solid CHP strongholds along the Turkish Mediterranean
and Aegean coasts became Justice and Development territory.
Several explanations are given for the CHP's decline,
ranging from archaic programs to weak leadership. Kemal
Kilicdaroglu, CHP's current chairman, is trying to transform
Ataturk's party from what the Financial Times characterizes
as "shrine worshippers with a lazy sense of entitlement to
power" into "a viable social democratic party." However,
there are noticeable fissures within the CHP's hierarchy
regarding its post-election strategy. Unless this
dissension is effectively contained, CHP risks further
marginalization.
What stopped Erdogan and the AKP from completely controlling
the political process were the other parties that hurdled
over the ten percent barrier for parliamentary
representation. The far right National Action Party (MHP)
and the Kurdish-oriented Peace and Development Party (BDP)
couldn't be more disparate in ideological outlook, yet they
will likely play pivotal roles in Turkey's political future.
Regarding MHP, their results were surprising. A sex scandal
involving several senior party officials was seen as the
death knell for MHP's electoral fortunes. There was
widespread speculation that the party's power base would
switch allegiance to the AKP, effectively handing Mr.
Erdogan a two-thirds majority to govern as he pleased.
However, the anticipated defection didn't occur: MHP's 13
percent tally hardly shrank from its 14 percent performance
in the 2007 general election.
Whereas MHP had been tainted by scandal, the BDP was mired
in controversy. Its platform advocating greater Kurdish
rights and autonomy within a highly centralized Turkey is
anathema throughout the political landscape. The issue is
generally kept at arm's length by the other parties, namely
due to suspicions that any Kurdish polity is a front for
separatism. Add to this wariness an ongoing insurrection
that has claimed 40,000 lives since the 1980's and any
Kurdish-based entity is barely tolerated within the Turkish
Parliament.
Procedural restrictions compelled the BDP to run its
candidates as independents. Thirty six deputies were elected
this way and will now form a Kurdish bloc in the Meclis.
(Six of these nominees are currently in jail.) This incoming
group poses a formidable challenge for Ankara to negotiate
an overall solution with. The delegation has doubled its
legislative presence from the last assembly and will likely
be more forceful in demanding greater autonomy. A recent
surge of Kurdish unrest throughout Turkey will like
intensify if the Erdogan government mishandles its dealings
with the BDP.
Initial indications are not promising. At the time of this
writing, Hatip Dicle, a newly elected BDP deputy, has been
prevented from entering Parliament due to accusations of
belonging to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) terrorist
organization. Mr. Dicle is one of the six imprisoned
individuals who are part of the BDP's incoming contingent,
and their fates are likely subject to the same decision. An
AKP candidate was chosen to fill Mr. Dicle's seat, provoking
a BDP boycott of the newly elected Meclis and an apparent
political deadlock.
The CHP faces a similar situation. Two of its recently
elected deputies sit in prison on charges of belonging to an
organization (the controversial Ergenekon scandal) that
conspired to overthrow the AKP government. A court ruling
decided against allowing them out of jail to be sworn in as
lawmakers. Both the CHP and BDP are concerned that these
judgments are a ploy by the AKP to reach the necessary
number of seats for governing by fiat. The two parties
advocate for a solution that's similar to what freed Mr.
Erdogan from prison shortly before he became Prime Minister.
"Regardless of whether the case they are on trial for is
Ergenekon or anything else, they have been elected
democratically," an independent deputy commented.
There are other matters besides legislative gamesmanship
that the AKP needs to focus upon. Various signs indicate
that economic difficulties lie ahead. While Turkey's overall
performance has been impressive amid present international
circumstances, its current account deficit is ballooning and
will likely reach 8% of the nation's GDP this year. In
April alone, the deficit figure widened to $7.7 billion from
$4.4 billion in the same month a year ago. Trade-wise, the
first four months of 2011 saw a 44 percent increase in
imports, while exports grew only 21 percent. As for
unemployment, Turkey's 10.7 percent figure is nominally
higher than the EU's 9.6 percent average. Particularly
troubling is the 19.3 percent jobless rate among Turkish
youth. Considering that the nation's median age is 28 years
old, the government needs to immediately address this
statistic.
Those familiar with recent Turkish history know this is a
potentially dangerous brew for political instability. Just a
decade ago, Turkey was in a deep financial crisis and
beholden to the IMF for assistance. It has successfully
emerged from that period, yet another threat currently
lingers on the horizon. During the election period, Prime
Minister Erdogan spoke of zero interest rates and a tax
amnesty to keep the economy growing. These were overly
simplistic solutions, reflecting campaign rhetoric instead
of reasonable thought. There's no longer a need to curry
favor with the electorate, so tougher, albeit unpopular
measures need to be enacted. One area where the reins can be
tightened is consumer credit. Low lending rates are a
contributing factor to the current trade and account
deficits. Curbing politically envisioned pork barrel
projects (i.e., a canal system for Istanbul intended to
bypass the heavily trafficked Bosphorus Straits) would also
help.
Another ominous development is the deteriorating situation
in next-door Syria. What's transpiring across the border is
a reprimand of Prime Minister Erdogan's regional outlook.
Syria has been the fulcrum of the AKP's "zero problems"
initiative, a policy whose primary aim is improving Turkey's
relations with the Arab world. It has opened new markets for
Turkish products and counterbalances an overdependence on
ties with Europe.
This outreach also satisfies the AKP's Islamist sentiments.
The closer rapport with fellow Muslims has been to Israel's
detriment, which prior to the AKP's tenure, enjoyed good
relations with Turkey. Syria is the main benefactor of this
estrangement, establishing a partnership with Turkey that
has removed trade barriers, visa restrictions and produced
numerous bilateral trade agreements. Both nations have
further expanded their cooperation into the military realm,
signing a defense cooperation treaty that raises eyebrows
throughout Western military circles.
The embraces and words of fraternity have changed with the
coming of the Arab Spring. When it came knocking on Syria's
door, Prime Minister Erdogan believed that Turkish democracy
would serve as the solution to their neighbors woes and
frustrations. He's badly miscalculated-Syrian President
Bashar Assad has no interest in adopting Turkey's system of
governance or other democratic models. Totalitarian rule and
suppression is what Assad knows best, a family enterprise
that's none of Ankara's business. His relationship with
Turkey is for strategic and economic purposes only.
As a result of President Assad's intransigence, Prime
Minister Erdogan's status has taken a hit throughout the
restive Arab world. By hesitating to criticize a fellow
Muslim, his "zero problems" policy appears inane. Moreover,
there's now a growing cross-border problem as Syrians flee
for safety. An estimated 11,000 people are currently living
in hastily built refugee camps, uncertain when or if they'll
be able to return home.
Ankara is warily monitoring the Syrian situation. There are
reports that the government is considering whether to close
the border and form a buffer zone within Syria should
further chaos ensue. One of the most feared scenarios is
that the current unrest will turn into a religious civil war
between the majority Sunni Muslim population and President
Assad's Alawite community. Another worry is Kurdish
militants establishing an operations base along the frontier
to launch attacks against Turkey. Whatever the case might
be, the Erdogan government has to prepare for various
contingencies should Syria's turmoil worsen.
After three resoundingly impressive general election
victories, there is little doubt that Recep Erdogan is
Turkey's most powerful leader since Ataturk. In many
respects he's the Turkish version of Andrew Jackson-an
Islamist populist who has successfully challenged the
secularist elite and its entrenched infrastructure. During
his time in office, the nation has undergone profound
changes, forging a dynamic economy and becoming a respected
player on the world scene. The once all-powerful military
has been brought to heel (albeit by questionable means),
resulting in a more egalitarian society.
Egalitarian isn't a word that would fit Mr. Erdogan's
personality, however. He governs with a heavy hand to
achieve his goals. His managerial style is criticized for
exhibiting an authoritarian impulse, which has a vindictive
streak. The tax authorities have been empowered to go after
his opponents in media and business circles. They aren't the
only ones subject to this intimidation; dissension within
the AKP ranks isn't tolerated. Those party cadre whose
loyalty to Mr. Erdogan had been questioned were reportedly
purged from candidate lists prior to the general election.
Whereas the AKP once reflected a spectrum of personalities
with varying outlooks, it has turned into the Prime
Minister's personal fiefdom.
There are no signs in the foreseeable future that Mr.
Erdogan's rule will be credibly challenged. His agenda to
create a new Turkey has so far succeeded and can culminate
by introducing a new constitution. Before starting this
endeavor, more immediate concerns need attention, namely
regional tumult, economic uncertainties and what threatens
to be parliamentary impasse. Perhaps the Prime Minister can
ease legislative tension by proposing to the BDP deputies
that a quasi-federal status for the Kurds be considered when
the constitution is drafted. It would be a bold,
controversial move that the other opposition groups would
promptly reject, but nonetheless initiate discussion on how
to finally resolve a long-festering dilemma. If Mr. Erdogan
can skillfully manage the process, he'll be remembered as
the person who settled the Kurdish issue, Turkey's most
burdensome problem.
----------------------------------------------------------
Copyright Foreign Policy Research Institute
(http://www.fpri.org/).
UNDERSTANDING TURKEY'S 2011 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS
by Gerald Robbins
June 28, 2011
Gerald Robbins is a Senior Fellow of the Foreign Policy
Research Institute, specializing in analyzing Turkey, the
Caucasus region, and Central Asia.
Available on the web and in pdf format at:
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201106.robbins.turkey.html
UNDERSTANDING TURKEY'S 2011 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS
by Gerald Robbins
Now that the results are known from Turkey's June 12 general
election, it is an appropriate time to discern this
strategically important nation's state of affairs. Turkey-
watching is never an easy matter, especially given the
current government's fluctuating ways which confound many
analysts. Nearly a decade has passed since the Justice and
Development came to power with its heavily-inspired Islamist
thinking. Detractors see the AKP's methodology as a stealth
jihad that's gradually eroding the country's secularist
bearings. Conversely, AKP's proponents applaud the various
reforms which the party has enacted, ostensibly projecting
it as a "bridge" between Western and Muslim civilizations.
Whatever the case may be, the Turkish post-electoral
environment is at a critical crossroad with far-reaching
implications for its society and beyond.
The election was essentially a foregone conclusion. The main
issue wasn't whether the AKP would win, but by how much.
Such a tacit acknowledgement was aptly reflected in
secularist newspapers and other opposition outlets.
Columnists were noticeably subdued in their criticisms of
AKP programs and their leader, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan. While part of this reticence was due to a growing
governmental crackdown against journalists questioning Mr.
Erdogan's motives (thereby causing deep concern about AKP's
commitment to democracy), the general population wasn't
afflicted by an immediate problem or crisis. Compared to its
anemic Western counterparts, the Turkish economy had
expanded by 8.9 percent in 2010, reflecting a near-decade of
strong growth since the AKP assumed control in 2002. Among
G-20 countries, only China has grown at a faster pace. This
sustained economic boom provides Turkish citizenry with a
sense of confidence both at home and abroad towards their
Muslim brethren. Additionally, considering that Turkey's per
capita income has almost tripled during Erdogan's tenure,
it's not hard to realize why AKP captured 50 percent of the
vote and once again rules without having to form a coalition
government.
However, dominating the popular vote didn't automatically
translate into a political mandate. Prime Minister Erdogan's
campaign aim was to secure a two thirds majority or 367 of
the 550 seats in the Turkish Meclis (assembly). Instead AKP
won 326 seats, which was five less than what it had in the
previous parliament. While the result still gave Mr. Erdogan
an absolute majority, it prevented him from having the
ability to rule by decree. Unhindered, the AKP could have
changed Turkey's constitution to fit their philosophical
outlook. It is unanimously agreed across Turkey's political
spectrum that a new doctrine needs to replace the existing
version, which had been installed by the military following
its 1980 coup d'etat. A constitutional referendum
incorporating several philosophical viewpoints besides AKP's
perspective is now likely. Taking heed of the electoral
result, Mr. Erdogan stated "the people gave us a message to
build the new constitution through consensus and
negotiation."
AKP's tempered victory wasn't due to a noticeable growth in
secularist support. Secularism's standard bearer, the
Republican Peoples Party (CHP), minimally improved upon
their prior 2007 general election performance. Despite new
leadership and a publicized shift from etatist ideology to
Europhilic Social Democracy, the CHP was able to garner only
26 percent of the total vote. Many political observers were
disappointed by the result, expecting the party which was
established by Kemal Ataturk, Turkey's founding father, to
get around 30% of the ballots cast. Furthermore, CHP's
national appeal continued to deteriorate. Save for the Izmir
region and European Turkey, nearly all of the Anatolian
peninsula (except the Kurdish-dominated Southeast) went AKP.
Once solid CHP strongholds along the Turkish Mediterranean
and Aegean coasts became Justice and Development territory.
Several explanations are given for the CHP's decline,
ranging from archaic programs to weak leadership. Kemal
Kilicdaroglu, CHP's current chairman, is trying to transform
Ataturk's party from what the Financial Times characterizes
as "shrine worshippers with a lazy sense of entitlement to
power" into "a viable social democratic party." However,
there are noticeable fissures within the CHP's hierarchy
regarding its post-election strategy. Unless this
dissension is effectively contained, CHP risks further
marginalization.
What stopped Erdogan and the AKP from completely controlling
the political process were the other parties that hurdled
over the ten percent barrier for parliamentary
representation. The far right National Action Party (MHP)
and the Kurdish-oriented Peace and Development Party (BDP)
couldn't be more disparate in ideological outlook, yet they
will likely play pivotal roles in Turkey's political future.
Regarding MHP, their results were surprising. A sex scandal
involving several senior party officials was seen as the
death knell for MHP's electoral fortunes. There was
widespread speculation that the party's power base would
switch allegiance to the AKP, effectively handing Mr.
Erdogan a two-thirds majority to govern as he pleased.
However, the anticipated defection didn't occur: MHP's 13
percent tally hardly shrank from its 14 percent performance
in the 2007 general election.
Whereas MHP had been tainted by scandal, the BDP was mired
in controversy. Its platform advocating greater Kurdish
rights and autonomy within a highly centralized Turkey is
anathema throughout the political landscape. The issue is
generally kept at arm's length by the other parties, namely
due to suspicions that any Kurdish polity is a front for
separatism. Add to this wariness an ongoing insurrection
that has claimed 40,000 lives since the 1980's and any
Kurdish-based entity is barely tolerated within the Turkish
Parliament.
Procedural restrictions compelled the BDP to run its
candidates as independents. Thirty six deputies were elected
this way and will now form a Kurdish bloc in the Meclis.
(Six of these nominees are currently in jail.) This incoming
group poses a formidable challenge for Ankara to negotiate
an overall solution with. The delegation has doubled its
legislative presence from the last assembly and will likely
be more forceful in demanding greater autonomy. A recent
surge of Kurdish unrest throughout Turkey will like
intensify if the Erdogan government mishandles its dealings
with the BDP.
Initial indications are not promising. At the time of this
writing, Hatip Dicle, a newly elected BDP deputy, has been
prevented from entering Parliament due to accusations of
belonging to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) terrorist
organization. Mr. Dicle is one of the six imprisoned
individuals who are part of the BDP's incoming contingent,
and their fates are likely subject to the same decision. An
AKP candidate was chosen to fill Mr. Dicle's seat, provoking
a BDP boycott of the newly elected Meclis and an apparent
political deadlock.
The CHP faces a similar situation. Two of its recently
elected deputies sit in prison on charges of belonging to an
organization (the controversial Ergenekon scandal) that
conspired to overthrow the AKP government. A court ruling
decided against allowing them out of jail to be sworn in as
lawmakers. Both the CHP and BDP are concerned that these
judgments are a ploy by the AKP to reach the necessary
number of seats for governing by fiat. The two parties
advocate for a solution that's similar to what freed Mr.
Erdogan from prison shortly before he became Prime Minister.
"Regardless of whether the case they are on trial for is
Ergenekon or anything else, they have been elected
democratically," an independent deputy commented.
There are other matters besides legislative gamesmanship
that the AKP needs to focus upon. Various signs indicate
that economic difficulties lie ahead. While Turkey's overall
performance has been impressive amid present international
circumstances, its current account deficit is ballooning and
will likely reach 8% of the nation's GDP this year. In
April alone, the deficit figure widened to $7.7 billion from
$4.4 billion in the same month a year ago. Trade-wise, the
first four months of 2011 saw a 44 percent increase in
imports, while exports grew only 21 percent. As for
unemployment, Turkey's 10.7 percent figure is nominally
higher than the EU's 9.6 percent average. Particularly
troubling is the 19.3 percent jobless rate among Turkish
youth. Considering that the nation's median age is 28 years
old, the government needs to immediately address this
statistic.
Those familiar with recent Turkish history know this is a
potentially dangerous brew for political instability. Just a
decade ago, Turkey was in a deep financial crisis and
beholden to the IMF for assistance. It has successfully
emerged from that period, yet another threat currently
lingers on the horizon. During the election period, Prime
Minister Erdogan spoke of zero interest rates and a tax
amnesty to keep the economy growing. These were overly
simplistic solutions, reflecting campaign rhetoric instead
of reasonable thought. There's no longer a need to curry
favor with the electorate, so tougher, albeit unpopular
measures need to be enacted. One area where the reins can be
tightened is consumer credit. Low lending rates are a
contributing factor to the current trade and account
deficits. Curbing politically envisioned pork barrel
projects (i.e., a canal system for Istanbul intended to
bypass the heavily trafficked Bosphorus Straits) would also
help.
Another ominous development is the deteriorating situation
in next-door Syria. What's transpiring across the border is
a reprimand of Prime Minister Erdogan's regional outlook.
Syria has been the fulcrum of the AKP's "zero problems"
initiative, a policy whose primary aim is improving Turkey's
relations with the Arab world. It has opened new markets for
Turkish products and counterbalances an overdependence on
ties with Europe.
This outreach also satisfies the AKP's Islamist sentiments.
The closer rapport with fellow Muslims has been to Israel's
detriment, which prior to the AKP's tenure, enjoyed good
relations with Turkey. Syria is the main benefactor of this
estrangement, establishing a partnership with Turkey that
has removed trade barriers, visa restrictions and produced
numerous bilateral trade agreements. Both nations have
further expanded their cooperation into the military realm,
signing a defense cooperation treaty that raises eyebrows
throughout Western military circles.
The embraces and words of fraternity have changed with the
coming of the Arab Spring. When it came knocking on Syria's
door, Prime Minister Erdogan believed that Turkish democracy
would serve as the solution to their neighbors woes and
frustrations. He's badly miscalculated-Syrian President
Bashar Assad has no interest in adopting Turkey's system of
governance or other democratic models. Totalitarian rule and
suppression is what Assad knows best, a family enterprise
that's none of Ankara's business. His relationship with
Turkey is for strategic and economic purposes only.
As a result of President Assad's intransigence, Prime
Minister Erdogan's status has taken a hit throughout the
restive Arab world. By hesitating to criticize a fellow
Muslim, his "zero problems" policy appears inane. Moreover,
there's now a growing cross-border problem as Syrians flee
for safety. An estimated 11,000 people are currently living
in hastily built refugee camps, uncertain when or if they'll
be able to return home.
Ankara is warily monitoring the Syrian situation. There are
reports that the government is considering whether to close
the border and form a buffer zone within Syria should
further chaos ensue. One of the most feared scenarios is
that the current unrest will turn into a religious civil war
between the majority Sunni Muslim population and President
Assad's Alawite community. Another worry is Kurdish
militants establishing an operations base along the frontier
to launch attacks against Turkey. Whatever the case might
be, the Erdogan government has to prepare for various
contingencies should Syria's turmoil worsen.
After three resoundingly impressive general election
victories, there is little doubt that Recep Erdogan is
Turkey's most powerful leader since Ataturk. In many
respects he's the Turkish version of Andrew Jackson-an
Islamist populist who has successfully challenged the
secularist elite and its entrenched infrastructure. During
his time in office, the nation has undergone profound
changes, forging a dynamic economy and becoming a respected
player on the world scene. The once all-powerful military
has been brought to heel (albeit by questionable means),
resulting in a more egalitarian society.
Egalitarian isn't a word that would fit Mr. Erdogan's
personality, however. He governs with a heavy hand to
achieve his goals. His managerial style is criticized for
exhibiting an authoritarian impulse, which has a vindictive
streak. The tax authorities have been empowered to go after
his opponents in media and business circles. They aren't the
only ones subject to this intimidation; dissension within
the AKP ranks isn't tolerated. Those party cadre whose
loyalty to Mr. Erdogan had been questioned were reportedly
purged from candidate lists prior to the general election.
Whereas the AKP once reflected a spectrum of personalities
with varying outlooks, it has turned into the Prime
Minister's personal fiefdom.
There are no signs in the foreseeable future that Mr.
Erdogan's rule will be credibly challenged. His agenda to
create a new Turkey has so far succeeded and can culminate
by introducing a new constitution. Before starting this
endeavor, more immediate concerns need attention, namely
regional tumult, economic uncertainties and what threatens
to be parliamentary impasse. Perhaps the Prime Minister can
ease legislative tension by proposing to the BDP deputies
that a quasi-federal status for the Kurds be considered when
the constitution is drafted. It would be a bold,
controversial move that the other opposition groups would
promptly reject, but nonetheless initiate discussion on how
to finally resolve a long-festering dilemma. If Mr. Erdogan
can skillfully manage the process, he'll be remembered as
the person who settled the Kurdish issue, Turkey's most
burdensome problem.
----------------------------------------------------------
Copyright Foreign Policy Research Institute
(http://www.fpri.org/).
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